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Résumé 
 
Comment pouvons-nous représenter un principe moral universel de manière à le rendre applicable à 
des cas concrets ? Ce problème revêt une forme aiguë dans la philosophie morale d’Emmanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), tout particulièrement dans sa théorie du jugement moral, car il soutient que l’on doit 
appliquer la loi morale « suprasensible » à des actions dans le monde sensible afin de déterminer 
celles-ci comme moralement bonnes ou mauvaises. Kant aborde ce problème dans un chapitre de la 
Critique de la raison pratique (1788) intitulé « De la typique de la faculté de juger pratique pure » 
(KpV 5: 67-71). La première partie de la thèse vise à fournir un commentaire compréhensif et détaillé 
de ce texte important, mais trop peu étudié. Étant donné que la loi morale, en tant qu’Idée 
suprasensible de la raison, ne peut pas être appliquée directement à des actions dans l’intuition 
sensible, Kant a recours à une forme particulière de représentation indirecte et symbolique. Sa solution 
inédite consiste à fournir la faculté de juger avec un « type [Typus] », ou analogue formel, de la loi 
morale. Ce type est la loi de la causalité naturelle : en tant que loi, il sert d’étalon formel pour tester 
l’universalisabilité des maximes ; et, en tant que loi de la nature, il peut aussi s’appliquer à toute action 
dans l’expérience sensible. Dès lors, le jugement moral s’effectue par le biais d’une expérience de 
pensée dans laquelle on se demande si l’on peut vouloir que sa maxime devienne une loi universelle 
d’une nature contrefactuelle dont on ferait soi-même partie. Cette expérience de pensée fonctionne 
comme une « épreuve [Probe] » de la forme des maximes et, par ce moyen, du statut moral des actions. 
Kant soutient que tout un chacun, même « l’entendement le plus commun », emploie cette procédure 
pour l’appréciation morale. De plus, la typique prémunit contre deux menaces à l’éthique rationaliste 
de Kant, à savoir l’empirisme (c’est-à-dire le conséquentialisme) et le mysticisme. La seconde partie de 
la thèse se penche sur l’indication de Kant que la typique « ne sert que comme un symbole ». Un bon 
nombre de commentateurs ont voulu assimiler la typique à la notion d’« hypotypose symbolique » 
présentée dans le § 59 de la Critique de la faculté de juger (1790). La typique serait un processus de 
symbolisation esthétique consistant à présenter, de façon indirecte, la représentation abstraite de la loi 
morale sous la forme d’un symbole concret et intuitif. Dans un premier chapitre, cette interprétation est 
présentée et soumise à un examen critique qui cherche à montrer qu’elle est erronée et peu judicieuse. 
Dans le second chapitre, nous poursuivons une voie d’interprétation jusqu’ici ignorée, montrant que la 
typique a de plus grandes continuités avec la notion d’« anthropomorphisme symbolique », une 
procédure strictement analogique introduite auparavant dans les Prolégomènes (1783). Nous en 
concluons, d’une part, que la typique fut un moment décisif dans l’évolution de la théorie kantienne de 
la représentation symbolique et que, d’autre part, elle marque la réalisation, chez Kant, d’une 
conception proprement critique de la nature et de la morale comme deux sphères distinctes, dont la 
médiation s’opère par le biais des concepts de loi et de conformité à la loi (Gesetzmässigkeit). En un 
mot, la typique s’avère l’instrument par excellence du « rationalisme de la faculté de juger ». 
 
Mots clés : Kant, Emmanuel (1724-1804) ; Critique de la raison pratique (1788) ; Typique (Typik) ; 
type (Typus) ; jugement moral ; loi morale ; éthique ; symbole ; analogie ; esthétique.  
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Abstract 
 
How can we represent a universal moral principle in such a way as to render it applicable to concrete 
cases? This problem takes on an acute form in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), 
particularly in his theory of moral judgment, since he holds that one must apply the ‘supersensible’ 
moral law to actions in the sensible world in order to determine them as morally good or evil. Kant 
deals with this problem in a remarkable chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) entitled “On 
the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment” (KpV 5: 67-71). Part One of the thesis aims to 
provide a comprehensive, coherent, and detailed commentary of this important yet neglected text. 
Given that the moral law, as a supersensible Idea of reason, cannot be applied directly to actions in 
sensible intuition, Kant resorts to a particular form of indirect, symbolic representation. His ingenious 
solution is to provide the power of judgment with a “type [Typus],” or formal analogue, of the moral 
law. This type is the law of natural causality: qua law, it serves as a formal standard for assessing the 
universalizability of maxims; qua law of nature, it can also be applied to any and every action in 
sensible experience. Moral appraisal is performed by asking oneself if one could voluntarily belong to 
a counterfactual nature in which one’s maxim were a universal law. This thought experiment functions 
as a “test [Probe]” of the form of maxims and thereby of the moral status of actions. Kant maintains 
that everyone, “even the most common understanding,” employs this procedure for moral appraisal. In 
addition, the typic guards against two threats to Kant’s rationalist ethics, namely empiricism (i.e., 
consequentialism) and mysticism. Part Two investigates Kant’s comment that the typic “serves only as 
a symbol.” Many commentators have assimilated the typic to the notion of “symbolic hypotyposis” 
presented in § 59 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). They hold that the typic is an 
aesthetic process of symbolization that indirectly presents the abstract representation of the moral law 
as a concrete, intuitive symbol. Chapter 1 presents this interpretation, subjects it to a critical 
examination, and contends that it is both mistaken and misguided. Chapter 2 pursues a hitherto 
unexplored avenue of interpretation by showing that the typic has much greater continuities with the 
earlier notion of symbolic anthropomorphism, a strictly analogical procedure, introduced in the 
Prolegomena (1783). It is concluded that the typic represents a decisive moment in the evolution of 
Kant’s theory of symbolic representation, and that it also marks the attainment of a properly critical 
conception of nature and morality as two distinct realms mediated only by the concepts of law and 
lawfulness (Gesetzmässigkeit). In a word, the typic is the instrument par excellence of “the rationalism 
of the power of judgment.” 
 
Keywords: Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804); Critique of Practical Reason (1788); Typic (Typik); type 
(Typus); moral judgment; moral law; ethics; symbol; analogy; aesthetics.  
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Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations of Kant’s works are from the Cambridge 
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The secondary literature is cited in footnotes, in a slightly modified version of Chicago A style. 
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Many years ago there lived in China a young man. 
Wishing to further his education, he went to a wise man 
in a remote land.  
“Master,” he said, “if you will allow me to study with 
you for one year, I will give you, in payment, this 
elephant.” And he displayed to the wise man an 
elephant, strong and beautiful.  
The old man looked from the young man to the 
elephant, and asked: “How much does the elephant 
weigh?”  
“I do not know, Master” the boy replied.  
“Weigh the elephant. Come back tomorrow and we will 
begin to learn from each other.”  
So the boy left, running through the town, looking for a 
scale to weigh the elephant. The largest scale he could 
find, however, was only scaled to 200 pounds.  
The next morning the boy sat, despondent, under a big 
tree, on a rocky river bank. As he watched, a boat came 
into view; the old man was rowing toward him. The old 
man got out of the boat, went to the boy and sat down.  
“How much does your elephant weigh?”  
“I cannot find a large scale, master.”  
“It is not the elephant I am measuring, my son. It is the 
student’s thinking. You have everything you need to 
weigh the elephant. When you have done so, you may 
join me.” And the old man stood up and moved up the 
path to his school, leaving the boy with the problem. 
- Zhe Chen2 
                                                
2 "Analogical Problem Solving: A Hierarchichal Analysis of Procedural Similarity," Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 28, no. 1 (2002): 97. The problem is adapted from a riddle in the 
classical Chinese novel The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, by the fourteenth-century writer Luo Guanzhong. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The Typic chapter in the Critique of Practical Reason  
 
How can we represent a universal moral principle in such a way as to render it applicable to 
concrete cases? This problem takes on a particularly acute form in the moral philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), since he holds that the moral law refers to freedom, a 
‘supersensible’ form of causality that is radically different from the natural causality that 
governs the sensible world in which we act. Kant’s theory of moral judgment stands or falls 
with this problem, since one must apply the moral law to particular actions in order to 
determine them as morally good or evil. More precisely, the “pure practical power of 
judgment” must subsume actions, as cases in concreto, under the moral law, as a rule in 
abstracto. This task raises particular difficulties, however, because it evokes a conflict in the 
constitution of humans as finite rational beings. As beings possessed of reason, we represent 
the moral law as a supersensible Idea, but as finite, sensible beings, we represent actions in the 
physical world via sensible intuition. However, these two species of representations are totally 
heterogeneous; hence it seems “absurd,” if not impossible, to subsume the latter under the 
former (KpV 5: 68). 
This representational mismatch between sensible intuitions and the supersensible Ideas 
of morality gives rise to two opposing dangers that threaten the very heart of Kant’s moral 
philosophy.3 On the one hand, if Kant were to admit that the Ideas of morality cannot be 
applied to actions at all, then he would have to concede that these Ideas are empty of 
significance, that moral appraisal is futile, and that practical reason is bankrupt – in a word, he 
would have to capitulate to the objection of formalism. On the other hand, presenting the 
                                                
3 For an excellent presentation of the philosophical issues at stake in the Typic, see Alain Renaut, Kant 
aujourd'hui (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), 301-302, 307-308, 311-313. 
 2 
supersensible Ideas directly in sensible intuition would denature them beyond recognition, for 
no concrete image can ever be commensurate with the pure universality of the rational Idea.  
Furthermore, the solution to these difficulties must harmonize with Kant’s outlook and 
principles. Consequently, two escape routes – if such they are – are barred from the outset. 
Kant cannot grant that the significance of the Ideas can be intuited independently of sensibility 
(e.g., through intellectual intuition or mystical illumination), for then he would have to recant 
his fundamental position that human beings are radically finite. Nor can Kant posit, à la 
absolute idealism, that the moral Ideas manifest their significance directly in the world in 
virtue of an underlying ontological identity between the rational and the real; such a 
transcendent assertion would “tear down the boundary posts” erected by the critical 
philosophy (KrV A296/B352-3). In a word, Kant cannot take refuge in the metaphysics of 
immediacy or identity; rather, the dualism between Ideas of reason and sensibility is a 
fundamental tenet of his critical rationalism, and therefore he must find a way to mediate 
between them so as to enable moral judgment, yet without denaturing the supersensible Idea of 
the moral law by turning it into an image. Thus, the viability of Kant’s moral philosophy 
depends on ‘presenting the unpresentable’.  
Kant raises this complex representational problem, and proposes a solution to it, in a 
remarkable chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason entitled “On the Typic of the Pure 
Practical Power of Judgment [Von der Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft]” (KpV 5: 69-
71).4 Given that the moral law, as a supersensible Idea of reason, cannot be applied directly to 
actions that present themselves in sensible intuition, Kant resorts to a particular form of 
indirect, symbolic representation. His ingenious solution is to provide the power of judgment 
with a “type [Typus],” or formal analogue, of the moral law (KpV 5: 69). This type is the law 
of natural causality: qua law, it serves as a formal standard for assessing the universalizability 
of maxims; qua law of nature, it can also be applied to any and every action in experience. 
With this type in hand, one can perform moral appraisal by means of a thought experiment in 
which one asks oneself if one could will to be part of a counterfactual nature in which one’s 
maxim were a universal law. This thought experiment functions as a “test [Probe]” of the 
universalizability of maxims and thereby of the moral status of actions (KpV 5: 69-70). Kant 
                                                
4 The German text is reproduced in Appendix I; the English translation used in the thesis appears in Appendix II. 
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maintains that, as a matter of fact, everyone, “even the most common understanding,” judges 
the moral status of actions in this manner. Finally, he adds that this “typic [Typik]”5 serves a 
critical, protective function insofar as it guards against two threats to his rationalist ethics, 
empiricism (i.e., consequentialism) and mysticism.  
In short, the typic performs indispensable functions, and has important philosophical 
stakes riding on it. It should therefore be recognized as a fundamental component of Kant’s 
practical philosophy, as several scholars have argued.6 By the same token, studying the Typic 
chapter promises “to elucidate and give meaning to the themes and features that distinguish 
Kant’s view,” as John Rawls has suggested, and thereby “to bring to life and make intelligible 
Kant’s characteristic and deeper ideas.”7  
 
2. Need for the present study 
2.1.	  Obscurity	  of	  the	  primary	  text	  
 
Most readers, from Kant’s contemporaries to present-day scholars, have found the Typic 
chapter difficult to understand (even by Kantian standards). For instance, in 1789, a year after 
the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason, Gotthard Ludwig Kosegarten, an earnest 
reader of Kant’s philosophy, reported his struggles in a letter to the author: 
Dearest Kant, I am still a long way from being able to pride myself on having grasped and 
worked through your thought so completely that I could then acclaim you with completely 
unreserved applause. The deduction of the pure dynamical principles is still somewhat 
                                                
5 When uncapitalized in English, the word “typic” shall refer to Kant’s concept (more precisely, to the procedure 
for using the “type”); when capitalized, it shall refer to the text, as in “the Typic chapter.” This convention is 
analogous to the practice of using “the schematism” to refer to the procedure for using schemata, and “the 
Schematism” to designate the corresponding chapter in the first Critique. 
6 Petra Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren. Religionstheoretische Studien zum Darstellungsbegriff bei A. G. 
Baumgarten und I. Kant (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 276; Ernst Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, trans. 
James Haden (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1987), 259; ———, Kants Leben und Lehre, vol. 8, 
Gesammelte Werke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001), 249; Jean Grondin, "Zur Phänomenologie des 
moralischen ‚Gesetzes’. Das kontemplative Motiv der Erhebung in Kants praktischer Metaphysik," Kant-Studien 
91 (2000): 394; Gerd Irrlitz, Kant-Handbuch. Leben und Werk, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart & Weimar: Metzler, 2010), 
316, 331; Gerhard Krüger, Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1931), 
83; John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge (MA) & London: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 163-164; Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 297-302. 
7 Lectures, 163-164. 
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obscure, but perhaps only to my eyes. The transcendental ‘I’ is an abyss that I have yet to 
fathom. But as for this ‘type’ by means of which actions in the sensible world are to be 
subsumed under the totally heterogeneous moral law – I can’t make head or tail of it [der 
Typus … ist mir unbegreiflich].8 
The fact that Kosegarten found the Typic chapter even less comprehensible than the 
notoriously obscure Transcendental Deduction testifies to its difficulty. Unfortunately, there is 
no record of Kant’s reply. And Kosegarten was not alone: even a reader as acute and 
sophisticated as Jacob Sigismund Beck wrote to Kant in 1792 to express his puzzlement over 
the Typic.9 More recently, several scholars have remarked that this text presents considerable 
hermeneutical challenges, both philological and conceptual.10 The text is highly condensed 
(only four pages long in the Akademie edition) and contains technical, even unusual 
vocabulary. For example, the key term “typic [Typik]” is practically a hapax legomenon in the 
corpus, occurring only within the Typic chapter itself, while the term “type [Typus]” remains 
absent from Kant’s subsequently published works, reappearing (in the relevant sense) only in a 
single letter.11 What is more, the text’s philosophical content is undeniably difficult: the 
problem is technical and formidably complex; Kant’s proposed solution is abstract, even 
counter-intuitive; and his highly condensed reasoning remains largely implicit. Moreover, 
Kant’s theory of symbolic representation, while crucial to understanding the typic’s nature and 
function, is nowhere near as fully and explicitly developed as many of Kant’s other 
doctrines.12 More generally, we will see that the Typic chapter is a microcosm of Kant’s 
philosophical system, requiring comparisons with principles, concepts, and problems from his 
moral philosophy (the moral law, maxims, the will, universalization tests), theoretical 
philosophy (the imagination, the schematism, the understanding as the law-giver of nature), 
philosophy of religion (the critique of mysticism, symbolic anthropomorphism), and aesthetics 
(symbolic hypotyposis, the sublime).  
                                                
8 Letter to Kant, 4 June 1789 (11: 340, my translation). 
9 Letter to Kant, 31 May 1792 (11: 340).  
10 Heiner Bielefeldt, Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 6; Irrlitz, Kant-Handbuch, 316; Andrews Reath, "Formal principles and the form of a law," in A 
Critical Guide to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 34; Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 309. 
11 Letter from Kant to Jacob Sigismund Beck, 3 July 1792 (11: 348).  
12 Bielefeldt, Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 5-6, 180. 
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2.2.	  Neglect	  in	  the	  secondary	  literature	  	  
 
In 1969, Paul Dietrichson made the following observation about the state of the secondary 
literature on the typic: “It is surprising that Kant’s commentators and critics have not devoted 
more attention to the typic. Its nature and function is not explained satisfactorily in any work 
on Kant I am familiar with.”13 Almost half a century later, the same can be said of the current 
state of research.   
Often, the Typic chapter is not viewed as an object of study in its own right, but 
instead as a “minor appendix.”14 Many general works on Kant’s ethics, including some that 
are devoted primarily to the Critique of Practical Reason, mention the Typic chapter only in 
passing or disregard it altogether.15 The same neglect can be observed in studies of directly 
related topics, such as moral judgment,16 the concept of the “type” in philosophy,17 and 
symbolic representation.18 When the Typic is mentioned within a more general work, it is 
most often dispatched with a footnote or a quick summary.19 One possible explanation for this 
cursory treatment is that the typic tends be overshadowed by its precursor, the Formula of the 
Law of Nature (FLN) in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals; indeed, the second 
                                                
13 "Kant's criteria of universalizability," in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals with Critical Essays, ed. 
Peter Paul Wolff (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 168. 
14 Stephan Zimmermann, Kants 'Kategorien der Freiheit', vol. 167, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2011), 51. 
15 Little more than a page is devoted to the Typic in Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann, eds., Kant's Critique 
of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide (2010). The Typic is completely absent in Alexis Philonenko, L'Œuvre de 
Kant. La philosophie critique II. Morale et politique, 2nd. ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1981). 
16 E.g., Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Although the book deals extensively with Kant’s theory of moral judgment, the index contains only two 
references to the Typic.  
17 Werner Bergfeld’s study does not deal with Kant’s conception; Der Begriff des Typus: Eine systematische und 
problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1933). Ryan Showler mentions the Typic only 
once in "Archetypal and Ectypal Ideals in Kant's Practical Philosophy" (PhD Thesis, Loyola University, 2008), 
28. 
18 For instance, Sebastian Maly excludes the Typic from his otherwise excellent study of symbolic hypotyposis, 
on the grounds that it “presents the interpreter with special challenges,” Kant über die symbolische Erkenntnis 
Gottes, vol. 165, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 14-15. 
19 E.g., Victor Delbos, La Philosophie pratique de Kant, 3rd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 
374-376. 
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Critique as a whole tends not to receive as much attention as the Groundwork. This is a 
regrettable oversight, however, as the typic performs different functions from FLN and is in 
fact considerably more sophisticated. Moreover, the tendency to summarize the Typic chapter 
rather than interpret it in depth, may result from what could be called an exegetical illusion: 
Kant’s succinct, step-by-step exposition can give the impression that it explains itself and 
therefore requires no more than a summary. In reality, the text requires extensive commentary 
to be properly understood, as it is highly condensed and contains many obscurities. 
Some studies of the Typic chapter do exist, but they are few and far between. The past 
century of Kant scholarship has only produced, on a generous count, just under thirty studies 
touching on the Typic. But none of these is book-length; in fact, most of them are merely 
sections of chapters and are under twenty pages long.20 Tellingly, not one of these studies is 
                                                
20 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960); Heiner Bielefeldt, Kants Symbolik. Ein Schlüssel zur kritischen Freiheitsphilosophie (Freiburg & 
Munich: Verlag Karl Aber, 2001); ———, Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy; Monique 
Castillo, "Le traitement critique de la représentation dans la morale," in La Responsabilité des Modernes: Essai 
sur l'universalisme kantien (Paris: Kimé, 2007); Michèle Cohen-Halimi, Entendre raison : Essai sur la 
philosophie pratique de Kant, Bibliothèque d'Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 2004), 81-108; Maria Elton 
Bulnes, "Racionalismo Etico Kantiano y Amor Puro," Anuario Filosófico 22, no. 2  (1989); Antoine Grandjean, 
"Jugement moral en situation et exception chez Kant," Philosophie, no. 81  (2004); Michael K. Green, "Using 
Nature to Typify Freedom: The Application of the Categorical Imperative," International Studies in Philosophy 
14, no. 1  (1982); Grondin, "Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen Gesetzes; Otfried Höffe, Kants Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft: Eine Philosophie der Freiheit (München: C.H. Beck, 2012); Mark Johnson, "Imagination 
in Moral Judgment," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46, no. 2  (1985); Klaus Konhardt, Die Einheit 
der Vernunft: Zum Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants, 
vol. 178, Monographien zur Philosophischen Forschung (Regensburg: Forum Academicum, 1979), 287-306; 
Krüger, Philosophie und Moral, 79-89; Gerhard Luf, "Die "Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft" und ihre 
Anwendung auf Kants Rechtslehre," Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie 8 (1975); François Marty, "La Typique du 
jugement pratique pur: La morale kantienne et son application aux cas particuliers," Archives de Philosophie 19, 
no. 1  (1955); ———, La Naissance de la métaphysique chez Kant: Une étude sur la notion kantienne 
d'analogie, 2nd ed. (Paris: Beauchesne, 1997); Alejandro Mumbrú Mora, "Sensibilización y Moralidad en Kant," 
Eidos 10 (2009); H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (London: 
Hutchinson's University Library, 1947); Annemarie Pieper, "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," in Immanuel Kant. 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011); ———, "On the Concept of 
an Object of Pure Practical Reason (Chapter 2 of the Analytic of Practical Reason)," in Kant's Moral and Legal 
Philosophy, ed. Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); John Rawls, 
"Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. E. Förster (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989); ———, Lectures; Birgit Recki, Ästhetik der Sitten. Die Affinität von ästhetischem 
Gefühl und praktischer Vernunft bei Kant (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2001), 243-250; Renaut, Kant 
aujourd'hui; Johannes Schwartländer, Der Mensch ist Person. Kants Lehre vom Menschen (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1968); ———, "Sittliche Autonomie als Idee der endlichen Freiheit. Bemerkungen zum Prinzip 
der Autonomie im kritischen Idealismus Kants," Theologische Quartalschrift 161 (1981); Susan Meld Shell, The 
Rights of Reason: A study of Kant's philosophy and politics (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University of Toronto 
Press, 1980), 81-91; J. R. Silber, "Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft," Kant-Studien 56 (1966); John R. 
Silber, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics," Review of Metaphysics 28, no. 2  (1974); Zimmermann, Kants 
'Kategorien der Freiheit'. 
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cited in the (very brief) article on the Typic in the forthcoming Kant-Lexikon.21 One can 
appreciate how little research has really been done on the Typic chapter when one considers 
how much more attention has been given to its two ‘sister chapters’ in the first and third 
Critiques. The Schematism chapter, in the Critique of Pure Reason, and § 59, “On beauty as a 
symbol of morality,” in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, have been studied in countless 
monographs, dissertations, and articles. Moreover, it will be shown that many of the studies 
nominally devoted to the typic in fact overlook its specific nature and function because they 
wrongly assimilate it to concepts from other parts of Kant’s corpus (especially the notion of 
“symbolic hypotyposis” in § 59 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment).  
But the most serious lacuna in the current state of research on the Typic chapter is the 
near total absence of scholarly discussion and debate. I have frequently observed that the 
scholars who have written on the Typic chapter do not cite each other – no doubt because the 
existing studies are so few in number and are scattered across different time periods, scholarly 
traditions, and languages. As a result, most commentators confronted with the Typic chapter 
must start from scratch, with very little input or feedback from other scholars. Not 
surprisingly, the resulting interpretations, when viewed all together, appear disparate, 
inconsistent, and sometimes arbitrary. Indeed, the lack of consensus is striking, even 
bewildering. It will be shown, for example, that commentators have proposed four main 
interpretive approaches to the universalization test that the typic provides for moral judgment, 
six different interpretations of the “particular difficulties” that the typic is designed to 
overcome, and no less than ten different construals of the analogy between the moral law and 
its “type,” the law of nature. And while the existing scholarship does contain many valid 
explanations and insights, no cumulative knowledge, much less consensus, can be attained 
until the alternative hypotheses are compared and critically evaluated within the framework of 
a comprehensive study of the Typic.   
 
 
                                                
21 Marcus Willaschek et al., eds., Kant-Lexikon (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, forthcoming). 
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3. Goals of the thesis  
 
Clearly, there is a need to study this important text in more depth. The present thesis will 
provide the first book-length treatment of the Typic chapter, and, more specifically, pursue 
three main goals: 
 
1. To provide a unified, coherent and comprehensive exegesis of the Typic chapter in the 
form of a Commentary that elucidates its central concepts and inner logic together with 
its presuppositions, principles, and philosophical significance within Kant’s system. 
 
2. To characterize the typic as a mode of symbolic representation by situating it, both 
historically and conceptually, within Kant’s theory of symbolic representation, notably 
by comparing and contrasting it with “symbolic hypotyposis” in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment (1790) and “symbolic anthropomorphism” in the Prolegomena 
(1783).  
 
3. To foster a scholarly discussion about the Typic by integrating the existing secondary 
literature into the study and critically engaging with it throughout.  
 
4. Approach and Methodology 
4.1.	  General	  approach	  
 
The present thesis is an exegetical study in the history of philosophy. An exegesis, or what 
Dieter Schönecker has called a “kommentarische Interpretation,” treats the text as an ‘end in 
itself’.22 That is, it enjoins the scholar to understand the text’s meaning, inner logic and 
coherence in relation to the author’s presumed intention (or intentions). Indeed, it is this 
                                                
22 Dieter Schönecker, "Textvergessenheit in der Philosophiehistorie," in Kant verstehen / Understanding Kant: 
Über die Interpretation philosophischer Texte, ed. Dieter Schönecker and Thomas Zwenger (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001). This paragraph and following one are based on Sebastian Maly’s 
explanation of this approach in Symbolische Erkenntnis, 6-12. 
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particular attitude vis-à-vis the text, rather than any specific methodological tools, that 
distinguishes the exegetical approach. It requires the interpreter to read the text patiently, 
attentively and persistently. One must carefully analyze every paragraph, every sentence, 
every word; establish their interconnections, parallels and contrasts; and fix their respective 
places in the structure of the whole, which is gradually reconstructed from the parts. The 
resulting interpretation typically takes the form of a commentary, which may be compared to a 
seventeenth-century Dutch still-life, in which meticulously painted individual elements are 
combined with each other, through overlaps, reflections, and transparencies, to form an 
interconnected and coherent composition. Moreover, this painstakingly thorough way of 
working through the text presents the considerable advantage of making the genesis of the 
interpretation itself fully transparent and thereby comprehensible, or nachvollziehbar. 
Throughout the exegetical process, the interpreter must entertain and test alternative 
interpretive hypotheses, weigh the evidence for and against each one, determine the best fit, 
and make the necessary adjustments. This transparency of the exegetical approach reflects the 
responsibility of the individual commentator towards the subject-matter as well as towards 
other scholars. Indeed, transparency is an especially appropriate epistemic ideal for a study of 
Kant, who held that all scholarship worth the name must be presented “before the entire public 
of the world of readers” (WA 8: 37).  
In this study, I do not prioritize the ‘systematic’ approach, which uses the text as a 
means for thinking through contemporary philosophical problems and proposing solutions to 
them. Nor do I purport evaluate the philosophical plausibility or usefulness of Kant’s doctrines 
from the perspective of any particular contemporary theory. Instead, what I offer is a lectio 
benevolentiae that provides a maximally coherent interpretation of the Typic within Kant’s 
philosophical system, assuming its specific principles, concepts, and constraints. Indeed, I 
believe that systematic assessments should be preceded by an understanding of Kant’s thought 
on his own terms, as Lewis White Beck declares in the preface to his Commentary on Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason:  
But the first task is to find out what Kant said, how he said it, and why. Only then can 
evaluation have before it a firm object, not an amorphous mass that varies in shape with 
the degree of sympathy or hostility with which it is approached; too often in the past, 
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debates on whether Kant was right or wrong have been vitiated by lack of the most 
rudimentary agreement as to what he actually said and meant.”23 
The need to determine precisely “what Kant said, how he said it, and why” is especially 
pressing for the Typic chapter. As was mentioned above, most readers, from Kant’s 
contemporaries to present-day scholars, have found the Typic difficult to understand. 
Moreover, the danger of misrepresentation against which Beck warns is very real in this case. 
In the absence of a clear, faithful and generally accepted account of what Kant actually meant 
in the Typic chapter – and, conversely, of what he did not mean – some theory-driven 
interpreters have wilfully distorted the text, sometimes to the antipodes of Kant’s considered 
views. Consequently, one of my main tasks throughout the thesis will be to expose, criticize 
and counteract this tendency.  
 
4.2.	  Specific	  methodology	  
 
Throughout the thesis, I make extensive use of philological analysis to provide precise, 
detailed glosses of particular passages or expressions in their immediate context. I therefore 
devote considerable attention and significance to the precise phrasing of the German original, 
which accompanies most quotations (in brackets or in footnotes). In some cases, it is necessary 
to examine the etymology of certain terms (e.g., Kant’s term Typus, which is derived from the 
ancient Greek word túpos), or their usage beyond the Kantian corpus (e.g., the many uses of 
“Symbol/symbolisch” in eighteenth-century German).  
 Of course, Kant’s philosophy is made not only out of words, but out of concepts and 
principles. Accordingly, throughout the study I employ conceptual analysis to characterize 
particular concepts as well as to trace their logical, justificatory, and functional relationships to 
each other and to more general principles. These concepts and principles are duly situated 
within the overall structure of Kant’s architectonic.  
                                                
23 Similar arguments to this effect have been advanced by Karl Ameriks, "Text and Context: Hermeneutical 
Prolegomena to Interpreting a Kant Text," in Kant verstehen / Understanding Kant: Über die Interpretation 
philosophischer Texte, ed. Dieter Schönecker and Thomas Zwenger (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2001), esp. 12ff; Dieter Schönecker, "Textvergessenheit in der Philosophiehistorie," ibid., esp. 
171-172; Allen Wood, "What Dead Philosophers Mean," ibid., esp. 277-280. 
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Another general characteristic of the interpretation is that it is diachronic, rather than 
synchronic. That is, the evolution of Kant’s thought over time strongly informs the analysis; 
conversely, I take care to avoid anachronistically reading later texts back into earlier ones. 
Most notably, historical considerations exert a decisive influence on the analysis and overall 
argument of Part Two.  
The secondary literature is integrated throughout the exposition. This method provides 
an overview of the current state of research which clearly shows the precise points where the 
existing scholarship converges or diverges. In places where there is considerable 
disagreement, I lay out the various interpretations that have been proposed and conduct a 
critical assessment of the alternatives. My aim is thereby to arrive at the most plausible gloss, 
but I also leave some questions about the text open, and even raise new ones. 
 Furthermore, Part One and Part Two each has some methodological particularities 
worth noting here. Part One provides an exegesis of the Typic chapter in the form of a 
Commentary. The most conspicuous and consequential feature of the Commentary is its 
overall organization. While the exposition is meant to be read as a continuous whole, it is sub-
divided into five sections that correspond to the progressive stages of the resolution of a 
problem: there is a task to be accomplished; an obstacle, which Kant refers to as “particular 
difficulties,” standing in the way; a certain number of resources that present themselves; a 
solution that resolves the difficulties and accomplishes the task; and finally an assessment of 
the outcome, effectiveness and additional functions of the solution. 24  This analytical 
framework performs three important exegetical functions. Firstly, it largely matches the 
structure and sequential order of the Typic chapter, thereby carving the text at its joints. 
Secondly, this analytical scaffolding serves to ‘reverse-engineer’ the typic, so that the reader 
can understand it as a carefully designed solution to a well defined problem. Thinking the 
problem through – while assuming the particular resources and constraints of the Kantian 
system – not only elucidates the typic’s specific nature and function, but also contributes to a 
greater appreciation of the ingenuity, even audacity, of Kant’s strategy as well as the 
remarkable coherence, consistency and complexity of his system as a whole. Thirdly, the 
                                                
24 This framework was inspired by Zhe Chen, "Analogical Problem Solving: A Hierarchichal Analysis of 
Procedural Similarity," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 28, no. 1  
(2002): 82. 
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exposition is transparent insofar as it clearly shows the logic underlying each and every step 
of the interpretation; there are no dubious ‘leaps of genius’, to paraphrase Kant. By the same 
token, the clearly articulated structure of the Commentary contributes to the goal of fostering 
scholarly discussion and debate by facilitating targeted comparisons and contrasts between 
different interpretations. For instance, the “symbolist interpretation” presented in Part Two, 
Chapter 1, can be compared, point by point, with the exegesis proposed in the Commentary.  
The business of Part Two is to shed more light on the notion of the ‘typic’ by 
characterizing it as a mode of symbolic representation. Indeed, Kant provides a valuable clue 
to the nature and function of the typic when he indicates that it functions not as a schema, but 
“serves only as a symbol” (KpV 5: 70-71). I take this brief remark as a point of departure for 
situating the typic, both historically as well as conceptually, within Kant’s theory of symbolic 
representation. This is achieved by means of a comparative analysis: I examine the typic’s 
continuities and divergences with the notions of “symbolic hypotyposis,” as presented in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment and other texts, and “symbolic anthropomorphism,” as 
presented in the Prolegomena.  Consequently, Part Two is broader than the Commentary, both 
philologically as well as philosophically: it goes beyond the Typic chapter proper to examine 
other texts in detail; and it extends beyond the sphere of Kant’s moral philosophy to aesthetic 
and epistemological contexts. Another distinguishing feature of Part Two is that the 
investigation requires more analysis of a conceptual and formal nature, notably of the roles 
played by analogy in the various forms of symbolic representation. Finally, Part Two gives a 
strong impetus to scholarly debate by first, in Chapter 1, unifying and elaborating a favoured 
yet hitherto scattered interpretation of the typic (as a form of symbolic hypotyposis), then 
challenging this interpretation, and finally, in Chapter 2, suggesting a new alternative (namely, 
that the typic bears greater affinities to symbolic anthropomorphism).  
 
4.3.	  On	  the	  selection	  of	  texts	  
 
The central primary text is, naturally, the Typic chapter, entitled “On the Typic of the Pure 
Practical Power of Judgment [Von der Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft]” (KpV 5: 69-
71). The German original is reproduced in Appendix I; the English translation used in the 
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thesis appears in Appendix II. In addition, references are made to the entire Kantian corpus, 
including major and minor published works, the Nachlass, and the lectures. Of these 
additional primary texts, the following receive the most attention: 
 
• Critique of Practical Reason (1788): “On the Deduction of the Principles of Pure 
Practical Reason” (KpV 5: 42-50); “On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical 
Reason” (KpV 5: 57-67). 
 
• Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785): the Formula of the Law of Nature 
(G 4: 421-425, 436-437). 
 
• Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87) “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of 
the Understanding,” B version (KrV B129-169); “On the Schematism of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding” (KrV A137-147/B176-187).  
 
• Prolegomena (1783) “On Determining the Boundary of Pure Reason” (P 4:350-365, 
§§ 57-59) 
 
• Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) “On Beauty as a Symbol of Morality” (KU 
5: 351-354, § 59) 
 
• Nachlass: Letter from Jacob Sigismund Beck to Kant, 31 May 1792 (esp. 11: 340); 
letter from Kant to Beck, 3 July 1792 (esp. 11: 348). 
 
• Lectures on Ethics (Vorlesungen über Ethik, Ak 27) 
 
The secondary literature includes Kant scholarship, studies of topics related to the Typic 
chapter (e.g., analogy), and works by other philosophers. I was able to consult studies written 
in English, German, French or Spanish; research in other languages is unfortunately not 
included here. Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations of the secondary literature 
are my own.  
 
 
 
 14 
5. Overview 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Part One offers a comprehensive exegesis of the 
Typic chapter in the form of a Commentary, which is sub-divided into five sections. These 
sections, unlike conventional chapters, collectively constitute a single, continuous exposition 
while varying individually in length and in structure. Part Two situates the typic in Kant’s 
theory of symbolic representation by comparing it with two other modes of symbolic 
representation. Part Two is divided into two Chapters. Chapter 1 compares the typic with 
symbolic hypotyposis as described in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, mostly stressing 
the differences. Chapter 2 compares the typic with symbolic anthropomorphism as described 
in the Prolegomena, mostly stressing the similarities. The general Conclusion contains 
summaries of both Parts as well as an analysis of the Typic’s particular relevance to the 
evolution of Kant’s conception of the symbolic relation between nature and morality. 
 
5.1.	  Part	  One.	  Commentary	  	  
 
The Commentary is organized into five sections that correspond to the progressive stages of 
the resolution of a problem, as outlined above.  
 
1. Task  
 
The task to be accomplished is a particular exercise of the “pure practical power of judgment 
[die reine praktische Urtheilskraft]” that Kant terms “moral appraisal [die moralische 
Beurtheilung]” (KpV 5: 67, 69). Moral appraisal consists in judging particular actions as 
morally good or evil with respect to the moral law. More precisely, it is a matter of subsuming 
particular actions qua cases in concreto under the two “concepts of an object of pure practical 
reason” (KpV 5: 67) namely “the morally good [das sittlich Gute] and “the morally evil [das 
sittlich Böse]” (KpV 5: 57ff.). Both of these concepts flow a priori from the moral law, 
conceived as an abstract rule that determines actions as good or evil depending on whether 
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they were willed according to “the representation of a law in general and its form” (KpV 5: 
68), i.e., according to universalizable maxims. 
 
2. ‘Particular difficulties’ 
 
However, this task entails “particular difficulties [besondere Schwierigkeiten]” (KpV 5: 68) for 
the pure practical power of judgment because of a mismatch between the cases and the rule 
under which they are to be subsumed. I examine and criticize a number of interpretations of 
this mismatch that have been proposed by commentators. I then proceed to make the case that 
the mismatch is representational in nature: on the one hand, actions in the physical world 
present themselves to us in sensible intuition; on the other hand, the moral law is a 
supersensible Idea of reason to which sensible intuition can never correspond. The total 
heterogeneity between these two kinds of representation threatens to prevent subsumption and 
thereby impede moral appraisal.  
 
3. Resources 
 
The next question is to determine which resources in Kant’s conceptual repertoire could serve 
to resolve these difficulties and accomplish the task. 
The first possibility that suggests itself is the transcendental schema, introduced in the 
Critique of Pure Reason as a mediating representation that the theoretical power of judgment 
employed for overcoming the heterogeneity between the pure concepts of the understanding 
and sensible intuition. Nonetheless, I explain that the schema is unsuitable for solving the 
particular difficulties of the pure practical power of judgment. As a product of the sensible 
imagination, it would contaminate the supersensible moral Ideas. Also, it does not represent 
actions in a manner that would be relevant to moral appraisal. 
On the other hand, the assessment of the transcendental schema opens up a “favourable 
prospect”: we should look for a representation that performs an analogous function to that of 
the schema – i.e., mediation between heterogeneous representations in order to enable the 
subsumption of cases under a rule – while avoiding the particular characteristics of the 
 16 
transcendental schema that do not fit the “particular difficulties” of the pure practical power of 
judgment. What is needed, Kant hints, is a “schema (if the word ‘schema’ is appropriate here) 
of a law itself” (KpV 5: 68). I propose an interpretation of this peculiar expression as a formula 
encapsulating four criteria that describe the right tool for overcoming the particular difficulties 
and accomplishing the task, viz. (1) a sensibly uncontaminated representation of (2) the form 
of universal lawfulness that can (3) mediate the subsumption of particular actions given in 
sensible intuition under the supersensible moral law and (4) provide an effective procedure for 
moral appraisal. 
I then offer a characterization of the universal law of natural causality (or, simply ‘the 
law of nature’) and of natura formaliter spectata as pure representations of formal lawfulness 
produced by the understanding’s intellectual synthesis.    
 
4. Solution 
 
Kant’s original solution is to employ the law of nature as the “type [Typus],” or analogon, of 
the moral law for the purposes of moral appraisal (KpV 5: 69-70). As a pure representation of 
universal lawfulness, the law of nature – more precisely the form of this law – can be 
analogically substituted for the supersensible moral law without contaminating it with sensible 
intuition (an interpretation I expand upon in Chapter 2). And as a law of nature, its application 
to any and every action in sensible intuition is assured by the schematism. Thus can the type 
mediate the subsumption of actions in sensible intuition under the supersensible moral law 
despite the heterogeneity between the two species of representations – a process I term 
“typification.” Finally, the type also provides an appropriate standard against which to test the 
formal universalizability that the moral law demands of all maxims.  
Before elaborating on this last point, I investigate Kant’s remark that “it is also 
permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an intelligible nature” (KpV 5: 
70). I offer an interpretation of the source, nature, and function of this second, more general 
formulation of the type (‘Type2’), which I then compare with other interpretations in the 
secondary literature. Starting from the etymology of the ancient Greek word “túpos,” I 
propose that Kant conceives of Type2 as the abstract form shared by natura archetypa and 
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natura ectypa, namely the understanding’s purely conceptual representation of nature’s 
universal lawfulness (natura formaliter spectata). Type2 mediates between reason’s Idea of a 
supersensible ‘nature’ under the law of freedom and the sensible nature in which we live and 
act, thereby providing a regulative horizon for our moral vocation that heeds the strictures of 
Kant’s critical rationalism. 
Moral judgment is performed by means of a thought experiment that I term “the typic-
procedure”: the agent asks herself if she can both conceive and will herself as a part of a 
counterfactual nature in which the maxim of her action were a universal law. This is a decisive 
“test” or “trial” (Probe) of the formal universalizability of a maxim and thereby of its moral 
possibility. I offer an analysis of this thought-experiment based on the fundamental principles 
of Kant’s moral philosophy, proposing that the typic-procedure should be understood as a new 
way of operationalizing the “canon of moral appraisal” first introduced in the Groundwork (G 
4: 124). In addition, I bring out the specificity of this procedure in Kant’s moral philosophy 
and in his theory of moral judgment in particular. Also, I evaluate the exegetical strengths and 
weaknesses of the consequentialist, teleological, logical, and ‘rational agency’ interpretations 
of the typic-procedure.  
 
5. Outcome, effectiveness, and additional functions 
 
Lastly, I examine the outcome, effectiveness, and additional functions of Kant’s proposed 
solution. I explain Kant’s claim that the typic-procedure is widely and effectively employed by 
“even the most common understanding” to make accurate, even subtle, moral judgments with 
ease (KpV 5: 70). This explanation involves an analysis of the Typic’s heuristic efficacy, in 
particular the way in which it provides “an example in a case of experience” (KpV 5: 70).   
I also discuss why and how the typic guards against two dangers to morality, 
empiricism (consequentialism) and mysticism. The typic’s formal, a priori, and strictly 
universal standard for moral appraisal prevents empiricism’s grave error of turning moral 
appraisal into a self-interested, probabilistic calculus and thereby protects the purity of moral 
motivation from being corrupted by the heteronomous ideal of happiness. In fact, Kant hints at 
a way of transforming the principle of happiness into a purely formal type of the Idea of the 
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morally Good (‘Type3’). In addition, the typic’s strictly analogical representation of the moral 
law in the pure form of the law of nature provides a properly rationalist alternative to 
mysticism’s tendency to denature the supersensible Ideas by a transcendent pseudo-
schematization with ostensibly “real but non-sensible intuitions of a kingdom of God” (KpV 5: 
71). In sum, the typic is presented as the instrument par excellence of “the rationalism of the 
power of judgment [Rationalism der Urtheilskraft].” 
 
5.2.	  Part	  Two.	  The	  typic	  in	  Kant’s	  theory	  of	  symbolic	  representation.	  
 
Kant states that the typic functions not as a schema, but “served only as a symbol” (KpV 5: 
70), which suggests that the typic is a particular mode of symbolic representation. Part Two 
investigates this connection in depth, with the aim of characterizing the typic as a particular 
form of symbolic representation by comparing it with two other notions in Kant’s theory of 
symbolic representation, namely symbolic hypotyposis and symbolic anthropomorphism. 
 
Chapter 1: The typic and symbolic hypotyposis 
 
Many commentators affirm that the typic is a form of “symbolic hypotyposis” as defined in § 
59 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Yet as I mentioned above, these commentators 
generally do not cite each other; as a result, my first task is to weave their studies together in 
order to present a unified and complete interpretation of the Typic chapter. I then critically 
examine the resulting ‘symbolist interpretation’, arguing extensively that it is anachronistic, 
inaccurate and arbitrary. The type is not a symbol in the sense of § 59, I argue, nor does 
typification function in the same manner as symbolic hypotyposis. Furthermore, I contend that 
the tendency to assimilate the typic with symbolic hypotyposis is not only mistaken, but 
misguided. Indeed, many such attempts are motivated by a desire to aestheticize the typic, and 
with it, Kant’s moral philosophy as a whole. But this enterprise is ill-advised, even from an 
aesthetic point of view: I show that the sublime and the aesthetic idea respectively produce far 
more powerful and poetic expressions of the moral Ideas than symbolic hypotyposis could 
ever provide.  
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Chapter 2: The typic and symbolic anthropomorphism 
 
In Chapter 2, I pursue a hitherto unexplored avenue of research by comparing the typic with 
the concept of “symbolic anthropomorphism” that Kant had developed in the Prolegomena, 
five years before the Critique of Practical Reason. I first bring out the characteristic features 
of symbolic anthropomorphism by means of a close textual analysis of §§ 57-59 in the 
Prolegomena. An important result of this analysis is that Kant consistently imposes a series of 
restrictions on this mode of “only [nur]” or “merely [bloß]” symbolic representation: it is a 
non-absolute, non-sensible, and strictly analogical procedure in accordance with the 
restrictions imposed by Kant’s critical rationalism. In addition, I provide some historical 
background to Kant’s conception of symbolic anthropomorphism by investigating its 
continuities and discontinuities with the influential doctrine of analogical predication proposed 
by St. Thomas Aquinas. Next, I identify and illustrate the key differences between symbolic 
anthropomorphism and the notion of symbolic hypotyposis as presented later on in the third 
Critique. While the former employs analogy only to provide a conceptual grasp of abstract 
relations, the latter employs analogy in order to furnish an “indirect presentation [indirekte 
Darstellung]” of an abstract concept in the form of a symbol in sensible intuition (KU 5: 351). 
Finally, I carry out a systematic and detailed comparison between symbolic 
anthropomorphism and the typic. I endeavour to show, through numerous correspondences, 
that the typic is also a merely symbolic – i.e., strictly analogical – form of representation, and 
furthermore that this analogical character is the source of the legitimacy and efficacy of both 
procedures, each of which, in its respective sphere, gives us a conceptual grasp of the 
supersensible while preserving its purity. In the course of this comparative analysis I also 
propose detailed reconstructions of the complex, implicit analogies underlying Type1 and 
Type2.   
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PART ONE. 
COMMENTARY 
 
“Dearest Kant, I am still a long way from being able to pride myself on having grasped 
and worked through your thought so completely that I could then acclaim you with 
completely unreserved applause. The deduction of the pure dynamical principles is still 
somewhat obscure, but perhaps only to my eyes. The transcendental ‘I’ is an abyss that I 
have yet to fathom. But as for this ‘type’ by means of which actions in the sensible world 
are to be subsumed under the totally heterogeneous moral law – I can’t make head or tail 
of it.” – Gotthard Ludwig Kosegarten25 
  
1. Task 
 
The general purpose of a moral theory is to tell us how we ought to act. In the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant maintains that the concepts of the morally good (das sittlich Gute) and 
morally evil (das sittlich Böse) respectively determine which actions ought to be performed or 
avoided. Yet Kant’s moral theory would be otiose if it did not also provide a decision 
procedure for ascertaining whether a particular action is, was, or would be either good or evil. 
And since Kant holds that these concepts are determined by a practical rule (namely the moral 
law), the problem becomes that of ascertaining whether a particular action is a case falling 
under this rule. This is a particular problem of moral judgment, to which Kant refers more 
specifically as “moral appraisal [die moralische Beurtheilung].” Moral appraisal is the main 
task set for the “pure practical power of judgment [die reine praktische Urtheilskraft]” (KpV 5: 
67). 
 
                                                
25 My translation of Kosegarten’s letter to Kant, 4 June 1789 (11: 340): “Ja, theuerster Kant, noch fehlt viel 
daran, daß ich Sie ganz zu fassen, zu durchdringen, folglich mit ganzem uneingeschränkten Beyfalle zu 
umfangen, mich rühmen dürfte. Die Deduction der reinen dynamischen Grundsätze hat noch immer einige 
vielleicht nur subjective Dunkelheit für mich. Das transscendentale Ich ist ein mir noch unergründeter Abgrund. 
Der Typus, vermöge dessen erscheinende Handlungen unter das ganz heterogene moralische Gesetz subsumirt 
werden sollen, ist mir unbegreiflich.” 
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1.1.	  Preliminaries:	  objects	  of	  pure	  practical	  reason	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  good	  
and	  evil	  	  
 
The Typic chapter opens by succinctly recapitulating the main results of the immediately 
preceding chapter, entitled “On the concept of an object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5: 57-
67):  
The concepts of good and evil first determine an object for the will. They themselves, 
however, stand under a practical rule of reason which, if it is pure reason, determines the 
will a priori with respect to its object (KpV 5: 67).26  
All of these points are taken for granted in the subsequent development of Kant’s exposition; 
therefore we need first to clarify what the concepts of good and evil are and how they 
determine an object for the will according to a ‘practical rule of reason’.  
Kant defines the concept of an “object” of practical reason in general as the 
representation of “an object as a possible effect through freedom” (KpV 5: 57). This definition 
is broad: “freedom” refers to the generic freedom of choice (Willkür);27 and the term “object” 
refers loosely to an action or to an object produced by an action.28 In other words, an object of 
practical reason in general is anything the existence of which we could voluntarily produce in 
the world. The definition of an object of pure practical reason is more specific: it refers to an 
action considered in light of its moral possibility. In order to determine whether a given action 
is an object of pure practical reason, accordingly, “the moral possibility of the action must 
come first [die moralische Möglichkeit der Handlung [muss] vorangehen]” (KpV 5: 58); that 
is, moral evaluation must precede the question of the physical possibility of executing the 
action, which is a matter of experience (KpV 5: 57-58). Accordingly, an object of pure 
practical reason is an action that we “may will [wollen dürfen]” in accordance with the moral 
law (KpV 5: 57-58). As is well known, Kant holds that the will of an agent possessed of pure 
practical reason, i.e., a free, morally responsible will (Wille), is subject – or better, subjects 
                                                
26 [Die Begriffe des Guten und Bösen bestimmen dem Willen zuerst ein Object. Sie stehen selbst aber unter einer 
praktischen Regel der Vernunft, welche, wenn sie reine Vernunft ist, den Willen a priori in Ansehung seines 
Gegenstandes bestimmt] 
27 Beck, Commentary, 130. 
28 ———, Commentary, 129f. As Beck also notes, Kant seems to use the terms “Objekt” and “Gegenstand” 
interchangeably in this context.  
 22 
itself – to the moral law; indeed, the capacity of the will to determine itself by the 
representation of laws is just what characterizes it as a will (Wille), in contradistinction to a 
generic faculty of volition (Willkür) (G 4: 414). In short, an object of pure practical reason is a 
morally possible action, i.e., one that a free rational agent could permissibly will in accordance 
with the moral law. 
 A morally possible action is good; a morally impossible action is evil.29 Accordingly, 
the class of “good” actions in this sense is broad: it includes those that are permitted (erlaubt) 
as well as those that are obligatory (obligatorisch, verpflichtet), i.e., commanded (befohlen) by 
the law. The class of “evil” actions includes only those actions that are unpermitted 
(unerlaubt), i.e., forbidden (verboten) by the moral law. Accordingly, the concepts of “the 
morally good” (das sittlich Gute) and “the morally evil” (das sittlich Böse) apply primarily to 
actions: “Thus good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions [Das Gute oder Böse wird 
eigentlich auf Handlungen … bezogen]” (KpV 5: 60). These moral concepts characterize 
actions adverbially, so to speak, according to the way in which the latter are willed vis-à-vis 
the moral law: an action is good (i.e., is a morally possible object of pure practical reason) if 
and only if it is willed in a morally good way, that is, if the will is permitted or commanded by 
the moral law to realize the action (G 4: 373n); an action is evil (i.e., a morally impossible 
object of pure practical reason) if and only if it is willed in a morally bad way, that is, if the 
moral law forbids the willing of the action (G 4: 373n; KpV 5: 68). Kant also notes that good 
actions are what the will would desire, and evil actions, those that the will would avoid, if the 
will were entirely and exclusively determined by pure practical reason (KpV 5: 57). More 
generally, Kant proposes this construal of the concepts of good and evil in opposition to the 
conception of them in terms of their beneficial or deleterious effets on our empirical state and 
hence as equivalent to “well-being or ill-being [das Wohl oder Übel],” which “always 
signif[y] only a reference to our state of agreableness or disagreeableness, of gratification and 
pain” (KpV 5: 60). This distinction is fundamental, for the latter way of framing the concepts 
                                                
29 A disadvantage of Kant’s formulation is that it seems to imply that evil actions cannot possibly be objects of 
the will at all, in which case it is hard to see how one could choose to do evil; however, there is no contradiction, 
for while evil actions are impossible objects for a Wille determined exclusively by pure practical reason, they 
remain possible objects of sensibly conditioned Willkür. 
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of good and evil underlies “the empiricism of practical reason” – a philosophical position that 
Kant will fiercely oppose in the Typic chapter (KpV 5: 70-71).30 
We are now in a position to understand the opening statements of the Typic chapter 
quoted above. The concepts of good and evil “first determine an object for the will [bestimmen 
dem Willen zuerst ein Object]” (KpV 5: 67) by instructing it, when it entertains a possible 
particular action, whether it should make that action its object (i.e., desire to realize it): “What 
we are to call good must be an object of the faculty of desire in the judgment of every 
reasonable human being, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone” (KpV 5: 61). 
The rule mediated by the concepts of good and evil can be formulated as follows: For any 
particular action, it should be desired if it is good, and avoided if it is evil. Furthermore, the 
statement that the concepts of good and evil “themselves stand under a practical rule of reason 
which […] determines the will a priori with respect to its object” (KpV 5: 67) refers to their 
being derived a priori from the moral law. Indeed, Kant’s key philosophical move in the 
“Concept of an object of pure practical reason” chapter was to explain and justify this apparent 
“paradox of critical method,” which consists namely in deriving good and evil from the moral 
law, rather than, as other moral philosophers have done, deriving the law from a prior 
determination of the good (KpV 5: 62-63). In the Typic, however, Kant stresses not the 
methodological, but rather the logical aspect of this dependency: the extension of the concepts 
of good and evil (i.e., good and evil actions) must be determined with respect to the rule 
articulated by the moral law. What does this “rule” state? In the Groundwork, dedicated to the 
identification and exposition of “the supreme principle of morality,” Kant explains that, for 
finite rational beings such as us, the moral law is represented as a categorical imperative. This 
abstract rule is essentially a law of lawfulness; empty of determinate empirical content, it 
prescribes that maxims conform to the universal form of a law as such:  
“But when I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For, since 
the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in 
conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be 
limited, nothing is left with which the maxim is to conform but the universality of a law as 
such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as necessary 
[so bleibt nichts als die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes überhaupt übrig, welchem die 
Maxime der Handlung gemäß sein soll, und welche Gemäßheit allein der Imperativ 
eigentlich als notwendig vorstellt]. There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative 
                                                
30 See below, section 5.2.1. 
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and it is this: act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it become a universal law” (G 4: 420-1; cf. KpV 5: 30). 
Accordingly, the good will ought to determine itself according to the form of “universal 
lawfulness in general [die allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt]” (G 4: 402), or, as Kant 
puts it in the Typic, “merely through the representation of a law in general and its form [blos 
durch die Vorstellung eines Gesetzes überhaupt und dessen Form]” (KpV 5: 68). Hence, if an 
action is willed through a maxim that accords with this rule, then it is good; if it is willed 
through a maxim that violates this rule, then it is evil. 
 
1.2.	  Moral	  appraisal	  
 
Despite the fact that the chapter’s title is often garbled in translation, and occasionally even in 
German, as “The Typic of Pure Practical Reason,” the Typic properly concerns the “Pure 
Practical Power of Judgment [die reine praktische Urtheilskraft] (KpV 5: 67 my emphasis).”31 
Appreciating this faculty’s role is essential to understanding the text. Kant defines the power 
of judgment (die Urtheilskraft) in general as “the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of 
determining whether something stands under a given rule (casus datae legis) or not” (KrV 
A133/B172). The ability to conjugate general rules and particular cases is so indispensable for 
our thinking that the power of judgment lies at the root of the “sound understanding” shared 
by all human beings (KU 5: 169), although its acuity may vary between individuals (KrV 
A133-134/BB172-173; TP 8: 275-276). At the time of writing the Critique of Practical 
Reason, Kant held that the power of judgment could be exercised theoretically or practically: 
the theoretical power of judgment subsumes appearances under the categories and concepts of 
the understanding;32 the practical power of judgment subsumes actions and maxims under 
moral principles. Kant assignes the pure practical power of judgment with the task of “moral 
appraisal [die moralische Beurtheilung],” namely, determining which particular actions fall 
under the concepts of the morally good and evil. And since, as we just saw, the concepts of 
good and evil derive a priori from the moral law, the pure practical power of judgment must 
                                                
31 Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 306-307. 
32 See the “Analytic of Principles” (KrV A137-235/B176-B294).  
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determine whether or not each particular action is a case falling under this law (casus datae 
legis): “Now, whether an action possible for us in sensibility is or is not a case that stands 
under the rule concerns the practical power of judgment, by which what is said in the rule 
universally (in abstracto) is applied to an action in concreto” (KpV 5: 67).33 Further on, Kant 
specifies that moral appraisal therefore involves “the [s]ubsumption of an action possible to 
me in the sensible world under a pure practical law” [die Subsumtion einer mir in der 
Sinnenwelt möglichen Handlung unter einem reinen praktischen Gesetze] (KpV 5: 68, my 
emphasis), whereby, as Beck explains, “subsumption may mean the estimation of a particular 
action in the light of a general rule or the decision that a particular action would satisfy the 
rule and should, therefore, be performed.”34 In short, an action that can be subsumed under the 
“rule” articulated by the moral law is good; one that cannot is evil.  
Some additional remarks are necessary in order to properly situate moral appraisal in 
Kant’s theory of judgment. Firstly, the relation between an abstract rule and the particular 
representations falling under it can be conceived in two directions, as it were, whereby the 
power of judgment is called determining or reflecting, respectively:  
The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained 
under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the 
power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it … is determining. If, however, 
only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of 
judgment is merely reflecting (KU 5: 179).  
Moral appraisal is an exercise of the determining power of judgment. We must determine 
unequivocally whether a particular action is good or evil through a judgment “by which what 
is said in the rule universally (in abstracto) is applied to an action in concreto” (KpV 5: 67, my 
emphasis). Here, the rule is given – indeed, the moral law imposes itself on us as an 
indisputable “fact of reason [Faktum der Vernunft]” (KpV 5: 31) – and the particular case must 
be subsumed under it. Consequently, as Beck has, I believe, rightly emphasized, “in the 
                                                
33 [Ob nun eine uns in der Sinnlichkeit mögliche Handlung der Fall sei, der unter der Regel stehe, oder nicht, 
dazu gehört praktische Urtheilskraft, wodurch dasjenige, was in der Regel allgemein (in abstracto) gesagt 
wurde, auf eine Handlung in concreto angewandt wird] 
34 Beck, Commentary, 156.  
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Critique of Practical Reason, Kant is concerned exclusively with determinative judgment: the 
principle being given, find the case to which it applies.”35  
In contrast, some commentators have suggested that moral appraisal is instead an 
exercise of the reflecting power of judgment. For instance, Béatrice Longuenesse claims that 
moral judgments concerning the derivation of duties (‘What should I do?’) are determining 
while moral appraisals (‘Is this action good or evil?’) are reflecting, with the hedge that her 
characterization of moral appraisal as “reflecting” – which, she admits, Kant never explicitly 
makes in the text – should be taken in a “distinctively practical meaning,” viz. that one must 
look for the practical rule under which an action has been performed.36 This gloss does not 
hold up to scrutiny, however. To begin with, it is clearly anachronistic, given that Kant did not 
introduce the notion of reflecting judgment until the Critique of the Power of Judgment in 
1790, two years after the publication of the second Critique. What is more, the 
characterization that Kant later offers of reflecting judgement conflicts with his 
characterization of moral appraisal. In the First Introduction he explains that, in 
contradistinction to determining judgment, “to reflect (to consider) [Reflectiren (überlegen)] 
however, is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with 
one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible [in Beziehung auf 
einen dadurch möglichen Begrif] (EEKU 20: 211, my emphasis).” But this is not at all what 
Kant is suggesting in the second Critique. On the contrary, the concepts of good and evil and, 
a fortiori, the moral law, are given a priori (KpV 5: 57ff.); there is absolutely no need to ‘first 
make them possible’ by comparing many actions amongst themselves and extracting a 
common rule by reflection. Indeed, Kant views the idea of inventing a new moral principle as 
preposterous: “But who would even want to introduce a new principle of morality and, as it 
were, first invent it? [und diese gleichsam zuerst erfinden?]” (KpV 5: 8n).”37 Clearly, moral 
appraisal is not an exercise of the reflecting, but of the determining power of judgment.38  
                                                
35 ———, Commentary, 154n. 
36 "Moral Judgment as a Judgment of Reason," in Kant on the Human Standpoint, Modern European Philosophy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 237-238n; Dulce María Granja, Lecciones de Kant para hoy, 
vol. 79, Autores, Textos y Temas. Filosofía (Barcelona & México: Rubí & Anthropos, 2010), 131-144.  
37 Cf. Beck, Commentary, 154n. 
38 I will argue below that what I term the ‘typic-procedure’ for moral appraisal is strictly determining as well, see 
section 4.2.2.4. 
 27 
Secondly, moral appraisal is a pure, rather than an applied employment of moral 
judgment. As the title of the Typic chapter already makes explicit, moral appraisal pertains to 
the “pure practical power of judgment” (der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft) (KpV 5: 67, my 
emphasis) for the determination of the pure concepts of good and evil, insofar as it consists in 
evaluating the moral possibility of actions with respect to an a priori rule (the moral law) 
(KpV 5: 62). Therefore, moral appraisal in the strict sense does not involve, as has been 
suggested, “moving rationally from the formulation of a supreme moral principle to specifying 
particular imperatives as they apply to the messy and intricate circumstances of our lives.”39 
This is a mischaracterization, for two reasons. First of all, while Kant believes that maxims 
can and must be appraised a priori with respect to the moral law, he does not claim that 
particular maxims can be fully specified or deduced a priori from the moral law.40 Moreover, 
in moral appraisal we take a particular action and its corresponding maxim as given and then 
evaluate its moral possibility according to an a priori rule.41  By contrast, fine-tuning one’s 
maxims to the “messy and intricate circumstances of our [human] lives” is an applied, fine-
grained use of the power of practical judgment – a kind of phronêsis that requires extensive 
empirical knowledge of what Kant calls “anthropology” (psychology, pedagogy, etc.) and of 
other aspects of the actual situation in which we act (e.g. particular social mores and cultural 
practices). But as Otfried Höffe and others have emphasized, these two forms of moral 
judgment should not be confused, since the “pure practical power of judgment” that Kant 
introduced in the Typic chapter represents a distinctive philosophical innovation vis-à-vis the 
Aristotle’s influential notion of phronêsis.42 It is crucial to keep this pure, limited function of 
moral appraisal in mind, as it would be misguided to expect the typic – which, as we will see 
next, is designed to enable moral appraisal – to serve as a comprehensive guide to all aspects 
                                                
39 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 266; cf. Brigitta-Sophie von Wolff-Metternich, "Sobre el papel del 
juicio práctico en la filosofia moral de Kant," Anuario Filosófico. Doscientos Anos Después. Retornos Y 
Relecturas De Kant XXXVII, no. 3  (2004).  
40 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 169-170.  
41 See Maria Schwartz, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant: Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants 
praktischen Philosophie (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 121-122. 
42 Höffe, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 107; ———, "Kants kategorischer Imperativ als Kriterium des 
Sittlichen," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 31 (1977): 364ff; Zimmermann, Kants 'Kategorien der 
Freiheit', 52.  
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of moral judgment, whereas it in fact serves only to enable the strictly delimited task of 
mediating the subsumption of actions in sensibility under the pure concepts of good and evil.  
A final point to note is that moral appraisal presupposes what could be called the 
volitional finitude of human beings – i.e., the “subjective imperfection” of our will vis-à-vis 
the moral law. Indeed, it only makes sense to distinguish good actions from evil ones if we do, 
or at least can, perform actions of both kinds. For angels, say, who supposedly have perfect, 
“holy wills” and accordingly never do – and never can do – anything wrong (G 4: 414, 439), 
moral appraisal would be a vain exercise. Lamentably, our sorry species is not so constituted 
that we automatically do whatever the law prescribes; rather, the law has to command our 
morally deficient wills to do the good (G 4: 414; KpV 5: 19-20). Accordingly, moral appraisal 
is needed to evaluate whether the performance of a particular action in a certain situation 
either complies with or violates a moral command.  
 
2. ‘Particular diff icult ies’:  a mismatch between the 
case and rule 
 
We have just seen that the task of the pure practical power of judgment is moral appraisal: the 
subsumption of actions under the pure moral concepts of good and evil. When the pure 
practical power of judgment undertakes this task, however, it becomes “subject to particular 
difficulties [besonderen Schwierigkeiten unterworfen]” (KpV 5: 68). Kant states the problem 
in three key passages:  
But a practical rule of reason first, as practical, concerns the existence of an object, and 
second, as a practical rule of pure reason, brings with it necessity with respect to the 
existence of an action and is thus a practical law, not a natural law through empirical 
grounds of determination but a law of freedom in accordance with which the will is to be 
determinable independently of anything empirical (merely through the representation of a 
law in general and its form); however, all cases of possible actions that occur can only be 
empirical, that is, belong to experience and nature; hence, it seems absurd to want to find 
in the sensible world a case which, though as such it stands only under the laws of nature, 
yet would admit of the application to it of a law of freedom and to which there could be 
 29 
applied the supersensible Idea of the morally good, which is to be exhibited in it in 
concreto (KpV 5: 67-68).43 
On the other hand, the morally good as an object is something supersensible, so that 
nothing corresponding to it can be found in any sensible intuition; and the power of 
judgment under laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special 
difficulties having their source in this: that a law of freedom is to [be] applied to actions 
qua events that take place in the sensible world and so, to this extent, belong to nature 
(KpV 5: 68).44 
“But no intuition and hence no schema can be put under the law of freedom (as that of a 
causality not at all sensibly conditioned), nor consequently under the concept of the 
unconditioned good, for their application in concreto and [the power of judgment] under 
laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special difficulties (KpV 5: 
69).45 
Needless to say, these passages are quite complex and have consequently elicited many 
different interpretations. Yet it is essential to understand precisely what these ‘particular 
[besondere] difficulties’ consist in, as the particular role of the typic will be to overcome them 
and thereby enable the task of moral appraisal to be performed. Fortunately, the analysis of the 
previous section provides a guiding thread: given that moral appraisal (like all exercises of 
determining judgment) consists in subsuming particular cases under an abstract rule, we can 
expect that the obstacle to this subsumption should take the form of a mismatch between the 
case and the rule – here, a mismatch between actions and the moral law. I will begin by 
presenting and critically examining various construals of this mismatch that have been 
proposed by commentators. Although some adduce relevant aspects of the problem, none of 
                                                
43 [Weil aber eine praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft erstlich, als praktisch, die Existenz eines Objects betrifft 
und zweitens, als praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft, Nothwendigkeit in Ansehung des Daseins der Handlung 
bei sich führt, mithin praktisches Gesetz ist und zwar nicht Naturgesetz durch empirische Bestimmungsgründe, 
sondern ein Gesetz der Freiheit, nach welchem der Wille unabhängig von allem Empirischen (blos durch die 
Vorstellung eines Gesetzes überhaupt und dessen Form) bestimmbar sein soll, alle vorkommende Fälle zu 
möglichen Handlungen aber nur empirisch, d.i. zur Erfahrung und Natur gehörig, sein können: so scheint es 
widersinnisch, in der Sinnenwelt einen Fall antreffen zu wollen, der, da er immer so fern nur unter dem 
Naturgesetze steht, doch die Anwendung eines Gesetzes der Freiheit auf sich verstatte, und auf welchen die 
übersinnliche Idee des sittlich Guten, das darin in concreto dargestellt werden soll, angewandt werden könne.] 
44 [Hingegen ist das sittlich Gute etwas dem Objecte nach Übersinnliches, für das also in keiner sinnlichen 
Anschauung etwas Correspondirendes gefunden werden kann, und die Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen 
praktischen Vernunft scheint daher besonderen Schwierigkeiten unterworfen zu sein, die darauf beruhen, daß ein 
Gesetz der Freiheit auf Handlungen als Begebenheiten, die in der Sinnenwelt geschehen und also so fern zur 
Natur gehören, angewandt werden soll.] 
45 [Hingegen ist das sittlich Gute etwas dem Objecte nach Übersinnliches, für das also in keiner sinnlichen 
Anschauung etwas Correspondirendes gefunden werden kann, und die Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen 
praktischen Vernunft scheint daher besonderen Schwierigkeiten unterworfen zu sein] 
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them quite hit the nail on the head. In the following section I will go on to propose my own 
characterization of the mismatch. 
 
2.1.	  Construals	  of	  the	  mismatch	  in	  the	  secondary	  literature	  
 
Commentators have interpreted the mismatch between the case and the rule in terms of five 
dichotomies: natural necessity vs. freedom; is vs. ought; concrete vs. abstract; matter vs. form; 
and subjective ends vs. objective ends. Here I present and critically assess each interpretation 
in turn. 
 
2.1.1. Natural necessity vs. freedom 
 
The passages previously quoted readily invite the interpretation that the mismatch between 
actions and the moral law consists in a metaphysical dichotomy between natural necessity and 
causality through freedom. Longuenesse advances an interpretation along these lines: 
Kant is mostly concerned with explaining the fundamental difficulty we encounter in 
attempting to think the relation between the moral law (which depends on the faculty of 
reason alone, and thus on our belonging to a purely intelligible world) and actions that 
unfold in the sensible world and are thus causally necessitated. This metaphysical 
difficulty is according to Kant the root of the difficulty of moral judgment, evaluating an 
action or the will of the subject that performs the action (is it a good will or not?).46  
On the one hand, all actions belong to nature. In the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant established that nature is the sum of all sensible appearances under laws 
prescribed by the understanding, such that everything that happens within nature must be 
empirically determined by a cause preceding it in time (KrV A542/B570). In general, “the 
sensible world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected in accordance with universal 
laws” [Die Sinnenwelt ist nichts als eine Kette nach allgemeinen Gesetzen verknüpfter 
Erscheinungen]” (P 4: 354) and every particular action constitutes merely a “link in the chain 
of nature” [ein Glied der Naturkette]” (KrV A544/B572). Accordingly, a person acting within 
nature exercises her causality by setting certain events in motion, yet she is always already 
                                                
46 "Moral Judgment," 237, my emphasis. 
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determined to do so by previous links in the causal nexus of which she forms a part. Actions 
qua sensible appearances are events within the unbroken causal chain of natural necessity; 
they not only cause succeeding events in time, but are themselves caused by preceding events 
in time – as Kant puts it in the Typic, they are brought about “through empirical grounds of 
determination [durch empirische Bestimmungsgründe]” (KpV 5: 68; cf. KrV A543/B571). In 
other words, there is nothing new under the sun:  
all the actions of the human being in appearance are determined in accord with the order 
of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if we could 
investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there 
would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as 
necessary given its preceding conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there 
is no freedom … (KrV A549-550/B578-9). 
On the other hand, the concepts of good and evil derive from a law of freedom. As we 
have seen, they flow a priori from a practical rule of reason, which, when applied to a 
particular action, instructs us whether or not we should desire to perform it. As Kant stresses 
in the Typic chapter, this rule is a practical law insofar as it represents the actual realization of 
good actions as necessary effects of freedom:  
“But a practical rule of reason first, as practical, concerns the existence of an object, and 
second, as a practical rule of pure reason, brings with it necessity with respect to the 
existence of an action and is thus a practical law, not a natural law through empirical 
grounds of determination but a law of freedom in accordance with which the will is to be 
determinable independently of anything empirical (merely through the representation of a 
law in general and its form)” (KpV 5: 67-8; cf. KpV 5: 31).47 
By characterizing the moral law here as a law of freedom, Kant is recalling the key result of 
the first main chapter of the second Critique, namely that “[t]he moral law is, in fact, a law of 
causality through freedom … [Das moralische Gesetz ist in der Tat ein Gesetz der Kausalität 
durch Freiheit …]” (KpV 5: 47). Rational beings exercise causality through freedom – i.e., 
exercise free will – positively insofar as they autonomously determine themselves to act 
according to the moral law, which in turn presupposes negative, or “transcendental,” freedom, 
i.e., the capacity to determine one’s will completely independently from sensible 
                                                
47 [Weil aber eine praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft erstlich, als praktisch, die Existenz eines Objects betrifft 
und zweitens, als praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft, Nothwendigkeit in Ansehung des Daseins der Handlung 
bei sich führt, mithin praktisches Gesetz ist und zwar nicht Naturgesetz durch empirische Bestimmungsgründe, 
sondern ein Gesetz der Freiheit, nach welchem der Wille unabhängig von allem Empirischen (blos durch die 
Vorstellung eines Gesetzes überhaupt und dessen Form) bestimmbar sein soll] 
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determination (KrV A533-534/B561-562; G 4: 446; MS 6: 213). Freedom is therefore “a 
causality not at all sensibly conditioned [eine gar nicht sinnlich bedingt[e] Causalität]” (KpV 
5: 69), as Kant puts it in the Typic. Actions brought about through freedom can be called 
freely willed, or free actions. Finally, as Kant stresses in many contexts, the law of freedom 
can only be conceived as the law of the supersensible, intelligible or noumenal realm, 
separated by a great gulf from the realm of sensible appearances.  
This stark metaphysical dichotomy apparently creates a grave predicament for moral 
appraisal. On the one hand, the actions under appraisal belong to the sensible world; as such, 
they are in the first instance events determined through and through by natural law. On the 
other hand, appraising actions as good or evil presupposes their being freely caused by the 
agent, for insofar as they are morally appraisable, they must be entirely imputable to the 
agent’s will, to the exclusion of other causes (negative freedom); furthermore, the action is 
judged qua effect of a will that determines itself by the moral law (positive freedom). The 
problem is, no “link in the chain of nature [Glied der Naturkette]” (KrV A544/B572) as such 
can be represented as freely caused and hence, as Kant writes in the Typic, “it seems absurd to 
want to find in the sensible world a case which, though as such it stands only under the laws of 
nature, yet would admit of the application to it of a law of freedom … [so scheint es 
widersinnisch, in der Sinnenwelt einen Fall antreffen zu wollen, der, da er immer so fern nur 
unter dem Naturgesetze steht, doch die Anwendung eines Gesetzes der Freiheit auf sich 
verstatte …] (KpV 5: 68, my emphasis). It therefore seems that moral appraisal must inevitably 
run into “particular difficulties” because it requires a metaphysical impossibility, namely that 
actions be both naturally and freely caused. 
 However, this problem cannot constitute the ‘particular difficulties’ in the Typic for 
the simple reason that it is not a difficulty at all – at least not in Kant’s eyes, as he considers 
himself to have satisfactorily resolved the matter beforehand. Indeed, it is the solution to this 
problem that constitutes the ontological backdrop to the Typic. Kant takes himself to have 
already demonstrated, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that natural necessity and causality 
through freedom are metaphysically compatible, even with regard to the very same action:  
Yet the problem which we had to solve … was only this [Allein die Aufgabe, die wir 
aufzulösen hatten … war nur diese]: Do freedom and natural necessity in one and the 
same action contradict each other? And this we have answered sufficiently [und diese 
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haben wir hinreichend beantwortet] when we showed that since in freedom a relation is 
possible to conditions of a kind entirely different from those in natural necessity, the law 
of the latter does not affect the former; hence each is independent of the other, and can 
take place without being disturbed by the other” (KrV A557/B585; cf. P 4: 356).  
As far as Kant is concerned, then, moral appraisal implies no metaphysical contradiction or 
impossibility. If a person tells a lie, for example, her action can be viewed as freely caused 
through her intelligible character even though it is at the same time the necessary product of 
her empirically determined character; accordingly, the lie qua free act can be morally 
condemned and the liar can be held morally responsible for his action (KrV A554-556/B582-
4). And whereas in the first Critique Kant defended the compatibility of natural necessity with 
transcendental freedom as a mere possibility from a theoretical point of view while abstaining 
from asserting freedom’s reality, in the second Critique he goes one step further by proving 
the reality of freedom from a practical point of view through the moral law, which is in turn an 
indisputable ‘fact’ of reason (cf. KpV 5: 70). So by the time we get to the Typic chapter, the 
metaphysical stage has already been set for moral appraisal: actions are the sensible effects of 
free wills that can determine themselves according to the law of free causality. We must 
therefore conclude that the metaphysical construal of the mismatch between the case and the 
rule, while alluded to in the language of the Typic and relevant to its problematic, nevertheless 
does not constitute the ‘particular difficulties’ of moral judgment per se.48 
 
2.1.2. Is vs. ought  
 
Other commentators, notably Beck and Pieper, trace the special difficulties of the pure 
practical power of judgment to a conceptual mismatch, namely “the conceptual gap between 
what ought to be and what is.”49 On the one hand, moral appraisal invokes normative 
predicates – good and evil – belonging to the conceptual domain of what “ought to be” (das 
                                                
48 I fully concur with Sala’s reading here: “Obwohl Kant im ersten Absatz vom „Gesetz der Freiheit“ einerseits 
und von einer „Sinnenwelt ... die unter dem Naturgesetz steht“ andererseits spricht, geht es hier nicht (zumindest 
nicht in erster Linie) um die Frage nach der Anwendbarkeit des Sittengesetzes als eines Gesetzes der Freiheit auf 
eine Natur, in der ein lückenloser Determinismus herrscht. Dieses Problem wurde bereits im Rahmen der dritten 
Antinomie der KrV behandelt und kommt zwar an mehreren Stellen der KpV zur Sprache, vor allem in der 
„Kritischen Beleuchtung der Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ (A 167-191), aber ist hier nicht gemeint.” 
Kants "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft": Ein Kommentar (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004), 153-154. 
49 Beck, Commentary, 157.   
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Sollen). As we have seen, moral appraisal consists in determining an action’s moral 
possibility, i.e., whether or not one may will to bring it into existence as an “object of pure 
practical reason” in accordance with the moral law. In other words, we have to consider 
whether or not the action could be regarded as an effect consonant with “a law of what ought 
to be,” regardless of whether or not the action actually exists, and even independently of its 
physical possibility. We appraise actions solely with respect to what we ought to do (sollen) 
and what we are permitted to will (wollen dürfen). On the other hand, the actions we are to 
appraise belong to the conceptual domain of what is (das Sein). We conceptualize them as 
events in the natural world, determined by the law of natural necessity. Accordingly, we must 
describe every action as just another link in an unbroken causal chain; everything that happens 
must have a preceding physical cause that brings it into existence according to ‘a law of what 
is.’ From this point of view, the description of human action is not qualitatively different from 
that of other events in the physical universe (KrV A550/B579). All that we can meaningfully 
say, under these conditions, concerns what is (sein), can (können), or must (müssen) be the 
case according to natural laws. In Kant’s thought these two conceptual domains – das Sollen 
and das Sein – constitute incommensurable spheres of meaning: 
The ought expresses a species of necessity and a connection with grounds which does not 
occur anywhere else in the whole of nature. In nature the understanding can cognize only 
what exists, or has been, or will be. It is impossible that something in it ought to be other 
than what, in all these time-relations, it in fact is; indeed, the ought, if one has merely the 
course of nature before one’s eyes, has no significance whatever. We cannot ask at all 
what ought to happen in nature, any more than we can ask what properties a circle ought 
to have; but we must rather ask what does happen in nature, or what properties the circle 
does have (KrV A547/B575, trans. mod.). 
And therefore, the attempt to import concepts from one domain into the other would be a 
formidable leap (metábasis eis állo génos), and hence “absurd” or “non-sensical” – which is 
exactly what Kant asserts in the Typic chapter. (KpV 5: 68).  
Beck and Pieper argue that this is the mismatch that creates the ‘particular difficulties’ 
of pure practical reason. Beck declares that the very intelligibility of moral appraisal crucially 
depends on surmounting this conceptual divide: “unless some way is found to “bridge the 
conceptual gap between what ought to be and what is so that the concepts of the former may 
be applied in a definite way to … the latter,” he maintains, “the normative-descriptive 
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distinction, upon which Kant lays such enormous weight, marks an uncrossable chasm.”50 
Similarly, Pieper locates the special difficulties of pure practical reason in what she calls “das 
Problem der Sein-Sollens-Differenz.”51 Natural necessity (das Sein) and free causality (das 
Sollen) constitute two entirely heterogeneous rule systems, and consequently one cannot make 
valid inferences from one to the other: “No ‘is’ can be derived from an ‘ought’ and no ‘ought’ 
can be derived from an ‘is’. How then can practical judgment … [avoid – AW] committing the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’?”52 That is, from the fact that something does happen according to the 
law of physical causality one cannot infer that it ought to happen according to the law of free 
causality; conversely, from the moral law’s command that something ought to happen one 
cannot infer that it will also occur through physical law. Either way, then, moral appraisal 
would seem to involve an invalid, “absurd” inference between what ought to be and what is.53 
Overcoming this logical gap, Pieper suggests, constitutes the special difficulty that the typic 
must solve.  
Now, while Beck and Pieper are correct to note that Kant laid great weight on the 
normative-descriptive distinction, assigning natural and free causality to mutually irreducible 
rule systems (cf. VE Vigilantius, 27: 488), I do not think that their logico-conceptual 
interpretation of the ‘particular difficulties’ is entirely apt. There is no talk in the Typic chapter 
about the problem of making inferences between two systems of rules; rather, the task set for 
the pure practical judgment consists in simply subsuming individual cases under a rule.54 
Indeed, the task of making inferences does not belong to the power of judgment at all, but 
rather belongs to the logical use of reason (KrV A303-305/B359-361). And as we will see in 
more detail below, it is an essential feature of the mismatch that it involves two different 
species of representations; consequently, it cannot consist in a merely logical difference 
between two concepts or two systems of rules.55 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," 109; cf. "Object of Pure Practical Reason," 189. (The second reference is an 
English translation of Pieper’s original German article.) 
52 "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," 189-190; "Object of Pure Practical Reason," 110. 
53 Other scholars have also framed the difficulty in these terms; see Höffe, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 
111; Wolff-Metternich, "Juicio prático," 743. 
54 For similar criticisms, see Zimmermann, Kants 'Kategorien der Freiheit', 57-58. 
55 See section 2.2.3. 
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2.1.3. Concrete vs. abstract  
 
François Marty submits that the purpose of the typic is to resolve an incongruity between a 
concrete action belonging to space and time on the one hand and an abstract rule of reason on 
the other: “But the action is realized in space and time, it belongs to sensibility. On the other 
hand, reason presents itself as independent of any particularity, and hence as ‘general’ and 
abstract. And so we face the problem of the typic of pure practical judgment.”56 Dietrichson 
construes the problem along similar lines: “So the important problem [is] how we are to go 
about applying the purely formal, abstract, existentially indeterminate moral law as a criterion 
for evaluating the material maxims of our particular actions in the concretely existing 
phenomenal world” (original italics).57  
However, the “problem” described by Marty and Dietrichson is not a particular 
difficulty, but simply the task of moral appraisal just as it is described in the Typic: the 
subsumption of an action in concreto under a practical rule in abstracto (KpV 5:67). 
Moreover, bridging the gap between the abstract and concrete, as such, is not particular to 
moral appraisal or even to moral judgment: every determining exercise of judgment involves 
applying an abstract rule to a concrete particular (KrV A133/B172). Tellingly, by framing the 
difficulties of the practical power of judgment in these terms, Dietrichson can no longer 
distinguish them in any relevant way from those of the theoretical power of judgment, which 
he characterizes in exactly the same terms: “A schematization had to be worked out in order to 
explain how the purely abstract, existentially indeterminate categories could be applied to 
concrete individual sensory contents …” (my emphasis).58 But as we will see, Kant states that 
the practical power of judgment faces particular difficulties that it doesn’t share with the 
theoretical power of judgment (KpV 5: 68). In short, the abstract-concrete dichotomy cannot 
be the particular difficulty we are seeking, for it is not specific to the present context. 
 
                                                
56 Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique, 248. 
57 "Criteria of universalizability," 167-168. 
58 "Criteria of universalizability," 172. 
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2.1.4. Matter vs. form 
 
According to other scholars, the problem arises from a mismatch between “form” on the one 
hand and “matter,” or “content,” on the other. According to Johnson, it appears difficult, if not 
impossible, to subsume “material content” (i.e., actions) under a “purely formal principle that 
abstracts from all material content.”59 Interpreters have framed two variants of this dichotomy, 
depending on whether they construe the “material content” as actions or as maxims. On the 
first view, the problem is how to apply the unconditioned form of the moral law to the 
determinate contents of the will: “How is it possible,” asks Gerhard Luf, “to determine the 
unconditioned form of a universal law and to apply it to particular, finite contents derived from 
the objects of the faculty of desire?”60 On the second view, the mismatch takes the following 
form:  
The moral law (the law of pure practical reason) is an empirically empty principle, a 
purely formal principle, namely a norm prescribing that I should always act on such a 
maxim that I could also consistently want a universal law to become modeled on it. A 
maxim, on the other hand, is an empirically determinate principle, a material principle, 
namely a specific subjective rule of action in the phenomenal world. … It is obvious that 
the completely formal (empirically empty) law of pure practical reason is not a standard of 
evaluation that can be applied directly to our material (empirically determinate) rules of 
action.61  
The Typic chapter itself offers little textual basis for either construal of the problem, however. 
Firstly, Kant simply does not employ the terms “content” (Inhalt) or “matter/material” 
(Materie/materiell) at all. Secondly, actions are never characterized as “contents” of a formal 
principle, but rather as “cases [Fälle]” (KpV 5: 68) of a rule. Thirdly, maxims are not 
mentioned in the passage where the ‘particular difficulties’ are presented (KpV 5: 67-8); and 
when they do come into play, it is always with reference to their form, rather than to their 
status as ‘material’ principles, as in the following passage: “If the maxim of the action is not so 
constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a law of nature in general, then it is 
morally impossible [Wenn die Maxime der Handlung nicht so beschaffen ist, daß sie an der 
Form eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt die Probe hält, so ist sie sittlich unmöglich]” (KpV 5: 69-
                                                
59 "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 270. 
60 "Die "Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft" und ihre Anwendung auf Kants Rechtslehre," 58. 
61 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 173-174. Cf. Reath, "Formal principles and the form of a law," 35.  
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70).62  Either way, Kant does tell us, at least in principle, how it is possible to apply the formal 
principle to actions qua contents, namely mediately, by imparting the maxim (the subjective 
principle through which the action is willed) with “the form of lawfulness in general” – that is 
just what the Universal Law Formula of the categorical imperative states. Furthermore, this 
very requirement clearly presupposes that maxims have both a matter and a form: while they 
are material insofar as they make reference to concrete actions in the empirical world, they 
also have a formal dimension, insofar as they are principles or rules of action (G 4: 436). So 
the supposed incongruity between the formal law and the “material” maxim is a false problem: 
the formal law applies not to the matter, but to the form of the maxim – and that is both the 
source of moral obligation and the corresponding criterion of moral judgment (KpV 5: 27-28). 
This is not a special difficulty, but just the task of moral appraisal. The problem specific to the 
typic is therefore not ‘Is this determination possible?’ but rather ‘How is it done?’  
 
2.1.5. Subjective ends vs. objective ends 
 
It has also been suggested that there is an incongruity between the kinds of ends respectively 
referred to by maxims and by the moral law, namely subjective and objective ends (or ends in 
themselves). This apparent mismatch leads Johnson to ask: “How can a particular maxim that 
specifies subjective ends […] be evaluated by a moral principle […] that does not depend on 
subjective ends?”63 But ends – whether subjective or objective – are not germane to the special 
difficulty that makes the typic necessary. Again, this ostensible problem has already been 
answered (at least in principle) by a formula of the categorical imperative, namely the Formula 
of Humanity: a maxim is wrong if it involves treating another person as a mere means to a 
subjective end and not also at the same time as an end in itself (G 4: 436). In any case, it 
seems implausible that the typic’s purpose should be to resolve some particular difficulty with 
the application of the Formula of Humanity, which is never mentioned. Indeed, in the Typic 
chapter Kant makes no mention of ends at all, whether subjective or objective; as we will see, 
                                                
62 I will of course return to this key statement in more depth below, in section 4.2. 
63 "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 270. 
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he is concerned instead with the strict universalizability of maxims, a criterion that abstracts 
from ends altogether.64 
 
2.2.	  The	  representational	  mismatch:	  sensible	  intuitions	  vs.	  supersensible	  Ideas	  	  
2.2.1. From ‘the very same difficulties’ to the ‘particular difficulties’ 
 
Since none of the interpretations examined above proved entirely satisfactory, let us return to 
the primary text. A valuable hint as to the true nature of the problem is Kant’s indication that, 
in at least one important respect, “the power of judgment of pure practical reason is subject to 
the very same difficulties as those of pure theoretical reason [Also ist die Urtheilskraft der 
reinen praktischen Vernunft eben denselben Schwierigkeiten unterworfen, als die der reinen 
theoretischen]” (KpV 5: 68). Accordingly, determining what these “very same difficulties” 
consist in will allow us to establish the backdrop against which the “particular difficulties” of 
the practical power of judgment should come into focus.  
In the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes how the 
power of judgment must subsume empirical cases (sensible appearances) under the a priori 
rules defined by the pure concepts of the understanding, or categories. Let us recall that 
subsumption operates on representations: ‘subsuming an object under a concept’ is really 
shorthand for subsuming the representation of the object under the representation of the 
concept. Furthermore, these two levels of representation must be “homogeneous 
[gleichartig],” that is, representationally compatible (KrV A157/B176). On the other hand, the 
pure concepts of the understanding are, by definition, “totally unhomogeneous [ganz 
ungleichartig]” vis-à-vis the empirical intuitions to which they are to be applied (KrV 
A137/B176). Thus, the “difficulties” of pure theoretical judgment stem from a mismatch 
between pure concepts and sensible intuitions qua representations. I will call this the 
theoretical heterogeneity problem. 
Are these the “very same difficulties” faced by pure practical judgment? Not entirely. 
Practical judgment does not apply pure concepts of the understanding to sensibility in order to 
                                                
64 See below, section 4.2.3.2. 
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obtain theoretical cognition; rather, it applies concepts of practical reason in order to appraise 
actions morally. So the “very same difficulties” must be less specific than those described in 
the Schematism. If we recast the theoretical heterogeneity problem more generally, in terms of 
judgment as such, we can say that subsumption is hindered by a representational mismatch: 
the representation of the case is heterogeneous vis-à-vis the representation of the rule. I will 
refer to this more general and abstract formulation of the difficulty as the general 
heterogeneity problem. Accordingly, Kant’s hint that pure practical judgment faces “the very 
same difficulties” as pure theoretical judgment should be understood as referring to the 
general heterogeneity problem rather than to the specifically theoretical form. That is, both 
theoretical judgment in the context of possible experience and practical judgment in the 
context of moral appraisal face the common general problem of subsumption’s being hindered 
by a representational mismatch between the case and the rule.  
Conversely, what distinguishes the “particular difficulties” the pure practical power 
judgment is that they refer to the particular form that the general heterogeneity problem 
assumes for it regarding moral appraisal. I will call this the practical heterogeneity problem: 
the representation of a particular action (the case) is heterogeneous vis-à-vis the representation 
of the moral law (the rule). On my view, the ‘particular difficulties’ confronting pure practical 
judgment should be spelled out in terms of the heterogeneity between the specific 
representations involved in moral appraisal. In the rest of this section, I will further 
characterize the source and nature of this problem.  
 
2.2.2. Reason and finitude 
 
In order to understand the source of the ‘particular difficulties’ posed by moral appraisal, it is 
essential to consider who is doing the appraising. Although Kant emphasizes that the moral 
law applies in principle to “all rational beings as such [alle vernünftigen Wesen überhaupt]” 
(G 4: 408), he specifically states that the typic is employed by the ordinary human mind 
(which he calls “the common understanding”) (KpV 5: 69-70). Thus we human beings are the 
ones who must overcome a certain obstacle in order to exercise our power of judgment in our 
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moral life – and this, in spite of a deep tension between our finitude, linked to sensibility, and 
our reason, linked to the supersensible.65 
Our epistemic finitude stems from the “particular constitution of our faculties of 
cognition” (die eigentümliche Beschaffenheit unserer Erkenntnisvermögen) (KU 5: 402, 408). 
As Kant explains in the famous opening paragraph of the Transcendental Aesthetic (KrV 
A19/B33), all cognition must relate to objects, and the only way it can relate to them 
immediately is through intuition. Intuitions only arise if the objects are “given” to the 
cognizing subject in some way. While in theory a divine being could spontaneously produce 
the objects of its intuition (intuitus originarius), such a feat, “at least for us humans” (uns 
Menschen wenigstens), is impossible; instead, our finite mind must first be affected by objects 
(intuitus derivatus) (KrV B72). More particularly, we can only be affected by objects via our 
senses, and consequently all of our intuition is sensible: “It comes along with our nature that 
intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are 
affected by objects [Unsre Natur bringt es so mit sich, daß die Anschauung niemals anders als 
sinnlich sein kann, d.i. nur die Art enthält, wie wir von Gegenständen affiziert werden]” (KrV 
A51/B75).” It follows from this contingent particularity of human nature (P 4: 350-1) that all 
of our thought must ultimately relate to sensible intuition in order to acquire significance: “But 
all thought, whether straightaway (directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must ultimately be 
related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility [zuletzt auf Anschauungen, mithin, bei 
uns, auf Sinnlichkeit beziehen]” (KrV A19/B33, my emphasis). Two consequences entailed by 
this epistemic “receptivity” of our mind are especially significant to the Typic: 
 
1. Sensibility acts as a “restricting condition” (restringierende Bedingung) (KrV 
A146/B186) on our thought: all of our concepts must relate to sensibility in order to to 
acquire meaning (Bedeutung) (KrV A146/B185). So while our understanding can 
frame empirical concepts of varying degrees of generality (e.g., ‘dog’) as well as 
engender pure concepts not drawn from experience (e.g., ‘substance’), these concepts 
can acquire meaning only if they are ultimately presented or exhibited (dargestellt) in 
                                                
65 Alain Renaut in particular has emphasized the importance of finitude for understanding the Typic in Kant 
aujourd'hui, 300ff.  
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sensible intuition (KU 5: 351). Without a sensible presentation, the concept remains, at 
best, a pure form of logical synthesis through which we can think objects, or, at worst, 
an empty thought-entity (Hirngespenst) devoid of objective referents.  
 
2. Not only must we exhibit all our concepts sensibly, but we cannot do it in any other 
way than sensibly. Just as a monitor can display information only in illuminated pixels, 
a radio only in soundwaves, so can the human mind exhibit concepts only in sensible 
intuition, according to Kant. We have no other medium, as it were, for exhibiting 
abstract concepts in concreto; our capacity for presentation, i.e., our imagination, can 
only present concepts in intuition, which (whether pure or empirical) is always 
sensible. Correspondingly, Kant denies that non-sensible, “intellectual intuition” is 
available to human beings (KrV B307, B159), dismissing “supersensible intuition” and 
other forms of ostensible insight into the intelligible realm as “mysticism,” 
“fanaticism,” or “enthusiasm [Schwärmerei]” (KpV 5: 70-1, 135-6, 146; KU 5: 459; SF 
7: 45).66 For human beings, therefore, all “hypotyposis [Darstellung, sujectio sub 
adspectum]” is limited to “sensible rendering [Versinnlichung]” (KpV 5: 351). 
 
These two consequences of our epistemic finitude – our need to exhibit our thoughts in 
sensible intuition and our inability to exhibit them any other way – are two sides of the same 
coin. Together, they constitute a more specific limitation of the human mind that I will refer to 
as representational finitude.  
On the other hand, humans beings also possess reason (Vernunft), a faculty that 
spontaneously engenders supersensible representations that are not limited by sensibility: 
“pure concepts of reason [reine Vernunftbegriffe],” or “Ideas [Ideen].” It is in virtue of this 
capacity to engender Ideas that Kant sometimes characterizes reason as a ‘productive’ or 
‘poietic’ faculty (Verstandes-Dichtungskraft, facultas fingendi).67 Accordingly, reason can be 
considered an ‘in-finite’ representational faculty that surpasses even the pure understanding:  
                                                
66 See below, section 5.2.3. 
67 See Claude Piché, Das Ideal: Ein Problem der Kantischen Ideenlehre (Bonn: Bouvier, 1984), 24-31. 
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Now, a human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself 
from all other things, even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is 
reason. This, as pure self-activity, is raised even above the understanding by this: that 
though the latter is also self-activity and does not, like sense, contain merely 
representations that arise when we are affected by things (and are thus passive), yet it can 
produce from its activity no other concepts than those which serve merely to bring 
sensible representations under rules and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, 
without which use of sensibility it would think nothing at all; but reason, on the contrary, 
shows in what we call “Ideas” a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes far beyond 
anything that sensibility can ever afford it … [weil die Vernunft unter dem Namen der 
Ideen eine so reine Spontaneität zeigt, daß sie dadurch weit über alles, was ihr 
Sinnlichkeit nur liefern kann, hinausgeht …] (G 4: 452).  
Since the notion of “supersensible representations” will play a crucial role in what follows, let 
me take a moment to define it. Representations can be called “supersensible” in two regards:  
 
1. Representations can be deemed “supersensible” in virtue of their objective referents. In 
contradistinction to empirical concepts like “dog” or “table,” which refer to 
perceivable objects in the sensible world, Ideas of reason are special concepts that refer 
to objects in the intelligible, noumenal, or supersensible realm that is ontologically 
distinct from the world of sensible appearances. Take, for example, the Idea of God as 
a wise architect of the physical cosmos. No referent can be found in the sensible world 
for this Idea of reason because it refers to a supersensible object that is ontologically 
heterogeneous from all objects in the sensible world: “The deistic concept is a wholly 
pure concept of reason [ein ganz reiner Vernunftbegriff], which however represents 
merely a thing [nur ein Ding … vorstellt] that contains every reality, without being 
able to determine a single one of them, since for that an example would have to be 
borrowed from the sensible world, in which case I would always have to do only with 
an object of the senses, and not with something completely heterogeneous which 
cannot be an object of the senses [nur mit einem Gegenstande der Sinne, nicht aber mit 
etwas ganz Ungleichartigem, was gar nicht ein Gegenstand der Sinne sein kann]” (P 4: 
355, my emphasis).  
 
2. Ideas are also “supersensible” with respect to their subjective quality as our 
representations. The moral law and associated concepts of reason have no sensible 
content, nor are they derived from sensation through composition or abstraction. Due 
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to our representational finitude, however, we cannot display them adequately in 
sensible intuition. As I already mentioned, although Kant raises the merely 
hypothetical possibility of a supersensible intuition, which would produce an 
immediate presentation of an intelligible object designated by an Idea, he strictly 
denies that human beings possess any such thing (KrV B307, B159). We 
representationally finite beings enjoy no direct representational access to intelligible 
objects; at best, we can think – i.e., logically determine – Ideas through the abstract 
concepts of the understanding. Thus, the Ideas of the morally good or the moral law 
are super-sensible representations (Vorstellungen) insofar as they transcend our finite 
capacity for giving them direct sensible presentations (Darstellungen). In this respect, 
the Ideas of reason consequently differ in kind from the concepts of the understanding, 
which can be exhibited in sensible intuition through examples (in the case of empirical 
concepts) or schemata (in the case of pure concepts) (KpV 5: 351): “Ideas, however, 
are still more remote from objective reality than categories; for no appearance can be 
found in which they may be represented in concreto” (KrV A567/B595; P 4: 452).” 
 
Consequently, the term “supersensible” can be ambiguous with respect to the Ideas: it can 
pertain either to their objective referents or their subjective quality as representations. In order 
to prevent confusion, I will reserve the term “intelligible” for talking about the objective 
referents of the Ideas (i.e. the intelligible realm or mundus intelligibilis as a whole, its objects 
or its laws) and reserve “supersensible” for their subjective quality as rational Ideas 
intrinsically heterogeneous from sensible intuitions.  
In sum, the finite rationality of human beings entails a deep tension with regard to our 
representational capacity. On the one hand, insofar as we are representationally finite, we need 
sensible, and only sensible, exhibitions of all of our concepts; on the other hand, insofar as we 
possess reason, we produce supersensible representations that transcend all sensibility and can 
never be exhibited within it.  
 
2.2.3. Sensible intuitions vs. supersensible Ideas 
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Crucially, this particular constitution of ours as finite rational beings results in ‘particular 
difficulties’ because moral appraisal provokes a conflict between our ability, as beings 
endowed with reason, to produce supersensible representations and our inability, as finite 
beings, to furnish sensible exhibitions of such concepts.  
Let us recall that all exercises of determining judgment involve subsuming particular 
cases in concreto under a pre-given rule in abstracto – more precisely, subsuming the 
representation(s) of the cases under the representation of the rule (KrV A68/B93). 
Accordingly, moral appraisal consists in subsuming our representations of particular actions 
under our representations of the moral law and the morally good. On the one hand, actions 
present themselves to us as events in nature, and as a consequence of our epistemic finitude, 
we can only become acquainted with such events via our sensible intuition, i.e., as “objects of 
sensible intuition [Gegenstände sinnlicher Anschauung]” (KpV 5: 68, my emphasis). On the 
other hand, in the Typic, Kant repeatedly refers to the moral law and the morally good with 
the term “Idea,” thereby characterizing them as a supersensible representations produced by 
reason. But given the total heterogeneity between these two kinds of representations, direct 
subsumption is impossible. Kant expresses this problem by saying that it is impossible to 
exhibit or apply the moral Ideas in sensible intuition:  
“hence, it seems absurd to want to find in the sensible world a case … to which there 
could be applied the supersensible Idea of the morally good, which is to be exhibited in it 
in concreto” (KpV 5: 68).68 
“But no intuition and hence no schema can be put under the law of freedom (as that of a 
causality not at all sensibly conditioned), nor consequently under the concept of the 
unconditioned good, for their application in concreto and [the power of judgment] under 
laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special difficulties (KpV 5: 
69).69 
To my eyes, these passages strongly suggest that the ‘particular difficulties’ of the pure 
practical power of judgment are representational in nature. More precisely, they consist in a 
mismatch between sensible intuitions by which actions are represented and the supersensible 
                                                
68 [so scheint es widersinnisch, in der Sinnenwelt einen Fall antreffen zu wollen, der, … die Anwendung eines 
Gesetzes der Freiheit auf sich verstatte, und auf welchen die übersinnliche Idee des sittlich Guten, das darin in 
concreto dargestellt werden soll, angewandt werden könne] 
69 [Hingegen ist das sittlich Gute etwas dem Objecte nach Übersinnliches, für das also in keiner sinnlichen 
Anschauung etwas Correspondirendes gefunden werden kann, und die Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen 
praktischen Vernunft scheint daher besonderen Schwierigkeiten unterworfen zu sein] 
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Ideas of the moral law and the morally good (i.e., the practical heterogeneity problem).70 
Moreover, this construal of the particular difficulties make sense against the backdrop of the 
common difficulties that the pure practical power of judgment shares with the theoretical 
power of judgment: in both cases the power of judgment faces a subjective obstacle to 
subsumption, namely the heterogeneity between the representations to be subsumed. The 
specific difference that gives rise to practical judgment’s particular difficulties, therefore, is 
that the subjective quality of the representations in each case are different: for theoretical 
judgment, the mismatch exists between sensible intuitions and pure concepts of the 
understanding; for practical judgment, between sensible intuitions and supersensible Ideas of 
reason.  
It has been argued, however, that the “particular difficulties” of pure practical 
judgment involve an incompatibility between the case and the rule due to their respective 
objective referents rather than an incompatibility with respect to their subjective quality as our 
representations. According to this reading, the problem stems from the ontological deficiency 
of actions qua objects in the sensible world to serve as adequate counterparts to the intelligible 
objects that we are referring to in moral appraisal. Grandjean frames the problem in this way, 
rejecting any “merely subjective” construal of the problem.71 In my view, by contrast, this 
incompatibility at the objective, ontological level is presupposed, however it only becomes 
relevant to the particular problematic of the Typic insofar as it results in ‘particular 
difficulties’ for us at the subjective, representational level. And the text confirms this. If we 
look more closely at the passage where Kant mentions the good’s objective, intelligible 
referent, “as an object something supersensible [etwas dem Objecte nach Übersinnliches],” the 
problem that Kant identifies as such is not the good’s objective, ontological incongruity with 
an object of the sensible world per se, but rather the consequent impossibility – for us, as 
representationally finite beings – of furnishing a presentation of it: “…. nothing corresponding 
to it can be found in any sensible intuition [in keiner sinnlichen Anschauung]… ” (KpV 5: 68, 
my emphasis). 
                                                
70 Renaut and Ware also construe the problem in these terms. See Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 301, 307; Owen 
Ware, "Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility" (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010), 120. 
71 "Jugement moral," 46. Cf. Ch. 1, section 2.2. 
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Crucially, the representational mismatch between sensible intuitions and the 
supersensible Ideas of morality gives rise to two opposing dangers that threaten the very heart 
of Kant’s moral philosophy.72 On the one hand, if Kant were to admit that the supersensible 
moral Ideas cannot be applied to actions in sensible intuition at all, then he would have to 
concede that the moral Ideas are empty of significance, that moral appraisal is futile, and that 
practical reason is bankrupt – in a word, he would have to capitulate to the objection of 
formalism. But on the other hand, presenting the supersensible Ideas directly in sensible 
intuition would defigure them beyond recognition, for no concrete image can ever be 
commensurate with the purity and universality of the rational Idea. Next we will see how Kant 
navigates between this Skylla and Charybdis by inventing a ‘presentation of the 
unpresentable’. 
 
3. Resources 
 
We have identified both the task – successfully carrying out moral appraisal by subsuming 
particular actions under the moral law – as well as the ‘particular difficulties’ – the 
representational mismatch between actions in sensible intuition and the supersensible Ideas of 
the moral law and the morally good. Now it is time to take stock of the resources for an 
eventual solution. Which faculties and representations does Kant have at his disposal? Which 
ones does he presently need? Which ones can he suitably use?  
 
3.1.	  The	  schematism	  and	  the	  imagination	  	  
3.1.1. Nature and function  
 
Kant recalls that the theoretical power of judgment has a “means at hand [ein Mittel zur 
Hand]” for overcoming its representational difficulties, namely the schematism:  
Thus the power of judgment of pure practical reason is subject to the very same 
difficulties as that of pure theoretical reason, though the latter had means at hand for 
                                                
72 This paragraph is based on the exposition in Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 301-302, 307-308, 311-313. 
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getting out of these difficulties, namely that with respect to its theoretical use it depended 
upon intuitions to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied, and such 
intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be given a priori (as schemata) 
conformably with pure concepts of the understanding (KpV 5: 68).73  
Kant introduced the schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason as a procedure for overcoming 
the heterogeneity between the pure concepts of the understanding and sensible intuition. As 
we saw above, this difficulty consists in a mismatch between two kinds of representations: the 
pure concepts of the understanding are “totally unhomogeneous [ganz ungleichartig]” vis-à-
vis the sensible intuitions to which they are to be applied (KrV A137/B176). In order to 
mediate between these representations, the power of judgment employs a “third thing [ein 
Drittes],” namely a transcendental schema. The schema assumes the form of a transcendental 
time-determination sketched by the imagination. It serves as a “mediating representation 
[vermittelnde Vorstellung]” (KrV A138/B176) insofar as it is “homogeneous [gleichartig]” 
with each of the two poles – on the one hand, with the pure concept of the understanding 
insofar as it expresses a universal, a priori rule and, on the other hand, with the manifold of 
sensible intuition insofar as time is the pure form of the latter (KrV A138-9/B177-8). While 
the individual pure concepts cannot be exhibited directly by individual intuitions, the 
schematism nevertheless enables judgment to subsume all sensible intuitions under the former 
through the mediation of their schemata, i.e., the a priori rules that determine the order and 
mutual connection of all sensible intuitions in time (KrV A145/B184-5). 
 
3.1.2. Two problems with the schematism 
 
Crucially, Kant insists that the practical power of judgment cannot rely on a schema to get out 
of its own difficulties (KpV 5: 69). It is essential to understand why the schematism is the 
wrong tool for the job here, as this will allow us to spell out what the right tool must be like. 
In the Typic chapter Kant adduces two problems with the schematism. The first problem 
                                                
73 [Also ist die Urtheilskraft der reinen praktischen Vernunft eben denselben Schwierigkeiten unterworfen, als die 
der reinen theoretischen, welche letztere gleichwohl, aus denselben zu kommen, ein Mittel zur Hand hatte: 
nämlich da es in Ansehung des theoretischen Gebrauchs auf Anschauungen ankam, darauf reine 
Verstandesbegriffe angewandt werden könnten, dergleichen Anschauungen (obzwar nur von Gegenständen der 
Sinne) doch a priori, mithin, was die Verknüpfung des Mannigfaltigen in denselben betrifft, den reinen 
Verstandesbegriffen a priori gemäß (als Schemate) gegeben werden können] 
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reflects its ineffectualness for overcoming pure practical judgment’s particular difficulties, 
while the second problem reflects its unsuitability for performing the task of moral appraisal. 
 
3.1.2.1. Sensible contamination 
 
The first problem is that no transcendental schema could resolve pure practical judgment’s 
particular difficulties because it would inevitably denature the supersensible representations of 
the moral law and the morally good. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defined a schema in general as the “representation 
of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image [Die 
Vorstellung … von einem allgemeinen Verfahren der Einbildungskraft, einem Begriff sein Bild 
zu verschaffen]” (KrV A140/B179-80). Transcendental schemata, while they do not match 
each pure concept of the understanding with a single intuition or “image [Bild],” nevertheless 
translate the former’s logical structure into a sensible structure, namely a transcendental 
determination of time, thereby applying – and restricting – the categories to sensible intuition: 
“although the schemata of sensibility first realize the categories, yet they likewise also restrict 
them, i.e., limit them to conditions that lie outside the understanding (namely, in sensibility)” 
(KrV A146/B185-6). By contrast, the Ideas of reason tolerate no such sensible restriction; they 
cannot be schematized. And significantly, Kant repeats several times in the Typic chapter that 
the schematism can yield exhibitions only in sensible intuition:  
… such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be given a priori (as 
schemata) [dergleichen Anschauungen (obzwar nur von Gegenständen der Sinne) doch a 
priori … (als Schemate) gegeben werden können] (KpV 5: 68). 
… it belongs to the theoretical use of reason to appraise that possibility in accordance with 
the law of causality, a pure concept of the understanding for which reason has a schema in 
sensible intuition. [ … denn die gehört für die Beurtheilung des theoretischen Gebrauchs 
der Vernunft nach dem Gesetze der Causalität, eines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, für den 
sie ein Schema in der sinnlichen Anschauung hat] (KpV 5: 68). 
Physical causality, or the condition under which it takes place, belongs among [the] 
concepts of nature, whose schema transcendental imagination sketches. [Die physische 
Causalität, oder die Bedingung, unter der sie stattfindet, gehört unter die Naturbegriffe, 
deren Schema transscendentale Einbildungskraft entwirft] (KpV 5: 68). 
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To a natural law, as a law to which objects of sensible intuition as such are subject, there 
must correspond a schema, that is, a universal procedure of the imagination (by which it 
presents a priori to the senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law 
determines) [Dem Naturgesetze als Gesetze, welchem die Gegenstände sinnlicher 
Anschauung als solche unterworfen sind, muß ein Schema, d.i. ein allgemeines Verfahren 
der Einbildungskraft (den reinen Verstandesbegriff, den das Gesetz bestimmt, den Sinnen 
a priori darzustellen), correspondiren] (KpV 5: 69). 
… a schema of sensibility [ein Schema der Sinnlichkeit] (KpV 5: 69). 
These passages also highlight the fact that all schemata originate in the imagination (die 
Einbildungskraft). Indeed, if the schematism gives only sensible output, it is because the 
faculty that produces it, the imagination, is also necessarily constrained by the 
representationally finite human mind, which is limited to sensibility: 
Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective 
condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of the 
understanding, belongs to sensibility [so gehört die Einbildungskraft … zur Sinnlichkeit]” 
(KrV B151-2).  
In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant acknowledges the imagination’s 
spontaneity, however he strictly confines its field of action to sensibility. Bounded by our 
representational finitude, the imagination can only produce sensible output through its 
“figurative” synthesis (synthesis speciosa) (KrV B 151). The schemata, accordingly, are 
produced by this very figurative synthesis (KrV A145-6/B185). 
But there’s the rub: if we fed supersensible Ideas into the schematism, it would 
invariably produce the wrong kind of output; consequently, it cannot be employed to solve the 
practical heterogeneity problem. Supersensible Ideas of reason, to be adequately presented, 
would require supersensible intuitions. But representationally finite human beings do not 
possess a faculty of supersensible intuition; instead they possess only the schematism, which, 
as a procedure of the sensibly limited imagination, yields only sensible intuitions and therefore 
cannot fully and adequately exhibit the Ideas. And it is primarily for this reason that Kant rules 
out the schema as a potential type for the moral law: “But no intuition and hence no schema 
can be put under the law of freedom (as that of a causality not at all sensibly conditioned), nor 
consequently under the concept of the unconditioned good, for their application in concreto 
[Aber dem Gesetze der Freiheit (als einer gar nicht sinnlich bedingten Causalität) mithin auch 
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dem Begriffe des unbedingt Guten kann keine Anschauung, mithin kein Schema zum Behuf 
seiner Anwendung in concreto untergelegt werden]” (KpV 5: 69). 
 
3.1.2.2. Irrelevance 
 
The second problem is that the schematism, on its own, does not provide the pure practical 
power of judgment with a suitable procedure for appraising actions from a moral point of 
view. As Kant explained in the first Critique, the schematism is a procedure that the 
theoretical power of judgment employs to subsume all cases of experience under the laws of 
possible experience. And since “all cases of possible actions that occur can only be empirical, 
that is, belong to experience and nature [alle vorkommende Fälle zu möglichen Handlungen 
aber nur empirisch, d.i. zur Erfahrung und Natur gehörig, sein können]” (KpV 5: 68), the 
schematism automatically assigns all actions a determinate order, duration, etc. in the 
spatiotemporal nexus of experience. In so doing, however, the schematism represents human 
actions no differently from any other event in nature, like an apple falling from a tree or a 
planet orbiting a star. As far as the theoretical power of judgment is concerned, all events 
without distinction are subsumed under the (schematized) law of physical causality.74  
The practical power of judgment cannot content itself with this procedure, however, as 
it views actions from a radically different perspective. When it engages in moral appraisal, it 
regards every particular action as a freely caused, morally imputable deed: “An action is called 
a deed [That] insofar as it comes under obligatory laws and hence insofar as the subject, in 
doing it, is considered in terms of the freedom of his choice” (MS 6: 223). In the Typic chapter 
Kant draws a sharp contrast between theoretical and practical judgment’s respective interests 
with regard to actions:   
Subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world under a pure practical law 
does not concern the possibility of the action as an event in the sensible world; for, it 
belongs to the theoretical use of reason to appraise that possibility in accordance with the 
law of causality, a pure concept of the understanding for which reason has a schema in 
sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under which it takes place, belongs 
among the concepts of nature, whose schema transcendental imagination sketches. Here, 
however, we have to do not with the schema of a case in accordance with laws but with 
                                                
74 On this point see Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 289. 
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the schema of a law itself (if the world ‘schema’ is appropriate here), since the 
determination of the will (not the action with reference to its result) through the law alone 
without any other determining ground connects the concept of causality to conditions 
quite other than those which constitute natural connection (KpV 5: 68-9).75 
In other words, the practical power of judgment does not aim to subsume actions qua events 
under the law of nature, but rather to subsume actions qua deeds under “a law of freedom in 
accordance with which the will is to be determinable independently of anything empirical 
(merely through the representation of a law in general and its form) [ein Gesetz der Freiheit, 
nach welchem der Wille unabhängig von allem Empirischen (blos durch die Vorstellung eines 
Gesetzes überhaupt und dessen Form) bestimmbar sein soll]” (KpV 5: 68). When we morally 
appraise an action, we are not interested primarily in its physical possibility but rather in its 
moral possibility; in other words, we are not interested in investigating which physical forces 
could bring about a particular event, but rather whether we are “allowed to will [wollen 
dürfen]” a particular action as an “object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5: 57-67).76 (For 
example, consider euthanasia: the theoretical question as to which particular method would be 
the most humane way to end a human being’s life is a technical problem for theoretical 
judgment to solve scientifically, and is obviously distinct from the properly moral question as 
to whether the action of deliberately cutting short a suffering person’s life should be deemed 
good or evil.) It follows from all this that the “schema of a case [i.e., event – AW] according 
to [physical] laws,” while indispensable for theoretical cognition, is nonetheless inappropriate 
for the purposes of moral appraisal. While all human actions are in fact realized in the sensible 
world in accordance with natural causality, when we engage in moral appraisal we 
nevertheless consider actions not under the aspect of nature, but rather under the aspect of 
freedom: “the determinations of a practical reason can take place … conformably with the 
                                                
75 [Es ist bei der Subsumtion einer mir in der Sinnenwelt möglichen Handlung unter einem reinen praktischen 
Gesetze nicht um die Möglichkeit der Handlung als einer Begebenheit in der Sinnenwelt zu thun; denn die gehört 
für die Beurtheilung des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft nach dem Gesetze der Causalität, eines reinen 
Verstandesbegriffs, für den sie ein Schema in der sinnlichen Anschauung hat. Die physische Causalität, oder die 
Bedingung, unter der sie stattfindet, gehört unter die Naturbegriffe, deren Schema transscendentale 
Einbildungskraft entwirft. Hier aber ist es nicht um das Schema eines Falles nach Gesetzen, sondern um das 
Schema (wenn dieses Wort hier schicklich ist) eines Gesetzes selbst zu thun, weil die Willensbestimmung (nicht 
die Handlung in Beziehung auf ihren Erfolg) durchs Gesetz allein, ohne einen anderen Bestimmungsgrund, den 
Begriff der Causalität an ganz andere Bedingungen bindet, als diejenige sind, welche die Naturverknüpfung 
ausmachen.]  
76 As explained above, in section 1. 
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categories of the understanding, but not with a view to a theoretical use of the understanding 
…” (KpV 5: 65). 
 
3.2.	  The	  ‘schema	  of	  a	  law	  itself’	  
 
The schema is the wrong tool for the job, “[b]ut here again a favourable prospect opens for the 
pure practical power of judgment [allein hier eröffnet sich doch wieder eine günstige Aussicht 
für die reine praktische Urtheilskraft]” (KpV 5: 68). That is, if we articulate the criteria with 
respect to which the schematism was found wanting, we can form a precise idea of what the 
right tool would be. Indeed, in the very passage where Kant rejects the schematism, he 
provides an enigmatic yet valuable hint as to what kind of tool could overcome the latter 
difficulty: “Here, however, we have to do not with the schema of a case in accordance with 
laws but with the schema of a law itself (if the world ‘schema’ is appropriate here) [Hier aber 
ist es nicht um das Schema eines Falles nach Gesetzen, sondern um das Schema (wenn dieses 
Wort hier schicklich ist) eines Gesetzes selbst zu thun]” (KpV 5: 69). The expression “the 
schema of a case according to laws” refers to theoretical judgment’s subsumption of events 
under the law of nature by means of transcendental time-determinations – but what does the 
expression “the schema of a law itself” mean?  
First, Kant’s qualified use of the word “schema” – “(if the word ‘schema’ is 
appropriate here [wenn dieses Wort hier schicklich ist)]” (KpV 5: 68) – reflects the need to find 
a ‘schema’ in a general, functional sense which can be spelled out as follows: “The schema 
presents itself as a ‘third thing,’ i.e., as a ‘mediating representation’ between the rule (or the 
concept) and the concrete instance. The most general characterization of a schema that we can 
obtain, then, consists in the mediation between a rule and the cases of its application; therefore 
the schema does not necessarily have to be a product of the sensible imagination.”77 In the 
Typic chapter, accordingly, Kant cannot employ a ‘schema’ in the specific sense of the first 
Critique, but he can employ a ‘schema’ in the generic sense of a representation that would 
play a functional role in the practical heterogeneity problem analogous to the functional role 
played by the transcendental schema in the theoretical heterogeneity problem, namely a 
                                                
77 Piché, Das Ideal, 106. 
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mediating representation (vermittelnde Vorstellung) or ‘third thing’ that enables subsumption 
between a general rule and particular cases despite their heterogeneity. But given the 
supersensible nature of the moral Ideas, the sought-after ‘schema’ must achieve a presentation 
without any direct temporalization or sensible rendering (Versinnlichung).78  
Second, the “law itself” referred to here is of course the moral law, with respect to 
which we appraise moral actions. Now, the moral law determines the will not by commanding 
particular actions per se, but rather by commanding the universally lawful form of maxims, the 
subjective principles according to which actions are willed (G 4: 420-1). Accordingly, a 
schema of the moral law itself would have to be a representation that captures the form of 
lawfulness in general to which maxims and actions ought to conform.  
Third, as Beck and others have noted, “[w]e have, therefore, an analogy: a schema of a 
case occurring according to a law is necessary for knowledge of the case, while a schema of 
the law itself is necessary to connect, in practice, possible events in sense experience with a 
cause under a law which is not a law of natural connection.”79  
Fourth, just as the theoretical power of judgment employs the schematism as a 
“procedure [Verfahren]” (KrV A140/B180) for achieving its own theoretical task (i.e., 
experiential cognition), so,  mutatis mutandis, should the pure practical power of judgment 
employ its “schema of a law itself” in a procedure for achieving its task (i.e., moral appraisal). 
Based on this analysis, I want to suggest that the expression “the schema of a law itself 
[das Schema … eines Gesetzes selbst]” (KpV 5: 68) can be understood as a formula 
encapsulating a number of criteria for the right tool for overcoming the particular difficulties 
of the pure practical power of judgment and enabling moral appraisal. I propose to articulate 
the criteria that the required representation must meet as follows:  
 
1. It must be a pure, non-sensible representation. 
 
                                                
78 Cf. Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 308-309. 
79 Beck, Commentary, 158. Cf. Delbos, La Philosophie pratique de Kant, 374; Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 44; 
Emmanuel Kant, Fondation de la métaphyisque des moeurs, edited and translated by Alain Renaut (Paris: 
Garnier Flammarion, 1994), 194-195n.  
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2. It must be a representation of the moral law insofar as the latter determines the will, 
i.e., “the representation of a law in general and its form [die Vorstellung eines Gesetzes 
überhaupt und dessen Form]” (KpV 5: 68) that prescribes the “the form of lawfulness 
in general [die bloße Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt]” (KpV 5: 70). This form of 
lawfulness must have strict universality. 
 
3. It must serve as a third thing, or ‘schema’ in a functional sense, i.e., as a mediating 
representation (vermittelnde Vorstellung) that can overcome the heterogeneity between 
the case and the rule and thereby enable the subsumption of the former under the latter.  
 
4. It must ultimately give the pure practical power of judgment a procedure by which 
actions and maxims can be appraised with respect to a morally relevant criterion, 
namely conformity with universal law (Gesetzmäßigkeit).  
  
Lastly, we can confirm that these are indeed the relevant criteria by using them to explain 
retrospectively why Kant excluded the imagination’s schematism as an instrument for 
applying the moral law:  
 
1. The schema fails to meet the first criterion because, as a product of the imagination’s 
figurative synthesis, it is a sensible representation and would therefore contaminate the 
supersensible Ideas with sensible content (as in the first problem adduced above). 
 
2. Likewise, the transcendental schema cannot meet the second criterion: it does not 
represent the pure form of lawfulness, but instead ‘intuitivizes’ (veranschaulicht) the 
laws articulated by the pure concepts of the understanding by converting them into 
‘temporal laws’ of appearances (KrV A145/B184-185).80 
 
                                                
80 See Holm Tetens, Kant's "Kritik der reinen Vernunft": Ein systematischer Kommentar (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
2006), 127.  
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3. The schema does function as a mediating representation; nevertheless, it does not meet 
the third criterion, for it performs this function only within the parameters of the 
theoretical heterogeneity problem, not the practical heterogeneity problem. In other 
words, while it can successfully mediate between pure concepts of the understanding 
and sensible intuition, it cannot mediate between supersensible Ideas of reason and 
sensible intuition. 
 
4. The schema fails to meet the fourth criterion because it fails to provide a relevant 
procedure for judging actions from a properly moral point of view (as in the second 
problem adduced above). 
 
Given these shortcomings, it is no surprise that Kant rules out the imagination and turns 
instead to the understanding:  
“Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the 
imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature … [Folglich hat das 
Sittengesetz kein anderes die Anwendung desselben auf Gegenstände der Natur 
vermittelndes Erkenntnißvermögen, als den Verstand (nicht die Einbildungskraft) …]” 
(KpV 5: 69, my emphasis). 
But what makes the understanding a better option than the imagination? What are its particular 
capacities? Which particular representation could it furnish that would meet the four criteria 
for a ‘schema of the law itself’? To answer these questions, we must now examine Kant’s 
conception of the understanding as the “law-giver of nature.”  
 
3.3.	  The	  law	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  understanding	  	  
 
As is well known, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant identifies the understanding and 
sensibility as the two “fundamental sources of the mind [Grundquellen des Gemüts]” (KrV 
A50/B74). Kant’s critical model posits a fundamental separation between the two faculties as 
well as between their respective kinds of representations:  
If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected 
in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations 
itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. It comes along with our nature 
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that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which 
we are affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition, on the 
contrary, is the understanding. Intuitions and concepts therefore constitute the elements of 
all our cognition (KrV A51/B75).  
The understanding is characterized negatively as “a non-sensory faculty of cognition [ein 
nichtsinnliches Erkenntnisvermögen]” (KrV A67-8/B92), yet it also performs a range of 
positive functions, such as forming empirical and pure concepts as well as formulating logical 
rules. I will focus on its positive transcendental use, namely prescribing “laws … insofar as 
they are related to objects a priori” (KrV A57/B82). To this end, I will follow the guiding 
thread of the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
which, being written just before or even concurrently with the Critique of Practical Reason, I 
regard as the most relevant and authoritative source for interpreting Kant’s conception of the 
understanding in the Typic chapter. 
Kant opens the B Deduction by identifying the understanding’s particular transcendental 
function as “combination [Verbindung],” through which it spontaneously effects a synthesis of 
a manifold of intuition in general, and this, independently of sensibility: 
… the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the 
senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; 
for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call 
the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility [zum Unterschiede von der 
Sinnlichkeit], all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a 
combination of the the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case 
either of sensible or of non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding 
[Verstandeshandlung], which we could designate with the general title synthesis in order 
at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in 
the object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all 
representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but can be 
executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity [ein Actus seiner 
Selbsttätigkeit] (KrV B129-130). 
The understanding effects this combination of the manifold according to certain general forms 
of pure synthesis, namely the pure concepts of the understanding (KrV A78/B104). The 
categories are “concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as 
determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments” (KrV A94/B128). For 
example, to the logical functions of relation (categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive) there 
correspond three categories, i.e., forms of pure synthesis of intuitions in general: Inherence 
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and Subsistence (substance and accident), Causality and Dependence (cause and effect), and 
Community (reciprocity between agent and patient).81 
Crucially, Kant stresses in the B Deduction that this “combination of the understanding 
[Verstandesverbindung, synthesis intellectualis]” (KrV B151) operates completely 
independently from sensibility. Firstly, it is a spontaneous, original act of the understanding, a 
faculty that is radically separate from sensibility. Secondly, combination cannot possibly 
originate in sensibility: “the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come 
to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of 
sensible intuition” (KrV B129-1130).82 Thirdly, all of the representations originally produced 
by this “intellectual synthesis without any imagination merely through the understanding [der 
intellektuellen Synthesis ohne alle Einbildungskraft bloß durch den Verstand]” (KrV B152) – 
notably the pure concept of causality – are distinct and independent from sensible intuition: 
“the concept of cause itself … is always found a priori in the understanding, even 
independently of any intuition” (P 4: 49; cf. KpV 5: 56). Fourthly, intellectual synthesis has no 
intrinsic link to sensible intuition as such: combination applies a priori to a manifold of 
intuition in general, of which sensible intuition is just one particular parameter, as it were, out 
of a range of other types of intuition (which could conceivably include non-sensible ones) 
(KrV B153-154). Finally, while the understanding’s synthesis can ultimately be applied to 
sensible intuition, it does not thereby lose its purely conceptual, intellectual character. In 
effect, the categories, generated by a purely intellectual synthesis, are subsequently applied to 
the manifold of sensible intuition by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination on behalf 
of the understanding. In contrast to the A Deduction, in the B version Kant sharply 
distinguishes the two forms of synthesis from each other and orders them in a definite 
hierarchy – the sensible synthesis of the imagination is subordinated to the intellectual 
synthesis of the understanding insofar as the former serves as the mere “effect [Wirkung]” and 
“application [Anwendung]” of the latter: 
                                                
81 See the first chapter of the Analytic of Concepts, “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding” (KrV A66ff./B91ff.). 
82  [Allein die Verbindung (conjunctio) eines Mannigfaltigen überhaupt, kann niemals durch Sinne in uns 
kommen, und kann also auch nicht der reinen Form der sinnlichen Anschauung zugleich mitenthalten sein] 
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The synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a 
priori, can be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), as distinct from that which would be 
thought in the mere category in regard to the manifold of intuition in general, and which is 
called combination of the understanding (synthesis intellectualis) … the imagination is to 
this extent a faculty for determining sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in 
accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, 
which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application to objects of 
intuition that is possible for us. As figurative, it is distinct from the intellectual synthesis 
without any imagination merely through the understanding (KrV B151-2).83  
In other words, the understanding doesn’t get its hands dirty, but instead delegates the 
application of the categories to the imagination.  
The Deduction culminates with the revolutionary idea that the understanding lays down 
the conditions of a possible experience in general and thereby acts as the “lawgiver” of nature: 
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, thus to nature as the 
sum total of all appearances (natura materialiter spectata) … i.e., they … determine a 
priori the combination of the manifold of nature without deriving from the latter. ... all 
appearances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under the categories, 
on which nature (considered merely as nature in general) depends, as the original ground 
of its necessary lawfulness (as natura formaliter spectata) (KrV B163, B165) 
Let me unpack the different concepts of “nature” mentioned in this dense passage:  
 
• Nature in the material sense (die Natur in materieller Bedeutung, natura materialiter 
spectata) is the ‘stuff’ experience is made of (P 4: 318), namely the sum of spatio-
temporal appearances. 
 
• Nature in the formal sense, or formal nature (die Natur in formeller Bedeutung, das 
Formale der Natur, natura formaliter spectata) refers to the universal and necessary 
lawfulness of appearances in general, as articulated by the general conditions of the 
possibility of experience in general, namely the categories: “formal nature … is 
                                                
83 [Die Synthesis des Mannifaltigen der sinnlichen Anschauung, die a priori möglich und notwendig ist, kann 
figürlich (synthesis speciosa) genannt werden, zum Unterschiede von derjenigen, welche in Ansehung des 
Mannigfaltigen einer Anschauung überhaupt in der bloßen Kategorie gedacht würde, und Verstandesverbindung 
(synthesis intellectualis) heißt … so ist die Einbildungskraft so fern ein Vermögen, die Sinnlichkeit a priori zu 
bestimmen, und ihre Synthesis der Anschauungen, den Kategorien gemäß, muß die transzendentale Synthesis der 
Einbildungskraft sein, welches eine Wirkung des Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit und die erste Anwendung 
desselben (zugleich der Grund aller übrigen) auf Gegenstände der uns möglichen Anschauung ist. Sie ist, als 
figürlich, von der intellektuellen Synthesis ohne alle Einbildungskraft bloß durch den Verstand unterschieden.] 
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derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general and is fully identical 
with the mere universal lawfulness of experience [die (formale) Natur … ist mit der 
bloßen allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeit der letzteren völlig einerlei] (P 4: 319).”84 
 
• The concept of nature, or order of nature, in general (die Natur überhaupt, die 
Naturordnung überhaupt) represents the conjunction of the two, that is, the sum of all 
spatio-temporal appearances (material nature) under universal and necessary laws 
(formal nature) – yet sometimes Kant uses the expression to refer to the formal 
lawfulness of nature (e.g., KpV 5: 43). 
 
• Moreover, nature in general, as possible experience, is to be distinguished from a 
particular, or determinate, nature (eine bestimmte Naturordnung), i.e., a particular 
constellation of nature at a particular time, with particular empirical laws (P 4: 320).85  
 
Regarding the laws of nature, Kant distinguishes between the pure, or universal, laws of 
a nature in general, prescribed by the understanding to nature a priori, and the empirical laws 
of a particular nature, which, while they necessarily conform to the universal laws of nature, 
must nevertheless be investigated and discovered a posteriori (e.g., ‘Light travels at a constant 
                                                
84 Since this notion will figure prominently in my exegesis (esp. section 4.1.2. below), I will quote some 
additional passages in which it is described: “the understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature, and thus 
of the formal unity of nature [der Verstand ist selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur, und mithin der formalen 
Einheit der Natur]” (KrV A127-8). “The formal in nature … is therefore the conformity to law of all objects of 
experience, and, insofar as this conformity is cognized a priori, the necessary conformity to law of those objects 
[Das Formale der Natur … ist also die Gesetzmäßigkeit aller Gegenstände der Erfahrung und, sofern sie a priori 
erkannt wird, die nothwendige Gesetzmäßigkeit derselben]” (P 4: 296). “How is nature possible in the formal 
sense, as the sum total of the rules to which all appearances must be subject if they are to be thought as connected 
in one experience? The answer cannot come out otherwise than: it is possible only by means of the constitution of 
our understanding, in accordance with which all these representations of sensibility are necessarily referred to one 
consciousness, and through which, first, the characteristic mode of our thinking, namely by means of rules, is 
possible, and then, by means of these rules, experience is possible [Wie ist Natur in formeller Bedeutung, als der 
Inbegriff der Regeln, unter denen alle Erscheinungen stehen müssen, wenn sie in einer Erfahrung als verknüpft 
gedacht werden sollen, möglich? Die Antwort kann nicht anders ausfallen als: sie ist nur möglich vermittelst der 
Beschaffenheit unseres Verstandes, nach welcher alle jene Vorstellungen der Sinnlichkeit auf ein Bewußtsein 
nothwendig bezogen werden, und wodurch allererst die eigenthümliche Art unseres Denkens, nämlich durch 
Regeln, und vermittelst dieser die Erfahrung, welche von der Einsicht der Objecte an sich selbst ganz zu 
unterscheiden ist, möglich ist]” (P 4: 318). 
85 The latter distinction may sound odd, but it will become relevant to an interpretive point discussed below, in 
section 4.2.3.4. 
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speed of 299 792 458 m/s’): “There are therefore certain laws, and indeed a priori, which first 
make a nature possible; the empirical laws can only obtain and be found by means of 
experience, and indeed in accord with its original laws, in accordance with which experience 
itself becomes possible” (KrV A216/B263; cf. KrV A126-8, B165; P 4: 320).86 Among the 
universal laws of nature, pride of place belongs to the law of cause and effect, which states 
that for every alteration that occurs in time (i.e., every event), “something must have preceded 
it, upon which it necessarily followed, that is, it must have a cause” (KpV 5: 51). Indeed, Kant 
will often refer to it in the singular as the law of nature (das Naturgesetz), as it is this 
fundamental law of the understanding that first constitutes a “nature” (in the formal sense):  
The law of nature that everything that happens has a cause [Das Naturgesetz, daß alles, 
was geschieht, eine Ursache habe], that since the causality of this cause, i.e., the action, 
precedes in time and in respect of an effect that has arisen cannot have been always but 
must have happened, and so must also have had its cause among appearances, through 
which it is determined, and consequently that all occurrences are empirically determined 
in a natural order – this law, through which alone appearances can first constitute one 
nature and furnish objects of one experience [dieses Gesetz, durch welches Erscheinungen 
allererst eine Natur ausmachen, und Gegenstände einer Erfahrung abgeben können], is a 
law of the understanding [Verstandesgesetz], from which under no pretext can any 
departure be allowed or any appearance be exempted … (KrV A542/B570, B163, B165; 
Prol 4: 320).87 
Lastly, this universal law of nature has two aspects – form and matter – analogous to the 
formal and material aspects of nature discussed above. As the supreme law of nature, its form 
consists in a universal and necessary ‘exponent for a rule in general’ articulated by the faculty 
of rules, the understanding (KrV A126). As a law of nature, its matter consists of the sum of 
sensible appearances (i.e., nature in the material sense).  
 
In summary, the understanding, in its role as the law-giver of nature, spontaneously 
produces purely conceptual representations of universal lawfulness (allgemeine 
Gesetzmäßigkeit): the universal laws of nature, notably the law of physical causality, function 
as ‘exponents’ of the lawfulness of appearances in general; together, these laws make up an 
even more universal representation of lawfulness as such, namely formal nature, or the form of 
                                                
86  Cf. Ernst Cassirer, Zur Einstein'schen Relativitätstheorie: Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen (Berlin: 
Bruno Cassirer, 1920), 37-38. 
87 Note that Kant clearly emphasizes that this law is universal, admitting of no exceptions. See below, section 
4.2.1.3. 
 62 
nature (das Formale der Natur, natura formaliter spectata) which constitute the universal and 
systematic lawfulness of all appearances. These representations are purely conceptual, formal, 
and extremely abstract, yet they can nonetheless be applied to appearances in sensible intuition 
by means of the schematism. 
 
4. Solution 
 
So far, we have been analyzing the Typic chapter within a global problem structure. In section 
1, we identified the task, namely moral appraisal, which consists in subsuming particular 
actions under the moral law, thereby determining them as either good or evil “objects of pure 
practical reason.” In section 2, we identified ‘particular difficulties’ hindering this task, 
namely the heterogeneity between actions in sensible intuition on the one hand and the 
supersensible Idea of the moral law on the other. In section 3, we considered the available 
resources that might be used for overcoming these difficulties: the schema produced by the 
imagination, and the law of nature produced by the understanding. This examination rejected 
the transcendental schema, yet also revealed a “favourable prospect” for the pure practical 
power of judgment: it needs a ‘schema’ (in a generic sense) of the moral law. We have now 
arrived at the solution, the general principle of which can be articulated in terms of the four 
criteria adduced above:  
Find and employ (1) a sensibly uncontaminated representation (2) of the form of universal 
lawfulness (3) that can mediate the subsumption of particular actions given in sensible 
intuition under the supersensible moral law and (4) provide a procedure for moral 
appraisal. 
The business of this section is to explain Kant’s strategy for resolving the particular 
difficulties and for performing the task of moral appraisal, which is naturally the “typic of the 
pure practical power of judgment” announced in the title of the chapter.  
 
4.1.	  Overcoming	  the	  ‘particular	  difficulties’	  	  
4.1.1. Type1: the law of nature as the ‘type’ of the moral law 
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Kant’s original strategy is to employ the law of nature as the “type [Typus]” of the moral law:  
Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the 
imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature, and what the 
understanding can put under an idea of reason is not a schema of sensibility but a law, 
such a law, however, as can be presented in concreto in objects of the senses and hence a 
law of nature, though only as to its form; this law is what the understanding can put under 
an idea of reason on behalf of the power of judgment, and we can, accordingly, call it the 
type of the moral law (KpV 5: 69).88  
Several “universal laws of nature” flow from the categories (KrV A216/B263; P 4: 320), but 
here Kant is specifically referring to the universal law of nature par excellence, namely the 
law of “physical causality [die physische Causalität]” (KpV 5: 68), which states that for every 
alteration that occurs in time (i.e., every event), “something must have preceded it, upon which 
it necessarily followed, that is, it must have a cause” (KpV 5: 51; cf. KrV A542/B570; G 4: 
421). But what exactly does Kant mean by calling the law of nature the “type [Typus]” of the 
moral law? I propose to examine this new, unusual term below, in section 4.1.2. For now, I 
will assume that the “type” is functionally equivalent to a ‘schema of a law itself’ as 
characterized above (section 3.2.) and show, on the basis of the Typic chapter, that Kant 
selects the law of nature (das Naturgesetz) to serve as the type of the moral law because it 
satisfies the corresponding four criteria. 
 
(1) Non-sensible: 
 
In the passage quoted above (KpV 5: 69), Kant clearly emphasizes that the law of nature has a 
non-sensible nature and origin. He underlines that the type can only come from the 
understanding, not from the imagination. Correspondingly, the “type” that the understanding 
supplies is “not a schema of sensibility but a law [nicht ein Schema der Sinnlichkeit, sondern 
ein Gesetz]” (KpV 5: 69). And as we have seen, the universal law of nature is a pure, 
                                                
88 [Folglich hat das Sittengesetz kein anderes die Anwendung desselben auf Gegenstände der Natur vermittelndes 
Erkenntnißvermögen, als den Verstand (nicht die Einbildungskraft), welcher einer Idee der Vernunft nicht ein 
Schema der Sinnlichkeit, sondern ein Gesetz, aber doch ein solches, das an Gegenständen der Sinne in concreto 
dargestellt werden kann, mithin ein Naturgesetz, aber nur seiner Form nach, als Gesetz zum Behuf der 
Urtheilskraft unterlegen kann, und dieses können wir daher den Typus des Sittengesetzes nennen.] 
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conceptual product of intellectual synthesis and is therefore free of sensible contamination – 
just as required by the first criterion. 
 
(2) The form of lawfulness: 
 
The law of nature has a form and a matter. Its form prescribes universal conformity to the law 
of causality and thereby functions as the constitutive unifying principle of nature’s formal 
lawfulness (natura formaliter spectata) (KrV A227-228/B280).89 Its matter consists of the 
entities that it governs, namely the sum of sensible appearances (i.e., material nature, natura 
materialiter spectata). In the passage just quoted, Kant explicitly appeals to this distinction, 
specifying that the type is “a law of nature, though only as to its form [ein Naturgesetz, aber 
nur seiner Form nach]” (KpV 5: 69). From that point onwards in the Typic chapter, he 
repeatedly specifies that only the law of nature’s form serves as a type of the moral law: he 
refers to “the form of a law of nature in general [der Form eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt]” 
(KpV 5: 70) and the “formal rule of a law of nature in general [der formalen Regel eines 
Naturgesetzes überhaupt]” (KpV 5: 71). Thus, the form of the law of nature provides an 
impeccable representation of the form of universal lawfulness – and that is exactly what the 
second criterion calls for.  
 
(3) Mediation (typification): 
 
Kant selects the law of nature as the type of the moral law in order to serve as a ‘third thing’ or 
‘schema’ (in the broad sense) for mediating between the supersensible representation of the 
moral law and the sensible representations of actions – just as the third criterion requires.  
On the one hand, the law of nature considered ‘only as to its form’ is a sensibly 
uncontaminated representation of universal lawfulness, and to that extent it is compatible with 
the supersensible representation of the moral law, which also contains the form of universal 
lawfulness (G 4: 401-402, 420-421; KpV 5: 29, 33). In this respect, the two laws are analogous 
to each other in spite of the radical metaphysical difference between their respective 
                                                
89 As explained above, in section 3.3. 
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“determining grounds,” namely natural causality and free causality, respectively: “for to this 
extent laws as such are the same, no matter where they derive their determining grounds from 
[Denn Gesetze als solche sind so fern einerlei, sie mögen ihre Bestimmungsgründe 
hernehmen, woher sie wollen]” (KpV 5: 70).90  
On the other hand, situating the type at such a high level of abstraction and universality 
begs the question: Can the type be brought back down to earth and applied to particular 
actions (qua events) represented in sensible intuition? As a law of nature, it can indeed, for as 
such its applicability to sensible intuition is guaranteed by the schematism (as was already 
established in the first Critique): “To a natural law … there must correspond a schema, that is, 
a universal procedure of the imagination (by which it presents a priori to the senses the pure 
concept of the understanding which the law determines) [Dem Naturgesetze als Gesetze … 
muß ein Schema, d.i. ein allgemeines Verfahren der Einbildungskraft (den reinen 
Verstandesbegriff, den das Gesetz bestimmt, den Sinnen a priori darzustellen), 
correspondiren]” (KpV 5: 69). Accordingly, if Kant selects the law of nature to serve as a type 
for the moral law, it is because he needs “a law … [that] can be presented in concreto in 
objects of the senses and hence a law of nature [ein Gesetz, aber doch ein solches, das an 
Gegenständen der Sinne in concreto dargestellt werden kann, mithin ein Naturgesetz]” (KpV 
5: 69). Correspondingly, all actions given in sensibility can be subsumed under the type “as a 
law to which objects of sensible intuition as such are subject [als Gesetze, welchem die 
Gegenstände sinnlicher Anschauung als solche unterworfen sind]” (KpV 5: 69).  
Thus, the form of the law of nature occupies an intermediary position as a ‘third thing’ 
between the supersensible moral law and actions qua events in sensible intuition. Now, the 
process of mediation, which I will call “typification,” occurs in two stages:  
 
1. The form of the law of nature is analogically substituted for the supersensible moral 
law, as its type. 
 
2. The type is then applied, via the schematism, to actions given in sensible intuition, all 
of which eo ipso fall under the law of nature.  
                                                
90 I spell out this analogy in Ch. 2, section 4.2. 
 66 
 
In this way, actions are subsumed under a formal rule that serves as an adequate proxy for the 
moral law’s demand of conformity to universal law; conversely, the supersensible moral law 
receives a Darstellung without a (direct) Versinnlichung, insofar as it is applied to concrete 
cases through the mediation of a pure, formal representation produced by the understanding.91  
 
(4) A procedure for moral appraisal: 
 
Finally, Kant maintains that employing the law of nature as the type of the moral law provides 
an effective procedure for moral appraisal – just as required by the fourth criterion. The law of 
nature functions as a formal standard for testing the universalizability of maxims through a 
thought experiment in which one asks oneself if one could will one’s maxim to become a 
universal law of a counterfactual nature to which one would belong oneself (KpV 5: 69-70). 
This procedure for evaluating maxims is complex and controversial, however, so I will treat it 
separately in section 4.2. But first, I propose to examine an additional formulation of the type 
in order to extend and clarify the interpretation proposed here.  
 
4.1.2. Type2: Natura formaliter spectata  as the type of supersensible 
nature  
 
In a seldom noticed passage of the Typic chapter, Kant states that “it is also permitted to use 
the nature of the sensible world as the type of an intelligible nature [Es ist also auch erlaubt, 
die Natur der Sinnenwelt als Typus einer intelligiblen Natur zu brauchen]” (KpV 5: 70). The 
expression “it is also permitted” at the head of a fresh paragraph, signals a separate, additional 
element in Kant’s exposition. And as Marty has aptly pointed out, this second formulation is 
significantly more general than the first: here, the “nature” of the sensible world as a whole is 
a type of the “nature” of the intelligible world as a whole, whereas the first formulation of the 
type involves only a single law – the law of nature –  serving as the type for the (one and only) 
                                                
91 This point is well explained in Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 308ff. 
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moral law.92 Thus it appears that Kant in fact introduces a second formulation of the type, or 
even a second type (henceforth “Type2”), in addition to the law of nature (henceforth 
“Type1”). Here I offer an exegetical account of the source, nature, and function of Type2, 
which I then compare with other interpretations in the secondary literature. 
 
4.1.2.1 The source of Type2 
 
This second, more general type derives directly from an earlier passage from the “Deduction 
of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason” in which Kant characterizes the moral vocation of 
human beings. In this rich and quintessentially Kantian passage, we are told that the moral law 
commands us, as finite rational beings, to impart the world in which we live and act – i.e., 
sensible nature – with the form of a purely intelligible moral order – i.e., supersensible nature: 
This law [i.e., the moral law – AW] is to furnish the sensible world, as a sensible nature 
… with the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a supersensible nature … 
Now, nature in the most general sense is the existence of things under laws. … The 
supersensible nature of [rational] beings … is their existence in accordance with laws that 
are independent of any empirical condition and thus belong to the autonomy of pure 
reason. … This law of autonomy, however, is the moral law, which is therefore the 
fundamental law of a supersensible nature and of a pure world of the understanding, the 
counterpart of which is to exist in the sensible world but without infringing upon its laws. 
The former could be called the archetypal world (natura archetypa) which we cognize 
only in reason, whereas the latter could be called the ectypal world (natura ectypa) 
because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former as the determining ground 
of the will (KpV 5: 43). 
This passage is the only place in the Critique of Practical Reason where Kant employs a 
vocabulary that bears a direct etymological relation to the key terms “Typus” and “Typik”: 
here, Kant speaks of a “natura archetypa” and a “natura ectypa” (KpV 5: 43). It is significant 
that Kant felt the need to supply these Fremdwörter in addition to their German counterparts 
(“urbildliche Welt” and “nachgebildete Welt”), for it suggests that he deemed them necessary 
for his philosophical purposes.93 Indeed, the words themselves tell an illuminating story. 
                                                
92 Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique, 252. 
93 Compare, for instance, Kant’s remarks in the Critique of Pure Reason on the importance of the original 
(Platonic) meaning of the term “Idea” (KrV A312ff./B369ff.). In addition, scholars have brought out the deep 
conceptual and philosophical import of other deliberately employed non-Germanic words such as “Deduction” 
and “Factum” in their respective contexts – see D. Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the 
Methodological Background of the First Critique," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. E. Förster (Stanford: 
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While Kant indicates the terms in Latin, the family of words related to Typus originally stems 
from ancient Greek. Kant was doubtless aware of this fact, for if there was one valuable thing 
that he acquired as a youth from his despised school in Königsberg, the Collegium 
Fredericianum, it was an excellent command of the ancient languages, including ancient and 
Biblical Greek. Originally, the ancient Greek word “túpos” (τύπος), deriving from the verb 
forms meaning ‘to strike’ (τύπτω) or ‘to stamp’ (τυπόω), had three related meanings: (1) that 
which stamps, impresses, or imprints; (2) that which is stamped, impressed or imprinted; and 
(3) the relationship between two things.94 After the classical period, the more univocal 
composite words ‘archetype’ (archetupos, ἀρχέτυπος) and ‘ectype’ (ectupos, ἔκτυπος) were 
coined to denote, respectively, (1) the original, impressing model and (2) the shape that is 
imprinted or copied.95 Although these coinages did not entirely supplant the wide application 
of ‘type’, they did allow its third sense to emerge more sharply, as from then on ‘type’ tout 
court could refer more precisely to what the arche-type and the ec-type have in common, 
namely (3) a shared relation, pattern, outline, or form (without the matter).96 I want to suggest 
that these three root meanings respectively inform Kant’s concepts of an “archetypal nature 
(natura archetypa),” “ectypal nature (natura ectypa),” and “type (Typus).” 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Stanford University Press, 1989); Pauline Kleingeld, "Moral consciousness and the 'fact of reason'," in Kant's 
Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide, ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
94 “Die Bezeichnung [Typus] geht auf griech. týpos zurück; im profanen wie im biblischen griechischen 
Sprachgebrauch verweist sie auf das Prägende (Prägestempel, Prägeform, Vorlage) wie auf das Geprägte 
(Siegelabdruck, Prägung, Kopie, Münzbild, Gestalt, Form, Muster), also (auch) auf eine Beziehung zwischen 
zwei Dingen” – "Typologie,"  in Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, ed. Gert Ueding (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
2009), 843. 
95 “Im Griechischen von τύπτω ‘schlagen’ bzw. τυπόω ‘prägen’ abgeleitet, bedeutet Typus im handwerklich-
künstlerischen Bereich die ‘prägende Form’ (Hohlform, Skizze) wie das ‘Geprägte (Relief, Statue, eingravierter 
Buchstabe, allgemein auch ‘Abdruck’, z.B. eines Siegelringes oder Münzstempels. Weiter finden sich die 
Bedeutungen ‘Umriß’, ‘Gestalt’, ‘Form’ und ‘Art’. Als ‘Vorbild’ und ‘Muster’ steht T[ypus] dem Begriff 
παράδειγµα (‘Paradigma’) nahe und wird im nachklassischen Zeit meist durch die in diesem Sinne eindeutigeren 
Komposita ἀρχέτυπος (‘Archetyp’) oder  προτότυπος (‘Protoyp’) erstetzt. Als ‘Abbild’ tritt T[ypus] wie ἔκτυπος 
(‘Ektyp’)” – "Typos; Typologie,"  in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried 
Gründer (Darmstadt: WBG, 1998), 1587. 
96 Liddell & Scott list “form,” “pattern” and “outline” as meanings of the term – see "τύπος,"  in A Greek-English 
Lexicon, ed. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and revised and augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart 
Jones with the assistance of Roderick Mackenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1835. 
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4.1.2.2 The nature of Type2 
 
In Kant, the expressions “natura archetypa” and “natura ectypa” designate a correlative pair 
of concepts, each of which is a hybrid containing both ontological and moral elements. Kant 
characterizes the intelligible world as an “archetypal nature (natura archetypa)”: it constitutes 
a nature “in the most general sense [of] the existence of things under laws” insofar as all 
rational denizens of the noumenal realm are universally governed by the law of autonomy 
(KpV 5: 43); and it represents a pure rational archetype of moral order that is to be copied in 
the sensible world. Correlatively, Kant characterizes the sensible world as an “ectypal nature 
(natura ectypa)”: it constitutes an ordered, lawful nature insofar as all spatio-temporal objects 
within it obey the law of natural causality; and from a practical point of view, it can be 
regarded as an ectype insofar as it represents a potential ‘counterpart’ or ‘copy’ (Gegenbild) of 
the archetypal moral cosmos – or, as Kant puts it, “because it contains the possible effect of 
the idea of [archetypal nature] as the determining ground of the will.” Introducing these two 
concepts allows Kant to articulate the practical vocation of finite rational beings as the task of 
instituting a systematic moral order here on Earth, which amounts to copying, or as it were 
‘imprinting’, the universal lawful form of supersensible nature onto sensible nature by 
systematically performing morally good actions. 
Kant does not introduce Type2 in the Deduction passage (KpV 5: 43), but only later, in 
the Typic chapter proper (KpV 5: 70). The Typic chapter is to the second Critique what the 
Schematism chapter is to the first Critique. Accordingly, we can expect Type2 to be a special 
representation that will mediate between, on the one hand, the representation of “archetypal 
nature” as a supersensible Idea produced by reason, and on the other hand, the representation 
of “ectypal nature” as the sum of sensible intuitions that compose phenomenal experience. In 
other words, we are looking for a ‘schema’ – in a generic, functional sense – that can form a 
bridge between two heterogeneous representations (cf. KpV 5: 68). 
Type2 is the understanding’s representation of the pure form of nature, or natura 
formaliter spectata (KpV 5: 70). This corresponds to the narrow sense of the word “túpos” in 
ancient Greek as the abstract form shared by the archetupos and ectupos. Indeed, what 
supersensible nature and sensible nature share, in spite of their specific differences, is the form 
of “nature” itself (natura formaliter spectata): “Natural (formaliter) means what follows 
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necessarily according to laws of a certain order of whatever sort, hence under the moral order 
as well as the physical order” (ED 8: 333n, trans. mod.).97 In other words, nature in a formal 
sense is “the form of universal lawfulness in general” (P 4: 318-320; G 4: 37), and therefore it 
inheres in both supersensible nature and sensible nature qua representations of ‘nature’ i.e., 
insofar as they both constitute, albeit in different spheres, a lawful and ordered universe. And 
it just so happens that we already possess a representation of this very formal lawfulness a 
priori, since, as established in the Critique of Pure Reason, the form of nature is produced 
transcendentally by the understanding (KrV B163, B165). Thus “reason is entitled and even 
required to use nature (in the understanding’s pure form of nature) [die Natur (der reinen 
Verstandesform derselben nach)] as the type of judgment” (KpV 5: 70, my emphasis). This 
abstract conceptual form is shared by – and can thereby mediate between – the supersensible 
representation of archetypal nature and the sensible representation of ectypal nature, as shown 
in the following figure:   
natura archetypa 
“supersensible nature [die übersinnliche Natur]” 
(i.e., the rational Idea of a perfect moral order in the intelligible realm) 
natura ‘rationaliter’ spectata 
| 
Type2 
“nature (in the understanding’s pure form of nature) 
[die Natur (der reinen Verstandesform derselben nach)]” 
(i.e., the purely conceptual “form of lawfulness in general”  
prescribed to experience by the understanding) 
natura formaliter spectata 
| 
natura ectypa 
“sensible nature [die sinnliche Natur]” 
(i.e., nature as the sum of sensible intuitions & schematized categories) 
natura materialiter spectata 
 
                                                
97 [Natürlich (formaliter) heißt, was nach Gesetzen einer gewißen Ordnung, welche es auch sei, mithin auch der 
moralischen (also nicht immer bloß der physischen) nothwendig folgt] 
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It is indeed this formal representation of nature that Kant has in mind when he states in 
the Typic chapter that the power of judgment can “use the nature of the sensible world as the 
type of an intelligible nature” (KpV 5: 70). The formulation is confusing: at first sight, “the 
nature of the sensible world” seems to correspond to “sensible nature” rather than to the 
“understanding’s pure form of nature”; however, this would imply that sensible nature is at 
once the type and the ectype of archetypal nature, which is absurd. Despite their similarity, the 
expressions “sensible nature” and “nature of the sensible world” are not in fact synonymous in 
this context. On the one hand, “sensible nature [die sinnliche Natur]” designates the sum of 
sensible intuitions and schematized categories making up phenomenal experience and which 
Kant calls “nature in the material sense” or “natura materialiter spectata” (P 4: 318); it is the 
ectype vis-à-vis archetypal nature. On the other hand, the ‘nature of the sensible world [die 
Natur der Sinnenwelt]’ designates “the understanding’s pure form of nature,” i.e., the pure 
“form of lawfulness in general” (KpV 5: 70) which the understanding thinks into sensible 
nature a priori and which the power of judgment then extracts from sensible nature in order to 
use it as a type: “the power of judgment […] takes from sensible nature nothing more than 
what pure reason can also think for itself, that is, conformity with law, [von der sinnlichen 
Natur nichts weiter nimmt, als was auch reine Vernunft für sich denken kann, d.i. die 
Gesetzmäßigkeit] and transfers [it] into the supersensible” (KpV 5: 71).98 
What kind of representation is Type2? Natura formaliter spectata is a formal matrix 
composed of all the a priori rules (laws) of possible experience; it is a purely conceptual fabric 
woven from purely conceptual threads (P 4: 318). Type2 is thus an abstract, formal, and purely 
conceptual representation produced by the intellectual synthesis (synthesis intellectualis) (KrV 
B151) of the understanding – “a non-sensory faculty of cognition” (KrV A67-8/B92). As such, 
it belongs to the same representational genus as Type1, which is a pure Verstandesgesetz (KrV 
A542/B570). And while in this respect Type2 is extremely abstract, Kant emphasizes that ‘the 
form of lawfulness in general’ is nevertheless a concept that “occurs even in the most common 
use of reason” (KpV 5: 70). The original representation of the form of lawfulness is not 
abstracted from experience through conscious inquiry, but is rather a transcendental condition 
of the possibility of experience and can therefore be presupposed a priori in every normal 
                                                
98 Cf. Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 309. 
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subject. In summary, Type2 is an a priori, purely conceptual representation of the abstract 
form of nature’s universal lawfulness, which is the pattern, or “type,” shared by the 
representations of archetypal nature and ectypal nature. 
 
4.1.2.3. The function of Type2 
 
To recall, we expect the type to perform a function analogous to that of the schema, i.e., 
mediating between heterogeneous representations, with the difference that the type should 
mediate between Ideas and intuitions rather than between categories and intuitions. Like 
Type1, Type2 performs its mediating function through a process that I term typification, 
whereby a conceptual representation of the understanding is “transferred” or “transposed” 
(übertragen) between supersensible Ideas and sensible intuitions despite their representational 
heterogeneity, as explained in the Typic chapter: 
Hence it is also permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an 
intelligible nature, provided that I do not carry over into the latter intuitions and what 
depends on them but refer to it merely the form of lawfulness in general (the concept of 
which occurs even in the most common use of reason … For to this extent laws as such 
are the same, no matter where they derive their determining grounds from. … [T]he power 
of judgment … takes from sensible nature nothing more than what pure reason can also 
think for itself, that is, conformity with law [Gesetzmäßigkeit], and transfers into the 
supersensible nothing but what can, conversely, be really exhibited by actions in the 
sensible world in accordance with a formal rule of a law of nature in general (KpV 5: 70-
71, trans. mod.).  
On the one hand, in virtue of its purity as a non-sensible, conceptual representation of formal 
lawfulness, Type2 can be referred to the supersensible Idea of natura archetypa without 
contaminating it; Type2 thereby gives us a conceptual grasp of the formal architecture of the 
archetypal world and hence of a lawful moral order, while preserving the purity of the 
supersensible Idea. On the other hand, Type2 is compatible with the sensible representation of 
ectypal nature: natura formaliter spectata, as the blueprint of the a priori laws of sensible 
nature, can be schematized within sensible experience, as the first Critique proved, and can 
thus be applied to all actions and agents within it. In addition, because Type2 is a produced 
representation produced a priori by the understanding, it is available to everyone: “This is 
how even the most common understanding judges [so urtheilt selbst der gemeinste Verstand]” 
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(KpV 5: 70). Thus Type2 allows a presentation without sensible rendering, or a ‘Darstellung 
without Versinnlichung’, of the supersensible moral order while guarding against the dangers 
of “empiricism” and “mysticism,” which unduly sensibilize this Idea (KpV 5: 70-71).99 
Also like Type1, Type2 ultimately enables a specifically practical task, yet the latter’s 
function is more general than the former’s. Type1 provides a precise procedure for morally 
appraising concrete actions one at a time by means of a thought-experiment that tests whether 
each individual maxim could be universalized as a law of nature (KpV 5: 69).100 Type2’s 
function is more general, even holistic – it serves as a regulative “pattern [Muster]” for moral 
appraisal, deliberation and action by facilitating the coordination of maxims in general:   
“The most ordinary attention to oneself confirms that this idea is really, as it were, a 
sketch of the pattern for the determinations of our will [Daß diese Idee wirklich unseren 
Willensbestimmungen gleichsam als Vorzeichnung zum Muster liege, bestätigt die 
gemeinste Aufmerksamkeit auf sich selbst.] … [W]e are conscious through reason of a law 
to which all our maxims are subject, as if a natural order must at the same time arise from 
our will. This law must therefore be the idea of a nature not given empirically and yet 
possible through freedom, hence a supersensible nature … (KpV 5: 44, trans. mod.).  
In other words, employing natura formaliter spectata as the type of a perfect moral order 
allows the moral agent to anticipate the form that all of her own maxims, and indeed 
everyone’s maxims taken together, ought to collectively constitute: a system that has “the 
form of nature,” i.e., a system that is unified, ordered, and lawful (gesetzmäßig). And this, in 
turn, serves as a reliable and recognizable guide judging the universalizability of maxims in 
general.  
 
4.1.2.4. Type2 in the secondary l iterature 
 
I will now compare my interpretation of  Type2 with some other accounts that have been 
proposed in the secondary literature. I contend that Type2 should not be characterized as a 
sensible image or symbol, as a teleological realm, as the intelligible world per se, or as a 
fiction. 
 
                                                
99 Cf. ———, Kant aujourd'hui, 309-310. 
100 See below, section 4.2.1.4. 
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a) Type2 as a “sensible image” or “symbol” 
 
My interpretation of Type2 as a pure, formal, and abstract representation goes against the 
thesis put forward by some scholars, notably Susan Meld Shell, that the term “Typus” here 
signifies a ‘sensible image’ (Sinnbild). Shell bases her gloss on the etymology of Kant’s term:  
The typic expresses the abstract and objective moral law in terms subjectively concrete 
and comprehensible. Like the túpos or stamp, which translates force into image, the typic 
translates the moral law, which ‘forces itself’ on our consciousness, into a figure we can 
‘see’ or ‘imagine’ (einbilden) … [t]he archetype (Urbild) and ectype (Nachbild) are 
connected by a kind of visible construction (Bild).101  
However, the suggestion that Kant’s type is a picture, or image, that we can “imagine 
(einbilden)” is directly contradicted by the text of the Typic chapter, which clearly states that 
“the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the imagination) 
[nicht die Einbildungskraft] by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature” (KpV 5: 
69). Moreover, Shell’s etymological gloss of the term “Typus” as a stamp or image (Bild) is 
too concrete: as we have seen, in ancient Greek the word “túpos” already admitted of a more 
abstract sense of a shared formal relation between two terms. In the context of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, it is all the more necessary to recognize that what Kant calls a “type” is not 
literally, or even metaphorically, a physical object  or image, but rather a representation of an 
abstract relational structure (i.e., ‘the form of lawfulness in general’).  
 In a similar vein, Paton proposed that Kant’s term “type” should be understood as a 
particular kind of Sinnbild, namely the kind of symbolic prefiguration that has played such an 
important role in Scriptural exegesis.102 In his interpretation of the Typic chapter, he observes: 
“The word ‘type’ is commonly used in theology in more or less the same way as Kant uses the 
word ‘symbol’: it is that by which something is symbolised or figured. Thus the people of 
Israel are said to be a type of God’s people, and the Paschal lamb is said to be a type of Christ. 
Kant’s application of the word to the law of nature is a natural extension of this usage.”103 It 
should be clear by now, however, that the two contexts could not be more different: the Typic 
                                                
101 The Rights of Reason, 82, 86.   
102 “Die idee in concreto ist das Urbild in rationalem Verstande. Die Regel in concreto ist das Beyspiel. Das 
analogon des Urbildes ist das Sinnbild (typus), das des Beyspiels ist Gleichnis. … ” (Refl 4983, 18: 51).  
103 The Categorical Imperative, 160. 
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chapter has nothing to do with the figural interpretation of Scripture; and Kant’s technical 
philosophical usage of the term “Typus” to denote a formal representation produced by the 
understanding’s intellectual synthesis is anything but a “natural extension” of Biblical 
symbolism.104 More generally, although the interpretation of the type as a symbol is relatively 
popular among commentators, it has serious philological and philosophical flaws, as I argue 
more extensively in the next chapter. 
 
b) Type2 as a teleological “realm” 
 
Many scholars, starting with Paton, have given Type2 a teleological gloss. Based on the 
Groundwork, they identify “intelligible nature” with the “kingdom,” or “realm of ends [Reich 
der Zwecke]” whose counterpart – read: “type” – is the “kingdom,” or “realm of nature [Reich 
der Natur]” (G 4: 438f.). For example, Ernst Cassirer writes: “But the “nature” meant [in the 
Typic chapter –AW] is not the sensuous existence of objects, but the systematic interrelation 
of individual ends and their harmonious composition in a ‘final end.’ It is a model, a type, 
against which we measure every particular determination of the will …”105 Indeed, some 
                                                
104 The difference becomes immediately clear when one considers some concrete examples of the nature and 
function of typology in Scriptural exegesis: “The Church fathers often justify figural interpretation on the basis of 
certain passages in early Christian writings, mostly from the Pauline Epistles. The most important of these is I 
Cor. 10:6 and 11, where the Jews in the desert are termed typoi hemon (“figures of ourselves”), and where it is 
written that tauta de typikos synebainen ekeinois (“these things befell them as figures”). Another passage often 
adduced is Gal. 4:21-31, where Paul explains to the freshly baptized Galatians, who, still under the influence of 
Judaism, wished to be circumcised, the difference between law and grace, the old and the new covenant, 
servitude and freedom, by the example of Hagar-Ishmael and Sarah-Isaac, linking the narrative in Genesis with 
Is. 54:1 and interpreting it in terms of figural prophecy. Still others are Col. 2:16f., saying that the Jewish dietary 
laws and holidays are only the shadow of things to come, whereas the body is Christ; Rom. 5:12ff. and I Cor. 
15:21, where Adam appears as the typos of the future Christ, and grace is opposed to the law; II Cor. 3:13, which 
speaks of the veil (kalymnos) that covers the Scritpure when the Jews read it; and finally Heb. 8:11ff., where the 
sacrifice of Christ’s blood is represented as the fulfillment of the high priest’s sacrifice in the Old Testament.” 
Erich Auerbach, "Figura," in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 49-50.  
105 Kant's Life and Thought, 259; Kants Leben und Lehre, 250. See also Beck, Commentary, 158-160; Bielefeldt, 
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 181-182; Hermann Cohen, Kants Begründung der 
Ethik. Nebst ihren Anwendungen auf Recht, Religion und Geschichte, 2nd, expanded ed. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 
1910), 277; Grondin, "Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen Gesetzes," 394; Shell, The Rights of Reason, 88. 
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scholars have gone so far as to argue that only a teleological interpretation of the Typic chapter 
makes sense.106 
This interpretation is problematic, however. On the one hand, the realm of nature is a 
teleological conception of nature as a harmonious and hierarchical whole (G 4: 436n) “insofar 
as and because it has reference to rational beings as its ends” (G 4: 438); the realm of ends is 
conceived, by analogy, as a lawful and harmonious noumenal community of rational beings 
qua ends in themselves, united under God, conceived as a “sovereign [Oberhaupt]” (G 4: 438-
9). On the other hand, neither ends nor teleological hierarchies nor anything like a “sovereign” 
have any place whatsoever in “the understanding’s pure form of nature,” (KpV 5: 70) which is 
merely the abstract conceptual representation of lawful order that the understanding – the 
faculty of rules, not of ends – imposes on phenomenal experience a priori: “The 
understanding … in its transcendental legislation for nature … takes into consideration only 
the conditions of the possibility of an experience in general as far as its form is concerned” 
(EEKU 20: 210, my emphasis).107 Kant reiterated this point in a letter to his friend Jacob 
Sigismund Beck, where he took pains to emphasize that Type2 abstracts from everything 
except the mere form of lawfulness of a natural order in general: “But there is in that type only 
the form of a natural order in general, that is, the contexture of actions as events under moral 
laws just as under natural laws qua universal [Aber es ist in jenem Typus nur die Form einer 
Naturordnung überhaupt d.i. der Zusammenhang der Handlungen als Begebenheiten nach 
sittlichen Gesetzen gleich als Naturgesetzen blos ihrer Allgemeinheit nach].”108 Finally, the 
teleological interpretation of Type2’s mediating function turns out to be incoherent even on its 
own terms. If archetypal nature and Type2 are both conceived as teleological representations 
produced by reason, then ipso facto they must share the very same rational order – but then, 
they appear to be indistinguishable. This problem becomes especially evident in Aune’s gloss, 
which begins as follows: 
                                                
106 Bruce Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1979), 51ff; Konhardt, Die 
Einheit der Vernunft, 295ff; Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 149ff. By contrast, Lewis White Beck proposes a 
more moderate and inclusive version of the teleological interpretation in his Commentary, 154-163.  
107 Incidentally, Kant’s explicit identification of Type2 with “the understanding’s pure form of nature” directly 
contradicts Konhardt’s argument that the “form of lawfulness” in question is a teleological representation proper 
to the power of judgment; see Die Einheit der Vernunft, 297.  
108 Letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, 3 July 1792 (11: 348, trans. mod.).  
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The laws of freedom define a possible ‘order’ of rational wills. As imperfectly rational 
natural beings, our only available model for such a rational order is nature ‘as regards its 
form’, that is, as a system of natural laws. These natural laws are to be understood 
teleologically: they describe a world in which each element has a natural place or function 
and in which everything that happens contributes to some supreme end.… In conceiving 
of nature this way we are imposing a rational order on it; we are conceiving it as a 
fundamentally rational system. As so conceived, the formal structure of natural laws is not 
just analogous to the formal structure of rational laws: the formal structure is the same in 
both cases.109 
Then, in an endnote appended to this passage, Aune recognizes that this way of interpreting 
the text is problematic: “A problem worth thinking about arises here: If we need the typic for 
the moral law because we have no direct access to the domain of perfectly rational beings, 
how can Kant’s typic, which requires us to view nature as a rational system, possibly be 
comprehensible to us?”110 In other words, by construing the Type2 as identical with what it is 
supposed to typify, i.e., supersensible nature, the teleological intepretation makes the typic 
seem useless. 
 
c) Type2 as “intelligible” nature 
 
We encounter a similar conflation of type and archetype in Grondin’s interpretation of the 
Typic. While Grondin correctly identifies Type2 as natura formaliter spectata, he goes on to 
identify this intellectual representation produced by the understanding with the intelligible 
world on the basis of the ostensible synonymy of the expressions “Verstandeswelt,” 
“intelligible Welt” and “intellectuelle Welt.”111 This leads Grondin to declare that Kant’s typic 
is useless: if the type is an ‘intelligible nature’ infinitely remote from sensibility, then we 
would need an additional typic for employing it.112 Grondin then goes on to propose that the 
                                                
109 Kant's Theory of Morals, 58-60. 
110 Kant's Theory of Morals, 204, note 231. 
111 "Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen Gesetzes," 393-394. 
112 “Hat die Typik ihre Aufgabe einer Vermittlung zwischen dem Sittengesetz und der Sinnen weit schließlich 
gelöst? Im Grunde genommen: Nein, aber in diesem großartigem Verzicht ist die Typik vielleicht doch ihrem 
unmöglichen Ziel nähergekommen. Nein, entscheidend nein, weil sie eine »Vermittlung«, wie die der 
Schematismus der Einbildungskraft leistete, zwischen der Vernunft und dem »Empirischen« auf keinen Fall 
zuwege gebracht hat. Durch die Typik und ihre Verstandesvorstellung eines intelligiblen Reiches der Zweck, die 
nicht von dieser Welt sind, wurde vielleicht das sittliche Gesetz sogar in eine noch weiter, kaum nochvollziehbare 
Ferne gerückt. Denn: Wie kann ich mir eine ‘intelligible Natur’ vorstellen? Auch dafür bedürfte es wohl einer 
weiteren Typik.” "Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen Gesetzes," 394.  
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typic’s “great renunciation” to mediate the moral law must give way to an alternative, 
“phenomenological” mode of presentation, namely the mystical experience of “awe 
[Ehrfurcht]” inspired by “the miracle of moral elevation above and beyond the sensible world 
[das Wunder der sittlichen Erhebung über das Sinnliche hinaus].”113 But in fact the terms 
“intellectual” (intellectuell) and “intelligible” (intelligible) are not synonymous. In the passage 
cited by Grondin, Kant does seem to use the terms in a loose way (G 4: 451ff.); however, in 
other passages (including one from the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, written 
only a year before the Typic), Kant carefully distinguishes them: “For the cognitions through 
the understanding are intellectual [intellektuell], and the same sort of cognitions also refer to 
our sensible world; but intelligible [intelligibel] means objects insofar as they can be 
represented only through the understanding, and none of our sensory intuitions can refer to 
them” (P 4: 316n; cf. KrV B312n.). Accordingly, the understanding’s intellectual 
representation of nature (natura formaliter spectata) is not identical with the intelligible 
world. Therefore, the alleged useless of the type does not follow: Type2 is not an infinitely 
remote intelligible object, but rather an intellectual representation which can “also refer to our 
sensible world” (as the a priori form of its universal lawfulness). Indeed, this representation 
“occurs even in the most common use of reason” (KpV 5: 70).  
 
d) Type2 as a “fiction” 
 
In the early twentieth century, the renowned and controversial Kant scholar Hans Vaihinger 
devoted a substantial part of his Philosophie des Als-Ob to adducing ostensible textual 
evidence that the philosophy of the great Kant was rife with fictions, i.e., ideas that we treat as 
if they were true or real even though we know – or ought to know, hence the urgency of 
Vaihinger’s message – that they are actually false or impossible. Naturally, Vaihinger pounced 
on the occurrences of the expression “as if” in and around the Typic chapter, and he 
triumphantly declared that Kant’s doctrine that the sensible world serves as the type of 
                                                
113 Ibid. 
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intelligible nature proves the latter to be a fiction.114 Famously, Vaihinger’s appropriation of 
Kant so outraged his fellow scholar Erich Adickes that the latter devoted an entire book to 
decrying and redressing Vaihinger’s “fictionalist violation [fiktionalistische Vergewaltigung]” 
of the critical philosophy.115 Significantly, of the countless passages tendentiously intepreted 
by Vaihinger, Adickes regarded the Typic as one of the most important – and egregious – 
examples.116 As Adickes never tired of pointing out throughout his extensive critique, not 
every occurrence of the expression “as if” in the Kantian corpus denotes a fiction in the 
peculiar sense of Vaihinger’s ‘as-if’ philosophy. 117 And Adickes denounced this philological 
“sleight of hand [Kunstgriff]” in Vaihinger’s gloss of the Typic chapter: Kant of course never 
said – and never would have said – that we are “only members of the sensible world” and that 
we therefore merely fool ourselves into regarding ourselves only “as if” we belonged to a 
higher order; on the contrary, Kant asserts in many places that the intelligible world exists, that 
we are indeed members of it and that we can even positively cognize its fundamental law. In 
short, we can agree with Adickes that Vaihinger’s construal of intelligible nature as a mere 
fiction is a theory-driven distortion of Kant’s text. 
In summary, the difficulties of the above-mentioned interpretations lead to the 
conclusion that Type2 should not be characterized as a sensible image, a symbol, a teleological 
hierarchy, the intelligible world per se, or a fiction. Instead, Type2 should be conceived as the 
abstract form shared by natura archetypa and natura ectypa, namely the understanding’s 
                                                
114 “… die „übersinnliche Natur“ besteht eben dann rein nur aus den tatsächlich vorhandenen Willenssubjekten, 
welche, nach jenem Prinzip der Allgemeinheit zu handeln, entschlossen sind und sich als konstituierende Bürger 
einer Geisterwelt „betrachten“, „ansehen“, d.h. so tun, handeln, denken und fühlen, als ob sie Glieder einer 
übersinnlichen Ordnung wären. In diesem Sinne sind wir „gesetzgebende Glieder eines durch Freiheit möglichen, 
durch praktische Vernunft uns zur Achtung vorgestellten Reiches der Sitten“, in diesem Sinne und nur in diesem 
Sinne „widerfährt uns durch eine reine praktische Vernunft vermittelst des moralischen Gesetzes die Eröffnung 
einer intelligiblen Welt durch Realisierung des sonst transzendenten Begriffs der Freiheit“, d.h. wir handeln, als 
ob wir frei wären, und indem wir durch diese Idee der Freiheit unseren Willen bestimmen, fühlen wir uns, als ob 
wir, trotzdem wir nur Glieder der sinnlichen Welt sind, Glieder einer höheren Ordnung der Dinge wären. In 
diesem Sinne „betrachtet sich die handelnde Person als Noumenon.” Die Philosophie des Als Ob: System der 
theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus; 
mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche, 8th ed. (Leipiz: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1922), 655. 
115 Kant und die Als-Ob-Philosophie (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927), 169. 
116 “An der wichtigsten von [den von Vaihinger verfiktionalisierten – AW] Stellen ist die Interpretation eine so 
ungeheurliche, daß sie auch nicht einmal den schwächsten Schein eines Rechts für sich in Anspruch nehmen 
kann. Sie steht in dem Abschnitt „Von der Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft,” Kant und die Als-Ob-
Philosophie (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927), 193. 
117 Kant und die Als-Ob-Philosophie, 17f. 
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purely conceptual representation of nature’s universal lawfulness (natura formaliter spectata). 
Type2 mediates between reason’s Idea of a supersensible ‘nature’ under the law of freedom 
and the sensible nature in which we live and act, thereby providing a regulative horizon for 
our moral vocation that simultaneously heeds the strictures of Kant’s critical rationalism. 
More generally, I will suggest in the Conclusion that the typic marks a decisive stage in the 
evolution of Kant’s conception of nature and morality as two distinct realms, mediated by the 
concepts of law and lawfulness (Gesetzmässigkeit).  
 
4.2.	  Accomplishing	  the	  task	  
4.2.1. The typic-procedure  
 
Remarkably, after the abstract discussions of objects of pure practical reason, intellectual 
synthesis, the form of lawfulness, etc., the resulting procedure that Kant proposes for moral 
appraisal presents itself as relatively straightforward:   
The rule of the power of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: Ask 
yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of 
which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will. 
Everyone does, in fact, appraise actions as morally good or evil by this rule. Thus one 
says: if everyone permitted himself to deceive when he believed it to be to his advantage, 
or considered himself authorized to shorten his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of 
it, or looked with complete indifference on the needs of others, and if you belonged to 
such an order of things, would you be in it with the assent of your will? (KpV 5: 69)118 
But of course, the devil is in the details; properly understanding this ‘typic-procedure’, as I 
shall call it, requires extensive commentary. First, I will explain how the typic-procedure is 
supposed to enable the task of moral appraisal to be performed: my account will include a 
step-by-step reconstruction of the typic-procedure together with its underlying principles and 
assumptions. Second, I will bring out the specificity of the typic-procedure in Kant’s ethics. 
                                                
118 [Die Regel der Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist diese: Frage dich selbst, ob 
die Handlung, die du vorhast, wenn sie nach einem Gesetze der Natur, von der du selbst ein Theil wärest, 
geschehen sollte, sie du wohl als durch deinen Willen möglich ansehen könntest. Nach dieser Regel beurtheilt in 
der That jedermann Handlungen, ob sie sittlich gut oder böse sind. So sagt man: Wie, wenn ein jeder, wo er 
seinen Vortheil zu schaffen glaubt, sich erlaubte, zu betrügen, oder befugt hielte, sich das Leben abzukürzen, so 
bald ihn ein völliger Überdruß desselben befällt, oder anderer Noth mit völliger Gleichgültigkeit ansähe, und du 
gehörtest mit zu einer solchen Ordnung der Dinge, würdest du darin wohl mit Einstimmung deines Willens sein?]  
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Third, I will present a number of interpretations of the typic-procedure in the secondary 
literature – consequentialist, teleological, logical and ‘rational agency’ – and assess their 
exegetical adequacy. 
 
4.2.1.1. The canon of moral appraisal:  universalizabil ity as a law of nature  
 
I want to suggest that the typic-procedure enables the task of moral appraisal to be performed 
by operationalizing the “canon” for moral appraisal that Kant had introduced in the 
Groundwork. Kant defines a canon in general as “the sum of the a priori principles of the 
correct use of certain cognitive faculties in general” (KrV A796/B824). Accordingly, the 
canon for the power of pure practical judgment consists of one or more a priori principles for 
subsuming actions under the concepts of good and evil. And as we know, the concepts of good 
and evil, in turn, derive from the moral law, which commands that actions be willed through 
maxims that are fit to be universal laws.119  
In the Groundwork, Kant at first formulates the a priori principle of moral appraisal in 
the most general terms: “We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a 
universal law: this is the canon of moral appraisal of maxims in general” (G 4: 424). This 
canon is meant to provide a clear, unambiguous rule that extends a priori to all possible cases: 
an action is good if and only if its maxim can be rationally willed as a universal law, evil if 
and only if its maxim cannot be rationally willed as a universal law. (Note that here, for the 
purposes of judgment, the emphasis shifts from the action to the maxim according to which it 
is willed.) One might think that nothing more would be needed for us to go out into the world 
with this canon in hand and start classifying actions as good or evil by judging their maxims. 
Kant seems to suggest as much in one passage in the Groundwork, where he recommends 
basing moral appraisal on the Universal Law Formula (FUL) alone: “But one does better 
always to proceed in moral appraisal by the strict method [nach der Strengen Methode] and 
put at its basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative: act in accordance with a 
maxim that can at the same time make itself a universal law” (G 4: 436-437). Nevertheless, he 
                                                
119 See above, section 1.1. 
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manifestly came to see the matter differently, recognizing that the human power of judgment 
requires a more ‘user-friendly’ procedure for moral appraisal.120 
Already in the Groundwork Kant goes a step beyond the “strict method” by spelling out 
two ways in which a maxim can fail to meet the criterion expressed by the general principle:  
Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without 
contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become 
such. In the case of others that inner impossibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still 
impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the universality of a law of nature because 
such a will would contradict itself (G 4: 424).   
Notice that here Kant does not invoke a “universal law” simpliciter, i.e, a normative principle 
for how rational agents ought or are permitted to act (sollen, dürfen), but the universal law of 
nature, i.e., a law governing how people must or can act (müssen, können).121 In addition, 
Kant introduces two elements that are not explicitly mentioned in the strictest formulation of 
the canon, namely two distinct ways in which a maxim can fail to be universalized as a law of 
nature: the contradiction in conception and the contradiction in volition (or contradiction in 
the will), as these have come to be called.122 Thus the canon of moral appraisal, in the 
extended form that Kant gives it in the Groundwork, states that an action shall be judged as 
good or evil by determining whether or not the corresponding maxim is so constituted that it 
can be rationally conceived and willed without contradiction as a universal law of nature. 
These additional specifications assist the power of judgment by giving rise to a pair of 
universalization tests for assessing the constitution of maxims and appraising them 
accordingly. Thus we can ask (1) ‘Is the maxim so constituted that it can be conceived without 
contradiction as a universal law of nature?’ and (2) ‘Is the maxim so constituted that it can be 
                                                
120 Cf. Allen W. Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
79; Rawls, Lectures, 212n. 
121 See Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 79-80.  
122 Onora Nell (O'Neill), Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1975); Onora O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," in Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Christine M Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula 
of Universal Law," in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Cf. Paul 
Dietrichson’s distinction between “primary” and “secondary” universalizability criteria, "Criteria of 
universalizability," 184ff. 
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willed without contradiction as a universal law of nature?’123 The purpose of the typic-
procedure, I will argue, is to operationalize these tests.  
Precisely characterizing Kant’s criterion of universalizability poses a notoriously 
difficult and controversial problem for Kant scholarship. I will discuss the main interpretive 
approaches in section 4.2.3. For now, I simply aim to work out the criterion that provides what 
I view as the most plausible interpretation of the typic-procedure based on the Typic chapter 
and closely related texts. For a helpful indication of what the universalizability of a maxim 
implies, I propose to begin with the Groundwork passage where Kant explains what a 
violation of the canon of moral appraisal consists in: 
If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we do not really 
will that our maxim should become a universal law, since that is impossible for us, but 
that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain a universal law, only we take the 
liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves (or just this once) to the advantage of our 
inclination. Consequently, if we weighed all cases from one and the same point of view, 
namely that of reason, we would find a contradiction in our own will, namely that a 
certain principle be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet subjectively not hold 
universally but allow exceptions. Since, however, we at one time regard our action from 
the point of view of a will affected by inclination, there is really no contradiction here but 
instead a resistance of inclination to the precept of reason (antagonismus), through which 
the universality of the principle (universalitas) is changed into mere generality 
(generalitas) and the practical rational principle is to meet the maxim halfway. Now, even 
though this cannot be justified in our own impartially rendered judgment, it still shows 
that we really acknowledge the validity of the categorical imperative and permit ourselves 
(with all respect for it) only a few exceptions that, as it seems to us, are inconsiderable and 
wrung from us (G 4: 424).  
This passage suggests that a bad maxim is an exceptionalist maxim, which consists in 
giving myself special treatment, or more precisely, in adopting a private rule of conduct by 
which I authorize myself to make an exception to a public rule that I expect everyone else to 
follow (cf. VE Mrongovius 29: 629). In the Typic chapter Kant calls attention to this feature 
when he enumerates examples of maxims that cannot be universalized because they licence 
exceptions to a general rule: “if everyone permitted himself [sich erlaubte] to deceive when he 
believed it to be to his advantage, or considered himself authorized [sich befugt hielte] to 
shorten his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it …” (KpV 5: 69). In the Groundwork 
                                                
123 Kant specifies that the maxims that lead to a contradiction in conception when universalized are those that 
strict, or perfect, duty enjoins us to avoid, while those that can be conceived but not willed without contradiction 
conflict with wide, or imperfect, duties (G 4: 424; MS 6: 389). 
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passage Kant also mentions that these private exceptions to the moral law must be hidden, and 
the maxims that license them, kept secret – a point he repeated in other places: 
“Everyone sees the moral law as something he can openly profess. But everyone sees his 
maxims as something that must be kept hidden, because they are contrary to morality, and 
cannot serve as a universal rule” (VE Collins 27: 1427). 
“We must conceal those of our maxims that cannot be universalized from others, and even 
from ourselves” (R 6: 38).  
Kant adduces a variety of reasons for why people must conceal their exceptionalist maxims. 
On the one hand, he affirms that even when our inclinations push us to make exceptions for 
ourselves, we nevertheless do so reluctantly because of our feeling of respect for the moral 
law: “The universality of the rule is holy to everyone, but we all want to retain for ourselves 
the right of being able, at times, to make exceptions to it …” (VE Mrongovius 29: 629). On the 
other hand, Kant fully recognized that rationalist pudeur is not the only, or even the main 
factor leading us to cover up our trespasses. In addition, instrumental cleverness (Klugheit) 
incites us to actively deceive others in order to achieve our selfish aims. Indeed, we selfishly 
count on the generality of the very law whose universality we have ourselves violated: like 
Hume’s ‘sensible knave’, we will only venture an exception if we can take advantage of the 
fact that most people, in most situations, will continue to act as they ought to.124 Conversely, if 
our decent fellows ever caught wind of our selfish exceptionalism, then they would be up in 
arms:  
For a maxim that I cannot divulge without thereby defeating my own purpose, one that 
absolutely must be kept secret if it is to succeed and that I cannot publicly acknowledge 
without unavoidably arousing everyone’s opposition to my project, can derive this 
necessary and universal, hence a priori forseeable, resistance of everyone to me only from 
the injustice with which it threatens everyone (EF 8: 381). 
For all of these reasons – pure respect for the law, instrumental shrewdness in achieving our 
selfish aims, and the inherent unfairness of making exceptions for ourselves – we must 
conceal those of our maxims that cannot be universalized. By contrast, a morally legitimate 
maxim must, in principle, be fit for being publicly communicated and justified.  
                                                
124 An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Charles W Hendel (Indianapolis & New York: The 
Liberal Arts Press, 1957), Sec. 9, Pt. 2, 102-103. 
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Indeed, this discussion of exceptions shows that while universalizability does have an 
abstract, formal dimension, that does not make it an empty moral principle. Rather, as we have 
just seen, Kant stresses that the way in which we frame our maxims has concrete practical 
implications for how we relate, in words and deeds, to ourselves and others: honestly and 
fairly in the case of good maxims; deceitfully and unjustly in the case of bad ones. Thus moral 
law’s formal requirement that maxims be universalizable translates into a substantive ethical 
demand to make fairness, honesty and good faith prevail over selfishness, deceit and 
hypocrisy:  
The intuitive idea behind the thought that a universality test can provide a criterion of 
moral acceptability may be expressed quite simply as the thought that if we are to act as 
morally worthy beings, we should not single ourselves out for special consideration or 
treatment. Hence whatever we propose for ourselves should be possible (note: not 
‘desired’ or ‘wanted’ – but at least possible) for all others.125  
Conversely, the “true or strict universality [wahre oder strenge Allgemeinheit]” of a 
law consists in its applying to all cases without exception – as opposed to mere “generality,” 
which applies to most cases while allowing some exceptions (KrV B3-4). Consequently, a 
maxim can be deemed suitable for adopting the universal form of a law as such if and only if it 
can be followed as a rule of conduct without exception; i.e., by all agents, in all situations of 
the specified type, at all times (cf. G 4: 421).126 Thus, if my maxim (insofar as it is be to 
submitted to moral appraisal) takes the form ‘I am to do X in circumstances C (without 
exception)’, then the universalized version of this maxim  – namely, ‘Everyone is to do X in 
circumstances C (without exception)’ – must be capable of becoming a practical law, i.e., an 
objective principle of action valid for all rational beings (G 4: 421).127 I will refer to this most 
                                                
125 O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," 94. 
126 Jens Timmermann elaborates on this point in his commentary of the Groundwork: “A law lacks universality if 
it fails to apply in all relevantly similar circumstances, not just at present but also in the past and in the future. (A 
truly universal law cannot change.) That is why, at IV 424.19 below, Kant says that some actions violate the 
commands of duty because the agent takes the liberty of making an exception from a generally valid law in 
favour of inclination ‘for just this once’.” In a footnote to this remark, Timmermann adds: “There are indications 
of this throughout Kant’s work. According to the formulation of the moral principle in the lectures, our actions 
must cohere (übereinstimmen) with a rule that is valid ‘at all times and for everyone’ (Mrongovius, XXVII 
1427.1–4). (The passage is missing in Collins.) See also Critique of Practical Reason, V 36.15.” Kant's 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80-
81.  
127 Cf. Rawls, Lectures, 168. 
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basic criterion with respect to maxims’ formal constitution as “strict universalizability.” This 
criterion is clearly meant to follow from Kant’s key thesis that once we have deprived the will 
of all material incentives, the only thing left to serve as a determining ground of the will is 
conformity with the universality of a law in general (G 4: 4: 401-402, 420-421; KpV 5: 29, 
33).128 Furthermore, since the concepts of good and evil derive from this supreme principle, 
the “appraisal of what is “good and evil in itself” comes down to ascertaining whether the “the 
mere lawful form of the maxim” determined the willing of a particular action under 
consideration (KrV 5: 62) – and Kant reiterates this very point at the beginning of the Typic 
chapter (KpV 5: 67-68). In short, strict universalizability serves as the conditio sine qua non 
for assessing the formal constitution of maxims and hence for appraising the moral status of 
actions (KpV 5: 41).  
While strict universalizability concerns the aptitude of a maxim to serve as a universal 
law simpliciter, the requirement that a maxim be able to assume the form of a law of nature 
imposes some additional constraints. First of all, the law of natural causality determines how 
people actually act – i.e., not merely how everyone ought to act or may act – and therefore a 
maxim can stand the test of a law of nature if and only if everyone could actually perform (or 
attempt to perform) the action prescribed by the law in every relevant situation without fail, as 
Wood explains: “In practice, to suppose that one’s maxim is a universal law of nature is 
apparently to suppose that every rational being without exception adopts the maxim and acts 
on it unfailingly whenever it applies.”129 Secondly, as we will see in more detail below, the 
typic-procedure imposes the additional constraint (not mentioned explicitly in the Groundwork 
canon) that the person judging a maxim must consider herself as situated within the context of 
nature. In sum, a maxim can be considered universalizable as a law of nature if and only if the 
judging agent can consistently conceive and will for everyone within a nature to which she 
herself belongs to really act according to it with the regularity of a law of nature. 
 
                                                
128 I say ‘meant to follow’ because the validity of this deduction has been challenged on philosophical grounds – 
see Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 81-82. 
129 ———, Kant's Ethical Thought, 79-80. 
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4.2.1.2. The typic-procedure: a blueprint for constructing moral thought 
experiments 
 
The basic idea behind the typic-procedure is that we can use the law of nature as a standard 
against which to ‘compare’ maxims and thereby test maxims with respect to their 
universalizability because it is the best “type,” or analogue, we have, within the world in 
which we act, of the moral law’s prescription of strict universality (cf. G 4: 421). We all 
understand the law that every event in nature, without exception, must have a preceding cause; 
and this gives us a standard for how a truly universal maxim should be constituted, namely 
that it should be capable of being a law admitting of no exceptions.130 Accordingly, the typic-
procedure instructs one to undertake a moral thought experiment whereby one mentally 
constructs a counterfactual world in order to determine whether one’s maxim could 
conceivably be a truly universal law of nature. Here again is Kant’s description of this 
procedure:  
The rule of the power of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: Ask 
yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of 
which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will. 
Everyone does, in fact, appraise actions as morally good or evil by this rule. Thus one 
says: if everyone permitted himself to deceive when he believed it to be to his advantage, 
or considered himself authorized to shorten his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of 
it, or looked with complete indifference on the needs of others, and if you belonged to 
such an order of things, would you be in it with the assent of your will? (KpV 5: 69)131 
Thus, just as in the actual world there is a law of nature such that water will always boil when 
heated to 100 degrees Celsius, so in the counterfactual nature would there be a law such that 
one’s contemplated action would always occur in a certain type of situation. The universality 
of the law of nature implies that in such a world, not only would I necessarily perform the 
action I am considering in the situation at hand, but also in every situation of the same kind, 
and everyone else would also invariably act in the same way in all situations of that kind, as if 
                                                
130 See below, section 5.1.2. 
131 [Die Regel der Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist diese: Frage dich selbst, ob 
die Handlung, die du vorhast, wenn sie nach einem Gesetze der Natur, von der du selbst ein Theil wärest, 
geschehen sollte, sie du wohl als durch deinen Willen möglich ansehen könntest. Nach dieser Regel beurtheilt in 
der That jedermann Handlungen, ob sie sittlich gut oder böse sind. So sagt man: Wie, wenn ein jeder, | wo er 
seinen Vortheil zu schaffen glaubt, sich erlaubte, zu betrügen, oder befugt hielte, sich das Leben abzukürzen, so 
bald ihn ein völliger Überdruß desselben befällt, oder anderer Noth mit völliger Gleichgültigkeit ansähe, und du 
gehörtest mit zu einer solchen Ordnung der Dinge, würdest du darin wohl mit Einstimmung deines Willens sein?] 
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they were compelled to do so by a law of nature. Kant hastens to add the important point that 
one knows full well that the resulting scenario is not actual, or even probable:  
“Now everyone knows very well that if he permits himself to deceive secretly it does not 
follow that everyone else does so, or that if, unobserved, he is hard-hearted everyone 
would not straightaway be so toward him; accordingly, this comparison of the maxim of 
his actions with a universal law of nature is also not the determining ground of his will”  
(KpV 5: 69).132  
In other words, one remains cognizant, when employing the typic-procedure, that one is 
constructing a counterfactual, ‘as-if’ scenario under stipulated conditions rather than  
prognosticating about how the world would likely turn out if a certain way of acting were 
universally practiced. The point of the exercise is to ask oneself 1) whether one could conceive 
of this counterfactual nature as a coherent system and 2) whether one could rationally will to 
belong to it as a member. Moreover, while the typic is often referred to as a thought 
experiment tout court,133 it may be more accurately described as a general procedure for 
constructing individual moral thought experiments according to a certain “blueprint” or 
“template” [Muster] (5: 43).134 This construal seems to correspond best to the passage above, 
where Kant first articulates a general “rule of the power of judgment” and subsequently 
provides individual examples of its implementation, sketching how one would run a first 
thought experiment for evaluating fraud, a second for suicide, and a third for indifference – all 
according to the same single template prescribed by the typic-procedure. The typic-procedure 
does not instantly provide a definitive answer to all moral queries through a single infallible 
                                                
132 [Nun weiß ein jeder wohl: daß, wenn er sich ingeheim Betrug erlaubt, darum eben nicht jedermann es auch 
thue, oder, wenn er unbemerkt lieblos ist, nicht sofort jedermann auch gegen ihn es sein würde; daher ist diese 
Vergleichung der Maxime seiner Handlungen mit einem allgemeinen Naturgesetze auch nicht der 
Bestimmungsgrund seines Willens.] 
133 Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth, and Nico Scarano, "Kommentar," in Immanuel Kant: Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007), 226; Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 146; Pieper, 
"Object of Pure Practical Reason," 114ff; ———, "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," 194ff; Silber, "Procedural 
Formalism in Kant's Ethics," 211-212; Timmermann, Kant's Groundwork: A Commentary, 78; Hans Vaihinger, 
Die Philosophie des Als Ob: System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf 
Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus; mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Meiner, 
1918), 655. 
134  See Rawls’ “Four-Step CI-Procedure” in Lectures, 167-170. Cf. Thomas Pogge, "The Categorical 
Imperative," in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 206. 
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operation; rather, the procedure must be applied à la pièce to each particular action (or kind of 
action) being considered in order to determine its moral status. 
Before proposing a step-by-step reconstruction of typic-procedure, a few other 
preliminary remarks are in order.  
It must be kept in mind that the textual basis is slim: the passage that articulates the 
typic-procedure – “The rule … (KpV 5: 69) morally impossible (KpV 5: 70)” – is very brief: at 
215 words it fills only half a page in the Akademie edition and accounts for less than than a 
fifth of the Typic chapter. This condensed form is common for philosophical thought 
experiments; philosophers tend to address the ‘participant’ directly, while suppressing the 
implicit assumptions and mechanisms underlying the exercise.  
Also, there seems to be a discordance between the extended canon in the Groundwork 
(G 4: 424) and the typic-procedure in the second Critique (KpV 5: 69): the former invites one 
to consider whether one’s maxim can be thought and willed as a law of nature, whereas the 
initial formulation of the typic-procedure makes no mention of maxims, but only of one’s 
action: “Ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the 
nature of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your 
will” (KpV 5: 69). Nonetheless, the discrepancy is only apparent: the instruction to ‘represent 
your action as if were the effect of a law of nature’ should be read as a shorthand for ‘represent 
the maxim of your act as if it were itself a law of nature’. Just a few sentences further, Kant 
characterizes the typic-procedure as a “comparison of the maxim of one’s actions with a 
universal law of nature [Vergleichung der Maxime seiner Handlungen mit einem allgemeinen 
Naturgesetze]” (KpV 5: 69, my emphasis). And as Beck has pointed out, it only makes sense 
for the typic-procedure to test the universalizability of maxims, rather than actions per se, for 
otherwise the thought experiment would lead to absurd results: “In the Critique, however, 
[Kant – AW] speaks also of actions as universalizable … This is an inaccuracy in the Critique. 
If lying were universal, we would be able to get along far better than in this world, where it is 
only frequent; we should simply interpret affirmative sentences negatively and negative ones 
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affirmatively.”135 Incidentally, this consideration speaks against Luf’s characterization of the 
typic-procedure as “a universalization of concrete sensible contents,” i.e., of actions.136 
Let us also recall that Kant conceives of a maxim as a subjective principle of action (G 
4: 421n.). As familiar as this characterization may be, a number of points must be kept in mind 
for what follows. First, maxims do not merely specify the execution of a particular action in a 
particular situation, but rather express a more encompassing rule according to which the agent 
vows to perform a certain type of action in a certain type of situation.137 Second, maxims are 
firm, substantive Lebensregeln that express an agent’s long-term, or even-life-long, resolution 
always to act in a certain way; correspondingly, an agent’s maxims are relatively few in 
number and are to be judged with due care and seriousness.138 Third, moral appraisal involves 
a special consideration of maxims’ form. When it is a matter of planning or executing actions, 
the maxim includes a reference to the end that the agent aims to achieve: ‘When in situations 
of type S, I will do an action of type A in order to achieve an end of type E.’139 When it comes 
to morally appraising maxims, however, the agent must abstract from the end and attend only 
to the rule connecting a certain type of action with a certain type of situation: ‘When in 
situations of type S, I will do an action of type A.’ And since the typic-procedure subserves 
moral appraisal, any maxims that come into play there will assume this pared-down form.  
How is the ‘comparison’ of one’s maxim with a law of nature meant to bear on the 
appraisal of the moral status of actions? The answer, in a nutshell, is that this operation serves 
as a test of the formal constitution of the maxim with respect to its universalizability as a 
putative law of a counterfactual nature within which the deliberating agent imagines herself: if 
the maxim passes the test (i.e., proves to be suitable for assuming the universal form of a law 
of nature), then, according to the extended canon of moral appraisal, it must be deemed 
morally possible, and hence the corresponding action must be appraised as good (i.e., 
subsumed under the concept of das sittlich Gute); if the maxim fails the test (i.e., proves to be 
                                                
135 Commentary, 159n. Cf. O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," 83. 
136 "Die "Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft" und ihre Anwendung auf Kants Rechtslehre," 60. 
137 Cf. Schwartz, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant, 121.  
138 Manfred Kuehn has emphasized this point in connection with Kant’s conception of moral character (cf. APH 
7: 294-295) – see Kant: A Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 146-147. See also Höffe, 
Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 122.  
139 Rawls, Lectures, 168. 
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unsuitable for assuming the universal form of a law of nature), then, according to the extended 
canon of moral appraisal, it must be deemed morally impossible, and hence the action must be 
judged as evil (i.e., subsumed under the concept of das sittlich Böse). Kant encapsulates the 
way in which the law of nature serves as “a type for the appraisal of maxims in accordance 
with moral principles” in a condensed and elliptical sentence: “If the maxim of the action is 
not so constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a law of nature in general, then it is 
morally impossible [Wenn die Maxime der Handlung nicht so beschaffen ist, daß sie an der 
Form eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt die Probe hält, so ist sie sittlich unmöglich]” (KpV 5: 69-
70).  
Step 1. Formulation of the maxim 
 
First of all, one must formulate the maxim of the action to be appraised. To illustrate, let us 
take Kant’s false promise example. If I am short of money at a particular time and consider 
taking out a loan from someone by making a false promise of repayment, I would first 
formulate the corresponding maxim in terms of a more general ‘behaviour policy’, as follows: 
“Whenever I am in financial need I will borrow money with a false promise to repay it in 
order to get out of my financial difficulties.” Here – where it is a matter of formulating the 
principle on which I plan to execute the action – the maxim does not include the specifics of 
my particular situation, but instead takes the form of a rule prescribing the same kind of action 
in all situations of the same kind in order to achieve a certain kind of end (i.e., a particular 
hypothetical imperative): “I am do to X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y.”140 
However, insofar as this maxim is to be appraised morally – i.e., with respect to the 
unconditional moral law – we must abstract from its matter (i.e., the end to be achieved by the 
action – in this case, to get out of financial difficulties), and retain only its form, which is a 
simple conditional rule prescribing the same kind of action in all situations of the same kind: 
Wheneve I am in financial need, I will borrow money with a false promise to repay it. And it is 
this form of the maxim that will be put to the test as a putative law of nature. 
 
                                                
140 Cf. Ibid. 
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Step 2. Conversion of the maxim into law of nature  
 
As originally formulated, the typic-procedure instructs me to mentally construct a 
counterfactual world in which the action occurs as if by a universal law of nature. 
Accordingly, I mentally construct a world in which a law of nature would cause me to make a 
false promise every time I need money, and so too everyone else whenever they find 
themselves in similar circumstances. The law of nature compelling all of the inhabitants of this 
world always to act in this deceitful manner is, qua law, a universal and necessary rule. And if 
one were to formulate the rule corresponding to this example, it would surely read as follows: 
‘For all agents in nature (‘everyone’), when an agent finds herself in a situation where she 
needs money, then that agent will knowingly make a false promise to acquire some.’ Clearly, 
this formulation expresses the maxim as if it were converted into a counterfactual law of 
nature – a law which causes everyone with in its ambit to act in a certain way whenever they 
find themselves in a certain kind of situation (KpV 5: 69). The newly minted, ‘as if’ law of 
nature can be referred to as the “universalized typified counterpart” of the maxim,141 or more 
simply as the “typified maxim.” 
 
Step 3. Testing for contradictions 
 
Although Kant’s universalization tests have elicited several different interpretations and a 
great deal of controversy among commentators,142 Kant himself seems to have thought that the 
identification of contradictions in conception and contradictions in volition was a fairly 
straightforward matter. Tellingly, in the Typic chapter itself he simply lists off three examples 
of how the typic-procedure is applied, without any analysis at all: “Thus one says: if everyone 
permitted himself to deceive when he believed it to be to his advantage, or considered himself 
authorized to shorten his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it, or looked with 
complete indifference on the needs of others, and if you belonged to such an order of things, 
would you be in it with the assent of your will?” (KpV 5: 69). In the Deduction, he provides 
                                                
141 Nell (O'Neill), Acting on Principle, 62. 
142 See the discussion below, in section 4.2.3. 
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slightly more indications as to how a morally unacceptable maxim, when tested by the typic-
procedure, can immediately and unmistakably give rise to a contradiction in conception:   
“When the maxim on which I intend to give testimony is tested by practical reason, I 
always consider what it would be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature. It is 
obvious that in this way everyone would be necessitated to truthfulness. For it cannot hold 
with the universality of a law of nature that statements should be allowed as proof and yet 
be intentionally untrue” (KpV 5: 44). 
The maxim tested here is presumably ‘When I believe it to be to my advantage, I will give 
false testimony’. Once the maxim has been converted into a counterfactual law of nature, it 
compels everyone to act in the same way whenever they find themselves in analogous 
circumstances. But this maxim clearly fails the “test [Probe]” as a putative law of nature (KpV 
5 : 70), because a world in which everyone gave false testimony whenever they believed it to 
be to their advantage would fatally undermine the practice, or institution, of giving testimony. 
No one, in such a world, would believe what was testified, and hence a world in which the 
maxim of deceitful testimony enjoyed the same universality as a law of nature is 
inconceivable. (Not so, conversely, for the maxim of truthful testimony.) Ultimately, this 
glaring contradiction betrays the fact that the real intention of the agent entertaining this 
maxim is to permit an exception for herself from a rule that she expects everyone else to 
follow.143  
In the Typic chapter, Kant also briefly mentions an example of a maxim that would 
elicit a contradiction in volition: the maxim of indifference, i.e., ‘When I am not so inclined, I 
shall refrain from aiding others, even if it may be in my power to give them the help they 
need.’ The typic-procedure enjoins the agent to consider a scenario in which that maxim were 
a law of nature compelling everyone in similar circumstances to automatically act in the same 
manner: “if everyone … looked with complete indifference on the needs of others, and if you 
belonged to such an order of things, would you be in it with the assent of your will?” (KpV 5: 
69). Unlike the false testimony example, this scenario does not straightaway evoke a 
contradiction in conception; nevertheless, it does create a contradiction in the agent’s will. As 
Kant explains in his elucidation of the same example in the Groundwork, “although it is 
possible that a universal law of nature could very well subsist in accordance with such a 
                                                
143 This interpretation is modelled on Timmermann’s gloss of the false promise example in the Groundwork (G 4: 
422); cf. Kant's Groundwork: A Commentary, 82-83.  
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maxim, it is still not possible to will that such a principle hold everywhere as a law of nature” 
(G 4: 423). Because if I chose to “belong to such an order of things” – i.e., if I were a member 
of a world in which everyone (not just myself) “looked with complete indifference on the 
needs of others” – then I would be voluntarily depriving myself of the very possibility of aid 
that I might someday require, namely assistance in meeting my “true human needs”144 as well 
as in furthering my general interests as a finite rational being (G 4: 423).145 If the maxim of 
indifference were universalized as a law of nature, then my will would contradict itself, and 
therefore the maxim is morally unacceptable. Once again, the typic-procedure reveals that the 
unacceptable maxim involves permitting oneself a private exception to the rule that one 
expects everyone else to follow: here, I can only will the maxim of indifference if I can 
simultaneously count on the fact that everyone else would continue to follow the opposite rule 
of benevolence if I were to fall on hard times. 
 
Step 4. Subsumption 
 
Ultimately, the typic-procedure must culminate in the definitive moral appraisal of a 
particular action as morally good or morally evil. And there are indeed a series of logical steps 
leading from the thought experiment to the conclusion that a particular action must be 
subsumed either under the concept of morally evil (das sittlich Böse) or the concept of the 
morally good (das sittlich Gute): 
 
1. As we just saw, the typic-procedure is so constructed that the attempt to mentally 
universalize a flawed (i.e., exceptionalist, non-universalizable) maxim as a 
counterfactual law of nature will elicit either a contradiction in conception or a 
contradiction in volition; conversely, a well-formed maxim could become a universal 
law of nature without any contradiction.  
 
                                                
144 I.e., basic needs common to all human beings (MS 6 : 393, 432f. 453ff.), including elementary physical 
necessities like nutrition and shelter, and arguably things like “security” (MS 46ff.); see Rawls, Lectures, 173-
174; Korsgaard, "Kant's FUL," 99. 
145 Cf. Nell (O'Neill), Acting on Principle, 88, 90-91. 
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2. This “test [Probe]” of the maxim’s form operationalizes the canon of moral appraisal 
in the Groundwork, which states that if a maxim cannot be conceived and willed as a 
law of nature without contradiction, then it is morally impossible, and if a maxim can 
be both conceived and willed without contradiction, then it is morally possible (G 4: 
424). 
 
3. Therefore, if the thought-experiment reveals that “the maxim of the action is not so 
constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a law of nature in general, then it 
is morally impossible” (KpV 5: 69-70); if the maxim does pass this test, then it is 
morally possible. 
 
4. An action whose corresponding maxim is morally impossible may not be willed as an 
“object of pure practical reason”; an action whose corresponding maxim is morally 
possible may be willed as an “object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5: 57-62). 
 
5. If an action may not be willed as an object of pure practical reason, then it is morally 
evil;146 if an action may be willed as an object of pure practical reason, then it is 
morally good (KpV 5: 57-62).  
 
6. Therefore, “the rule of the power of judgment” (KpV 5: 69) when using the typic-
procedure amounts to this: if the maxim through which a particular action is willed 
does not pass the test as to the form of a law of nature, then the pure practical power of 
judgment must subsume the action under the concept of the morally evil (das sittlich 
Böse); if the maxim through which the action is willed does pass the test, then the pure 
practical power of judgment must subsume the action under the concept of the morally 
good (das sittlich Gute) (KpV 5: 67-8).  
 
                                                
146 As I mentioned above, “good” should be taken in a broad sense here, i.e., including merely permissible 
actions; see section 1.1. 
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In principle, therefore, the typic-procedure ultimately allows one to pass a definitive judgment 
on whether a particular action is good or evil – and thereby accomplishes the task of moral 
appraisal.147  
 
4.2.2. The typic-procedure in Kant’s ethics 
 
I will now bring out the specificity of the typic-procedure by contrasting it with some other 
elements of Kant’s ethics with which it can easily be confused. 
 
4.2.2.1. The typic-procedure vis-à-vis FLN 
 
The typic-procedure, whereby one asks oneself, for a particular action, whether one could will 
to be part of a world in which everyone always acted in the same way in similar circumstances 
as if they were compelled to do so by a natural law, readily recalls the Natural Law Formula 
(FLN) of the Categorical Imperative from the Groundwork:  
… act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of 
nature [handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum 
allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden sollte] (G 4: 421). 
… maxims must be chosen as if they were to hold as universal laws of nature [... daß die 
Maximen so müssen gewählt werden, als ob sie wie allgemeine Naturgesetze gelten 
sollten] (G 4: 436). 
act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves 
as universal laws of nature [Handle nach Maximen, die sich selbst zugleich als allgemeine 
Naturgesetze zum Gegenstande haben können] (G 4: 437). 
This raises the question of the typic-procedure’s relation to FLN. Is the typic-procedure “just 
Kant’s new name” for FLN?148 Or is there a “radical difference in function” between the 
                                                
147 In my view, Dietrichson’s contention that the typic-procedure can only serve “to supply the moral law with a 
non-constitutive, purely heuristic, illustrative mediation-principle” is too weak; cf. "Criteria of 
universalizability," 176. 
148 Paul Guyer, "Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy by Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe, eds.," Ethics 120, no. 4  
(2010): 824. 
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two?149 The answer is somewhere in between. In the Typic chapter, Kant takes the basic idea 
behind FLN – the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature – and adapts it to the 
specific problem of moral appraisal. The main function of FLN, as a formula of the 
Categorical Imperative, was not moral judgment per se; rather, it was the systematic 
derivation of duties. By contrast, the typic-procedure is explicitly introduced as a tool for “the 
pure practical power of judgment” (KpV 5: 67). Indeed, Kant did not even consider FLN to be 
suitable, much less indispensable, for the purpose of moral judgment per se; rather, he first 
proposed the FLN variant only “tentatively, cautiously,” as Timmermann has observed,150 
privileging the “strict method” based on FUL for moral appraisal (compare G 4: 421 with G 4: 
422). But in the Typic chapter, Kant decidedly affirms that we are “entitled and even required 
to use nature … as the type of judgment” (G 5: 70), and he spells out a new, more detailed 
procedure for constructing thought experiments.151 Moreover, in the Groundwork, Kant only 
accords FLN the secondary role of making the austere Categorical Imperative more 
subjectively “accessible” by bringing it “closer to intuition and thereby to feeling” (G 4: 436), 
whereas in the second Critique he relegates this auxiliary matter of making the moral law 
psychologically vivid to the Doctrine of Method. On the other hand, only in the Typic chapter 
does Kant explicitly thematize the deeper problem of ‘schematizing’ the supersensible moral 
law (in the broad sense) and propose a technical solution (i.e., typification).152 In sum, the 
introduction of the typic-procedure in 1788 marked a significant new development in Kant’s 
thinking about moral judgment vis-à-vis FLN.153  
 
                                                
149 Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 44. While I find his thesis somewhat overstated, I take up a number of 
Grandjean’s points in the body of the text. 
150 Kant's Groundwork: A Commentary, 78. 
151 Höffe, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 108. Nell (O’Neill) also notes that the typic-procedure supplies 
more detailed instructions than either FUL or FLN, Acting on Principle, 62. 
152 Cf. Renaut’s note on this topic in Kant, Fondation, 194-195n. 
153 Conversely, it is not advisable, much less necessary, to read the typic back into FLN or any of the other 
formulas in the Groundwork, as Marty attempts to do in "La Typique du jugement pratique pur: La morale 
kantienne et son application aux cas particuliers," 64ff. This is not to say that there is an outright incompatibility 
or contradiction between the Groundwork and the Typic, but rather that one must give proper due to the typic’s 
special task – see Höffe, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 108-110. 
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4.2.2.2. Not an instrument for determining the will  
 
Although it has been claimed that “the determination of the will by the moral law requires a 
type,”154 I would contend that the typic-procedure’s special epistemic status as a kind of 
counterfactual, ‘as if’ thinking provides a decisive reason for rejecting any construal of it as a 
means for directly determining the will. As I have already mentioned, when one considers an 
action as if it were to universally follow from a law of nature, one of course knows besides that 
not everyone in the world will actually start acting in the same way, and therefore the merely 
counterfactual scenario does not determine one’s motivation:  
Now everyone knows very well that if he permits himself to deceive secretly it does not 
follow that everyone else does so, or that if, unobserved, he is hard-hearted everyone 
would not straightaway be so toward him; accordingly, this comparison of the maxim of 
his actions with a universal law of nature is also not the determining ground of his will 
(KpV 5: 69, my emphasis)155  
As Beck puts it, “Kant was quite well aware that if I lie, it does not mean that all other men 
will lie, and therefore the fear of the consequences of my lying does not include the fear of the 
consequences which would follow from the existence of a world in which everyone lied.”156 
Moreover, any interpretation of the typic-procedure as an instrument of motivation conflicts 
with basic tenets of Kant’s moral philosophy. Firstly, Kant insists that “(1) The principle of 
appraisal [dijudication] of obligation and (2) the principle of its performance or execution,” 
must be sharply distinguished:  
If the question is, what is morally good or not?, that is the principle of appraisal, whereby 
I judge the goodness or depravity of actions. But if the question is: What moves me to live 
according to this law?, that is the principle of incentive. The approbation [Billigung] of the 
action is the objective ground, but not yet the subjective ground. That which impels me to 
do the thing, of which understanding tells me that I ought to do it, is the motiva subjective 
moventia. The supreme principle of all moral judgment lies in the understanding; the 
supreme principle of the moral impulse to do this thing lies in the heart. This incentive is 
the moral feeling (VE Collins 27: 274-5, my emphasis). 
                                                
154 Naissance de la métaphysique, 249-250. 
155 [Nun weiß ein jeder wohl: daß, wenn er sich ingeheim Betrug erlaubt, darum eben nicht jedermann es auch 
thue, oder, wenn er unbemerkt lieblos ist, nicht sofort jedermann auch gegen ihn es sein würde; daher ist diese 
Vergleichung der Maxime seiner Handlungen mit einem allgemeinen Naturgesetze auch nicht der 
Bestimmungsgrund seines Willens]. 
156 Beck, Commentary, 158n. 
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Secondly, if the typic-procedure did influence the will, it could only do so by holding up the 
ulterior consequences of one’s act before one’s eyes – but that would be a fundamental 
distortion not only of the typic-procedure but also of Kant’s moral theory as a whole, 
according to which any influence of the will by consequences is heteronomy (KpV 5: 64, 33, 
35-7).157 Thirdly, Kant asserts that the objective and the subjective motivation of the will 
occur in other ways. As for the objective source of motivation, neither the typic-procedure, nor 
even the power of judgment in general determines the will, instead it is practical reason that 
does so; indeed, the whole point of the Critique of Practical Reason is to prove that “pure 
reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will [daß reine Vernunft zur Bestimmung des 
Willens allein zulange]” (KpV 5: 15, my emphasis; see also KpV 5: 30) – and for this objective 
determination of what the will ought to do, practical reason has no need of judgment per se. 
As for the subjective source of motivation for performing good actions and avoiding evil ones, 
in the chapter immediately following the Typic Kant introduces moral feeling (respect) to play 
the role of an incentive (Triebfeder) – and again, reason produces this feeling entirely on its 
own (KpV 5: 75-76). 
 
4.2.2.3. Not egocentric deliberation ex ante 
 
The typic-procedure’s emphasis on the subject’s own conscience, characteristically expressed 
by the question “Ask yourself whether … [Frage dich selbst, ob … ]” has induced many 
interpreters to construe the typic’s function egocentrically, so to speak – that is, primarily as a 
means for deliberating about one’s own actions. Thus Marty158 frames the typic against the 
backdrop of what he calls “le problème de la décision” – i.e.,, as a means for answering the 
question ‘What should I do?’ – and Guyer sees deliberation ex ante on one’s own prospective 
                                                
157 “Failure to recognize the difference between the type of moral judgment and the motive of moral action has 
led some critics to say that the in the categorical imperative Kant has committed himself to a utilitarian or even 
egoistic doctrine (cf., for example, Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. i). But Kant did not fall into this confusion, which 
he warns against.” Ibid. See below, section 4.2.3.1.  
158 Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique, 233ff. 
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actions as the purpose of the thought experiment, denying that it serves to evaluate actions ex 
post facto at all.159 
Nevertheless, several considerations speak against the narrow, egocentric construal and 
in favour of a wider application of the typic-procedure. It seems arbitrary to limit the function 
of the typic to deliberation ex ante by the agent. If that were so, one could only sensibly apply 
the typic-procedure to one’s own prospective actions, to be performed at some point in the 
future. But Kant specifies no such time restriction, and it seems entirely plausible that one 
could use the typic-procedure to reconsider one’s past actions (e.g. ‘Was that the right thing to 
do?’; ‘Did I do the right thing?’). It seems equally arbitrary to limit the typic-procedure’s field 
of application to the actions of a particular agent. When in the Typic chapter Kant describes 
how people commonly employ the typic-procedure, he writes that they thereby evaluate 
actions tout court, not specifically their own actions: “Everyone does, in fact, appraise actions 
[Handlungen, not ‘seine Handlungen’ – AW] as morally good or evil by this rule” (KpV 5: 
69). Indeed, in the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant observes that 
people commonly enjoy morally judging the actions of other people (even historical figures 
and fictional characters) (KpV 5: 153).160 In sum, while the typic-procedure can undoubtedly 
aid the agent’s deliberation and guide her choices by enabling her to properly appraise the 
actions she is entertaining – and that may well be its most common application – it remains a 
method for appraising the maxims of actions in general, not merely those that a single agent is 
considering performing herself in the future.  
 
4.2.2.4. Determining or reflecting judgment? 
 
Finally, several scholars have claimed that the typic-procedure is, in whole or in part, an 
exercise of reflecting judgment,161 however these claims are unconvincing. To begin with, 
                                                
159 Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Reader's Guide (London: Continuum, 2007), 141. 
160 Cf. Nell (O'Neill), Acting on Principle, 77-78, 126-132; Recki, Ästhetik der Sitten, 244.  
161 Claus Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion. Eine Untersuchung zur Stellung der Religion im System der 
praktischen Philosophie Kants (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1998), 43; Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 48-
51; Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 272ff; Longuenesse, "Moral Judgment," 236-238; Recki, Ästhetik 
der Sitten, 80, 242-252; ———, "Die Dialektik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft und die Methodenlehre des 
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they are anachronistic: the notion of reflecting judgment did not enter Kant’s conceptual 
repertoire until two years after the second Critique.162 As a consequence, the attempts to read 
reflecting judgment back into the Typic are inevitably strained and artificial. There simply is 
no explicit characterization of the typic-procedure as an exercise of reflective judgment in 
either the Typic chapter or the third Critique. Grandjean, for his part, attempts to drum up 
some textual evidence with the following argument: given that in the Typic Kant used the 
same word for moral appraisal that he would later employ for reflecting judgment, namely 
“Beurtheilung/beurtheilen,” this choice must have been in contradistinction to the terms 
“Urtheil/urtheilen” associated with determining judgment.163 But the claim need only be stated 
to see how implausible it is: Are we to believe that during the composition of the second 
Critique – and even before (the expression “moralische Beurtheilung” occurs as early as the 
Groundwork in 1785, to say nothing of the pre-critical writings) – Kant was strictly following 
a subtle terminological nuance corresponding to a conceptual distinction that he would 
introduce years later? In reality, Kant employed the expression “die moralische Beurtheilung” 
because that is just the normal term in German for moral appraisal, although he of course 
assigned it a specific meaning within his moral philosophy. Moreover, one can just as easily 
turn Grandjean’s weak terminological argument on its head: Kant refers to the capacity for 
reflecting judgment as a “Beurtheilungsvermögen,” (EEKU 20: 211) whereas the Typic 
pertains explicitly to the “Urteilskraft” (KpV 5: 69).  
More fundamentally, such claims are self-defeating, since they conflict with the very 
definition of reflecting judgment. In the third Critique Kant makes it clear that reflecting 
judgment serves to generate a new general concept from the comparison of particular 
representations:  
[t]he power of judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty for reflecting on a given 
representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is 
thereby made possible [zum Behuf eines dadurch möglichen Begriffs], or as a faculty for 
determining an underlying concept through a given empirical representation. In the first 
case it is the reflecting, in the second case, the determining power of judgment. To reflect 
(to consider) [reflectiren (überlegen)] however, is to compare and to hold together given 
                                                                                                                                                    
Geschmaks (§§ 55-60)," in Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Otfried Höffe, Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2008), 198. See above, section 1.2. 
162 Otfried Höffe, "Urteilskraft und Sittlichkeit. Ein moralischer Rückblick auf die dritte Kritik," ibid., 292. 
163 Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 51n. 
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representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a 
concept thereby made possible [in Beziehung auf einen dadurch möglichen Begriff]” 
(EEKU 20: 211, my emphasis). 
But it is obvious that none of the general concepts involved in the typic-procedure depend on 
reflective comparison to be first “made possible.” Quite the opposite: the moral law, the 
concepts of good and evil and the law of nature are all given a priori – respectively as a fact of 
reason, as pure practical concepts deduced from the moral law, and as a theoretical category 
“the concept of which occurs even in the most common use of reason” (KpV 5: 70). The whole 
point of the typic-procedure is to enable the subsumption of particular cases under these pre-
given a priori concepts according to a definite hierarchy (KrV 5: 67), and therefore it clearly 
and unequivocally pertains to the determining power of judgment alone: “If the universal (the 
rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the 
particular under it … is determining” (KpV 5: 179).  
On this issue, I side with Beck, Guyer, and Höffe, all of whom have rejected the thesis 
that the typic belongs to reflecting judgment and have held instead that both moral appraisal 
and the typic-procedure are exclusively determining. 164  Guyer puts the point clearly: 
“‘typification’ [i.e., the ‘typic-procedure’ – AW] … fits the model of what Kant subsequently 
called determinant judgment pretty well. Kant defines determinant judgment as that in which 
we seek to apply a given universal to a particular, and that is precisely what we are doing 
when we ask whether the universalization of our maxim would be consistent with the 
particular consisting in our proposed action on the maxim.”165 Moreover, Guyer adds that 
Pieper’s suggestion that the typic-procedure represents an entirely novel form of judgment 
corresponding neither to determining nor reflecting judgment is unconvincing.166 And I would 
say the same of Grandjean’s oxymoronic thesis that the typic produces “a reflecting judgment 
whose outcome is determining [un jugement réfléchissant dont l’issue est déterminante].”167 In 
my view, most of these interpretations of the typic-procedure in terms of reflecting judgment 
                                                
164 Beck, Commentary, 154n; Guyer, "Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy; Höffe, "Urteilskraft und Sittlichkeit," 
292; José María Torralba, "Facultad del juicio y aplicación de la ley moral en la filosofía de Kant," Methodus. 
Revista Internacional de Filosofía Moderna / An International Journal for Modern Philosophy 2 (2007): 14. 
165 "Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy," 824.  
166 Ibid; compare Pieper, "Object of Pure Practical Reason," 190ff; ———, "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," 110ff. 
167 Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 48-51. 
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are symptomatic of a compulsion to read the third Critique back into the Typic, even to the 
point of distortion – a tendency that I will critically examine more extensively in Chapter 1 of 
Part Two. 
 
4.2.3. The typic-procedure in the secondary l iterature 
 
The problem of interpreting Kant’s universalization tests has become, to paraphrase the first 
Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, a battlefield of endless controversies. I will present the 
four most influential approaches – consequentialist, teleological, logical, and ‘rational agency’ 
– and compare them from an exegetical point of view: How accurately do they respectively 
interpret the typic-procedure? This analysis will shed additional light on the Typic chapter by 
clarifying certain points of contention and also bring out its special value for testing these 
interpretive approaches which, all too often, are selectively applied to a small number of 
examples. 
 
4.2.3.1. The consequentialist interpretation 
 
a) Presentation 
 
Perhaps the most tempting way to interpret the typic-procedure is along the following lines: 
“If everyone acted as you propose to do, then the world would go to hell in a hand basket, and 
therefore you shouldn’t act that way.”168 This familiar and intuitive moral reasoning expresses 
a consequentialist decision procedure which can be spelled out more abstractly as follows: an 
action is good if and only if it causes an increase in happiness (and/or a decrease in 
suffering), evil if and only if it causes a reduction in happiness (and/or an increase in 
suffering). This formula admits of rational egoist or utilitarian variants depending on whether 
the happiness under consideration is that of the deliberating agent alone or of “the greatest 
number” (the utilitarian variant can also be declinated as rule utilitarianism if one considers 
                                                
168 Monique Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes: Essai sur l'universalisme kantien (Paris: Kimé, 2007), 31-
34; Horn, Mieth, and Scarano, "Kommentar," 238. 
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not just individual actions but rules of action). Mill famously argued that the Categorical 
Imperative can only acquire meaning if translated into utilitarian terms:  
When Kant … propounds as the fundamental principle of morals ‘So act, that thy rule of 
conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings’, he virtually acknowledges that 
the interest of mankind collectively, or at least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in the 
mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. … Otherwise 
he uses words without a meaning: for, that a rule even of utter selfishness could not 
possibly be adopted by all rational beings – that there is any insuperable obstacle in the 
nature of things to its adoption – cannot be even plausibly maintained. To give any 
meaning to Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape our 
conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective 
interest.169 
Mill’s allegation that Kant must appeal, nolens volens, to consequentialist considerations in 
order to derive substantive ethical conclusions from the categorical imperative has been 
reiterated by Broad and Singer.170 On the consequentialist interpretation, the typic-procedure 
serves for estimating the expected costs and benefits of certain rules of action with respect to 
the happiness of “the greatest number” of people concerned: a morally acceptable action 
would, if universalized, have a net positive (or at least neutral) effect on general happiness; a 
morally unacceptable action would, if universalized, have net negative consequences on 
happiness.171 Indeed, such thought-experiments can be quite powerful means for encouraging 
individuals to assume more responsibility for the consequences of their actions; these days 
they are often employed in environmental ethics, which concerns situations where the actions 
of billions of individuals do in fact add up to large-scale effects on all current and future 
inhabitants of the planet: “What if everyone drove a polluting car, ate meat, wasted water, 
etc.?”  
 
b) Assessment 
 
                                                
169 Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 5.22.13-25. 
170 C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Adams & Co., 1965), 130; Marcus Singer, 
Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961), 262; both cited in O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," 
82n. 
171 Horn, Mieth, and Scarano, "Kommentar," Horn 232. 
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From an exegetical point of view, Mill’s consequentialist Umdeutung of the typic-procedure is 
obviously unacceptable. Although both rule-utilitarianism and Kant’s universalization test 
involve envisaging what would happen if everyone acted in a certain way, they must be 
distinguished, as Timmons explains: “The rule utilitarian is interested in the values of the 
consequences of everyone acting in some way or accepting a certain rule, while Kant’s tests 
focus on whether, in willing one’s maxim as universal law, one is caught in some sort of 
inconsistency.”172 That is, the rule utilitarian considers the net consequences of everyone’s 
acting according to a certain policy of conduct – hence there is no veritable contradiction in 
the universalization of a bad maxim, but simply a trade-off or difference (in an arithmetic 
sense) between expected outcomes with respect to happiness. But in the typic-procedure one 
considers whether one could rationally conceive and will without contradiction for everyone 
to universally follow the principle of one’s action, but one pays no heed to whether the 
consequences would have beneficial or deleterious consequences for happiness as such: “Here, 
however, we have to do with … the determination of the will (not the action with reference to 
its result) through the law alone without any other determining ground …” (KpV 5: 68-9). For 
instance, it is not because the false promise maxim would make everyone worse off if 
universally followed that acting on it should be deemed morally wrong, according to the typic-
procedure, but rather because the conversion of that maxim into a universal law cannot be 
rationally conceived or willed without contradiction – a very different concept from a negative 
balance of consequences.173 Indeed, Mill himself emphasized this very point in his criticism of 
Kant’s ethics: “he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any 
logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most 
outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their 
universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.”174 Kant could retort to 
                                                
172 Mark Timmons, "The Categorical Imperative and Universalizability," in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, ed. Christoph Horn, Dieter Schönecker, and Corinna Mieth (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 2006), 
172-173. Marty and Silber construe the typic-procedure primarily in terms of the consideration of consequences, 
although neither explictly endorses Mill’s utilitarian interpretation. Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique, 251; 
Silber, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics," 212-213. 
173 Otfried Höffe, "Kants nichtempirische Verallgemeinerung: zum Rechtsbeispiel des falschen Versprechens," in 
Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar, ed. Otfried Höffe (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Klostermann, 2010). 
174 Mill, Utilitarianism, 1.4.26-34. 
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Mill’s allegation of unintelligibility that the difference between these two ways of appraising 
an action could not be clearer: “So distinctly and sharply drawn are the boundaries of morality 
and self-love that even the most common eye cannot fail to distinguish whether something 
belongs to the one or the other” (KrV 5: 36; cf. TP 8: 286-7). Furthermore, the consequentialist 
mode of deliberation only makes sense if one considers the most realistic or probable 
outcomes of action. By contrast, the typic-procedure involves imagining a counterfactual and 
highly unrealistic scenario with no expectation that the envisaged consequences will actually, 
or even probably, occur: “Now everyone knows very well that if he permits himself to deceive 
secretly it does not follow that everyone else will do so …” (KrV 5: 69). Finally, Kant could 
not possibly endorse a consequentialist version of the typic-procedure, since on his view all 
consequentialist universalization tests are unavoidably heteronomous.175 In sum, Kant clearly 
did not intend for the typic-procedure to be employed as an exercise in utilitarian deliberation 
à la Mill nor as a tool for calculating one’s personal advantage. Indeed, when we examine 
Kant’s discussion of what he calls the “empiricism of practical reason” at the end of the Typic 
chapter (KpV 5: 70-1), we will see that one of the typic’s critical functions consists in 
guarding against the employment of the principle of happiness as a criterion for moral 
appraisal. From an exegetical point of view, therefore, the consequentialist interpretation of 
the typic-procedure must be entirely rejected.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
175 “Since universality tests of these sorts all make moral acceptability in some way contingent upon what is 
wanted (or, more circumspectly expressed, upon what is preferred or found acceptable or promises the maximal 
utility), they all form part of moral theories that are heteronomous, in Kant’s sense of the term. Such theories 
construe moral acceptability as contingent upon the natural phenomena of desire and inclination, rather than upon 
any intrinsic or formal features of agents and intentions. If we rely on any of these proposed criteria of moral 
acceptability, there will be no types of act that would not be rendered morally acceptable by some change or 
changes in human desires.” By contrast, in the typic-procedure Kant invites us “to consider what we can will or 
intend, what it is possible or consistent for us to ‘will as a universal law’ (not what we would will or would find 
acceptable or would want as a universal law.” O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," 81. 
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4.2.3.2. The teleological interpretation 
a) Presentation 
 
H. J. Paton advanced the strongest version of the teleological interpretation in his classic 
study, The Categorical Imperative (1947), where he argued that the typic-procedure must be 
understood as entirely and exclusively teleological: 
Kant is not concerned with causal laws nor with finding breaches in them: his arguments, 
if interpreted in this way, are completely broken-backed. In every case he appeals to 
teleological considerations; and there is no possibility of even beginning to understand his 
doctrine, unless we realise that the laws of nature he has in mind are not causal, but 
teleological.176 
In other words, the “law of nature” referred to in the typic cannot be the law of natural 
causality produced by the understanding: that law is too poor and indeterminate for appraising 
actions, because “action as such is essentially purposive” and hence goes beyond merely 
efficient causation.177 In addition, we ought to consider the universalization of actions with 
respect to human nature, which is also intrinsically purposive; relatedly, the reference to “the 
order of nature” in the Typic chapter must be understood as a systematic teleological whole 
into which human purposes are inextricably woven (a widely held view of the cosmos in the 
eighteenth century).178 Only against the backdrop of these teleological assumptions can we 
even make sense of Kant’s text, Paton avers, as “all of this was so much taken for granted by 
Kant that he fails to state it explicitly, and so tends to mislead his readers.”179 Accordingly, 
Paton suggests the following way of construing the typic-procedure: “When we ask whether 
we can will a proposed maxim as if it were to become thereby a law of nature, we are asking 
whether a will which aimed at a systematic harmony of purposes in human nature could 
consistently will this particular maxim as a law of human nature.”180 On this model, in order to 
determine whether it is morally possible to make a false promise, commit suicide, let one’s 
talents rust, and so on, we must consider whether universalizing those actions would somehow 
                                                
176 The Categorical Imperative, 149ff.  
177 The Categorical Imperative, 151, 155. 
178 The Categorical Imperative, 151, 162f.  
179 The Categorical Imperative, 151. 
180 The Categorical Imperative, 155. 
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undermine the attainment of the ends respectively aimed for by those actions and thereby enter 
into contradiction with the purposiveness of human nature and of the cosmos as a whole. 
Otherwise, Paton alleges, Kant’s universalization tests remain not only ineffectual but 
meaningless: “Kant’s doctrine becomes intelligible only when his law of nature is interpreted 
teleologically as concerned with the harmony of human purposes.”181 More recently, Konhardt 
has elaborated on Paton’s interpretation, 182  and Aune has also argued for an overtly 
teleological construal of the typic.183 
Beck, for his part, proposed an attenuated version of the teleological interpretation. In 
the section of his Commentary devoted to the Typic, he largely endorses Paton’s “definitive 
and exemplary exposition” while watering down the latter’s strong claim that the typic-
procedure refers exclusively to a teleological conception of nature.184 Beck points out that Kant 
entertained, alongside his teleological conception of the order of nature, a “concept of causal 
uniformity” and suggests, as a friendly amendment, that the latter “does have … at least a 
minor role.”185 Accordingly, Beck suggests that the typic-procedure does involve testing the 
universalizability of the maxim as a uniform causal law; nevertheless he agrees with Paton that 
the decisive consideration must be teleological, namely whether the maxim-become-law could 
in turn fit into a harmonious teleological cosmos:  
I do not merely ask myself whether a realm of nature consisting of rational beings acting 
uniformly in the way I propose to act would be possible, i.e., if the maxim could be a 
universal law and accomplish the ends I have and express in the maxim; I ask, further, 
whether I, as a creator of the world in which every part should have its natural place and 
function, would will that certain maxims should have the force of law. Would it be a 
world in which the natural ends of things would be systematically thwarted? If so, though 
such a world is possible as a territory of uniform event-sequences, it would not be a realm 
which would be rationally desired by a being who consistently traced out the implications 
of his desires. That is, when I will an immoral action, one that would sow discord among 
rational beings, I will according to the maxim of the act and also will (tacitly) that my 
maxim not be universal. And such a maxim is not then analogous to a law of nature.186 
                                                
181 Ibid.  
182 Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 295ff. Recki is sympathetic to this interpretation: Ästhetik der Sitten, 249.  
183 Kant's Theory of Morals, 58ff. 
184 Commentary, “The Typic of Pure Practical Judgment,” 154-163. 
185 Commentary, 159n. 
186 Beck, Commentary, 161. 
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More recently, Beck’s interpretation of the typic-procedure has been endorsed by Bielefeldt, 
who finds this construal “more persuasive” than Paton’s exclusively teleological model.187 
 
b) Assessment 
 
The most one can say in favour of the teleological interpretation of Kant’s universalization test 
is that in some examples he does seem to appeal, at least implicitly, to teleological 
considerations. However, one must be careful when interpreting Kant’s discussions of 
particular examples to distinguish between his rhetoric, which may invoke teleological 
language like “(un)naturalness,” and his philosophical principles. For instance, even in his 
infamous condemnation of masturbation in the Metaphysics of Morals (MS 6: 424-6), where 
he openly reviles the act’s “unnaturalness,” Kant nevertheless admits that its 
“contrapurposiveness” does not by itself constitute a legitimate “rational proof” that the action 
is also contrary to duty (MS 6: 425). 
More generally, the teleological interpretation of Kant’s universalization tests has been 
roundly criticized on textual and systematic grounds, to the point that “most interpreters now 
reject that approach.”188 I will not reiterate all of the criticisms here, except to confirm that the 
teleological interpretation fails to offer a satisfactory account of the typic-procedure. Indeed, 
the Typic chapter, Kant does not employ any teleological language.189 Paton and the other 
defenders of the teleological interpretation offer no plausible explanation as to why Kant 
should have altogether suppressed such language here while he did not shy away from it in 
other contexts.190 The real explanation for this absence is, quite simply, that neither moral 
appraisal nor typification depends on teleological concepts or principles. 
                                                
187 Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 53. 
188 Paul Guyer, ed. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield,1998), xxxiii. See also Horn, Mieth, and Scarano, "Kommentar," 238-239; Korsgaard, "Kant's FUL," 
87ff; Nell (O'Neill), Acting on Principle, 64-65. 
189 The only expression with a whiff of teleology is the “invisible Kingdom of God [unsichtbares Reich Gottes]” 
(KpV 5: 71); however, the context makes it clear that, far from being a reference to the Kingdom of Ends, this 
expression is a semi-quotation that Kant critically attributes to the mystics. 
190 "Kommentar," 233-234..  
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Indeed, Kant denies a decisive role to ends in moral appraisal. While the defenders of 
the teleological interpretation are correct to note that Kant conceives of rational action as end-
directed, they neglect that Kant clearly and repeatedly states that when it comes to the moral 
status of actions – which is just what moral appraisal is concerned with – we must abstract 
from all consideration of ends and attend to the strict formal universalizability of maxims, 
independently of any ends to be achieved: “For without some end there can be no will, 
although, if it is a question only of lawful necessitation of actions, one must abstract from any 
end and the law alone constitutes its determining ground” (TP 8: 279n). Morally obligatory 
actions, for instance, “are necessary without any end, and for whose existence no intention or 
purpose provides the motive” (VE Vigilantius 27: 487). Indeed, it would be absurd for an 
obligatory action to be indexed to an arbitrary end, since its obligatory status as such must be 
as unconditional as the principle from which it derives in the first place, namely the 
categorical imperative – which, as a purely formal principle, abstracts from material ends 
altogether: “the categorical imperative carries with it an unconditioned moral necessitation, 
which is founded not at all on the end or purpose of the action; so all that is left is the form of 
lawfulness, which is the determining ground of free action…” (VE Vigilantius 27: 495).191 
Correspondingly, the moral worth of an action commanded by duty derives from the principle 
of volition rather than from the end to be achieved: “an action from duty has its moral worth 
not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided 
upon … without regard for any object of the faculty of desire” (G 4: 399-400). Accordingly, 
when morally appraising the moral status of an action we must attend exclusively to the 
formal universalizability of the corresponding maxim: 
In all moral judgments we frame the thought: What becomes of the action if it is taken 
universally? … In no sense does [the understanding] contain the end of the action; the 
morality of the action consists, rather, in the universal form of the understanding (which is 
purely intellectual), assuming, that is, that the action is taken universally, so that it can 
exist as a rule. (VE Collins 27: 1428) 
                                                
191 Kant apparently stressed this point especially heavily in the lectures on ethics recorded by Vigilantius:  “This 
is inherent in the nature of the unconditioned necessitation of the law, which enjoins fulfillment of duty without 
end or purpose, and regardless of advantage or disadvantage” (VE Vigilantius 27: 496); “In and for itself alone, 
the rule of my will must at the same time be the sufficient reason for determining it; the act must rest solely on 
this unconditioned imperative, without being coupled to any end …” (VE Vigilantius 27: 487). 
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Correspondingly, in the typic-procedure, where we are concerned with evaluating the moral 
status of actions, we abstract from their ends. And as we have already seen, both Type1 (the 
law of natural causality) and Type2 (natura formaliter spectata) are formal representations 
produced by the understanding – the “faculty of rules” – and therefore they contain no matter, 
i.e., neither ends nor teleological hierarchies.192 Indeed, only on this condition can they serve 
as types for morality, since the moral law determines the will “through the mere form of 
giving universal law” rather than through its matter (KpV 5: 27, 41; G 4: 400). 
 
4.2.3.3. The logical interpretation 
a) Presentation 
 
The proponents of the logical interpretation, most prominently Otfried Höffe, hold that a 
morally unjustifiable maxim inevitably ‘destroys itself’ when universalized because it contains 
or gives rise to a logical contradiction.193 The contradiction can be formal (the maxim asserts 
or implies both A and not-A) or conceptual (e.g., an insincere promise is like a square that 
does not have four sides). Otfried Höffe’s most recent analysis of Kant’s deposit example 
(KpV 5: 27; TP 8: 286-7) represents a paradigmatic application of the logical interpretation:  
Dort, wo ein Depositum via Ableugnen das zum Begriff unverzichtbare, sogar 
entscheidende Moment der «fremden» Sache verliert, wird es in seinem «Wesen» fremdes 
Eigentum zu sein, zerstört, und in diesem begrifflichen [...] Sinn vernichtet. [...] Weil ein 
Verwahrungsvertrag seinem Begriff nach – etwas Fremdes verwahren – die Verpflichtung 
zur Rückgabe begrifflich einschließt, bedeutet eine Ableugnung des Verwahrten, daß man 
eine fremde Sache verwahrt und die Sache doch nicht als eine fremde ansieht. Einem 
Depositum, das man im Wissen und der Absicht annimmt, es zu behalten, liegt also 
tatsächlich die «in sich widersprüchliche» Maxime zugrunde, etwas als fremde Sache 
anzuerkennen und es zugleich als fremd zu leugnen. Diese Widersprüchlichkeit wird im 
Einzelfall praktiziert und erweist sich damit als denkmöglich und darüber hinaus als 
problemlos praktizierbar, erst die zu einem Naturgesetz gewordene Verallgemeinerbarkeit 
                                                
192 See above, section 4.1.2., esp. 4.1.2.4. 
193 Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 2nd ed., Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2011); ———, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft; ———, "Kants kategorischer 
Imperativ; ———, "Kants nichtempirische Verallgemeinerung." For general descriptions of the logical 
intepretation as compared with other interpretive approaches, see Horn, Mieth, and Scarano, "Kommentar," 
233ff; Korsgaard, "Kant's FUL," 81ff. 
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ist nicht denkmöglich. Denn ein strenges Gesetz erlaubt den Widerspruch nicht, daß etwas 
eine fremde Sache und doch keine fremde Sache ist.194 
Höffe indicates that his analysis of Kant’s universalization tests applies not only to the 
treatments of FUL and FLN in the Groundwork, but also to the Typic chapter.195 On this view, 
the purpose of the typic-procedure consists – exclusively – in testing for such logical or 
conceptual contradictions in maxims. Correspondingly, the logical interpretation regards the 
criterion of logical-conceptual universalizability as both necessary and sufficient for moral 
appraisal – hence, no other considerations, such as ends, consequences, existing social 
institutions, etc. play any decisive role. Consequently, the proponents of the logical 
interpretation tend to reject the teleological, consequentialist, and rational agency 
interpretations.196  
 
b) Assessment 
 
On the one hand, the logical interpretation has certain virtues: it offers a sophisticated analysis 
of what a ‘contradiction in conception’ might consist in; it can claim strong textual support 
from those passages where Kant writes that morally unjustifiable maxims “destroy themselves 
[sich selbst zerstören]” or “annihilate themselves [sich selbst vernichten]” upon being 
universalized (G 4: 403; KpV 5: 27; VE Collins 27: 1428-9); it has the merit of having shown 
up the flaws in Hegel’s (characteristically uncharitable) criticisms of Kant’s universalization 
tests;197 finally, by excluding any reference to ends or consequences from moral appraisal, it 
avoids the main pitfalls of the teleological and consequentialist interpretations.  
                                                
194 Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 119-120. 
195 Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 120, cf. 108-112. The same goes for Dietrichson’s logical intepretation 
of the typic-procedure in Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability." 
196 Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 119-120. 
197 See Korsgaard, "Kant's FUL," 86-87; Otfried Höffe, "Die Form der Maximen als Bestimmungsgrund (4-6: 27-
30)," in Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed. Otfried Höffe, Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2011), esp. 61-65. Compare G. W. F. Hegel, Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungen des 
Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven 
Rechtswissenschaften, vol. 2, Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970 (1803)), 462f; ———, 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, vol. 3, Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970 (1807)), 322f. 
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On the other hand, the logical interpretation faces a number of standard objections. 
One objection alleges that its central notion of ‘logical self-annihilation’ can at best explain 
the contradiction in conception, but not the contradiction in volition. Relatedly, it has also 
been hinted that the proponents of the logical interpretation have cherry-picked their examples 
accordingly – but, to be fair, the same could be alleged of all the main interpretative 
approaches. Another standard objection charges that the logical interpretation makes the 
universalization test otiose: if every bad maxim contains an inherent logical or conceptual 
absurdity ‘in itself’, then shouldn’t we be able to detect the flaw directly just by analysing the 
maxim in isolation, i.e., without universalizing it at all? Höffe and others have given replies to 
such objections,198 yet not all scholars have been convinced.199  
In my view, the logical interpretation can given the benefit of the doubt with respect to 
these objections; however it misinterprets one crucial element of the typic-procedure. 
Specifically, it misconstrues the criterion of strict universalizability by equating it with 
‘contradictionlessness’ (Widerspruchslosigkeit), whereas Kant in fact equates strict 
universality with ‘exceptionlessness’ (Ausnahmslosigkeit). This comes out clearly in Höffe’s 
explanation of why the maxim authorizing oneself to appropriate deposits at will cannot be 
universalized as a law: “For a strict law does not permit the contradiction that something 
should be both somebody else’s property and yet not somebody else’s property [Denn ein 
strenges Gesetz erlaubt den Widerspruch nicht, daß etwas eine fremde Sache und doch keine 
fremde Sache ist]” (my translation and emphasis). Höffe’s statement is not false in and of 
itself, but it implies that what the law’s strict universality proscribes, in the first instance, are 
contradictions. But that is simply not how Kant defines strict universality per se in either his 
theoretical or practical works; rather, he holds in both contexts that “universality [is set] 
against particularity (exception)” (Refl 4490, 17: 570). In the Introduction to the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (written immediately before or even concurrently with 
the Critique of Practical Reason), he states that “a judgment is thought in strict universality” 
just in case it is thought “in a such way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible [wird 
                                                
198 For instance, the penultimate sentence in the deposit passage quoted above is meant to address the second 
objection:  “Diese Widersprüchlichkeit wird im Einzelfall praktiziert und erweist sich damit als denkmöglich und 
darüber hinaus als problemlos praktizierbar, erst die zu einem Naturgesetz gewordene Verallgemeinerbarkeit ist 
nicht denkmöglich.” 
199 E.g. Guyer, "Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy," 823-824. 
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also ein Urteil in strenger Allgemeinheit gedacht, d. i. so, daß gar keine Ausnahme als 
möglich gestattet wird]” – and, tellingly, he gives as an example the synthetic a priori 
judgment corresponding to the law of nature, i.e., “the proposition that every alteration must 
have a cause” (KrV B4, my emphasis, cf. KrV A542/B570). And we find the exact same 
definition of strict universality in Kant’s moral philosophy. In the “canon of moral appraisal in 
general,” he makes it very clear that a maxim that one can will as a strictly universal law must, 
in the first instance, exclude exceptions (G 4: 424). That is why I argued above that what the 
typic-procedure tests for, in the first instance, is whether maxims can be thought such that no 
exception at all is possible.200 To be sure, the typic-procedure does elicit ‘contradictions’ (in 
conception and in volition); however, these contradictions pertain not to the logical form of 
the maxim per se but rather to the agent’s rational reactions to the exceptions highlighted by 
the thought experiment.201 
 
4.2.3.4. The rational agency interpretation 
a) Presentation 
 
The rational agency interpretation, advanced most prominently by John Rawls, is based on a 
rich concept of an ideal “reasonable and rational agent.”202 On this view, the thought-
experiment tests maxims according to whether or not they could be adopted by such agents: 
“In assessing the maxims implicit in their actions, I suppose that ideal reasonable and rational 
agents, who are also lucid and sincere, use [moral – AW] principles intuitively in their moral 
thought and judgment.”203 Accordingly, a good deal of the justification of this interpretation 
depends on spelling out what rational agency consists in and what constraints it is subject to, 
particularly when it comes to moral judgment. I will not be evaluating these accounts of 
                                                
200 See above, section 4.2.1. 
201 See below, section 5.1.3. 
202 Rawls, Lectures; ———, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy; Green, "Using Nature to Typify Freedom: 
The Application of the Categorical Imperative; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, 
MA & London: Harvard University Press, 1993); Korsgaard, "Kant's FUL; Nell (O'Neill), Acting on Principle; 
O'Neill, "Consistency in Action; Pogge, "The Categorical Imperative." 
203 Rawls, Lectures, 165. 
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rational agency per se, as they have become quite sophisticated and draw on many theoretical 
resources, such as contemporary action theory, that transcend the historical and systematic 
bounds of Kant’s moral philosophy. Instead, I propose to focus on the reconstruction of the 
typic-procedure that Rawls proposes in his influential analysis of the application of the 
categorical imperative, which he calls “the CI-procedure.”204 While his analysis concerns the 
categorical imperative in general, he specifies that it includes the Typic as well, to which he 
refers at key junctures.  
Rawls’ interpretative is highly condensed and succinct, and so I will present it mostly 
in his own words. The CI-procedure has four main steps. In the first step, the agent formulates 
her maxim as a hypothetical imperative of the following standard form:   
1. “‘I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.’ (Here, X is an 
action and Y is an end, a state of affairs.)”205  
Rawls stresses that the maxim specifies an end, since all rational action is end-directed. He 
also proposes two assumptions regarding the maxim. First, the maxim is assumed to be 
rational from the agent’s point of view: “the maxim is rational given the agent’s situation and 
the available alternatives, together with the agent’s desires, abilities and beliefs (taken to be 
rational in the circumstances).”206 Second, “the maxim is also assumed to be sincere: that is, it 
reflects the agent’s actual reasons for the intended action as the agent, presumed to be lucid, 
would truthfully describe them.”207 In the second step, the maxim is generalized into what 
Rawls calls a “universal precept” that applies to all rational agents:  
2. “Everyone is to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.”208 
In the third step, we convert the universal precept from step 2 into a law of nature:  
3. “Everyone always does X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y, as if by a law 
of nature (as if such a law was implanted in us by natural instinct) [G 4: 422-423].”209  
                                                
204 Lectures, 167-170; for a more condensed version, see also his "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy." 
205 ———, Lectures, 168. 
206 ———, Lectures, 167. 
207 ———, Lectures, 167-168. 
208 ———, Lectures, 168. In my view, this intermediary step is superfluous, since the law of nature, as an 
“exponent for a rule in general” (KrV A159/B198), converts the maxim into a universal rule on its own, see Ch. 
2, section 4.2. 
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Rawls formulates the fourth and final step as follows:   
4. The intuitive idea is this: We are to adjoin the as-if law of nature at step (3) to the 
existing laws of nature (as these are understood by us) and then think through as best we 
can what the order of nature would be once the effects of the newly adjoined law of nature 
have had sufficient time to work themselves out.210 
This step is by far the most complicated, as Rawls proposes a number of assumptions that he 
argues are necessary for making the thought experiment work as a procedure for moral 
appraisal.  These assumptions bear repeating here.  
The first assumption, which could be called the equilibrium assumption, pertains to the 
counterfactual natural order generated at this stage of the thought experiment: 
It is assumed that a new order of nature results from the addition of the law at step (3) to 
the other laws of nature, and that this new order of nature has a settled equilibrium state 
the relevant features of which we are able to figure out.211 
Given that the as-if laws that we contemplate in the typic-procedure hypothetically govern 
social behaviour, Rawls terms the resulting order or equilibrium state of nature the “adjusted 
social world” (e.g., a society where everyone ‘looks with indifference on the needs of others’, 
etc.).212 
The second is the perpetuity assumption: 
[W]e are to think of the adjusted social world as if it has long since reached its conjectured 
equilibrium state. It is as if it has always existed, exists now, and always will exist. … 
There is no lapse of time.213  
The idea that we must ‘fast-forward’ time is meant to close a potential loophole in the thought 
experiment. It should not be possible for an agent to take advantage of the lapse of time 
between the private adoption of a selfish maxim (e.g. false promising) and the moment when 
everyone else catches on (cf. TP 8: 286-7). As Rawls explains, “[i]t is not as if the agent 
working through the CI-procedure says, ‘I will that my maxim be a law of nature from now 
on.’ This would allow time for the equilibrium state to be reached, in which interval the agent 
                                                                                                                                                    
209 Ibid. 
210 Lectures, 169. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
213 ———, Lectures, 171-172. 
 117 
might gain a considerable fortune by deceit.”214 Moreover, this formulation of the perpetuity 
assumption (“It is as if it has always existed, exists now, and always will exist”) corresponds 
nicely to the strict universalizability criterion, whereby a truly universal law must hold at all 
times.215 
The third is the publicity assumption, which Rawls illustrates with the false promising 
example:  
Now, plainly Kant assumes [in G 4: 422 – AW] … that people learn from experience and 
remember the past; hence once it becomes, as it were, a law of nature that everyone tries 
to make a false promise (in certain circumstances), the existence of the law becomes 
public knowledge. Everyone knows of it, and knows that others know of it, and so on. … 
We make this explicit by saying that in the equilibrium state of the adjusted social world, 
the as-it-were laws of nature … are publicly recognized as laws of nature, and we are to 
apply the CI-procedure accordingly.216  
This assumption does not figure explicitly in the text, but Rawls supposes that if everyone 
always acted according to a law as ubiquitous as, say, the law of universal gravitation, then 
they would have some knowledge of it. 
The fourth can be called the ignorance assumption. Unlike the previous three 
assumptions, however, it does not concern the representation generated within the thought 
experiment, but rather the agent conducting the thought experiment. Rawls proposes that the 
typic-procedure implicitly imposes two limits on information:  
The first limit is that we are to ignore the more particular features of persons, including 
ourselves, as well as the specific content of their and our final ends and desires.  
The second limit is that when we ask ourselves whether we can will the adjusted social 
world associated with our maxim, we are to reason as if we do not know what place we 
may have in that world.217 
These limits on information are meant to safeguard the fairness of the CI-procedure by 
preventing egoistic interests or individual variations from biasing moral appraisal. Otherwise, 
there would be nothing to prevent a billionaire, for example, from rationally adopting the 
maxim of refraining from helping others (cf. G 4: 423): he could just shrug at the prospect of a 
                                                
214 ———, Lectures, 168. 
215 See above, section 4.2.1.3. 
216 Rawls, Lectures, 171. 
217 ———, Lectures, 175. 
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world in which indifference were a universal law of nature, since he could safely predict in 
advance that, given his vast wealth, he would surely be able to take care of himself regardless. 
But such a case would undermine the thought experiment by allowing egocentric prudential 
calculations to trump the properly moral appraisal of what is good and evil ‘in itself’. 
Significantly, Rawls specifically refers to the text of the Typic chapter in justifying this 
assumption, arguing that its wording and inherent logic imply that the agent’s eventual place 
within the counterfactual natural order is indeterminate.218  
In sum, the CI-procedure determines the moral status actions by testing idealized 
rational agents, subject to the assumptions stated above, with respect to two conditions:  
“First, we must be able to intend, as sincere, reasonable, and rational agents, to act from 
that maxim when we regard ourselves as a member of the adjusted social world associated 
with it, and thus as acting within that world and subject to its conditions; and 
Second, we must be able to will this adjusted social world itself and affirm it should we 
belong to it”219 
Correspondingly, the CI-procedure identifies morally unacceptable actions by giving rise to 
contradictions in conception (when the first condition is violated) or contradictions in volition 
(when the second condition is violated). On Rawls’ reading, a contradiction in conception 
results when a rational agent entertains a maxim that, if universalized as a law of nature in the 
adjusted social world, would defeat her original purpose, since a rational agent as such cannot 
intend, on pain of self-contradiction, to do something that she knows in advance will be 
futile.220 For example, once the maxim of deceitful promising becomes a law of nature in the 
equilibrium state, it becomes publicly known (as per the publicity assumption). In the adjusted 
social world, consequently, everyone knows – and everyone knows that everyone knows – that 
every member of that world will necessarily attempt to make a deceitful promise when they 
are in financial need. As a result, no agent can rationally intend to deceive in this context, for 
                                                
218 “I find it hard to read, say, Kant’s discussion of the Typic [KpV 5: 69f.] without feeling that some such idea is 
implicit. He says: “Ask yourself whether …” Here what suggests some limit on our knowledge of our place in the 
adjusted social world is Kant’s speaking of our being “a part” of that system of nature, and the suggestion at the 
end of the passage that we are to consider whether we would “assent of [our] own will,” that is, freely assent, to 
being a member of such a world. That surely depends on what we know about our place in that world.” ———, 
Lectures, 176. 
219 ———, Lectures, 169. 
220 ———, Lectures, 170-171; O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," 89-98. 
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she knows in advance that she will fail to achieve her aim.221 A contradiction in volition 
results when an agent entertains a maxim that, when universalized, would create an adjusted 
social world of which she could not rationally want to be a member – or, better, some member 
or other. For example, a rational agent as such cannot will to be a member of an adjusted 
social world in which the maxim of indifference were a universal law, for it would not be 
rational to voluntarily rob herself of the very possibility of receiving assistance that – as per 
the ignorance assumption – she cannot know in advance that she would not eventually need.222  
 
b) Assessment 
 
Although Rawls presents his model of the CI-procedure as a way to express “Kant’s 
characteristic and deeper ideas,”223 his interpretation has a distinctly Rawlsian flavour. For 
instance, the two limits on information immediately bring to mind his famous notion of the 
“veil of ignorance.” And sure enough, in the chapter on the original position in A Theory of 
Justice Rawls explicitly refers to Kant’s typic.224 Incidentally, this close connection raises the 
interesting question of whether Rawls read his own conception of the veil of ignorance into 
Kant or if he derived it from Kant in the first place, or yet again if this convergence represents 
a case of independent invention. Rawls himself seems to suggest the third possibility when he 
remarks that “[t]he veil of ignorance is so natural a condition that something like it must have 
occurred to many.”225 In any event, the exegetical adequacy of this interpretation vis-à-vis 
Kant’s thought is another matter.  
Some of the assumptions that Rawls proposes can be justified to a certain extent on 
properly Kantian terms. For instance, the idea of imposing limits on the specific information 
available to the agent engaged in moral appraisal in order to minimize self-serving biases 
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harmonizes well with Kant’s repeated emphasis on the need to sharply distinguish the 
appraisal of what is good and evil “in itself” from the egoistic assessment of what is good for 
me, i.e. for my particular state of well-being (KpV 5: 57ff., 70-71).226 In addition, the 
universalist ‘anonymity’ of the thought experiment accords well with the universality of 
autonomy, which is intrinsically impersonal, as Adorno has underlined: “the law I give myself 
is not concerned simply with my own personal needs or inclinations or the chance nature of 
my individuality.”227 
But generally speaking, Rawls and most proponents of the rational agency interpretation 
explicitly prioritize Kantian ethics over Kant’s ethics; that is, they aim primarily for 
philosophical or ‘systematic’ plausibility rather than for exegetical fidelity. Thus, Rawls’ 
additions to Kant’s terse formulation of the thought experiment no doubt stem from a guiding 
principle of his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, namely to present each author’s 
thought in the most philosophically plausible form.228 However charitable and however 
valuable these amendments may be, though, I feel it is important to point out that some of the 
the Rawls’ interpolations, principles, and presuppositions seem to conflict with Kant’s text. 
First, Rawls and other proponents of the rational agency interpretation include the end in 
the formulation of the typified maxim and correspondingly interpret the contradictions in 
conception and in volition in terms of “thwarted purposes.”229 But as I argued against the 
teleological interpretation, the typified maxim, qua law of nature, cannot include a material 
end; rather, it must be a formal if-then rule between a situation-type and an action.  
Second, by universalizing and depersonalizing the thought-experiment through 
ignorance and publicity assumptions, Rawls shifts the typic-procedure away from ethical 
concerns and towards matters of justice and politics: “the CI-procedure force[s] us to view 
ourselves as proposing public moral practice for an ongoing social world.”230 One telling 
                                                
226 See Kant’s treatment of moral “empiricism” (KpV 5: 70-71), discussed below in section 5.2.1; see also 5.1.3. 
227 Theodor W. Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, ed. Thomas Schröder, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 118. 
228 Rawls, Lectures, xvi-xviii. 
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indication of this shift towards the political is that Rawls’ model is not significantly different 
from the publicity test that Kant would later propose for States.231  
Third, the rational agency interpretation assumes – and assumes that Kant assumes – that 
the typic-procedure is performed by idealized rational agents. But as we will see in the next 
section, Kant actually claims to be presenting a model of how “everyone, in fact, judges 
actions” including the “the most common understanding” (KpV 5: 69-70).232  
Fourth, the rational agency intepretation faces the awkward task of reconciling two 
seemingly incompatible epistemic viewpoints during the thought experiment. How is the agent 
using the typic-procedure supposed to consider herself as rational, sincere, lucid, etc. and at 
the same time as a kind of automaton blindly following a new law of nature “as if such a law 
were implanted in [her] by natural instinct”?233 Conversely, how can that same automaton 
within the ‘adjusted social world’ determine what she could conceive or will as an ideal 
rational agent? Note that this mental juggling act is not called for by the other main 
interpretations of the typic-procedure. On the logical interpretation, for instance, all one has to 
determine is whether the maxim contradicts itself logically or conceptually when 
universalized, not whether the agent contradicts herself in situ, so to speak. 
Fifth, while Rawls’ suggestion that the typic-procedure is primarily designed for maxims 
that reasonable people might plausibly adopt is a welcome contrast to the widespread 
preoccupation in the secondary literature with highly contrived maxims (e.g., “I will get 
money on a false promise whenever it is March 8 and I can get it from someone name Igor 
Cycz in order to buy a metal detector”),234 his assumption, if taken at face value, raises the 
opposite worry: How can a maxim that is assumed in advance to be fully “sincere and 
rational” turn out to be immoral at all?  
                                                
231 In Perpetual Peace, based on the principle that “justice can be thought only as publicly known,” Kant 
proposes testing the ‘publicizability’ of any given claim to a right in an “experiment of pure reason”: “Every 
claim to a right must have this capacity for publicity, and since one can very easily appraise whether it is present 
in a case at hand – that is, whether or not publicity is consistent with an agent’s principles – it can yield a 
criterion to be found a priori in reason that is very easy to use; in case they are inconsistent we can cognize at 
once, as if by an experiment of pure reason, the falsity (illegitimacy) of the claim in question (praetensio iuris)” 
(EF 8: 381). 
232 See below, section 5.1. 
233 Cf. Rawls, Lectures, 168. 
234 Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 
310ff. 
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Lastly, there is one feature of the rational agency interpretation that merits special 
examination, namely the claim that the typic-procedure tests whether maxims are possible in 
our current world, and that it therefore requires general empirical knowledge of what nature is 
actually like. I want to show that although this suggestion may sound uncontroversial, even 
trivial, it is, strictly speaking, inaccurate from an exegetical point of view – but it is all the 
more illuminating, because it reveals a tension in Kant’s conception of the typic-procedure. 
The assumption is that the categorical imperative can only be applied to our situation if it is 
“adapted to our circumstances in the order of nature … [and] takes into account the normal 
conditions of human life.”235 That is why Rawls states that, at step four of the CI-Procedure, 
“we are to adjoin the as-if law of nature at step (3) to the existing laws of nature (as these are 
understood by us)” (my emphasis). Thomas Pogge has aptly expressed the upshot of this 
interpretation as follows:  
So I take Kant’s considered view to be that moral philosophy – though entirely based 
upon its pure part – is not entirely pure. We don’t need any empirical knowledge to see 
that the permissibility of our maxims hinges on their meeting the test of the categorical 
imperative. But we may need some general knowledge in order to see whether some given 
maxim does meet this test. Kant’s question is not whether I can will my maxim to be 
universally available in any context, but whether I can will this in our world, against the 
backdrop of the actual laws of nature.236  
It certainly seems as if Kant’s thought experiment presupposes some general empirical 
knowledge about the world in which we live. For instance, how could an agent properly 
appraise the false-promising maxim without the knowledge that human beings have the 
capacity to remember the past?237  
However, these supplementary specifications of the typic-procedure raise the problem 
of false negatives. A false negative, in this context, is a maxim that should be good or 
permissible according to our considered moral views, but that turns out to be impermissible 
according to the typic-procedure because it cannot be universalized as a law of nature. This 
problem, currently much discussed in the secondary literature, was actually first pointed out 
by Jacob Sigismund Beck in a letter to Kant on May 31st, 1792:  
                                                
235 Rawls, Lectures, 168. 
236 Pogge, "The Categorical Imperative," 195, my emphasis. 
237 Cf. Rawls, Lectures, 170-172. 
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The procedure of the Critique of Practical Reason seems extraordinarily illuminating and 
excellent. … But I confess that, although the transition from synthetic principles of the 
transcendental faculty of judgment to objects of the sense world (by means of the 
schemata) is quite clear to me, the transition from the moral law by means of its type is 
not clear. I would feel myself freed from a burden if you would kindly show me the 
emptiness of this question: Can’t one imagine the moral law commanding something that 
might contradict its type? In other words, couldn’t there be actions that would be 
inconsistent with a natural order but that are nevertheless prescribed by the moral law? It 
is a merely problematical thought, but it has this truth at its basis: the strict necessity of 
the categorical imperative is in no way dependent on the possibility of the existence of a 
natural order. Yet it would be a mistake to account for the agreement of the two as 
accidental (11: 340, trans. mod.).238  
Clearly, the worry voiced by Beck – that the typic-procedure might be too specific and 
constricting vis-à-vis the unconditioned moral law – would be exacerbated on the assumption 
that the typic requires that a maxim become a law of nature “not in any context,” but only “in 
our world, against the backdrop of the actual laws of nature.” 
Kant replied to Beck a few months later. His letter is significant, as it constitutes the 
only text in the entire corpus, outside of the Typic chapter itself, where Kant discusses the 
typic. Kant’s strategy for avoiding the problem of false negatives hinges on the theoretical 
distinction, made in the Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena, between the purely formal, 
a priori notion of “a natural order in general [eine Naturordnung überhaupt]” governed by 
universal laws of nature, on the one hand, and, on the other, the notion of a “particular nature 
[eine bestimmte Naturordnung],” as a particular constellation of nature at a particular time, 
governed by particular empirical laws which must discovered a posteriori (P 4: 320; KrV 
A216/B263, A126-8, B165):  
As for the question, Can there not be actions incompatible with the existence of a natural 
order but which are yet prescribed by the moral law? I answer, Certainly! If you mean, a 
                                                
238 [[M]ir [ist] das Verfahren der Critick der practischen Vernunft ausserordentlich einleuchtend und fürtreflich. 
… Aber ich gestehe, daß so einleuchtend wie der Uebergang der synthetischen Grundsätze der transc. 
Urtheilskraft zu Gegenständen der Sinnenwelt, die ihnen unterworfen sind vermittelst der Schemate, mir 
vorkömmt, mir der des Sittengesetzes vermittelst des Typus desselben, nicht erscheint, und ich würde wie von 
einer Last befreyet seyn, wenn Sie freundschaftlich, die Nichtigkeit folgender Frage mir zeigen wollten. Ich frage 
nehmlich, kann man sich nicht denken, daß das Sittengesetz etwas geböte, das seinem Typus zuwider wäre, mit 
andern Worten: kann es nicht Handlungen geben, bey denen eine Naturordnung nicht bestehen kann, und die 
doch das Sittengesetz vorschreibt? Es ist ein bloß problematischer Gedanke, aber ihm liegt doch das Wahre zum 
Grunde, daß die strenge Nothwendigkeit des categorischen Imperativs, keinesweges von der Möglichkeit des 
Bestehens einer Naturordnung herzuleiten ist; aber darin werde ich irren, wenn ich die Uebereinstimmung 
beyder für zufällig erkläre. Und nun, lieber theurer Lehrer, werden Sie mir doch nicht abgeneigt, wegen meines 
vieleicht ungestühmen Anhaltens mit meinen Briefen. Ich liebe und verehre Sie unaussprechlich und bin mit Herz 
und Seele Ihr Beck.] 
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particular order of nature, for example, that of the present world. For example, a courtier, 
must recognize it as a duty always to be truthful, although he would not remain a courtier 
for long if he did. But that type only contains the form of a natural order in general, that 
is, the agreement of actions as events with moral laws just as with natural laws, but only 
as regards their universality, for this in no way concerns the particular laws of any one 
nature or other (11: 348, trans. mod., my emphasis).239 
Whether one finds Kant’s reply philosophically compelling or not, one must admit that it is at 
odds with Rawls and Pogge’s suggestion that the typic-procedure involves universalizing 
one’s maxim within our present world, as if it were adjoined to the actual laws of nature; here, 
Kant emphasizes, to the contrary, that the typic concerns only “the form of a natural order in 
general.” This wording is not at all careless: it matches the language of the Typic chapter 
exactly, where Kant speaks of “merely the form of lawfulness in general” (KpV 5: 70). More to 
the point, Kant seems to think that this abstract, universal construal of the typic-procedure 
allows him to dodge the problem of false negatives raised by Beck: a maxim will not be 
unduly disqualified if, when universalized, it conflicts with the merely contingent parameters 
of nature in its current, particular state.  
On the other hand, Kant’s strategy here may invite the opposite problem of false 
positives: Does the concept of formal universalizability in a natural order in general provide a 
sufficiently determinate criterion for excluding all the maxims that we would reasonably 
consider to be morally impermissible? The worry is all the more pressing, as Kant’s account 
does not make it clear how to run the thought-experiment. How can one mentally construct a 
world where the false-promising maxim were universalized as a law of nature without 
assuming the backdrop of the laws and facts of biology (the functioning of the vocal tract, 
auditory system, etc.), physics (the propagation of sound waves), and psychology (memory, 
theory of mind, etc.)? Ironically, by trying to make Kant’s thought-experiment as plausible as 
possible, the rational agency interpretation seems to have uncovered a philosophical problem, 
                                                
239 [Was die Frage betrift: Kan es nicht Handlungen geben, bey denen eine Naturordnung nicht bestehen kan und 
die doch das Sittengesetz vorschreibt, so antworte ich, allerdings! namlich eine bestimmte Naturordnung z.B. die 
der Gegenwärtigen Welt z.B. ein Hofmann muß es als Pflicht erkennen jederzeit warhaft zu seyn, ob er gleich 
alsdann nicht lange Hofmann bleiben wird. Aber es ist in jenem Typus nur die Form einer Naturordnung 
überhaupt d.i. der Zusammenhang der Handlungen als Begebenheiten nach sittlichen Gesetzen gleich als 
Naturgesetzen blos ihrer Allgemeinheit nach; denn dieses geht die besondere Gesetze irgend einer Natur 
garnicht an.] Letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, July 3, 1792 (11: 348). 
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or at least a tension, in the typic-procedure – one that calls for additional examination by 
scholars.  
 126 
5. Outcome, effectiveness, additional functions 
5.1.	  The	  Typic’s	  heuristic	  effectiveness	  for	  the	  ‘common	  understanding’	  
 
Kant avers that the typic is not some subtle trick or sophisticated mechanism reserved for 
clever moral philosophers, but rather a way of thinking that everyone actually employs: 
“Everyone does, in fact, appraise actions as morally good or evil by this rule [Nach dieser 
Regel beurtheilt in der That jedermann Handlungen, ob sie sittlich gut oder böse sind] (KpV 5: 
69).” He stresses that constructing thought experiments using the typic-procedure requires no 
special instruction, as even the untutored human mind already possesses the necessary 
representations and cognitive capacities: 
This is how even the most common understanding judges; for the law of nature always 
lies at the basis of its most ordinary judgments, even those of experience. Thus it has the 
law of nature always at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is to be 
appraised it makes that law of nature merely the type of a law of freedom … (KpV 5: 
70).240 
In other words, Kant avers that the typic is so user-friendly that “even the commonest 
understanding,” can – and does “in fact” – carry out such thought-experiments with ease, as if 
by second nature.241 The purpose of the present section is to explain this claim from an 
exegetical point of view.  
 
5.1.1. The common understanding’s moral discernment  
 
First of all, Kant’s comments about the common understanding’s use of the typic must be read 
in light of his numerous remarks throughout the corpus attesting the common understanding’s 
                                                
240 [So urtheilt selbst der gemeinste Verstand; denn das Naturgesetz liegt allen seinen gewöhnlichsten, selbst den 
Erfahrungsurtheilen immer zum Grunde. Er hat es also jederzeit bei Hand, nur daß er in Fällen, wo die 
Causalität aus Freiheit beurtheilt werden soll, jenes Naturgesetz blos zum Typus eines Gesetzes der Freiheit 
macht … ] 
241 Cf. Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 170-171, 180ff. 
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competence, and even acuity, in all aspects of moral judgment.242 Beck sums up Kant’s 
attitude as follows:  
Kant, more than any philosopher of his age, respected the “ordinary moral consciousness” 
of the ordinary man; under the influence of his early Pietism and of Rousseau, he came to 
regard the unshakable moral convictions of the simple and humble as the proper starting 
point for philosophical analysis; and philosophy, so far from being the moral teacher of 
mankind, is given the task of defending it from its outward enemies – the philosophers of 
heteronomous ethics – and its internal dangers – moral fanaticism and mysticism.243  
Kant’s praise of the common understanding’s moral discernment was no platitude; other 
philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, have openly shown disdain for it.244 But on what basis 
does Kant regard the common understanding’s capacity for moral judgment so highly? In 
addition to the well-known historical influences mentioned by Beck, two general reasons can 
be adduced.  
The first reason is an a priori argument based on the principle that ‘ought implies can’. 
The moral law requires that everyone reliably determine what particular actions comply with 
its commands, and therefore everyone – “even the commonest understanding” – must be 
capable of making accurate moral judgments: “… the commonest human understanding can 
easily discern whether a thing be right or wrong, for it merely has to ask itself whether that 
thing could be a universal law. A principle of morality must at the same time be 
comprehensible to the commonest understanding, because every man must possess it, and such 
is the case here” (VE Mrongovius 29: 628, trans. mod).245 Consequently, Kant must have 
                                                
242 (KrV A831/B859; KpV 5: 36-7, 44, 92; G 4:402-405; TP 8: 286-7; VE Collins 27: 1426-9; VE Mrongovius 29: 
628-9, 632).  
243 Commentary, 235. See also (BB 20: 44) and Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, 144-187, esp. 131-132. Below, in 
section 5.1., I discuss why and how Kant defends the common understanding from the heteronomous “dangers” 
of empiricism and mysticism. 
244 “Bei den Meisten Menschen ist die Urteilskraft bloß nominell vorhanden: es ist eine Art Ironie, daß man sie 
den normalen Geisteskräften beizählt, statt sie allein den monstris per excessum zuzuschreiben. Die 
gewöhnlichen Köpfe zeigen selbst in den kleinsten Angelegenheiten Mangel an Zutrauen zu ihrem eigenen 
Urtheil; eben weil sie aus Erfahrung wissen, daß es keines verdient. Seine Stelle nimmt bei ihnen Vorurteil und 
Nachurteil ein; wodurch sie in einem Zustand fortdauernder Unmündigkeit erhalten werden, aus welcher unter 
vielen Hunderten kaum Einer losgesprochen wird.” Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, ed. 
Ludger Lütkehaus, Gesamtausgabe, 4th ed. (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008), 108. 
245 See also (KrV 807/B835, A831/B859; G 4: 404; KpV 5: 36-7; Refl 3345, 16: 789-790). Of course, other 
philosophers have doubted whether moral judgment is really as self-evident as Kant claims here, e.g., Adorno, 
Problems of Moral Philosophy, 116-117.  
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believed in principle that since the typic-procedure is the only method for moral appraisal, the 
common understanding must be capable of employing it.  
The second reason is a posteriori: Kant keenly observed how ordinary people engaged 
in moral appraisal, in particular during spirited conversations in which groups of friends and 
acquaintances debated the moral worth of other peoples’ actions. In the Critique of Practical 
Reason Kant provides a telling description of such conversations:  
If one attends to the course of conversation in mixed companies consisting not merely of 
scholars and subtle reasoners but also of business people or women, one notices that their 
entertainment includes, besides story-telling and jesting, arguing [Räsonieren] … Now, of 
all arguments there are none that more excite the participation of persons who are 
otherwise soon bored with subtle reasoning and that bring a certain liveliness into the 
company than arguments about the moral worth of this or that action by which the 
character of some person is to be made out. Those for whom anything subtle and refined 
in theoretical questions is dry and irksome soon join in when it is a question of how to 
make out the moral import of a good or evil action that has been related, and to an extent 
one does not otherwise expect of them on any object of speculation they are precise, 
refined, and subtle in thinking out everything that could lessen or even just make suspect 
the purity of purpose and consequently the virtue in it (KpV 5: 153-4). 
If we take these empirical observations at face value, we can understand Kant’s claim that 
ordinary people can – and do in fact – readily employ the typic-procedure.246   
 
5.1.2. An ‘example in a case of experience’ 
 
Nevertheless, Kant’s insistence that the common understanding is adept at employing the 
typic-procedure remains puzzling from an epistemological point of view. On the one hand, 
Kant defines the common understanding as “the faculty of cognition and of the use of rules in 
concreto, as distinguished from the speculative understanding, which is a faculty of rules in 
abstracto. … The common understanding, therefore, has a use no further than the extent to 
which it can see its rules confirmed in experience (although these rules are actually present in 
it a priori) …” (P 4: 369-370, trans. mod.; cf. JL 9: 27). On the other hand, the typic-
procedure, as we have seen, operates with extremely abstract representations of formal 
lawfulness. Thus there seems to be mismatch between the level of concreteness needed by the 
                                                
246 Incidentally, passages such as this one also contradict Longuenesse’s (unfounded) contention that, according 
to Kant, the common understanding can infallibly derive duties yet struggles with moral appraisal. Longuenesse, 
"Moral Judgment," 238f. 
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common understanding and the level of abstractness required by the typic. Nonetheless, I will 
argue that this gap can be bridged if one appreciates that the example provided by the typic 
serves as a concrete, easily recognizable cue that triggers the common understanding’s a priori 
representation of the law of natural causality, which can then be employed, by means of 
(largely unconscious) analogies, as a type for moral appraisal.  
Let us begin by taking a closer look at the passage in question: 
If the maxim of the action is not so constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a 
law of nature in general, then it is morally impossible. This is how even the most common 
understanding judges; for the law of nature always lies at the basis of its most ordinary 
judgments, even those of experience. Thus it has the law of nature always at hand, only 
that in cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised it makes that law of nature 
merely the type of a law of freedom, because without having at hand something which it 
could make an example in a case of experience, it could not provide use in application for 
the law of a pure practical reason (5: 69-70).247  
The common understanding, uncomfortable with abstraction, is ill-suited to employ what was 
described in the Groundwork as “the strict method [die strenge Methode]” of moral appraisal 
based solely on FUL: “act only in accordance with a maxim that can at the same time make 
itself a universal law” (G 4: 436). This abstract and austere injunction, on its own, would draw 
a blank stare from the common understanding. However, this resistance is not a sign of 
obtuseness; on the contrary, the demand that abstractions be elucidated by means of a concrete 
example is entirely legitimate.248 And there is the difficulty that makes the typic necessary: no 
sensible intuition – and hence no example – can be given of the moral law or of the morally 
good because they are supersensible Ideas (KpV 5: 69).249 
A similar difficulty arises in the theoretical sphere, where there is a mismatch between 
the concretely-minded common understanding and the law of natural causality, which is an 
                                                
247 [Wenn die Maxime der Handlung nicht so beschaffen ist, daß sie an der Form eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt 
die Probe hält, so ist sie sittlich unmöglich. So urtheilt selbst der gemeinste Verstand; denn das Naturgesetz liegt 
allen seinen gewöhnlichsten, selbst den Erfahrungsurtheilen immer zum Grunde. Er hat es also jederzeit bei 
Hand, nur daß er in Fällen, wo die Causalität aus Freiheit beurtheilt werden soll, jenes Naturgesetz blos zum 
Typus eines Gesetzes der Freiheit macht, weil er, ohne etwas, was er zum Beispiele im Erfahrungsfalle machen 
könnte, bei Hand zu haben, dem Gesetze einer reinen praktischen Vernunft nicht den Gebrauch in der 
Anwendung verschaffen könnte.] 
248 (KrV Axvii-xviii, Bxliv; JL 9: 62-3; VL Dohna-Wundlacken 24: 729-30; VL Wiener 24: 834-6, 848-9). I stress 
the importance of this “intuitive,” or “aesthetic,” clarity in "La Critique de la raison pure, une oeuvre inachevée" 
(Mémoire de maîtrise / Masters Thesis, Université de Montréal, 2009), 1-14.  
249 See above, section 2.2.  
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abstract and pure law of the understanding (Verstandesgesetz): “The common understanding 
will, then, hardly be able to understand the rule: that everything which happens is determined 
by its cause, and it will never be able to have insight into it in such a general way. It therefore 
demands an example from experience …” (P 4: 369). Here, though, the common 
understanding’s demand for an example can certainly be met – indeed, nothing could be 
easier, as all events in nature necessarily comply with the law of natural causality – “and when 
it hears that this rule means nothing other than what it had always thought when a 
windowpane was broken or a household article had disappeared, it then understands the 
principle and grants it” (P 4: 369). In other words, when presented with a broken windowpane, 
the common understanding will never assume that it simply shattered out of the blue, but will 
instead judge that something (e.g., a thrown rock), must have caused it to break; likewise, 
when it notices that a household article has gone missing, it will not assume that the object 
spontaneously vanished, but that someone must have removed it. Note that these judgments are 
neither inductive generalizations (“windowpanes are most often broken by stones”) nor 
inferences to the best explanation (“this windowpane was most likely broken by those kids 
playing catch next door”). Rather, as Kant declares in an opening section of the Introduction 
of the second edition of the Critique, such judgments attest that “we are in possession of 
certain a priori cognitions, and even the common understanding is never without them” (KrV 
B3-6) That is, these judgments, as applications of the (implicit) synthetic a priori proposition 
that “every alteration must have a cause,” are thought “in strict universality, i.e., in such a way 
that no exception at all is allowed to be possible” (KrV B4). Thus the common understanding 
is capable of employing the universal principle, despite its inability to spell it out in abstract 
terms, as long as it has a concrete example, i.e., an instance of that very law (casus datae 
legis). 
Kant’s ingenious strategy in the Typic chapter is to show how this solution in the 
theoretical sphere can provide a solution to the practical difficulty of giving the common 
understanding a concrete handle on the supersensible moral law for the purpose of moral 
appraisal. Although no example can be given of the Ideas themselves, he recalls that “in the 
most ordinary judgments” the common understanding duly represents every single “case of 
experience” as necessarily conforming to the law of natural causality. And, as we have just 
seen, such judgments are thought “in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at 
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all is allowed to be possible” (KrV B4). Thus, any event in experience, no matter how banal, 
can serve as a concrete example or instance that points towards the strict universality of the 
law of natural causality to which all “objects of sensible intuition as such are subject” (KpV 5: 
69). Thus, the common understanding “has the law of nature always at hand,” i.e., in every 
instance (KpV 5: 70; cf. P 4: 369-370; KrV B4). And once a concrete “case of experience” qua 
Beispiel has triggered the representation of universal physical law, “(the concept of which 
occurs even in the most common use of reason),” the common understanding can then employ 
this representation as “the type of the law of freedom” in virtue of an analogy between the two 
laws qua universal and hence ‘exceptionless’. Just as the law of natural causality necessarily 
applies to each and every “case of experience” without exception (KrV A542/B570), so must 
the moral law govern each and every action without exception (G 4: 421, 424). This analogy, 
in turn, guides the common understanding’s moral judgment: just as “in the most ordinary 
judgments of … experience” one must reject – i.e, disbelieve – each and every purported 
exception to the law of nature as superstition (KU 5: 294; JL 9: 11; VA Friedländer 25: 549), 
so “in cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised” (KpV 5: 70) must one reject – 
i.e., condemn – each and every purported exception to the moral law as morally unacceptable 
(G 4: 424).  
To be sure, Kant never states that the common understanding works through these 
abstract analogies consciously, for that would not fit with the characterization of the common 
understanding as concretely minded. It therefore seems reasonable to infer that some of the 
principles and cognitive processes underlying the typic must operate largely unconsciously. 
This suggestion is not as unorthodox as it might sound. Kant does in fact state that the 
complex cognitive mechanics of human cognition operate mostly unconsciously and are only 
retrospectively spelled out by means of conscious examination: “The exercise of our powers 
also takes place according to certain rules that we follow, unconscious of them at first, until 
we gradually arrive at cognition of them through experiments and lengthy use of our powers, 
indeed, until we finally become so familiar with them that it costs us much effort to think them 
in abstracto” (JL 9: 11). Thus in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously describes the 
schematism as a “a hidden art in depths of the human soul [eine verborgene Kunst in den 
Tiefen der menschlichen Seele] whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay 
unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (KrV A141/B181), and he also hints that the 
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understanding’s transcendental “combination” operates partly unconsciously (KrV B129-130). 
And in a section of the Anthropology entitled “On the representations that we have without 
being conscious of them,” he ventures that “the field of obscure representations [dunkle 
Vorstellungen] is the largest in the human being” (APH 7: 136; cf. VA Friedländer 25: 179). A 
ubiquitous example is language: human beings deftly apply the abstract rules of grammar in 
an unconscious manner and without special instruction.250 Tellingly, Kant specifically states 
that the common understanding makes universally valid judgments according to unconscious 
rational principles: “One must not regard what is universally judged through sound 
understanding to be absurd because it has no principle [Grund], but the principle exists in 
reason, for otherwise human beings could not judge universally. The principle however still 
exists in obscurity …” (VA Friedländer 25: 480, trans. mod.). Regarding the typic, then, it 
seems reasonable to propose that just as the common understanding can perfectly well make 
ordinary experiential judgments of cause and effect without consciously calling to mind its a 
priori representations of the law of nature or of natura formaliter spectata in their abstract 
forms, so can it make a habitual, unconscious use of these same representations for the 
purpose of moral appraisal without being consciously aware of how it’s doing what it’s doing. 
One last point to note in this connection is that, to the extent that Kant’s philosophical 
account of the typic makes its underlying processes and principles explicit, it may deviate 
from the way in which flesh-and-blood human beings ordinarily experience moral judgment 
first-hand (just as a linguist’s scientific reconstruction of the grammar of a given language 
differs from a native speaker’s internal representation of it251). Yet Kant was well aware of the 
difference between the philosopher’s abstract, theoretical point of view and the common 
understanding’s own concrete, immediate cognition. In the Prolegomena Kant distinguishes 
                                                
250 “Thus universal grammar is the form of a language in general, for example. One speaks even without being 
acquainted with grammar, however; and he who speaks without being acquainted with it does actually have a 
grammar and speaks according to rules, but ones of which he is not himself conscious” (JL 9: 11). This 
remarkable passage, which appears to anticipate central themes of Noam Chomsky’s revolution of linguistics, 
raises an intriguing possibility that is currently being explored in cognitive science: Could linguistic cognition 
provide an analogical model for how the human mind engages in moral cognition, viz. by unconsciously 
computing abstract rules that together constitute a largely innate ‘moral grammar’? See John Mikhail, Elements 
of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
251 Ray Jackendoff, Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 83. 
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clearly between the two viewpoints with respect to the principles of theoretical cognition: “to 
have insight into these rules a priori and independently of experience falls to the speculative 
understanding, and lies completely beyond the horizon of the common understanding” (P 4: 
370, trans. mod.). And in the first section of the Groundwork he famously effects a marked 
“transition from common rational to philosophical moral cognition” (G 4: 493ff.), declaring 
that with the identification of the principle of duty “we have arrived, within the moral 
cognition of common human reason, at its principle, which it admittedly does not think so 
abstractly in a universal form, but which it always actually … uses as the norm of its 
appraisals [welches sie sich zwar freilich nicht so in einer allgemeinen Form abgesondert 
denkt, aber doch jederzeit wirklich … zum Richtmaße ihrer Beurteilung braucht]” (G 4: 403-
404). This leaves the philosopher with the theoretical task of as it were retrospectively spelling 
out, systematizing and justifying the implicit principles of moral appraisal that the common 
understanding already effectively employs in virtue of an “obscurely conceived” 
metaphysics.252 Now, the Typic chapter, situated at the heart of Critique of Practical Reason, 
clearly belongs to the moral philosopher’s task thus characterized. Consequently, Kant’s 
primary objective in the Typic chapter was surely to provide a technical and systematic 
account of how the ‘practical heterogeneity problem’ is overcome rather than a 
phenomenological description of ordinary moral cognition from a first-person perspective.  
 
5.1.3. Isolation and amplification 
 
Although the conceptual mechanics underlying typification may operate largely 
unconsciously, the typic-procedure does have some heuristic functions that facilitate the 
common understanding’s conscious moral reflection. For Kant avers that the typic-procedure 
does more than just make moral appraisal possible: it also makes it easier, more reliable and 
more accurate. The typic-procedure accomplishes this feat by means of two heuristics which I 
will call isolation and amplification: by isolating and amplifying the conscience of the person 
doing the appraising, the typic-procedure helps to counteract our egoistic bias with respect to 
our own behaviour, especially our tendency to make exceptions for ourselves. These two 
                                                
252 Cf. Claude Piché, "La Phénoménologie de l'expérience morale chez Kant," Kairos, no. 22  (2003): 128. 
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heuristics have been aptly explained by Thomas Pogge in his account of the application of the 
categorical imperative:  
… its ingenuity consists in that it facilitates a decision by transforming it from one 
concerning oneself in a concrete situation (where it may be quite difficult to avoid bad 
faith and dishonesty) to one concerning the world at large. Such a thought experiment 
shows whether I, as a rational agent in a world of human beings, can really will the 
maxims I am about to adopt. In this way, the [typic-procedure – AW] amplifies my 
conscience by transforming the decision from one of marginal significance into one 
concerning the world at large, and also isolates my conscience by screening out any 
personal considerations that might affect my choice of maxims but are [morally – AW] 
irrelevant.253 
The typic-procedure promotes the reliability of moral judgment by affording us a point of 
view from which we can judge actions with greater seriousness, responsibility and openness. 
We must regard our maxims as fully our own, but not as just our own. From framing private 
decisions that ostensibly only concern ourselves (and hence can be treated as insignificant or 
secret exceptions), we envision ourselves as legislators whose judgment affects everyone. 
This simulation can act as a powerful psychological counterweight to our egoistic duplicity 
towards others and even ourselves. Together, isolation and amplification make moral appraisal 
easy, even obvious:  
When the maxim on which I intend to give testimony is tested by practical reason, I 
always consider what it would be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature. It is 
obvious that [Es ist offenbar, daß …] in this way everyone would be necessitated to 
truthfulness. For it cannot hold with the universality of a law of nature that statements 
should be allowed as proof and yet be intentionally untrue. Similarly, the maxim that I 
adopt with respect to disposing freely of my life is at once determined [sofort bestimmt] 
when I ask myself what it would have to be in order that a nature should maintain itself in 
accordance with such a law. It is obvious that [Offenbar …] in such a nature no one could 
end his life at will, for such an arrangement would not be an enduring natural order. And 
so in all other cases (KpV 5: 44, my emphasis). 
In other words, the typic-procedure’s heuristic functions make contradictions in conception 
and contradictions in volition leap out at the moral agent in such a way that she cannot miss or 
ignore them. 
 
                                                
253 "The Categorical Imperative," 206.  
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5.2.	  The	  typic’s	  protective	  functions	  
 
Kant closes the Typic chapter with a relatively long concluding remark (a quarter of the 
chapter’s total length), which, he says, “will serve to prevent reckoning among concepts 
themselves that which belongs merely to the typic of concepts” (KpV 5: 70).254 Significantly, 
he maintains that the Typic is so “important and advisable” because it “guards against” or 
“protects from [bewahrt von]” from two dangers threatening morality: empiricism and 
mysticism. 
 
5.2.1. Guarding against empiricism 
 
In the Typic chapter Kant offers the following definition of the philosophical doctrine that he 
calls the “empiricism of practical reason” (hereinafter: “moral empiricism”): it “places the 
practical concepts of good and evil merely in experiential consequences [Erfahrungsfolgen] 
(so-called happiness)” (KpV 5: 70). In other words, moral empiricism holds that the supreme 
principle of morality is the principle of happiness, whereby “a rational being’s consciousness 
of the agreeableness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence” ought to be 
“the supreme determining ground of his choice” (KpV 5: 22). This doctrine is empirical in two 
respects. Firstly, its principle refers to an empirical state: happiness is a maximum feeling of 
pleasure or well-being in the human being qua sensible organism. Secondly, it entails an 
empirical consideration of the “experiential consequences [Erfahrungsfolgen]” (KpV 5: 70) of 
actions, i.e., their effects – in accordance with natural causality – on happiness. As is well 
known, Kant developed a wide-ranging and fundamental critique of this form of 
consequentialism throughout his critical works on moral philosophy. In the present context, I 
will limit myself to two issues of direct relevance to the Typic: firstly, moral empiricism 
falsifies moral appraisal; secondly, it “degrades humanity” by corrupting our moral 
dispositions.  
                                                
254 [… so dient die gegenwärtige Anmerkung dazu, um zu verhüten, daß, was blos zur Typik der Begriffe gehört, 
nicht zu den Begriffen selbst gezählt werde.] 
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Moral empiricism yields a consequentialist criterion for moral appraisal of the 
following form: an action is good if and only if it causes an increase in happiness and/or a 
decrease in suffering; an action is evil if and only if it causes a reduction in happiness and/or 
an increase in suffering. However, by equating the concepts of good and evil with happiness 
and suffering, respectively, moral empiricism conflates Kant’s fundamental distinction 
between, on the one hand, the properly moral concepts of good (das sittlich Gute) and evil 
(das sittlich Böse) and, on the other, the empirical concepts of well-being (das Wohl) and ill-
being (das Übel) or woe (das Weh). Kant lays out the difference in the chapter immediately 
preceding the Typic, “On the concept of an object of pure practical reason”: 
Well–being or ill-being always signifies only a reference to our state of agreeableness or 
disagreeableness, of gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object on this 
account we do so only insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure it causes. But good [gut] or evil [böse] always signifies a reference 
to the will insofar as it is determined by the law of reason to make something its object; 
for, it is never determined directly by the object and the representation of it, but is instead 
a faculty of making a rule of reason the motive of an action (by which an object can 
become real) (KpV 5: 59-60).  
As a result, moral empiricism misconstrues the nature of moral appraisal altogether, for it 
neglects the fact that there are correspondingly “two very different appraisals of an action 
depending upon whether we take into consideration the good and evil of it or our well-being 
and woe (ill-being)” (KpV 5: 59-60). Only the former kind of appraisal is properly moral, in 
Kant’s view, whereas the latter remains an empirical matter pertaining to theoretical judgment. 
But moral empiricism collapses this distinction by reducing the appraisal of actions to an 
empirical problem of figuring out the most reliable technique for producing the most frequent, 
intense and durable feelings of pleasure in our bodies.255 By contrast, the typic guards against 
any such reduction insofar as it acutely emphasizes the distinction between theoretical and 
pure practical judgment: “Subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world under 
a pure practical law does not concern the possibility of the action as an event in the sensible 
                                                
255 For a contemporary – and unabashed – defense of this conception of ethics that would doubtless horrify Kant, 
see Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 
2010). 
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world; for it belongs to the theoretical use of reason to appraise that possibility in accordance 
with the law of causality” (KpV 5: 68).”256  
Furthermore, empirical moral judgments cannot yield the universality that is required 
for all pronouncements of the pure practical faculty of judgment. Kant has no shortage of 
arguments to this effect. To begin with, all empirical propositions about happiness are 
contingent and a posteriori; hence, according to a fundamental epistemological tenet already 
established in the Critique of Pure Reason they can at best attain mere “generality” (i.e., 
validity for most cases), but never “true universality” (KrV B4), i.e., a priori validity for all 
possible objects to which they refer – a point that Kant reiterates in the second Critique: “It is 
an outright contradiction to want to extract necessity from an empirical proposition (ex pumice 
aquam) and to give a judgment, along with necessity, true universality …” (KpV 5: 12, cf. G 
4: 424).” In addition, as a true moral rationalist, Kant insists that we must in principle be able 
to reach a a universal and definitive consensus on which actions to will or avoid: “[w]hat we 
are to call good or evil must be an object of the faculty of desire in the judgment of every 
reasonable human being, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone; hence for this 
appraisal reason is needed, in addition to sense” (KpV 5: 61, my emphasis). By contrast, the 
utilitarian principle that those actions that cause people to suffer should be condemned while 
those that foster human well-being should be lauded may seem straightforward, yet it turns out 
to be difficult to apply. Ironically, it is an empirical fact that the sources of pleasure and 
happiness vary so wildly from one individual to another that not even a general consensus 
could ever be arrived at. Indeed, even a single person who set out to maximize his individual 
own happiness would be hard pressed to arrive at a coherent and definitive strategy, as Kant 
explains in a famous Groundwork passage reminiscent of Ecclesiastes: “If he wills riches, how 
much anxiety, envy and intrigue might he not bring upon himself in this way! If he wills a 
great deal of knowledge and insight, that might become only an eye all the more acute to show 
him, as all the more dreadful, ills that are now concealed from him and that cannot be avoided, 
or to burden his desires, which already give him enough to do, with still more needs. …” (G 4: 
418). In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant restates this point in more abstract terms; the 
                                                
256 See above, section 3.1.2.2. 
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empirically conditioned principle of happiness cannot generate rules susceptible of being 
universalized as laws for the will, in the absence of which judgments will inevitably diverge:  
“The principle of happiness can indeed furnish maxims, but never such as would fit for 
laws of the will … For, because cognition of this rests on sheer data of experience, each 
judgment about it depending very much upon the opinion of each which is itself very 
changeable, it can indeed give general rules but never universal rules, that is, it can give 
rules that on the average are most often correct but not rules that must hold always and 
necessarily; hence no practical laws can be based on it … and then the variety of judgment 
must be endless (KpV 5: 36, trans. mod.).  
Relatedly, Kant maintains that the process of conscious calculation involved in making 
appraisals based on considerations of happiness is far too complex, uncertain and inconclusive 
to be reliably executed by the common understanding: “what brings true lasting advantage, if 
this is to extend to the whole of one’s existence, is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity, 
and much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule in accordance with it to the ends of 
life even tolerably, by making the appropriate exceptions” (KpV 5: 36-7). Once again showing 
his true rationalist colours, Kant holds that only the pure rational criterion of universalizability 
can explain the simplicity, reliability, and naturalness of common moral judgments: “The 
concept of duty in its complete purity is … incomparably simpler, clearer and, for practical 
use, more readily grasped and more natural to everyone than any motive derived from 
happiness, or mixed with it and with regard for it (which always requires much art and 
reflection)” (TP 8: 287-287).  
In sum, happiness fails as a criterion for moral appraisal, as it prevents us from arriving 
at reliable, consensual, and universally applicable judgments about which particular actions 
should or should not be performed. By contrast, the typic-procedure guards against all of this 
confusion, uncertainty and dissensus by operationalizing a truly universal criterion for moral 
appraisal that abstracts from individuals’ private ends and opinions. 
The second major danger that Kant sees in moral empiricism is that it corrupts the 
morality of dispositions and thereby degrades humanity:  
However, it is much more important and advisable to guard against empiricism of 
practical reason, since mysticism is … not natural and not in keeping with the common 
way of thinking … so that the danger from this side is not so general; empiricism, on the 
contrary, destroys at its root the morality of dispositions (in which, and not merely in 
actions, consists the high worth that humanity can and ought to procure for itself through 
morality), and substitutes for it something quite different, namely in place of duty an 
empirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly leagued; and 
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empiricism, moreover, being on this account allied with the inclinations, which (no matter 
what fashion they put on) degrade humanity when they are raised to the dignity of a 
supreme practical principle and which are, nevertheless, so favorable to everyone’s way of 
feeling, is for that reason much more dangerous than any enthusiasm, which can never 
constitute a lasting condition of any great number of people (KpV 5: 71). 
Empiricism poses a greater danger than mysticism for two reasons. Firstly, it threatens a 
greater number of people: the principle ‘if it feels good, then it can’t be wrong’ immediately 
appeals to everyone’s “way of feeling”  – rather than to their principled  “way of thinking” or 
Denkungsart (APH 7: 294ff.) – easily finding support from our sensible inclinations, egoism 
and complacency. Secondly, empiricism does greater damage than mystical Schwärmerei. By 
substituting the empirically conditioned principle of self-love for that of duty, empiricism 
prevents us from exercising our will in a morally pure way (G 4: 426). Worse still, it is 
positively shameful, Kant believes, to privilege, or even combine, self-interest with 
considerations of duty. Thus, of the example of a person thinking about appropriating a 
deposit (Depositum) entrusted to him, Kant writes: “He even feels, if the concept of duty 
counts for something with him, a revulsion merely at calculating the advantages he could gain 
by transgressing it” (TP 8: 286-7). By deriving the concept of the good from the feeling of 
pleasure, which is in turn determined by natural causes acting on our bodies, moral empiricism 
posits a heteronomous principle of morality (cf. KpV 5: 64, 33, 35-7) and thereby degrades our 
conduct to “mere animality,” i.e. the instinctive, merely mechanical pursuit of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain. By contrast, the true worth and dignity that humanity “can and ought to 
procure for itself” rests on the exercise of autonomy and on the employment of pure practical 
reason to determine what is good and evil “in itself” (KpV 5: 61-2) – and that is precisely what 
the typic promotes through its a priori criterion for moral appraisal. Lastly, we have seen that 
the typic’s heuristics of isolation and amplification counteract our selfish impulses, fostering 
instead a fair, responsible, and dignified Denkungsart.257  
 
 
 
                                                
257 Cf. Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 313. 
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5.2.2. Type3 
 
Immediately after explaining that the typic guards against empiricism, Kant adds a surprising 
qualification: 
This, then, as the typic of judgment, guards against empiricism of practical reason, which 
places the practical concepts of good and evil merely in experiential consequences (so-
called happiness), although happiness and the endless useful consequences of a will 
determined by self-love, if this will at the same time made itself into a universal law of 
nature, can certainly serve as a quite suitable type for the morally good but is still not 
identical with it (KpV 5: 70).258 
In light of Kant’s insistence that empiricism be excluded from moral philosophy, his passing 
suggestion that happiness could serve as a quite suitable type for the morally good is puzzling. 
How is this third formulation of the type (henceforth “Type3”) supposed to work?  
The answer is not immediately clear. We must first of all try to understand what it 
means for “a will determined by self-love” to “ma[k]e itself into a universal law of nature.” 
One plausible interpretation is that the principle of self-love can easily be universalized to all 
finite beings, all of whom eo ipso feel the “empirical interest [empirisches Interesse]” (KpV 5: 
70) in happiness: the pursuit of happiness appeals “everyone’s way of feeling [der Sinnesart 
aller]” (KpV 5: 71) and therefore expresses a form of universality that is easy to understand.259 
One complication, however, is that any determinate content given to the concept of happiness 
will impugn this universality. As we have seen, “happiness is not an ideal of reason but of 
imagination” – i.e., a protean ideal that changes shape depending who is pursuing it (G 4: 
418). In the same vein, Kant warned earlier in the Critique that universalizing the maxim of 
one’s own happiness as a law of nature would have catastrophic consequences (KpV 5: 28) – 
which in turn seems to directly contradict the very premise of Type3. On the other hand, the 
contradiction can perhaps be lifted: although the principle of happiness cannot be 
universalized with respect to its content, it may nevertheless be universalizable in terms of its 
form. This proposition can indeed be maintained, as Beck and other commentators have 
                                                
258 [Diese also als Typik der Urtheilskraft bewahrt vor dem Empirism der praktischen Vernunft, der die 
praktischen Begriffe des Guten und Bösen blos in Erfahrungsfolgen (der sogenannten Glückseligkeit) setzt, 
obzwar diese und die unendlichen nützlichen Folgen eines durch Selbstliebe bestimmten Willens, wenn dieser 
sich selbst zugleich zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze machte, allerdings zum ganz angemessenen Typus für das 
sittlich Gute dienen kann, aber mit diesem doch nicht einerlei ist.] 
259 Claude Piché, personal communication, March 26th, 2012.  
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explained, on the assumption that the “will determined by self-love” also harmonize with all 
the other wills that are simultaneously pursuing their own happiness (cf. KpV, 5: 34-35; KrV, 
A809/B837).260 The universal adoption this magnanimous principle, in turn, would surely 
produce universal happiness and “endless useful consequences” (KpV 5: 70), or “infinite 
utility” (KpV 5: 162), as Kant variously puts it. Finally, this mathematically infinite happiness 
in the sensible world may, in turn, typify the metaphysically infinite happiness enjoyed by 
rational beings in the intelligible realm where the Idea of the morally good were realized, i.e., 
where freedom were united under universal laws and virtue were universally practiced.261 For 
my part, I would venture that Type3 can be viewed as an audacious attempt on Kant’s part to 
appropriate the very touchstone of moral empiricism: Kant effects what could be called a 
rationalist ‘sublimation’ of happiness by transforming it from the concrete goal of pleasure 
into a merely formal type of the purely rational Idea of the morally good, thereby providing 
additional protection against empiricism. 
 
5.2.3. Guarding against mysticism 
 
The second danger from which the typic protects the pure practical power of judgment is what 
Kant calls the “mysticism of practical reason”:  
The same typic also guards against mysticism of practical reason, which makes what 
served only as a symbol into a schema, that is, puts under the application of moral 
concepts real but not sensible intuitions (of an invisible kingdom of God) and strays into 
the transcendent (KpV 5: 70-71).262 
We can best understand what the “mysticism of practical reason” amounts to with an example. 
While Kant does not name anyone in particular here, the mystic par excellence in Kant’s 
                                                
260 Beck, Commentary; Marty, "La Typique du jugement pratique pur: La morale kantienne et son application aux 
cas particuliers; Sala, Kommentar. Cf. Reath, "Formal principles and the form of a law," 36-37. 
261 Kant seems to have played with this idea in a number of Reflektionen (Refl 1187, 15: 524-525; Refl 5445, 18: 
184; Refl 7196, 19: 270; Refl 7211, 19: 286; Refl 7260, 19: 296-7). On the special significance of the relation 
between the mathematical and metaphysical infinite in Kant, see A. W. Moore, "Aspects of the Infinite in Kant," 
Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 97 (1988).  
262 [Eben dieselbe Typik bewahrt auch vor dem Mysticism der praktischen Vernunft, welcher das, was nur zum 
Symbol diente, zum Schema macht, d.i. wirkliche und doch nicht sinnliche Anschauungen (eines unsichtbaren 
Reichs Gottes) der Anwendung der moralischen Begriffe unterlegt und ins Überschwengliche hinausschweift.] 
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cultural horizon was Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772).263 After a fruitful career as a scientist 
and inventor, in 1744 Swedenborg suddenly entered a spiritual phase which would last for the 
following three decades. During this time, he experienced mystical visions which he described 
in eighteen published theological works. In works such as Heaven and its Wonders and Hell 
From Things Heard and Seen264 and the eight-volume Heavenly Mysteries,265 Swedenborg 
gave elaborate accounts of his visions of the ‘spiritual world’, including details about how 
angels in Heaven eat, sleep, talk, read, play, marry, and even procreate. In effect, Swedenborg 
claimed to enjoy special insights thanks to his divinely imparted spiritual vision – and he also 
drew substantive theological, metaphysical and moral conclusions from these revelations. As 
is well known, Kant took an initial interest in Swedenborg’s claims about the mundus 
intelligibilis, but quickly became disenchanted, ultimately lambasting and ridiculing the 
Swedish mystic in his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (Träume eines Geistessehers) of 1766. Kant 
continued to combat mysticism in his subsequent writings: in the Typic chapter, he flags 
mysticism as a “danger” in the moral sphere; later on, he frequently reiterated his warning that 
mystical “madness” will lead to “the moral death of reason” (SF 7: 86; R 6: 101, 174-5) unless 
philosophy tirelessly guards against and “censures” the excesses of Schwärmerei (R 6: 601, 
683; VpR 28: 1109; SF 7: 46). 
In the Typic chapter, Kant specifically criticizes mysticism for denaturing the 
representation of the moral law: insofar as it “puts under the application of moral concepts real 
but not sensible intuitions,” mysticism “makes what served only as a symbol into a schema” 
(KpV 5: 70). 266  Kant’s formulation here lends itself to confusion, because in fact he 
countenances no such thing as “real but not sensible intuitions” (at least for human beings), 
nor does he allow that the mystical mode of representation amounts to a genuine “schema” as 
characterized in the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, as Kant repeatedly stresses in the second 
Critique, human beings neither possess nor require a faculty of intellectual intuition (KpV 5: 
                                                
263 A fuller list of contemporaries whom Kant considered mystics would doubtless also include Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), Johann Georg Schlosser (1739-1799) and Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801). 
264 De Caelo et Ejus Mirabilibus et de inferno, ex Auditis et Visis (1758). 
265 Arcana Cœlestia, quae in Scriptura Sacra seu Verbo Domini sunt, detecta (1749-1756).  
266 Part Two provides an extensive analysis of the significance of this statement for the typic’s place in Kant’s 
theory of symbolism. 
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31, 42, 45, 46), and therefore the mystics’ ostensibly supersensible illuminations are merely 
delusional “pseudo-intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God”267 engendered by their own 
overheated – even sick – imaginations: “the enthusiast (visionary, fanatic) … is genuinely 
deranged from an alleged immediate revelation and from a great familiarity with the powers of 
heaven. Human nature knows no more dangerous deception” (KK 2: 267). Consequently, Kant 
dismisses all attempts to put such pseudo-intuitions under the moral Ideas as “a magic lantern 
of chimeras [Zauberlaterne von Hirngespenstern]” (KpV 5: 141). Critical moral philosophy – 
especially the Typic – must therefore “ward off fanaticism, which promises such an extension 
by means of supersensible intuitions or feelings” (KpV 5: 135-6).  
 Although he definitely considers mysticism a danger, Kant adopts a relatively lenient 
tone in the Typic chapter: 
However, it is much more important and advisable to guard against empiricism of 
practical reason, since mysticism is still compatible with the purity and sublimity of the 
moral law and, besides, it is not natural and not in keeping with the common way of 
thinking to strain one’s imagination to supersensible intuitions, so that the danger from 
this side is not so general … [E]nthusiasm [Schwärmerei] … can never constitute a lasting 
condition of any great number of people (KpV 5: 70). 
In other words, the very effort involved in dreaming up pseudo-supersensible intuitions 
testifies to the sublimity of the moral law, infinitely elevated above sensibility.268 Indeed, there 
are signs that, despite his deep philosophical misgivings, Kant held a reluctant admiration for 
Swedenborg’s visions as “quite sublime.”269 Moreover, whereas empiricism appeals directly to 
everyone’s way of feeling, mysticism will likely only appeal to a small number of individuals. 
Some Kant scholars have leapt to mysticism’s defense. Bulnes bemoans the strict 
limitations that the typic places on mystical experience, notably its preclusion of directly 
intuiting or feeling God’s will, which leads her to charge that Kant’s conception of intelligible 
nature “shows a great psychological and ethical poverty.”270 She then pleads for replacing the 
cold, rationalist typic with the mystical and “profoundly Christian experience” of opening 
                                                
267 Adickes, Kant und die Als-Ob-Philosophie, 194. 
268 See also Ch. 1, 3.2.1. 
269 Gregory R. Johnson, ed. Kant on Swedenborg: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Other Writings, vol. 15, 
Swedenborg Studies (West Chester (PA): Swedenborg Foundation, 2002), xv. 
270 "Racionalismo Etico," 137-138.  
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one’s heart to a direct influx of God’s love.271 In a similar vein, Grondin claims that the 
remote and intellectualized typic fails to mediate the moral law and so must give way to the 
feelings of “admiration and awe [Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht]” (KpV 5: 161), inspired by 
what he calls “the miracle of moral elevation above and beyond the sensible world [das 
Wunder der sittlichen Erhebung über das Sinnliche hinaus].”272 
However, it is crucial to recognize that Kant had strong philosophical reasons for 
excluding mysticism from morality. Firstly, Kant argues that we should not accord mystical 
experiences a constitutive role in morality because they cannot be publicly validated through 
open communication and debate. While truly “numinous” experiences can be intimated 
through works of art (such as Bernini’s Ecstasy of Saint Teresa), they cannot be 
communicated through ordinary language or concepts. 273  And if everyone based their 
judgments of right and wrong on their own private, ineffable visions and feelings, then 
confusion and conflict would inevitably ensue, as there would be no possibility for reasoned 
agreement, or even debate: “For unless the supersensible … is anchored to determinate 
concepts of reason, such as those of morality, fantasy inevitably gets lost in the transcendent 
… and leads to an illuminism in which everyone has his private, inner revelations, and there is 
no longer any public touchstone of truth” (SF 7: 46; cf. TG 2: 342).274 Indeed, in Was ist 
Aufklärung? Kant famously exhorted his fellow citizens to rely instead on their own reason to 
arrive at moral principles that could be openly communicated, critically debated and fairly 
implemented in a cosmopolitan society. Accordingly, Kant also fiercely opposed those “adepts 
of the philosopher’s stone” who promised “visionary treasures” through their ostensible “leaps 
of genius,” i.e., pompous philosophers who claimed to have gained access to esoteric truths 
                                                
271 "Racionalismo Etico," 141.  
272 "Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen Gesetzes," 394. 
273 See Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum 
Rationalen, Beck'sche Reihe (München: Beck, 2004). 
274 Tellingly, even Freud recognized the priority of public reason over private ’illumination’ in Die Zukunft einer 
Illusion (1927) : “Es gibt keine Instanz über der Vernunft. Wenn die Wahrheit der religiösen Lehren abhängig ist 
von einem inneren Erlebnis, das diese Wahrheit bezeugt, was macht man mit den vielen Menschen, die solch ein 
seltenes Erlebnis nicht haben? Man kann von allen Menschen verlangen, daß sie die Gabe der Vernunft 
anwenden, die sie besitzen, aber man kann nicht eine für alle giltige Verpflichtung auf ein Motiv aufbauen, das 
nur bein ganz wenigen existiert. Wenn der eine aus einem ihn tief ergreifenden ekstatischen Zustand die 
unerschütterliche Überzeugung von der realen Wahrheit der religiösen Lehren gewonnen hat, was bedeutet das 
dem anderen?” Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse. Die Zukunft einer Illusion (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2007), 
131.  
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about morality and humanity’s place in the universe through mystical intuition, insight, or 
feeling (KpV 5: 163; MS 6: 377). For instance, Kant directed his 1796 essay, On a Recently 
Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy, against Johann Georg Schlösser, who preached 
an esoteric form of Christianized Neo-Platonism. Allison has aptly explained the philosophical 
significance of Kant’s critique: “Tone is an attack on philosophical esotericism, that is, any 
view which sees philosophy as containing secret doctrines expressed in a mysterious language 
that are accessible only to a few adepts by means of some special power of intuition. Not only 
is any such view … completely antithetical to the very idea of a critique of pure reason, it is 
also anathema to Kant’s political republicanism.”275 Relatedly, Kant criticized the sects and 
secret societies to which so many of his contemporary intellectuals belonged, notably 
Freemasonry, for proceeding per initiationem, i.e., jealously guarding secret, esoteric truths 
from the uninitiated.276 
As Ernst Cassirer has pointed out, Kant also holds that mysticism can corrupt moral 
motivation by as it were colluding with the principle of happiness. This happens when ecstatic 
visions of ecstasy of “Mohammed’s paradise or the fusional union with the Godhead of the 
theosophists and mystics, according to the taste of each,” (KpV 5: 120) entice mere mortals 
into committing ‘holy’ atrocities here on Earth in order to attain a promised otherworldly 
reward; conversely the vivid threat of gruesome tortures in Hell (fire and brimstone, gnashing 
of teeth, etc.) as punishments for evil deeds replaces genuine respect for duty with fear and 
trembling.277 Consequently, Kant avers that if the mystics’ desire for insight into the noumenal 
world were granted, it would ruin moral motivation: “if God and eternity with their awful 
majesty stood unceasingly before our eyes … most actions conforming to the law would be 
done from fear, only a few from hope, and none at all from duty” (KpV 5: 147). And this 
perversion, in turn, would debase moral personality and degrade autonomy into heteronomy: 
“the moral worth of actions, on which alone … the worth of the person and even that of the 
                                                
275 "General Introduction," in Immanuel Kant. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter 
Heath, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
23; see also Claude Piché, "Rousseau et Kant: À propos de la genèse de la théorie kantienne des idées," Revue 
philosophique, no. 4  (1990): 632-635.  
276 See ———, "Kant et l'esprit de secte en philosophie," in Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht. Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010, ed. Stefano Bacin, et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013). 
277 Kant's Life and Thought, 260; Kants Leben und Lehre, 250-251. 
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world depends, would not exist at all. … [H]uman conduct would thus be changed into mere 
mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would 
be no life in the figures” (KpV 5: 147). In a word, the mystics should be more careful about 
what they wish for.  
The typic, by contrast, protects morality from these dangers of mysticism by instituting 
the “rationalism of judgment [der Rationalism der Urtheilskraft]”:  
Only rationalism of judgment is suitable for the use of moral concepts, since it takes from 
sensible nature nothing more than what pure reason can also think for itself, that is, 
conformity with law, and transfers into the supersensible nothing but what can, 
conversely, be really exhibited by actions in the sensible world in accordance with a 
formal rule of a law of nature in general.278  
By analogically transposing the pure form of nature’s lawfulness (natura formaliter spectata; 
Type2) into the intelligible sphere, we can as it were trace a conceptual blueprint of the lawful 
architecture of an intelligible moral order (natura archetypa) using representations which 
“can, conversely, be really exhibited” in the sensible world in which we live and act (natura 
ectypa).279 In this way, sober minds can employ the typic to think about the intelligible world 
without transgressing the boundaries set by critical rationalism: “By thinking itself into [sich 
hinein denkt] a world of understanding practical reason does not at all overstep its boundaries, 
but it would certainly do so if it wanted to intuit or feel itself into it [sich hineinschauen, 
hineinempfinden wollte]” (G 4: 458). And for the purposes of exercising pure practical 
judgment we have no need of more; the typic-procedure is sufficient for “even the most 
common understanding” (KpV 5: 70, 44).280 Thus, the rationalist typic, based on a concept of 
lawfulness “which occurs even in the most common use of reason” (KpV 5: 70), is in no way 
reserved for a dubious élite of visionaries ostensibly endowed with extraordinary faculties (cf. 
TG 2: 339-340). In sum, the typic dovetails with Kant’s long-running campaign against 
                                                
278 [Dem Gebrauche der moralischen Begriffe ist blos der Rationalism der Urtheilskraft angemessen, der von der 
sinnlichen Natur nichts weiter nimmt, als was auch reine Vernunft für sich denken kann, d.i. die Gesetzmäßigkeit, 
und in die übersinnliche nichts hineinträgt, als was umgekehrt sich durch Handlungen in der Sinnenwelt nach 
der formalen Regel eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt wirklich darstellen läßt.] 
279 See above, section 4.1.2.3. 
280 See above, section 5.1., and Ch. 2, 4.5. 
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Schwärmerei in the name of rationalism as well as, more generally, with the protective 
function of Kant’s critical moral philosophy as a whole (cf. KpV 5: 135-136, 162-163).281  
                                                
281 See Conclusion, 3.1., and Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 260ff; ———, Kants Leben und Lehre, 250ff.  
 148 
PART TWO. 
THE TYPIC IN KANT’S THEORY OF SYMBOLIC 
REPRESENTATION 
 
 
Kant states that the typic functions not as a schema, but “served only as a symbol” (KpV 5: 
70). This statement is a valuable clue, suggesting that the typic should be understood as a 
particular mode of symbolic representation. The business of Part Two is to situate the typic in 
Kant’s theory of symbolic representation. This is easier said than done, however; aside from 
the sentence fragment just quoted, Kant never mentions the typic in connection with symbolic 
representation. In fact, Kant never elaborated a unified, comprehensive and detailed theory of 
symbolic representation in general, acknowledging that “this business has as yet been little 
discussed, much as it deserves a deeper investigation” (KU 5: 352). 282 Rather, he seems to 
have developed several different forms of symbolism over the course of his philosophical 
development, inventing new tools piecemeal in order to deal with problems as they arose. I 
will situate the typic vis-à-vis these different forms of symbolic representation by means of a 
comparative analysis. Part Two is divided into two Chapters. In Chapter 1, I compare the typic 
with symbolic hypotyposis as described in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, mostly 
stressing the differences. In Chapter 2, I compare the typic with symbolic anthropomorphism 
as described in the Prolegomena, mostly stressing the similarities. This analysis will show in 
more detail how Kant’s theory of symbolic representation changed over time, and the general 
Conclusion contains a section (3.1) on the typic’s distinctive place in this evolution.   
                                                
282 See Bielefeldt, Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 5-6, 180. 
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Chapter 1. 
The typic and symbolic hypotyposis 
 
“Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness either of that which 
is in heaven, or on the earth, or yet under the earth.” (Exodus 20:4)  
 
Many scholars have argued that the typic should be identified with “symbolic hypotyposis” as 
defined in the famous § 59 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment entitled “On Beauty as a 
Symbol of Morality.” Essentially, symbolic hypotyposis is a procedure for providing abstract 
concepts, notably supersensible Ideas of reason, with an indirect presentation in the form of an 
intuitive symbol. Likewise, it is suggested, the typic is a procedure for concretely symbolizing 
the moral law; the type is an intuitive symbol. The purpose of the present Chapter is to present 
this interpretation in detail, and to subject it to a critical examination. Yet as I mentioned in the 
general Introduction, the secondary literature on the Typic is so disparate and disconnected 
that even commentators who defend the same thesis, as here, generally seem unaware of each 
other’s studies. Consequently, the first task is to weave these studies together into a complete, 
unified interpretation. In section 1, I present this “symbolist interpretation” within the same 
global framework as the Commentary (task, particular difficulties, resources, etc.) so as to 
facilitate direct comparison between the two accounts. In section 2, I then critically examine 
the symbolist interpretation, arguing that it is anachronistic, inaccurate and arbitrary. The type 
is not a “symbol” in the sense of KU, § 59, I contend, nor does typification function in the 
same manner as symbolic hypotyposis. In section 3, I further charge that the tendency to 
assimilate the typic with symbolic hypotyposis is not only mistaken, but misguided. Many 
such attempts are motivated by a desire to aestheticize the typic, and with it, Kant’s moral 
philosophy as a whole. But even from a properly aesthetic point of view, this enterprise is ill-
advised, since the sublime and the aesthetic idea respectively provide far more powerful and 
poetic aesthetic expressions of the moral Ideas than symbolic hypotyposis could ever muster.   
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1.	  Presentation	  of	  the	  symbolist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Typic	  chapter	  
1.1. Task 
 
The way in which one frames the task that the typic is meant to accomplish decisively 
influences how one characterizes its corresponding function. The symbolists agree that the 
typic is meant to enable moral appraisal, but their construal of this task is far more general 
than what I proposed in the Commentary. On this view, moral appraisal involves more than 
merely subsuming actions under the a priori concepts of good and evil: it belongs to the 
broader problematic of the application of the moral law and other moral Ideas to concrete 
experience, all the way down to the “actual situations encountered in our daily experience” and 
the “messy and intricate circumstances of our lives.”283 Furthermore, the proponents of the 
symbolist interpretation tie the concrete application of the moral law to a more profound 
human need for meaning and orientation when faced with the question: “How shall I represent 
to myself what I ought to do, what my duty commands me to realize in the world?”284 Unless 
the abstract formula of the Categorical Imperative can be made more comprehensible to the 
common human understanding, they argue, it will remain empty of significance and otiose for 
moral praxis.285 As finite, “image-dependent” (bilderbedürftig) beings (KU 5: 408), we 
inevitably feel “the analogue of a need for schematization” with respect to the abstract moral 
Ideas.286 In order to make these supersensible representations comprehensible and meaningful, 
a way must be found to connect them with “the intuitive, sensible dimension of moral 
experience.”287 Correspondingly, the symbolists will argue that moral appraisal should be 
regarded as an essentially “imaginative process of deliberating on specific cases” rather than 
as a dry, discursive method, 288 and that only by enlisting the “moral imagination” can moral 
                                                
283 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 265-266. See also Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 
164-165; Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 43ff; Schwartländer, "Sittliche Autonomie als Idee der endlichen 
Freiheit. Bemerkungen zum Prinzip der Autonomie im kritischen Idealismus Kants; ———, Der Mensch ist 
Person. 
284 Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 29. Cf. Silber, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics," 219. 
285 Schwartländer, Der Mensch ist Person, 154-155. Cf. Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 167ff. 
286 Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 30-31. 
287 Silber, "Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft," 267. 
288 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 265. 
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appraisal consummate the human need for a vivid sensible presentation of moral Ideas.289 On 
this interpretation, the ultimate goal of moral appraisal – and hence of the typic – will be to 
make the moral law comprehensible and efficacious in concreto by galvanizing our sensibility 
and feelings.290 Thus, from the outset, the advocates of the symbolist interpretation ascribe the 
typic a primarily subjective and aesthetic dimension. Let me also mention that in this chapter I 
will be taking the term “aesthetic” in a broad sense, encompassing not only the third Critique’s 
notions of the beautiful, art, judgments of taste, etc., but also feelings and emotions in 
general.291 
 
1.2. ‘Particular difficulties’ 
 
By contrast, the symbolists tend to frame the ‘particular difficulties’ of the power of judgment 
in objective, ontological terms. Grandjean defends the most overtly ontological interpretation, 
going so far as to reject any construal of the problem as “a merely subjective heterogeneity” 
between two kinds of representations, attributing instead the particular difficulties of practical 
judgment to an “objective heterogeneity with respect to the represented object.”292 In support 
of this interpretation, Grandjean highlights the passage where Kant specifies that “the morally 
good as an object is something supersensible (dem Ojekte nach) [KpV 5: 68, Grandjean’s 
italics]” – and then infers that the particular difficulties arise because no object in the sensible 
world can furnish an ontologically adequate counterpart to the intelligible objects we invoke in 
moral appraisal.293 Paton, for his part, does characterize the moral law as an Idea – hence as a 
supersensible representation rather than an as intelligible object – nevertheless, he traces the 
particular difficulties of moral appraisal to the ontological deficiency of actions qua objects in 
the sensible world to instantiate this Idea:  
                                                
289 See especially ———, "Imagination in Moral Judgment."  
290 Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 30-31. 
291 Cf. Daniel Dumouchel, "Kant et la 'part subjective' de la moralité," in Kant actuel: Hommage à Pierre 
Laberge, ed. G. Lafrance, C. Piché, and F. Duchesneau (Montreal & Paris: Bellarmin / Vrin, 2000), 109. 
292 In section 2.2.3. of the Commentary, I argued that the “particular difficulties” of the pure practical power of 
judgment consist in a subjective mismatch between two kinds of representations involved in moral appraisal: 
supersensible Ideas on the one hand and sensible intuitions on the other. 
293 Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 46.  
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The difficulty about our concept of the unconditioned and absolute law of morality is that 
it is an Idea of reason and therefore ex hypothesi it can have no corresponding object in 
sensuous experience. The actions which we wish to bring under the moral law are – from 
one point of view – mere events subject to the law of nature and not to the law of freedom. 
They cannot be adequate to the Idea of an unconditioned law, and we have no schema, 
transcendental or otherwise, whereby we can exhibit an object for such an Idea of reason” 
(my emphasis).294  
Similarly, Dietrichson locates the source of the particular difficulties in an ‘existential’ 
mismatch: “So the important problem [is] how we are to go about applying the purely formal, 
abstract, existentially indeterminate moral law as a criterion for evaluating the material 
maxims of our particular actions in the concretely existing phenomenal world” (original 
italics).295 
 
1.3. Resources 
 
The symbolists then argue that we need some way of bringing the moral law down to earth: 
“There is obviously a need for some principle of mediation, whereby the purely abstract moral 
law can be made concretely applicable as a standard for determining whether such-and-such a 
material maxim of voluntary actions is morally legitimate.”296 While noting a certain analogy 
between the problematics of mediation in the first and second Critiques,297 the symbolists duly 
recognize that the schematism of theoretical judgment cannot solve the difficulties of pure 
practical judgment. Tellingly, though, virtually none of them raise the problem – heavily 
stressed in the Commentary298 – that the schematism, as a procedure of the imagination, 
produces sensible intuitions that would contaminate the supersensible Ideas of morality; 
instead, they bring up a number of unrelated factors, such as purely epistemological 
considerations.299 As for Kant’s explicit rejection of the sensible imagination as a faculty for 
                                                
294 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 159. 
295 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 167-168, cf. 170, 173-164. See also Johnson, "Imagination in 
Moral Judgment," 259, 270. 
296 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 168. 
297 "Jugement moral," 45. 
298 See section 3.2.1.1.  
299 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 173, 176. Cf. Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 46. 
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producing the type (KpV 5: 69), the symbolists pass it over completely, mention it only in 
passing, or openly contest it.300 For instance, Johnson states outright “I want to argue that, in 
spite of his repeated insistence on the purely rational nature of moral judgment, Kant 
recognized the need for imagination in order to apply moral rules to specific cases.”301 But 
whatever the specific reasons given, the the upshot is framed in the same way: if we cannot 
schematize the supersensible moral Ideas directly, then we must schematize them indirectly. 
 Framing the rejection of schematic presentation only qua direct is crucial to the 
symbolist interpretation, because it leads to a correspondingly different characterization of the 
nature and function of the typic than on the interpretation proposed in the Commentary. On the 
latter view, Kant rejects the schematism as a means of presentation qua sensible and therefore 
turned to the pure understanding to provide representations devoid of sensible contamination 
(the form of the law of nature and natura formaliter spectata).302 On the other hand, by 
contending that Kant rejects the schematism as a means of presentation only qua direct, the 
symbolists can argue that while we cannot schematize the moral Ideas directly, we are 
nevertheless permitted, even compelled, to find a way to “schematize” these Ideas – i.e., 
exhibit them in sensible intuition – indirectly: “Kant’s solution is that, while there can be no 
direct presentation or schematism of the moral law, there can be an indirect or symbolical 
presentation.”303 Correspondingly, the function that they assign to the typic is to serve as a 
“figurative substitute for a schematization of the moral law”304 that is designed to furnish an 
“indirect sensible presentation of the supersensible, which is a symbolic presentation of the 
supersensible.”305  
 
                                                
300 ———, "Jugement moral," 46. Alquié wavers: on the one hand, he denies that there is or even can be a 
“moral imagination,” but on the other hand he characterizes the type as an “image” in Leçons sur Kant: La 
morale de Kant (Paris: La Table Ronde, 2005), 232-233. 
301 "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 265f.  
302 See section 4.1. of the Commentary. 
303 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 270. Cf. Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 35; Paton, The 
Categorical Imperative, 160-161; Silber, "Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft," 267. 
304 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 176-177. 
305 Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 35. 
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1.4. Solution 
1.4.1. Overcoming the ‘particular difficulties’ 
 
We have now come to the crux of the symbolist interpretation: the problem of the remoteness 
of the moral law can only be solved by means of symbolization, which consists in expressing 
the abstract representation of the moral law in the form of a concrete symbol in sensible 
intuition that human beings can readily comprehend and apply. Dietrichson explains the 
rationale using an analogy with dramaturgy:  
The problem of expressing the principle of the abstract moral law in terms of a Typus is 
analogous to that of a playwright who wants to portray a certain moral virtue in a morality 
play. A purely formal idea of a certain moral virtue has no concreteness as an idea for 
dramatic presentation in a play. The playwright therefore devises an artistic construct in 
the form of a fictional character (a dramatis persona) which in a symbolically concrete 
manner typifies the abstract principle of the virtue he wants to portray. In other words, he 
develops a heuristic dramatic construct which serves as its type … The dramatis persona 
is simply a practical device for symbolizing concretely the abstract idea of the virtue in 
question. I have to proceed in a similar manner if I am to succeed in concretizing the 
abstract principle of the moral law.306  
In the typic, accordingly, the law of nature personifies the moral law, imparting the latter with 
a vivid, “symbolically concrete form.”307 While the symbolists do not explicitly distinguish 
between Type1 and Type2 (or even mention Type3),308 they suggest that the law of nature, as 
the analogue of the moral law qua law, can serve as the latter’s “intuitive counterpart,”309 just 
as sensible nature as a whole can concretely symbolize the analogous lawfulness 
(Gesetzmäßigkeit) of the intelligible world.310 In this respect, the typic works in the same way 
as the Natural Law Formula in the Groundwork, which brings the moral law “closer to 
intuition and to feeling” by means of an analogy.311 Johnson suggests, along these lines, that 
                                                
306 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 177. 
307 ———, "Criteria of universalizability," 168. 
308 Cf. Commentary, sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 5.2.2. 
309 Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 46-47. 
310 Alquié, La morale de Kant, 232; Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 34f. According to Paton, it is 
nature as a harmonious teleological whole, or ‘kingdom of nature’, that serves as a symbol for the analogously 
constituted kingdom of ends in the intelligible world, The Categorical Imperative, 160-162.  
311 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 147, 158f. Grandjean, for his part, emphasizes the differences between 
FLN and the Typic, "Jugement moral," 44. 
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“the typification of the categorical imperative is essentially a metaphorical process,” where we 
intuitively and imaginatively grasp morality by means of the metaphor “MORAL LAWS ARE 
NATURAL LAWS.”312 Nature, employed as a symbolic image or metaphor, promises to 
satisfy our deep human need for some form of mediation between the sublime Ideas of 
morality and our lived, sensible reality: “Kant meets this need; what he calls the ‘type’ (Typus) 
of the moral law is precisely a concretizing of the moral law, namely a restatement of the 
abstract moral law in a symbolically concrete form.”313  
Furthermore, it is claimed that this symbolic function of the typic gives the key to the 
elusive meaning of the term “Typus,” as Paton maintains:  
The word ‘type’ is commonly used in theology in more or less the same way as Kant uses 
the word ‘symbol’: it is that by which something is symbolised or figured. Thus the 
people of Israel are said to be a type of God’s people, and the Paschal lamb is said to be a 
type of Christ. Kant’s application of the word to the law of nature is a natural extension of 
this usage.314 
Thus, when Kant says that the law of nature serves as the “type” of the moral law, he just 
means that the former serves as the symbol of the latter, which is in turn an indirect sensible 
rendering (Versinnlichung) of an abstract moral Idea. But the symbolist interpretation is not 
content to characterize the typic as a symbol only in this general sense; several commentators 
aim to situate it precisely within Kant’s own theory of symbolism. And so they turn to the 
well-known theory of “symbolic hypotyposis” described in § 59 of the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment: 
All hypotyposis (presentation, subjecto ad aspectum), as making something sensible 
[Versinnlichung], is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to a concept grasped by 
the understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or symbolic, where to a 
concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, 
an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in a way merely 
analogous to that which it observes in schematization, i.e., it is merely the rule of this 
procedure, not the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the 
content, which corresponds to the concept. … All intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a 
priori are thus either schemata or symbols, the first of which contain direct, the second 
indirect presentations of the concept. The first do this demonstratively, the second by 
                                                
312 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 271f. Here Johnson is doubtless alluding to the Conceptual 
Theory of Metaphor that he first developed with George Lakoff in the highly influential Metaphors We Live By. 
With a new Afterword (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).  
313 Dietrichson, "Criteria of universalizability," 168.  
314 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 160. 
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means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions are also employed), in which the 
power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a 
sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition 
to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical 
state is represented by a body with a soul if it is ruled in accordance with laws internal to 
the people, but by a mere machine (like a handmill) if it is ruled by a single absolute will, 
but in both cases it is represented only symbolically. For between a despotic state and a 
handmill there is, of course, no similarity, but there is one between the rule for reflecting 
on both and their causality (KU 5: 351).315 
It’s a perfect fit, the symbolists claim: § 59 spells out the precise sense in which the type is a 
“symbol [Symbol] (KpV 5: 70); correspondingly, typification is an instance of symbolic 
hypotyposis, i.e., an indirect presentation of a supersensible Idea in sensible intuition by 
means of an analogy.316 Some also claim that only by situating the typic in Kant’s critical 
theory of symbolic hypotyposis can one explain why Kant holds that the power of judgment is 
“entitled and even required” to employ it (KpV 5: 70).317 
 
1.4.2. Accomplishing the task 
 
Pursuant to this interpretation of typification as a symbolic Versinnlichung of the moral law, 
the symbolists propose that the typic-procedure is a primarily imaginative process that projects 
a scene before the mind’s eye.318 This makes the moral law more intuitively vivid, as Paton 
affirms: “the best, if not the only, way to make such a law vivid in our imagination is to 
picture to ourselves a world in which everybody in fact acted in accordance with it.”319 In 
                                                
315 Cf. the related discussion of symbolic hypotyposis in the 1804 Preisschrift (FM 20: 279-80). The mechanics 
of symbolic hypotyposis are discussed in more detail in Ch. 2, section 3.  
316 All of the following commentators explicitly identify the type with symbolic hypotyposis: Alquié, La morale 
de Kant, 232; H. W. Cassirer, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment (New York: Barnes & Noble, 
1938), 76; Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion, 42, 47; Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 47-48; Johnson, 
"Imagination in Moral Judgment," 270-272; Krüger, Philosophie und Moral, 84-86; Mumbrú Mora, 
"Sensibilización y Moralidad en Kant," 131-132; Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 159-162, esp. 159n; 
Schwartländer, Der Mensch ist Person, 83-86; Silber, "Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft," 267.  
317 Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 35-38; Irrlitz, Kant-Handbuch, 331-332. 
318 Johnson issues the disclaimer that by calling the thought experiment an “imaginative” procedure he does not 
mean that it only yields images "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 276. In the rest of his work, however, Johnson 
champions a conception of the imagination as deeply rooted in embodied sensibility: see The Meaning of the 
Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); cf. "Review of 
'The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding' by Mark Johnson," Ithaque, no. 2  (2008). 
319 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 146. 
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addition, Dietrichson claims that imagining the scene that would result if a corresponding 
maxim were to become a law of nature effectively guides and improves moral appraisal “by 
projecting in imagination the sort of world that would come into existence were the maxims of 
our act to become a universal law of nature … the moral agent gains a clearer intuitive sense 
of the consistency and universality of his volition” (my emphasis).320 Finally, the proponents 
of the symbolist interpretation emphasize that the imagination “render[s] the moral law 
efficacious in concreto” and thereby provides it with “subjective access” – i.e., an influence on 
the subject’s feeling.321 Accordingly, many of the commentators who endorse the symbolist 
interpretation maintain that the typic’s primary function is aesthetic. 
 
1.6. Outcome, effectiveness 
 
Finally, as we will see in more detail below, the symbolists interpret Kant’s remarks on the 
common understanding (KpV 5: 69-70) to mean that the typic effectively meets the latter’s 
need for concreteness by means of a symbol that renders the moral law comprehensible, vivid 
and applicable to our daily lives: “Once the typification of the categorical imperative is 
accomplished, we no longer have the abstract notion of universal law. Instead, we have the 
notion of ‘universal law of nature’, which gives us, symbolically, some direction in applying 
the moral law.”322 And some go on to claim that Kant thereby provides a psychologically 
realistic picture of moral reasoning: “Moreover, the typified imperative is not merely a 
philosopher’s answer to philosophers’ metaphysical concerns about bridging the gap between 
the realms of freedom and nature – it is also an adequate reconstruction of an actual reasoning 
process that all of us recognize in our moral deliberations from time to time.”323  
 
                                                
320 Silber, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics," 212-213. Cf. Alquié, La morale de Kant, 232. 
321 Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes, 30-31. 
322 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 272; cf. Robert B. Louden, "Making the law visible: the role of 
examples in Kant's ethics," in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. Jens 
Timmermann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 70-72. 
323 Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 272. For other positive assessments of the typic’s effectiveness as 
a symbol, see: Castillo, La Responsabilité des modernes; Schwartländer, Der Mensch ist Person; Silber, 
"Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics." 
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2.	  Critical	  assessment	  of	  the	  symbolist	  interpretation	  
 
I will now critically assess the symbolist interpretation of the Typic chapter, point by point. I 
argue that retrojecting the theory of symbolic hypotyposis from the third Critique into the 
second is anachronistic, inaccurate, and arbitrary. 
 
2.1. Task 
 
Firstly, the symbolist interpretation of the Typic chapter starts with a very broad conception of 
moral judgment: interpreting complex and nuanced situations from a moral point of view, 
making moral concepts personally meaningful, and applying universal moral principles to the 
particular circumstances of our individual lives. To be sure, all of these activities involve 
moral judgment in a general sense, and one would have to give them due attention if one 
aimed to give a comprehensive account of moral life in its real richness and complexity. 
However, if one sets oneself the more pointed interpretive aim of understanding the typic in its 
specificity, then one must identify the specific task that Kant intends it to solve – and from this 
point of view, the symbolists’ characterization of moral judgment is far too broad. Indeed, by 
throwing together different exercises of the power of judgment – pure and applied, ethical and 
aesthetic, determining and reflecting – the symbolist interpretation obscures the typic’s proper 
task. In fact, as Kant indicates in the title of the chapter, the typic belongs to the “pure 
practical power of judgment” (der reinen praktischen Urtheilskraft) (KpV 5: 67, my 
emphasis), whose proper business consists in subsuming particular actions under the two 
“concepts of an object of pure practical reason,” namely the morally good and evil (das sittlich 
Gute und Böse), which are in turn derived a priori from the moral law.324 Contrary to the 
symbolist interpretation, then, Kant designed the typic to enable a strictly a priori, determining 
exercise of the pure practical power of judgment – no more and no less. And because the 
symbolist interpretation construes the typic’s task so broadly, it mischaracterizes the typic by 
ascribing it functions that Kant never designed it to perform. Of course, Kant’s own 
                                                
324 As explained in the chapter immediately preceding the Typic, “On the concept of an object of pure practical 
reason” (KpV 5: 57-67). See section 1 of the Commentary. 
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conception of what it takes to be a competent moral judge in the real world involves far more 
than this narrowly defined task – yet he treats of the fine-tuned, concrete application of moral 
judgment in other contexts and with other resources. As a deeply moral person, Kant was 
acutely aware of the complexity of real-life moral situations “that call upon judgment to 
decide how a maxim is to be applied in particular cases” (MS 6: 411), and as a philosopher he 
consequently introduced supplementary resources for meeting this challenge (including 
casuistry, a moral catechism, examples, and moral didactics) in the “Doctrine of the method of 
pure practical reason” in the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV 5: 151-163), the “Doctrine of 
the methods of ethics” in the Metaphysics of Morals (MS 6: 411, 477-484), and in his Lectures 
on Pedagogy (VP 9: 488-493).325  
Secondly, the symbolist interpretation lays great weight on the premise that we finite 
human beings have a deep-seated need (Bedürfnis) for supersensible representations to be 
presented in sensible intuition in order for them to be comprehensible to us (KU 5: 408). Kant 
elaborates on this special need in a pair of passages in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason: 
It is plainly a limitation of human reason, one which is ever inseparable from it, that … we 
always need a certain analogy with natural being in order to make supersensible 
characteristics comprehensible to us (R 6: 61n).326 
Yet for the human being the invisible needs to be represented through something visible 
(sensible), indeed what is more, it must be accompanied by the visible for the sake of 
praxis and, though intellectual, made as it were an object of intuition (according to a 
certain analogy) (R 6: 192, trans. mod.).327 
                                                
325 See Stefano Bacin, "The meaning of the Critique of Practical Reason for moral beings: the Doctrine of 
Method of Pure Practical Reason," in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide, ed. Andrews Reath 
and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Louden, "Making the law 
visible: the role of examples in Kant's ethics; ———, Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human 
Beings (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Torralba, "Facultad del juicio."  
326 [Es ist freilich eine Beschränktheit der menschlichen Vernunft, die doch einmal von ihr nicht zu trennen ist, 
daß … wir bedürfen, um uns übersinnliche Beschaffenheiten faßlich zu machen, immer einer gewissen Analogie 
mit Naturwesen] 
327 [Allein das Unsichtbare bedarf doch beim Menschen durch etwas Sichtbares (Sinnliches) repräsentiert, ja, 
was noch mehr ist, durch dieses zum Behuf des Praktischen begleitet, und, obzwar es intellektuell ist, gleichsam 
(nach einer gewissen Analogie) anschaulich gemacht zu werden] 
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And since this need calls for a “schematism of analogy [Schematism der Analogie]” (R 6: 192) 
– which is just another name for symbolic hypotyposis328 – the symbolists argue that the 
function of the typic is likewise to furnish a symbolic presentation of the supersensible Ideas 
of the moral law and morally Good.329 
These passages appear to speak strongly in favour of the symbolist interpretation, but 
on closer inspection their relevance to the Typic becomes tenuous. Kant wrote his 
Religionsschrift five years after the Critique of Practical Reason; consequently, it is prima 
facie anachronistic to assume that the two texts deal with the very same problems and 
concepts. In fact, both Religion passages concern religion’s proper contribution to moral 
praxis.330 The first passage explains how the figure of Christ in Scripture serves “as an 
example to be emulated” (R 6: 64) insofar as he represents an “archetype [Urbild]” (R 6: 61, 
trans. mod.)331 – not “type” – of a perfect moral disposition. The second passage deals with the 
question of how churches can best cultivate the “the true (moral) service of God” (R 6: 192) 
by their members without encouraging dogmatic anthropomorphism or superstition. By 
contrast, the typic does not primarily concern fostering virtuous action, much less religion’s 
moralizing function, but rather the prior, abstract problem of how to represent the 
supersensible moral law in such as way as to subsume actions under it in the first place. 
Moreover, the focus of the Religion passages is internal: the goal is to provide a lively and 
inspiring presentation of the characteristics or qualities inherent in people’s moral disposition 
that are necessary for promoting virtue, e.g., the Devil’s temptation of Christ as a parable of 
moral fortitude (R 6: 61).332 By contrast, the typic’s focus is external: it is a matter of 
                                                
328 Andrew Chignell, "The Devil, the Virgin, and the Envoy: Symbols of Moral Struggle in Religion, Part Two, 
Section Two," in Immanuel Kant. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, ed. Otfried Höffe, 
Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: Akademie, 2011), 114f; Maly, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 312ff. 
329 The argument from these Religion passages to the identification of the typic with symbolic hypotyposis is 
especially direct in Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion, 40ff.  
330 Maly, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 326.  
331 Showler, "Archetypal and Ectypal Ideals", 49-50. 
332 Maly has stressed this point with respect to the second passage quoted above (R 6: 192): “Was hier also durch 
Sinnliches repräsentiert oder anschaulich gemacht werden soll, ist der wahre moralische Dienst Gottes bzw. die 
Gesinnung, in der dieser ‚Dienst im Herzen’ besteht. Es geht also nicht um eine Eigenschaft des höchsten 
Wesens, sondern vielmehr um eine moralische Eigenschaft oder Disposition des Menschen, die anschaulich 
gemacht werden soll, wobei diese moralische Disposition des Menschen in einem religiösen Kontext reflektiert 
wird.” Symbolische Erkenntnis, 326, my emphasis. See also Chignell, "Devil, Virgin, Envoy."  
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disinterestedly, even impersonally, evaluating maxims’ conformity to the form of universal 
law. In light of these differences, it is problematic to read the ‘need for symbolism’ back into 
the Typic chapter. 
Thirdly, a closer look at how Kant articulates the semantic relationship between 
aesthetic and moral judgments in § 59 belies the claim that moral Ideas are completely empty 
of significance unless they are given an aesthetic presentation. On the contrary, Kant states 
that when “we call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or fields smiling and joyful 
[or] colors innocent, modest and tender,” we are effectively transferring moral attributes that 
we already grasp onto beautiful objects in nature, and this, only because the latter “arouse 
sensations that contain something analogical to the consciousness of a mental state produced 
by moral judgments” (KU 5: 354, my emphasis). In other words, we try to make sense of the 
feeling of experiencing a natural object as beautiful by analogy with the feeling of judging an 
action to be good – not the other way around: “we often designate beautiful objects of nature 
or of art with names that seem to be grounded in a moral judging” (KU 5: 354, my emphasis). 
Put in the terminology of the contemporary theory of analogy, morality functions here as the 
source domain and aesthetics as the target domain. This suggests, contra the symbolist 
interpretation, that we do not require a prior sensible presentation of moral notions in order to 
analogically grasp their meaning; instead, we predicate moral epithets that we already employ 
in moral judgment onto the objects that we judge to be beautiful – without confusing the 
original moral meaning with the derivative, “symbolic” meaning.333  
 
2.2. Particular difficulties 
 
In the Commentary I have already raised a number of objections to the ontological construal 
of the “particular difficulties” faced by pure practical judgment.334 Here I wish to draw 
attention to an inconsistency within the symbolist interpretation itself: while its proponents 
frame the task of moral appraisal in terms of the particular needs and capacities of the subject, 
                                                
333 This view differs markedly from Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," 271ff. 
334 See section 2.1.1. of the Commentary. This is perhaps the closest Kant comes to Aquinas’ analogy of 
attribution. See Chapter 2, section 2. 
 162 
they characterize the problem in terms of an incompatibility between different kinds of 
objects. Why the shift? Because if the symbolists located the “particular difficulties” within 
the subject, then they would have to admit that Kant in fact emphasizes the inadequacy of the 
finite subject’s sensible imagination vis-à-vis the Ideas of reason; and since the symbolist 
interpretation will go on to appeal to this very faculty, the problem must first be displaced 
outside of the subjet so as not to disbar the subjective prerequisites for symbolic hypotyposis.  
 
2.3. Resources 
 
Given that the imagination cannot present the moral law directly – i.e., through schematic 
hypotyposis, the symbolists infer that it must therefore present the moral law indirectly – i.e., 
through symbolic hypotyposis. The inference does not follow, however, as it stems from a 
false alternative (based on § 59 of the third Critique). By assuming that the only substitute for 
‘direct’ presentation through the schematism must be ‘indirect’ presentation through symbolic 
hypotyposis, the symbolists overlook the possibility that the typic may provide its own, 
specific form of indirect presentation – typification – that corresponds neither to the 
schematism nor to symbolic hypotyposis. As I argued in the Commentary, the tool that Kant 
selects for overcoming the particular difficulties of pure practical judgment, the Typus, is 
neither a schema in the strict sense of the first Critique, nor a symbol in the special sense of the 
third, but instead a “schema of a law itself,” i.e., (1) a sensibly uncontaminated representation 
of (2) the form of universal law that (3) can mediate the subsumption of particular actions 
under the law of freedom and (4) provide a procedure for moral appraisal according to a 
rational standard (namely Gesetzmässigkeit – conformity to a universal law admitting of no 
exception).335 
 
 
 
                                                
335 See section 4.1.1. of the Commentary. 
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2.4. Solution 
2.4.1. Overcoming the ‘particular difficulties’ 
 
Retrojecting the theory of symbolic hypotyposis from the third Critique into the Typic chapter 
is anachronistic, inaccurate, and arbitrary. To begin with, Kant never refers to the typic as a 
“symbolic hypotyposis [symbolische Hypotypose],” nor as a “schematism of analogy” 
[Schematismus der Analogie].” And while the symbolists jump on the single occurrence of the 
word “symbol [Symbol]” in the Typic chapter, they are too quick to assume that it refers to 
symbolic hypotyposis. A search of the electronic edition of Kant’s complete writings336 for the 
terms “Symbol” and “symbolisch” prior to 1788 turns up six main types of occurrences in 
about as many texts. Examining these occurrences will make it clear that the notion of 
symbolic hypotyposis was not in fact present in the corpus prior to the Critique of Practical 
Reason.  
 
1. Mystical symbolism. The earliest references to symbolism in Kant’s writings appear 
in his 1766 treatise, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics 
(Träume eines Geistessehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik), a scathing 
critique of the self-proclaimed visionary Immanuel Swedenborg (and, by association, 
of dogmatic metaphysics). The text contains two conceptions of symbolism. 
In the “historical” part of Dreams, Kant explains that a central concept in 
Swedenborg’s mysticism was the symbolic relation between the material and spiritual 
worlds. Swedenborg held that the material world and all corporeal beings are no more 
than derivative effects brought about by causes in the spiritual world. Consequently, 
cognition of material things has a “double significance”: first, an “external sense,” of 
minor importance, that concerns only physical things as such; and, second, a far more 
important “internal sense,” insofar as material things, recognized as effects, point 
towards forces in the spiritual realm, as their causes. From the second point of view, 
the material world could thus be regarded as a symbol of the spiritual world – although 
Swedenborg claimed that only a visionary with his special gifts was capable of 
                                                
336 Kant im Kontext III. Werke, Briefwechsel, Nachlaß und Vorlesungen auf CD-ROM (Berlin: Karsten Worm 
InfoSoftWare, 2007). 
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recognizing the symbolic significance of the material world and of communicating it to 
the rest of humanity, as Kant explains: “This inner sense is unknown to man, and it is 
this inner sense which Schwedenberg [sic], whose inmost being was opened up, 
wished to make known to man. … the important thing in this symbolic connection of 
corporeal things, as images, with the inner spirit-state [in dieser symbolischen 
Verknüpfung körperlichen Dinge als Bilder mit dem innern geistigen Zustande] is the 
fact that all spirits at all times present themselves to each other under the semblance of 
extended forms, and the influences which these spirit-beings exercise upon each other, 
also arouse within them the appearance of yet other extended beings, as, as it were, the 
appearance of a material world, the images of which are, indeed, merely symbols 
[Symbole] of their inner state” (TG 2: 364). For instance, as Swedenborg would 
expound upon at length in the eight-volume Heavenly Mysteries337 and other works, 
the positions of spirits in space (e.g., on different planets in the Solar System) 
symbolize their spiritual positions relative to one another within the spiritual world. 
Conveniently, this doctrine of symbolism allowed Swedenborg to explain why his 
visions were genuinely spiritual even though they invariably assumed a material form: 
the concrete images he recounts in such detail (e.g., the spirits he describes have 
bodies, eat, speak, and even have children) were thus symbolic manifestations of 
spiritual truths hidden from ordinary consciousness, which takes the material world 
only in its “external sense.” Clearly, Swedenborg’s conception of symbolism can 
correspond neither to the typic nor to symbolic hypotyposis. Insofar as he ontologically 
hypostasizes the symbol as a material, visible thing, he flagrantly “makes what served 
only as a symbol into a schema” of the “invisible kingdom of God” (KpV 5: 70) and a 
fortiori violates the careful critical restrictions on reflective judgment spelled out in the 
third Critique.338 
In the “dogmatic” part of Dreams, however, Kant elaborates a version of 
Swedenborg’s symbolism that purports to be more philosophically respectable: “This 
                                                
337 Arcana Cœlestia, quae in Scriptura Sacra seu Verbo Domini sunt, detecta (1749-1756).  
338 Ernst Müller, "Kants Symbolbegriff in Ästhetik und Religionstheorie. Zum Ursrpung des Begriffs in den 
Träumen eines Geistesehers," in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-
Kongresses, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher (Berlin & New York: De 
Gruyter, 2001), 601. 
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heterogeneity [Ungleichartigkeit] between spirit-representations and those which 
belong to the bodily life of man need not, however, be regarded as an impediment 
serious enough to prevent all possibility of our becoming aware, from time to time, 
even during this present life, of the influences which emanate from the spirit-world. 
For these influences can enter the personal consciousness of man, not, it is true, 
directly, but, nonetheless, in such a fashion that they, in accordance with the law of 
association of ideas, excite those images which are related to them, and awaken 
analogous representations of our senses. They are not, it is true, the spirit-concept 
itself, but they are symbols of it” (TG 2: 338-339, trans. mod., my emphasis).339 How 
does this second view compare with Swedenborg’s? On the one hand, Kant, like 
Swedenborg, grants the symbol the general role of expressing an intelligible or 
spiritual meaning in a more concrete form. On the other hand, Kant demotes the 
ontological status of the symbol from a thing (the material world, corporeal beings, 
physical relations, etc.) to a mere image produced by the imagination (Bild der 
Phantasie). What is more, after arguing that these symbolic images are evoked by 
mere psychological association rather than by direct spiritual causation, Kant ironically 
reverses Swedenborg’s claim to special insight by insinuating that the latter’s 
susceptibility to experience visions was actually pathological: “Phenomena of this type 
cannot, however, be something common and usual; they can only occur with persons 
whose organs are endowed with an exceptionally high degree of sensitivity for 
intensifying the images of the imagination, according to the inner state of the soul … 
and do so to a greater degree than usually happens, or, indeed, ought to happen with 
people of sound constitution (TG 2: 339-340, my emphasis).340 Thus the theory of 
symbolism that Kant proposes here serves the negative function of deflating 
Swedenborg’s hyperbolic claims. 
Yet within the treatise itself, Kant ironically disavows it as a positive account of 
the relations between the intelligible and sensible world. In other words, he does not, 
                                                
339 [Denn sie können in das persönliche Bewußtsein des Menschen zwar nicht unmittelbar, aber doch so 
übergehen, daß sie nach dem Gesetz der vergesellschaften Begriffe machen, die mit ihnen verwandt sicnd und 
analogische Vorstellungen unserer Sinne unserer Sinne erwecken, die wohl nicht der geistige Begriff selber, aber 
doch deren Symbolen sind] 
340 Müller, "Kants Symbolbegriff," 600-601. 
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contrary to first appearances, fully endorse it as a legitimate philosophical theory. Kant 
goes on to intimate that, in truth, this “fragment of occult philosophy” (TG 2: 329) 
represents merely a parody, a “fairy tale from the cloud-cuckoo-land of metaphysics” 
(TG 2: 356) serving to highlight that dogmatic metaphysical theories, while apparently 
more sophisticated than Swedenborg’s ravings, can be just as preposterous – or, as he 
puts it in the title to his work, that “the dreams of a spirit-seer” can be “illustrated by 
dreams of metaphysics.” Indeed, the pervasively sardonic tone of the work struck its 
most influential reviewer, Moses Mendelssohn, who remarked, “The joking 
pensiveness with which this little work is written leaves the reader sometimes in doubt 
as to whether Herr Kant intends to make metaphysics laughable or spirit-seeing 
credible.”341 By the same token, this thoroughly polemical and ironic character of the 
conception of symbolism that Kant advances in Dreams makes untenable any full 
identification with his later theory of symbolic hypotyposis, which, by contrast, is both 
‘official’ as well as properly critical. Needless to say, in KU § 59 Kant does not 
characterize symbols as fantastical images evoked through the feverish associations of 
an idiosyncratic imagination. Moreover, the treatment of symbolism in the pre-critical 
Dreams lacks numerous critical distinctions that characterize Kant’s mature theory in 
the third Critique: we find no distinction between determining and reflecting judgment; 
no distinction between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis; no distinction between 
genius-like inspiration and intersubjective aesthetic validity; no distinction between 
imagination (Phantasie) and the faculty of imagination (Einbildungskraft); and no 
distinction between association and analogy.342  
 
2. Esoteric symbols. Related occurrences of the word “symbol” in Kant’s writings 
appear in a pair of letters to Hamann on the 6th and 8th of April 1774. Here is a 
representative passage from the first letter: “This figure ⊗, the mystical number 7, the 
days of the week, etc., constituting the universal monument to the first instruction 
which God himself gave to human beings, have thus been clothed in different symbols 
                                                
341 Moses Mendelssohn, review of Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, vol. 4, no. 2 
(Berlin, 1767), in Johnson, ed. Kant on Swedenborg, 123. 
342 Cf. Müller, "Kants Symbolbegriff," 601. 
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[in allerley symbola eingehüllt worden] by different nations, each according to its 
taste” (10: 155, trans. mod.). Here, Kant is indulging his friend’s fervent interest in 
esoteric symbols that supposedly shroud mystical truths. But are these numbers, 
allegories, letters, notes, etc. symbolic hypotyposes? Perhaps, but I believe that a better 
case can be made that these representations should instead be classified as aesthetic 
ideas insofar as they vehicle no determinate concept of reflection, but instead serve to 
evoke mystical notions like “the sublimity and majesty of creation” by “animating the 
mind” through “affinity,” that is, furnishing it with suggestive images and impressions 
that “open up for it the prospect of an immeasurable field of related representations,” 
thereby intimating a mystical harmony resonating throughout the universe (cf. KU 5: 
315-6). In any case, it would be very surprising if Kant had had this sense in mind 
when calling the type a “symbol,” given that he derided the dependence on esoteric 
symbolism to express rational concepts as “mere child’s play,” unworthy of 
philosophical discourse (JL 9: 28), which by contrast, should be universally intelligible 
and communicable. 
 
3. Creed. The noun “Symbol” occurs four times in the 1784 essay, “What is 
Enlightenment?”, as in the following passage: “So too, a clergyman is bound to deliver 
his discourse to the pupils in his catechism class and to his congregation in accordance 
with the creed [Symbol] of the church he serves, for he was employed by it on that 
condition” (WA 8: 38). Reading Gregor’s English translation, one would not even 
notice the term Symbol, as she quite rightly renders it as “creed.” In this context Kant 
was using the term in the technical sense that it had acquired in Christian theology 
since the sixteenth century, namely a formal statement of Christians’ beliefs, more 
precisely the Gospels.343 Obviously, this sense is not germane to the Typic.  
 
                                                
343 This sense is listed in the Grimm dictionary: “Symbol. Seit dem 16. Jarhhundert für das chritlische 
Glaubensbekenntnis, namentlich das Apostolikum; in der theologischen Fachsprache seit dem 16. Jh. auch 
‘Bekenntnisschrift’, von Bekenntnissen und Lehrzeugnissen des evangelischen Glaubens und später von den 
Lehrschriften der christlichen ‘Erkennungszeichen’.” "Symbol,"  in Deutsches Wörterbuch, ed. J.  Grimm and W. 
Grimm (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 1377. 
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4. Symbolic representation in the plastic arts. The 1785 essay, “On the Wrongfulness 
of Unauthorized Publication of Books,” Kant contrasts symbolic representation with 
the proper function of a book: “A book is the instrument for delivering a speech to the 
public, not merely a thought, as is, for example, a picture, a symbolic representation 
[symbolische Vorstellung] of some idea or event.” (UB 8: 81n). On a first reading, this 
“symbolic representation” of an “idea” in the form of a “picture” might seem like an 
early instance of symbolic hypotyposis. However, such an identification quickly 
dissipates on closer inspection. First of all, by “idea” (Idee) Kant is far from referring 
to the Idea of reason, but is just talking in a more general way of “some idea or other” 
(irgend einer Idee). Secondly, Gregor’s translation here obscures the fact that Kant’s 
example of a such a symbolic representation is not a generic “picture” – which could in 
turn be associated with an image or an intuition - but more specifically a painting 
(Gemälde). This suggests that Kant was making a passing reference to the notion, 
already well known in his time thanks to authors such as Lessing, that the plastic arts 
portrayed ideas and events “symbolically” – a notion so common, indeed, that Kant 
manifestly felt the need to distinguish it from the mode of representation proper to the 
book, his main subject in the essay.344  
 
5. Algebra. The expression “symbolic construction” turns up once in the Critique of Pure 
Reason in the context of a discussion of mathematical method: “But mathematics does 
not merely construct magnitudes (quanta), as in geometry, but also mere magnitude 
(quantitatem), as in algebra, where it entirely abstracts from the constitution of the 
object that is to be thought in accordance with such a concept of magnitude. In this 
case it chooses a certain notation for all construction of magnitudes in general 
(numbers), as well as addition, subtraction, extraction of roots, etc., and, after it has 
also designated the general concept of quantities in accordance with their different 
relations, it then exhibits all the procedures through which magnitude is generated and 
                                                
344 As a common meaning of Symbol/symbolisch in the eighteenth century, the Grimm dictionary lists, citing 
Lessing and Herder, “eine anschauliche, sinnbildliche Erscheinung von bestimmter Bedeutung … namentlich in 
der Darstellung bildender Kunst.” "Symbol,"  in Deutsches Wörterbuch, ed. J.  Grimm and W. Grimm (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 1378-1379. 
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altered in accordance with certain rules in intuition; where one magnitude is to be 
divided by another, it places their symbols together in accordance with the form of 
notation for division, and thereby achieves by a symbolic construction [einer 
symbolischen Construction] equally well what geometry does by an ostensive or 
geometrical construction (of the objects themselves), which discursive cognition could 
never achieve by means of mere concepts (KrV A717/B745).” As Lisa Shabel and 
Daniel Sutherland have insightfully explained, 345  “symbolic construction” is a 
technical designation of the method used in algebra for representing ratios of “mere 
magnitudes” with arbitrary signs, such as ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘:’. Now, it goes without saying 
that the Typic has nothing to do with algebra. But neither can there be any question of 
symbolic hypotyposis here, as in § 59 of the third Critique Kant will explicitly 
distinguish the latter, qua form of presentation in intuition, from algebraic “symbols,” 
which fall into a more general class of signs serving as visual memory-aids, that is as 
“mere characterizations [bloße Charakterismen], i.e., designations of the concepts by 
means of accompanying sensible signs [sinnliche Zeichen], which contain nothing at 
all belonging to the intuition of the object, but only serve them, in accordance with the 
laws of association of the imagination, and hence in a subjective regard, as a means of 
reproduction; such things are either words, or visible (algebraic, even mimetic) signs, 
as mere expressions [bloße Ausdrücke] for concepts” (KU 5: 352).346 This sense of 
“symbol” is therefore not specific to Kant, but rather corresponds to yet another sense 
of the word in the scholarly literature of his time.347  
 
                                                
345 Lisa Shabel, "Kant on the 'Symbolic Construction' of Mathematical Concepts," Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Science 29, no. 4  (1998); ———, Mathematics in Kant's Critical Philosophy: Reflections on 
Mathematical Practice, Studies in Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2003); Daniel Sutherland, "Kant on 
Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Proportions," Journal of the History of Philosophy 44, no. 4  (2006); ——
—, "Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics and the Greek Mathematical Tradition," The Philosophical Review 113, 
no. 2  (2004).  
346 See also Paul Guyer’s note to this passage in Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer 
and Eric Matthews. Edited by Paul Guyer, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
347 “Symbol. Bildliches Merkzeichen, Erkennungsmarke … so von künstlichen Hilfszeichen und Hilfsmitteln 
rationaler Verständigung.” "Symbol," 1378. 
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6. Symbolic anthropomorphism. The remaining occurrence of the term “symbolic” 
appears in the context of Kant’s discussion of  “symbolic anthropomorphism” in 
§§ 57-9 of the Prolegomena (1783). I propose to treat this occurrence separately, in 
Chapter 2, where I will analyse it in detail and argue that it directly informs the 
“symbolic” dimension of the typic while also differing in important ways from the 
conception of symbolic hypotyposis in the third Critique. 
 
In sum, this brief survey of the corpus up to the Critique of Practical Reason shows that 
although Kant was acquainted with several contemporary meanings of the terms 
“Symbol/symbolisch” and incorporated them directly into his philosophical writing, none of 
these usages corresponds to his later concept of symbolic hypotyposis. 
Indeed, Kant almost certainly did not have this special meaning in mind when writing 
the second Critique for the simple reason that he hadn’t invented the concept of symbolic 
hypotyposis yet. According to Zammito, Kant did not elaborate the notion of symbolic 
hypotyposis until the fall of 1789, a time when Kant’s attitude towards the symbolic and 
artistic expression of rational Ideas underwent a shift.348 This innovation therefore did not 
occur until over two years after Kant had completed the manuscript of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, in June 1787.349 Conversely, the symbolists never mention, much less 
explain, the fact that Kant never once mentions the typic in any of his later treatments of 
symbolic hypotyposis. But if the typic really did represent a groundbreaking introduction of 
symbolism into the heart of his moral philosophy, as they claim, then why doesn’t Kant ever 
refer back to it? Weil has pointed out the conspicuous absence of any mention of typic in § 59 
of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the locus classicus of symbolic hypotyposis:  
It should be noted that Kant does not speak here of the typic of practical reason as one 
would have expected given its analogous function to that of the schema and of the symbol 
in the two other Critiques; the reason is that this typic, stemming as it does from 
                                                
348 John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment (Chicago & London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 269, 285.  
349 See Kant’s letter to C. G. Shütz, editor of the Jenaische Allgemeine Literaturzeitung, on 25 June 1787 (10: 
490). 
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reflections on the form of the law of nature, is essentially discursive, not intuitive and 
immediate.350  
As Weil aptly remarks, Kant does not mention the typic in connection with symbolic 
hypotyposis because he never conceived of the type as an intuitive symbol at all. Indeed, a 
symbol in the sense of § 59 is a sensible intuition produced by the imagination: “the symbolic 
is merely a species of the intuitive” (KU 5: 351), and every sensible intuition, in turn, is a 
“representation of the imagination” (KU 5: 314). Elsewhere Kant also refers to the symbol as a 
“sensible image [Sinnbild]” or “analogon from sensibility” (VA Friedländer 25: 356; VA 
Mrongovius 25: 1294). The purpose of the symbol is to provide a lively sensible rendering 
(Versinnlichung) of an abstract concept (KU 5: 361).351 In contrast, the representations that 
Kant actually selects to serve as types could not be further removed from lively, intuitive 
“sensible images”: Type1 – “the form of a law of nature in general [die Form eines 
Naturgesetzes überhaupt]” (KpV 5: 70) – and Type2 – “the understanding’s pure form of 
nature [die Natur (der reinen Verstandesform derselben nach)]” – are both pure, formal and 
abstract concepts produced by the understanding’s intellectual synthesis.352 Indeed, in the 
Typic chapter Kant never calls the type a “symbol” tout court; what he actually writes is that 
the type “serves only as a symbol [nur als Symbol dient]” (KpV 5: 70, my emphasis). In 
Chapter 2 (esp. section 4), we will see the full significance of this contrastive restriction: 
serving merely symbolically means something quite different, I will argue, from being a 
symbol in the sense that the term would later acquire in the third Critique – something much 
closer, in fact, to the conception of symbolic anthropomorphism that Kant had previously 
introduced in the Prolegomena.  
Futhermore, typification works differently from symbolic hypotyposis. Strictly speaking, 
the expression “symbolic hypotyposis” refers not to the symbol per se, but rather to the 
process that produces the symbol, which Kant famously characterizes in § 59 as the “double 
                                                
350 Problèmes kantiens, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 93-94 fn. 
351 Sebastian Maly, whose painstakingly thorough treatment of symbolic hypotyposis I am indebted to, defines a 
symbol as follows: “Ein Symbol ist eine Anschauung, die auf der Grundlage einer Analogie durch das doppelte 
Geschäft der Urteilskraft einem Begriff unterlegt wird, wobei die unterlegte Anschauung dem Begriff nicht 
korrespondiert bzw. ihm nich angemessen ist. […] Die Aufgabe von Symbolen besteht darin, Begriffe indirekt 
darzustellen und dadurch Begriffe auf eine anschauliche, lebendige Weise vorzustellen,” Symbolische Erkenntnis, 
178, 290.  
352 See section 3.3. of the Commentary. 
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task [doppeltes Geschäft]” (DG) of the power of judgment (KU 5: 352-353). The two stages, 
as applied to Kant’s own example of the handmill as the symbol of the despotic state, can be 
summarized as follows:  
DG1: The imagination produces an image in sensible intuition of a handmill, and the 
power of judgment ascribes to it the specific causality elaborated by reflection from its 
corresponding empirical concept (i.e., mechanical causality). 
DG2: The power of judgment analogically transfers the rule of reflection on the specific 
causality of the handmill given in intuition onto the concept of the despotic state; in this 
way, the handmill becomes a symbol that indirectly presents the concept of the despotic 
state, particularly its specific causality (i.e., the mechanism of the handmill, whereby the 
crank moves the ‘passive’ gears through an external force, symbolizes the  mechanism of a 
despotic state, where the despot’s absolute will compels his passive subjects through an 
external force).353 
Several differences can now be adduced between symbolic hypotyposis and typification as 
described in section 4.1. of the Commentary:  
 
1. Purpose. The purpose of symbolic hypotyposis is quite general, namely the sensible 
rendering (Versinnlichung) of abstract concepts in general, including, but not limited 
to, moral Ideas. 354  Typification serves the more specific, technical purpose of 
overcoming the heterogeneity between the supersensible Ideas of the moral law and 
morally good on the one hand and particular actions given in sensible intuition on the 
other, and this in order to enable a precise procedure for moral appraisal.355  
 
2. Procedure. In symbolic hypotyposis, one begins by producing an image of an 
empirical concept in sensible intuition; following that, one establishes an analogy 
                                                
353 Cf. Maly, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 146, 198. 
354 For instance, Kant also mentions symbols of pure concepts of the understanding and of certain logical notions: 
“Our language is full of such indirect presentations, in accordance with an analogy, where the expression does 
not contain the actual schema for the concept but only a symbol for reflection. Examples are the words ground 
(support, basis) [Grund (Stütze, Basis)], depend (be held from above) [abhängen (von oben gehalten werden)], 
from which flow (instead of follow) [fließen (statt folgen)], substance (as Locke expresses it: the bearer of 
accidents [Substanz … der Träger der Akzidenten]), and innumerable other nonschematic but symbolic 
hypotyposes and expressions for concepts …” (5: 352). Based on this passage and others, Maly deems that, in 
principle, concepts of all kinds (empirical concepts, pure concepts of the understanding, Ideas of reason) can be 
symbolized, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 178-181. 
355 See section 3.2. of the Commentary. 
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between the schematized concept and an Idea (or other abstract concept). In 
typification, one begins by establishing an abstract analogy between the Idea and its 
type, and only afterwards does one schematize the type.356  
 
3. Specific vs. generic causality. Symbolic hypotyposis highlights the specific causality 
of the symbol (e.g., the mechanical causality of the handmill). 357  By contrast, 
typification operates with the most abstract and generic representation of natural 
causality, taking only its mere form while stripping it of all intuitive trappings and 
abstracting from its specific “determining grounds” (KpV 5: 70).  
 
4. Reflective vs. determining judgment. In symbolic hypotyposis, reflective judgment is 
needed to elaborate the specific causality from an empirical concept presented in 
intuition.358 In typification, only determining judgment is needed, since on the one 
hand the concept of the causality of the law of freedom is given a priori as a fact of 
reason, and on the other hand the concept of natural causality is given a priori as a 
category of the understanding under which events can be directly subsumed.359  
 
Clearly, the symbolists’ identification of typification with symbolic hypotyposis is inaccurate.  
Finally, the various proponents of the symbolist interpretation (most of whom do not 
cite each other) give inconsistent, seemingly arbitrary accounts of what symbolizes what. In 
general, they do not differentiate between Type1 and Type2, and as a result they do not clearly 
distinguish between the law of nature as the ‘symbol’ of the moral law on the one hand and the 
nature of the sensible world as the ‘symbol’ of intelligible nature. And depending on how each 
commentator construes the analogy underlying each symbol, he or she will come up with 
                                                
356 This is explained in more detail in Ch. 2, 4.2. 
357 See section 3 of Chapter 2; Maly, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 123. 
358 “Es kann sich in DG1 nicht nur um ein bestimmendes Urteil handeln. Denn die bestimmende Urteilskraft 
vermag lediglich, Gegenstände unter allgemeine Naturgesetze bzw. unter die Kategorie der Kausalität überhaupt 
zu subsumieren. .... [E]ntscheidend für den Vorgang der Symbolisierung [ist] das Auffinden der Regel und des 
empirischen Begriffs der spezifischen Kausalität der betroffenen Gegenstände. Und dazu ist die reflektierende 
Urteilskraft nötig.” ———, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 124-125. 
359 See section 4.2.2.4. of the Commentary. 
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different – often inconsistent –  combinations of symbolizing and symbolized entities.360 For 
example, Paton suggests that, through the typic, events in nature come to symbolize moral 
actions, which are in turn symbols of the moral law361 – implausible suggestions, given that 
Kant says that we cannot help representing actions as spatio-temporal events, which is what 
gives rise to the very problem that the typic was designed to solve in the first place. Krüger, 
for his part, maintains that “the empirical human being or the empirical whole of mutually 
interacting human beings” symbolize the morally good.362 Irrlitz adduces a symbolic relation 
between individual maxims and the moral law, and in the same breath adds that “empirical 
behaviour” is a symbol of … something unspecified. 363  Furthermore, some symbolist 
interpretations can themselves become symbolic or metaphorical. For example, Shell turns the 
etymology of the word Typus into a metaphor for moral obligation: “Like the túpos or stamp, 
which translates force into image, the typic translates the moral law, which ‘forces itself’ on 
our consciousness, into a figure we can ‘see’ or ‘imagine’ (einbilden).” 364  And 
Schwartländer’s fanciful interpretation of the “symbolic function” of the understanding reads 
like a Kantian morality play: “Although it is the spontaneous faculty, the understanding 
represents the unconditional claim of the moral being by adopting this claim obediently and 
translating it into a part of human consciousness.”365 
2.4.2. Accomplishing the task 
 
The symbolists’ suggestion that the typic-procedure turns moral appraisal into a kind of 
mental theatre highlights both the appeal of the symbolist interpretation as a reflection on 
moral psychology and aesthetics as well as its inadequacy – for better or worse – as an 
interpretation of Kant. On the one hand, the symbolists’ proposal that the thought experiment 
functions by projecting in imagination the world that would result if one’s maxim were 
                                                
360 See Ch. 2, 4.2. 
361 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 161, 163. 
362 Krüger, Philosophie und Moral, 186. 
363 Kant-Handbuch, 331-332. 
364 The Rights of Reason, 82. 
365 Quoted in English translation in Bielefeldt, Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 48-49; 
Schwartländer, Der Mensch ist Person, 148.  
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universalized does have a certain appeal, notably the suggestion that one could gain “a clearer 
intuitive sense” of the inconsistency of one’s maxim if one could visualize it writ large in 
nature. Surprisingly, though, while the symbolists mention Medieval morality plays and 
theological symbols, they neglect far more compelling expressions of this insight in literature 
and myth, where the symbolic amplification of an evil action in the form of a disrupted, 
unbalanced and distorted nature has long been employed as a powerful trope.366 For example, 
the following scene from Macbeth could be taken as a vivid typification, in the form of a 
disrupted and distorted natural order, of the maxim “If I believe it to be to my advantage, I will 
betray someone to whom I have sworn loyalty in order to supplant him”:  
 
OLD MAN:  
Threescore and ten I can remember well,  
Within the volume of which time I have seen  
Hours dreadful and things strange, but this sore night 
Hath trifled former knowings.  
 
ROSS: 
Ha, good father,  
Thou seest, the heavens, as troubled with man’s act, 
Threaten his bloody stage: by th’ clock, ‘tis day,  
And yet dark night strangles the traveling lamp: 
Is’t night’s predominance, or the day’s shame,  
That darkness does the face of earth entomb,  
When living light should kiss it?  
 
OLD MAN:  
‘Tis unnatural, 
Even like the deed that’s done. On Tuesday last, 
A falcon, tow’ring in her pride of place, 
Was by a mousing owl hawk’d at and kill’d. 
 
ROSS 
And Duncan’s horses—a thing most strange and certain— 
Beauteous and swift, the minions of their race,  
Turned wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung out,  
Contending ‘gainst obedience, as they would  
Make war with mankind. 
 
OLD MAN 
‘Tis said they eat each other. 
                                                
366 E.g., the opening of scene of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, or Luke’s depiction of the crucifixion (Luke 23:33-46, 
esp. 44-46). For a general study of moral symbolism, see Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson 
Buchanan (Boston: Beacon, 1967). 
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ROSS 
They did so, to th’amazement of mine eyes 
That looked upon’t.367 
 
This horrifying vision of nature, where even the celestial bodies and animals obey the new 
“unnatural” law, symbolizes the evil of the “deed that’s done,” namely Macbeth’s treacherous 
murder of Duncan, his king. Scenes such as this one testify that the imagination has the power 
to render moral concepts intuitively vivid and emotionally moving. 
But from a Kantian point of view, we could claim no rational validity for our moral 
judgments if, like Ross and the Old Man, we were to let our emotions of horror of disgust 
sway our moral appraisal of a deed like Macbeth’s instead of measuring it against the 
universal principles of practical reason. In general, individuals’ feelings provide no 
philosophically legitimate basis for appraising the morality of actions (KpV 5: 58f.), since “in 
fact no moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any feeling whatsoever” 
(MS 6: 376-377). Rather, Kant holds that one ought to exclude biasing emotional factors and 
instead exercise one’s “judicial office” with “well-meant strictness in determining genuine 
moral import in accordance with an uncompromising law [wohlgemeinte Strenge in 
Bestimmung des echten sittlichen Gehalts, nach einem unnachtsichtlichen Gesetze]” (KpV 5: 
154). Allen Wood explains Kant’s thinking as follows:  
the way of thinking (closer to “intuition”) that does best at animating human hearts and 
actions on behalf of morality is not the same as the way of thinking that does best when it 
comes time to pass critical judgment either on the actions we have performed or on the 
maxims we are proposing to adopt. For this latter task, a more austere and abstract 
principle is better because, corrupt human nature being what it is, the same feelings and 
intuitions that make us enthusiastic friends of virtue also make us susceptible to self-
deception and more likely to pass off corrupt actions and maxims to ourselves as morally 
commendable ones.368  
Indeed, even in his pre-critical period Kant insisted on making all moral judgments “with 
moral strictness [nach moralischer Strenge]” even in situations where our emotional strings 
are being pulled (B 2: 234; cf TP 8: 286-7). Kant hereby subscribes to a wider current of 
modern philosophy that regards feeling as something “suffered by” the subject and hence as a 
                                                
367 William Shakespeare, "The Tragedy of MacBeth," in The Yale Shakespeare, ed. Wilbur L. Cross and Tucker 
Brooke (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993), Act 2, Scene 4. 
368 Kant's Ethical Thought, 82.  
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“pathological” phenomenon of subjectivity; on this view, feeling acts as a perturbing element, 
or factor of instability, in moral judgment.369 This position may seem austere, but Kant has his 
own philosophical and psychological arguments for it.370 Yoking moral appraisal to feelings 
elicited by the so-called ‘moral imagination’ would prevent any one person’s moral judgments 
from becoming public in the Aufklärung sense of communicable between interchangeable 
perspectives. 371  It is no coincidence that Kant stresses this very point in the chapter 
immediately preceding the Typic: “… good and evil [must] always be appraised by reason and 
hence through concepts, which can be universally communicated, not through mere feeling, 
which is restricted to individual subjects and their receptivity …” (KpV 5: 58). And even in the 
Doctrine of Method chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason, devoted to making the 
principles of morality more subjectively accessible, Kant warns that the basic principles of 
action must be based not on passing feelings, but on firm concepts and principles: “On any 
other foundation only passing moods can be achieved which give the person no moral worth 
and not even confidence in himself, without which the consciousness of his moral disposition 
and character, the highest good in man, cannot arise” (KpV 5: 157).  
By contrast, the symbolists’ mental theatre, by its very design, would trigger violent 
and confusing affective reactions that would inevitably throw moral judgment into disarray. 
Indeed, Kant’s very definition of affect opposes it to deliberate rational reflection: “affect … 
quickly grows to a degree of feeling that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless).” 
(APH 7: 251-2, 254; KU 5: 272; M 15: 940). Worse still, if moral appraisal were practiced as 
the symbolists advocate, it would degrade moral motivation into a delusional exercise of 
                                                
369 Daniel Dumouchel, "La théorie kantienne de la subjectivité et le problème de l'affectivité pratique," in Kant 
und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter 
Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 2001), 172. 
370 Indeed, the roots of this position appear to go all the way back to Kant’s reservations about the theory of 
‘moral feeling’ in the 1760s: “Ainsi, dès les Remarques sur le sentiment du beau et du sublime (1765-1767), Kant 
signalait la variabilité du sentiment moral selon le sexe, l’âge, l’éducation, le mode de gouvernement, les races et 
les climats [20: 49-50]. Cela siginifie qu’une morale édifiée sur des bases aussi fragiles ne peut parvenir à établir 
un standard fixe, à moins d’en faire une propriété innée de l’humanité. Le sentiment moral fournit donc des 
raisons purement ‘contingentes’, qui ne peuvent au mieux prétendre qu’à une ‘validité privée’ [VE Collins, 27: 
254, 276; VE Powalski, 27: 119]. Seul un critère rationnel est en mesure, par-delà toute considération 
anthropologique, de procurer à la théorie morale un principe invariable et universel, c’est-à-dire accessible dès le 
départ à tout être rationnel.” Piché, "Phénoménologie de l'expérience morale," 136. 
371 Cf. (WA 8: 37-38; O 8: 144-7; KU 5: 294ff; EF 8: 381-6); see also section 5.2.3. of the Commentary and 
section 3.1. of the Conclusion. 
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pushing our own emotional buttons with fictions. The moral theatre, by as it were pre-empting 
the pure moral incentive of respect with a fictional mechanism that plays on our aversion to 
negative feelings and our attraction towards pleasant ones, reinstates on a psychological level 
the egoistic “empiricism” that the typic is designed to prevent (KpV 5: 71). Thus, the more 
psychologically powerful the mental theatre would be, the more it would corrupt one’s moral 
disposition. Indeed, one can gain a sense of how sharply Kant would criticize the symbolists’ 
mental theatre when one considers how harshly he condemned the moralistic literature and 
theatre of his own time: “Novels, sentimental plays, shallow moral precepts, which make play 
with (falsely) so-called noble dispositions, … in fact enervate the heart, and make it 
unreceptive to the rigorous precept of duty and incapable of all respect for the dignity of 
humanity in our own person and the right of human beings … and in general incapable of all 
firm principles …” (KU 5: 273; cf. VA Mrongovius, 25: 1213).372 
More fundamentally, Kant would categorically reject as heteronomous the principle 
that our motivation to perform or refrain from certain acts should be influenced, let alone 
determined, by what we feel while spectating a mental play (cf. KpV 5: 64f.). And as he 
explains in the chapter immediately following the Typic, the only genuine source of moral 
motivation is “moral feeling [das moralische Gefühl],” i.e., “respect [Achtung]” for the moral 
law.373 This singular feeling is evoked by pure practical reason and comes into play not before 
or during moral appraisal but only following it, as reason’s distinctive effect on sensibility: 
It is here that we have to bring in the already-mentioned distinction between the objective 
principle of the appraisal of the action, and subjective principle of its performance. Of the 
former we have just been speaking, but the subjective principle, the motive, is the moral 
feeling. … The moral feeling is a capacity for being affected by a moral judgment. When I 
judge by understanding that the action is morally good, I am still very far from doing this 
action of which I have so judged. But if this judgement moves me to do the action, that is 
the moral feeling (VE Collins, 27: 1428, my emphasis).  
                                                
372 See also Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 269. In this respect, Kant belongs to a long line of moralists, 
including Saint Augustine and Pierre Nicole, who have been suspicious of the very idea that theatre could serve a 
moralizing function. See my essay, "Les Yeux grands fermés : une analyse du 'Traité de la Comédie' de Pierre 
Nicole," Ithaque 2 (2008). For Augustine’s rejection of mere aesthetic pleasure derived from literature, see Haijo 
Westra, "Augustine and Poetic Exegesis: The Encounter between Classical and Christian Strategies of 
Interpretation," in Poetry and Exegesis in Premodern Latin Christianity, ed. Willemien Otten and Karla Pollman, 
Supplements to Vigilae Christianae: Texts and Studies of Early Christian Life and Language (Leiden & Boston: 
Brill, 2007). 
373 See the chapter immediately following the Typic, “On the incentives of pure practical reason” (KpV 5: 71-89).  
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Certainly, the will must have motives; but these are not certain objects proposed as ends 
related to natural feeling, but nothing other than the unconditional law itself; and the 
will’s receptivity to finding itself subject to the law as unconditional necessitation is called 
moral feeling, which is therefore not the cause but the effect of the determination of the 
will, and we would not have the least perception of it within ourselves if that necessitation 
were not already present within us” (TP 8: 283, emphasis added).  
“There is a moral feeling; however this is not the basis of judgment, but of inclination [Es 
giebt ein moralishes Gefühl; dieses ist aber nicht ein Grund des Urtheils, sondern der 
Neigung]” (Refl 6696, 19: 135, my translation) 
Kant goes so far as to affirm that we have a positive duty to cultivate moral apathy – 
which is not an absence of all feeling, but rather an active ability to prevent sensibly 
conditioned affects from overpowering the genuinely moral feeling of respect produced by 
reason: “Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human 
being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control and so to 
rule over himself, which goes beyond forbidding him to let himself be governed by his 
feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); for unless reason holds the reins of government 
in its own hands, his feelings and inclinations play the master over him” (MS 6: 408; cf. KU 5: 
272; APH 7: 252). This rational control over one’s own emotions is indispensable for moral 
appraisal, of course, where we must calmly and deliberately reflect on the principles of 
actions.374  
 Furthermore, Kant’s own descriptions of how “everyone, in fact, judges actions as 
good or evil” (KpV 5: 69) belie the symbolists’ assumption that the applicability of the moral 
law depends on visualization, symbolization or a kind of moral theatre. In fact, Kant sees no 
need to league moral appraisal with the so-called “moral imagination” or the emotions evoked 
thereby in order to make moral principles accessible, since the criterion that reason puts 
forward is unmistakably clear: if I cannot condone the principle on which I act as a law for 
everyone, then I cannot condone it for myself. And Kant affirms again and again that this 
criterion of universalizability is in fact easy to apply and suffices to produce fair, accurate, 
even subtle moral judgments in practice:  
                                                
374 On the roles of apathy and affect in Kant’s moral psychology I am indebted to the insightful and nuanced 
discussion by Anna Wehofsits, "Affekte und Leidenschaften als subjektive Hindernisse moralischer 
Selbstkontrolle," in Forschungskolloquium von Holm Tetens (Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität Berlin 
2013). 
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The principle of morality is thus the Idea of a will, insofar as it is a law unto itself. The 
will, whose maxims can hold good as universal laws, is a law unto itself, for what it wills 
is always a universal law, and that is the good will. In this way the commonest human 
understanding can easily discern whether a thing be right or wrong, for it merely has to 
ask itself whether that thing could be a universal law. The agreement of an action with the 
principle of my will, as a universal legislator, is thus the principle of morality. If we 
cannot consider our will to be universally legislative, we reject the action. A principle of 
morality must at the same time be comprehensible to the commonest understanding, 
because every man must possess it, and such is the case here (VE Mrongovius 29: 628, 
trans. mod., my emphasis).375  
As far as moral appraisal goes, therefore, there is no specific need to symbolically personify 
the moral law like a virtue in a morality play – besides, what kind of character would the law 
of nature be, anyway? As we have seen in the Commentary, the typic employs the law of 
nature not as an image, but rather as a formal standard against which the common 
understanding carries out a “comparison [Vergleichung]” (KpV 5: 69) of maxims’ form. When 
measured against this standard, the partiality of a self-serving maxim becomes glaringly 
“obvious [offenbar]” because it clearly cannot have the universality that the common 
understanding expects of a law of nature (KpV 5: 44). 
Finally, Kant believes that we genuinely care about the aptitude of our maxims to 
become a universal law – and this rational care, while it may be difficult to spell out, is 
nevertheless the bona fide source of moral motivation:  
The understanding pays regard to everything that eliminates the possibility of rules; it 
accepts everything that accords with the use of its rule, and opposes itself to everything 
that is contrary to that rule. Now since immoral actions are contrary to rules, in that they 
cannot be made into a universal law, the understanding is resistant to them, because they 
run counter to the use of its rule. Hence, in virtue of its nature there resides in the 
understanding a moving force (VE Collins 27: 1428-9; cf. G 4: 460). 
What could be further from the visceral disgust and horror in the Macbeth scene? On Kant’s 
view, moral appraisal does give rise to an emotional response, yet it does so not by triggering 
our emotions through the imagination, but instead by eliciting our sui generis rational attitudes 
via the understanding. – All this being said, one can of course disagree with Kant’s account of 
moral judgment on independent philosophical or empirical grounds, but if one purports to 
                                                
375 See also (KpV 5: 44; G 4:402-5, 422-4; VE Collins 27: 1426-9; TP 8: 286-7; EF 8: 381-6) and section 5.1. of 
the Commentary. 
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provide an exegesis of his text one should not attribute views to him that he would vigorously 
reject.  
 
2.6. Outcome, effectiveness 
 
The symbolists take Kant’s observation that “without having at hand something which it could 
make an example in a case of experience, [the common understanding – AW] could not 
provide use in application for the law of a pure practical reason” (KpV 5: 70) as a confirmation 
of their claim that the ultimate function of the typic is to meet the common understanding’s 
need for concrete images by means of an intuitive symbol in sensible experience.376 However, 
it is inapt to speak of a “symbolic relation of type to instance.”377 The “example” mentioned in 
the Typic chapter should not be construed as a symbol in the sense of KU § 59. Indeed, in the 
latter text Kant makes a clear distinction between the example (Beispiel) and the symbol 
(Symbol) (KU 5: 351). As we know, a symbol is defined as an indirect presentation of a 
concept attributed to the latter by means of the “double task” of the reflecting power of 
judgment. But an “example [Beispiel],” by contrast, is defined as a direct presentation of a 
concept, i.e., “a particular (concretum), represented in accordance with concepts as contained 
under a universal (abstractum)” (MS 6: 479n). The example is subsumed directly under the 
rule by the determining power of judgment (KrV A133/B172). Unlike a symbol, which should 
have lively, distinctive features that spur reflection (such as the handmill), the example is 
merely some concrete instance or other serving to cue the universal rule under which it falls: it 
can and should be ordinary, generic, and self-effacing, pointing beyond itself to the rule of 
which it is a mere case (casus datae legis). Accordingly, the purpose of the “example” 
mentioned in the Typic chapter is not to furnish a symbolic image of something ineffable, but 
instead to trigger an abstract representation of the law of nature qua universal rule that 
applies directly to every single “case of experience,” no matter how banal.378 It is the universal 
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ed. Michael L Thompson (Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 115. 
378 See section 5.1.2. of the Commentary. 
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rule, the law “as such” – not the example per se – that corresponds to the moral law and can 
therefore serve as its type (KpV 5: 70). 
More fundamentally, the symbolists’ emphasis on visualization conflicts with a 
fundamental tenet of Kant’s quintessentially rationalist ethics. Kant held that the true and 
original standards or “archetypes” of moral appraisal, the moral law and the morally good, are 
both Ideas of reason that one cannot see: “when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not 
actions, which one sees [die man sieht], but those inner principles of actions that one does not 
see [die man nicht sieht]” (G 4: 408). Kant even borrows a famous dictum of Jesus’ to express 
the sacrosanctity of this very notion: “Why do you call me (whom you see) [den ihr sehet] 
good? None is good (the archetype of the good) [das Urbild des Guten] but God only (whom 
you do not see) [den ihr nicht sehet]” (G 4: 409, based on Mark 10:18). Kant’s recourse to a 
pure, internal model of morality testifies to the enduring influence of Rousseau,379 who 
extolled virtue as “this divine model that I carry within me and that serves both as the object of 
my desires as well as the rule of my actions [ce divin modèle que je porte au dedans de moi, et 
qui servoit à la fois d’objet à mes désirs et de règle à mes actions].”380 Even the common 
understanding possesses this “obscurely thought metaphysics,” for it is “inherent in every 
human being because of his rational predisposition” (MS 6: 376-377).381 Ultimately, both 
philosophers hark back to Plato, according to whom, as Kant puts it in the first Critique, every 
person always already possesses “in his own head [in seinem eigenen Kopfe]” the “true 
original [das wahre Original]” of the “model of virtue [Muster der Tugend]” – an Idea to 
which no sensible example can ever be adequate (KrV A315/B372).382 But while Rousseau 
and Plato both postulated an intuitive access to the Ideas – through “sentiment” and intellectual 
intuition (anamnesis), respectively – Kant emphasized the non-intuitive, purely conceptual – 
i.e,. invisible – nature of the Ideas.383 Moreover, if the typic functioned primarily as a top-
down symbolic Versinnlichung of the supersensible, as the symbolists claim, then it would 
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Pléiade), 1964), 223, 224, 255, 358.  
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382 Cf. ———, La Nouvelle Héloïse, 223. 
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actually do the common understanding a disservice by reinforcing its counterproductive 
tendency, much bemoaned by Kant, to turn the intelligible into an image: “... the most 
common understanding ... as is well known, is very much inclined to expect behind the objects 
of the senses something else invisible and active of itself – but it spoils this again by quickly 
making this invisible something sensible in turn, that is, wanting to make it an object of 
intuition, so that it does not thereby become any the wiser” (G 4: 451-452: my emphasis). 
Therefore, the challenge of enabling moral appraisal in the Typic chapter is not a matter of 
making the invisible visible, as the symbolists assume, but rather of judging the already visible 
against an invisible standard. Particular actions present themselves to us as spatio-temporal 
events given in sensible intuition – we can already see them – and for the purposes of moral 
appraisal we are not interested in the actions qua visible, but only with respect to an abstract, 
‘invisible’ standard, namely the suitability of the corresponding maxims to be universalized as 
laws. Therefore, the decisive moment of moral appraisal takes place at an abstract level – and 
the typic assists the common understanding in making the transition from the concrete level at 
which it perceives actions to the abstract level where it judges their corresponding maxims in a 
principled manner.384 And as we will see next, the very non-visualizability of the moral Ideas 
opens the door to the most powerful way to experience them aesthetically – the sublime.  
 
3.	  Against	  aestheticizing	  the	  Typic	  	  
3.1. Two agendas  
 
Having presented and critically examined the symbolist interpretation in detail, we must now 
address the question of interpretive intent. What do the commentators who advocate the 
symbolist interpretation of the Typic intend to achieve? I think that two agendas can be 
distinguished.  
On the one hand, some commentators seek to provide an accurate exegesis of the 
Typic, and they propose the notion of symbolic hypotyposis in good faith as a means for 
illuminating this obscure chapter. For instance, while Dietrichson’s attempt to analogize the 
typic to the symbolic operation of morality plays undoubtedly has problems, his stated aim 
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remains to furnish a satisfactory explanation of how the typic serves to enable moral appraisal, 
and he devotes the greater part of his article to an valuable analysis of the universalizability 
criterion.385 I view this interpretation as a legitimate, if mistaken, exegetical hypothesis.  
On the other hand, certain commentators seem to be wilfully pursuing a different 
agenda – to aestheticize the typic. Johnson, for example, uses Dietrichson’s treatment as 
springboard to the position that the most important role of the typic is not merely to enable 
moral appraisal according to the criterion of universalizability, but rather to open up a new 
dimension of moral life saturated with symbolic, metaphorical meaning. 386  On this 
interpretation, the typic functions as an imaginative metaphorical procedure that not only 
enriches but also personalizes moral reflection: symbolizing moral concepts in and through 
nature “has its own special appeal, suggests its own perspective on the moral law, and calls up 
its own peculiar cluster of experiences, concepts, feelings, images, etc., which guides us in 
seeing how the law applies in particular cases.”387 Castillo echoes this point – the symbolic 
typic connects us with a more sensitive, hermeneutical and existentially authentic dimension 
of experience:  
The analogical and poetic dimensions of the symbol situate this representation in the field 
of interpretation … Besides its capacity to aestheticize our relation to the sensible, the 
symbol serves as the foundation for a particularly fruitful hermeneutic in the domain of 
belief … In this way, the critical symbol opens the path towards a genuine symbolic 
disalienation.388 
In a word, the aesthetic reading aims to transform the typic into a poetic device. But that’s not 
all. The proponents of the aesthetic interpretation of the typic extend their reading to other 
fundamental components of Kant’s ethics. As for moral praxis, Silber proclaims that “Kant did 
think of the embodiment of the highest good in terms of symbolic schematism”389 and that we 
are called upon to symbolically “incarnate” the Idea of the highest good through a “moral 
                                                
385 "Criteria of universalizability," 168.  
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schematism.”390 And in line with the conception of the typic as a kind of mental theatre, 
Freydberg claims that the concepts of good and evil are ultimately produced not by pure 
practical reason but by the “imagination’s synthesizing.”391 Indeed, Freydberg insists so 
adamantly that the typic is an activity of the imagination that he must allege that Kant didn’t 
know what he was talking about when he distinguished the typic from the schematism: “The 
difference between the two Critiques that Kant attempts to sharpen in the Typic does not 
amount to very much once the internal workings of imagination are discerned.”392 In a similar 
vein, Johnson argues that “rational” moral deliberation should be recharacterized as an 
“imaginative metaphorical process” that “requires a form of reflective creative judgment.”393 
For Johnson, it is only fitting that moral appraisal should be metaphorical, for all of Kant’s 
moral principles flow from an interrelated set of core metaphors, notably “MORALITY IS A 
STRICT FATHER.”394 From here, it is just a short step to the extreme thesis that all 
philosophical discourse is primarily or even entirely metaphorical: Johnson declares that “in a 
very strong sense, philosophy is metaphor”;395 and de Man notoriously endeavoured to 
collapse all forms of judgment into symbolic hypotyposis in order to show that all 
philosophical discourse is intrinsically metaphorical, eschewing determinate concepts 
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altogether.396 And if judging, conceptualizing and reasoning are essentially metaphorical, then 
we must fundamentally reconceive the Kantian architectonic as well: “the presence of such 
imaginative acts calls into question any strict interpretation of the dichotomy between 
imagination and reason and that between imagination and understanding … On the contrary, 
genuine understanding is permeated by imaginative reflection.”397 In the final analysis, these 
commentators use their symbolist interpretation of the typic as the thin end of the wedge of a 
more general project to aestheticize Kant’s philosophy. In the current section I explain why I 
regard this interpretation as not just mistaken but also misguided.  
 
3.2. Betting on the wrong horse 
 
Rather than producing a litany of general arguments against aestheticizing Kant’s ethics and a 
fortiori his philosophy as a whole, I will conduct a more focused, immanent critique of the 
aesthetic interpretation of the Typic. I will argue that the contention that the moral law’s 
aesthetic and emotional resonance depends on symbolic hypotyposis betrays a misappreciation 
of the resources offered by Kant’s aesthetics: the sublime and aesthetic ideas provide, each in 
their own way, far richer aesthetic expressions of moral Ideas than symbolic hypotyposis 
could ever muster. In other words, the commentators so keen on aestheticizing the typic are 
not even going about it in an effective way.  
 
3.2.1. The sublime: a more powerful  expression of moral Ideas 
 
The sublime expresses the most essential characteristic of the Ideas, namely that they infinitely 
surpass sensibility. The apprehension of an object judged as sublime “stretches the 
imagination to its limit” (KU 5: 268), whereby the “objective inadequacy of the imagination in 
                                                
396 See Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University 
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its greatest extension” to attain the Ideas of reason is judged as “subjectively purposive,” as 
Kant puts it, since it makes palpable our supersensible vocation (KU 5: 269). Thus the 
experience of the sublime, while negative and painful, exerts for this very reason an 
extraordinary aesthetic power:  
There need be no anxiety that the feeling of the sublime will lose anything through such 
an abstract presentation, which becomes entirely negative in regard to the sensible; for the 
imagination, although it certainly finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach 
itself, nevertheless feels itself to be unbounded precisely because of this elimination of the 
limits of sensibility; and that separation is thus a presentation of the infinite, which for that 
very reason can never be anything other than a merely negative presentation, which 
nevertheless expands the soul (KU 5: 274). 
When it comes to the aesthetic and emotional force of the moral law, therefore, the 
symbolists’ contention that the law would remain empty and cold without some sort of 
symbolic image could not be further removed from Kant’s own aesthetics. On the contrary, he 
believes that the moral law attains its greatest aesthetic and emotional power precisely when 
presented in its purest, most sublime form, as he emphatically states in the very same passage:  
Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Book of the Law than the 
commandment: Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness 
either of that which is in heaven, or on the earth, or yet under the earth, etc. […]. The very 
same thing also holds of the representation of the moral law and predisposition to 
morality in us. It is utterly mistaken to worry that if it were deprived of everything that the 
senses can recommend it would bring then with it nothing but cold, lifeless approval and 
no moving force or emotion. It is exactly the reverse: for where the senses no longer see 
anything before them, yet the unmistakable and inextinguishable idea of morality remains, 
there it would be more necessary to moderate the momentum of an unbounded 
imagination so as not to let it reach the point of enthusiasm, rather than, from fear of the 
powerlessness of these ideas, to look for assistance for them in images and childish 
devices (KU 5: 274, my emphasis). 
As Cassirer aptly observes, “in words like these we are in touch with Kant whole and 
entire.”398 Indeed, in the Typic chapter we find Kant advancing the very same view, asserting 
almost word for word that the “purity and sublimity [Reinheit und Erhabenheit]” of the moral 
law produce emotions so powerful that they can even excite people into mystical Schwärmerei 
(KpV 5: 71).399 Thus, while the symbolists hope to bring out the typic’s full aesthetic potential, 
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399 That being said, the experience of the sublime, insofar as it is taken as a purely negative presentation, is not 
itself a form of Schwärmerei (KU 5: 265). 
 188 
from Kant’s point of view they are in fact debasing it into a “childish device” on a par with 
stilted morality plays and tired theological symbols, thereby robbing the moral law of its true 
aesthetic power. Indeed, the sublime also outdoes symbolic hypotyposis as an aesthetic vehicle 
for the Idea of the morally Good. The sublime produces a more profound emotional impact 
than the beautiful, as it better intimates the purely intellectual nature of the good and thereby 
fosters a more genuine moral interest – which leads Kant to declare that “the intellectual, 
intrinsically purposive (moral) good, judged aesthetically, must not be represented so much by 
the beautiful but rather as sublime” (KU 5: 271, my emphasis).  
 
3.2.2. Aesthetic ideas: a more poetic  expression of moral Ideas 
 
In fact, the privileged vehicle in Kantian aesthetics for the poetic expression of Ideas of reason 
is not the symbol, but the aesthetic idea. Tellingly, despite their grand claims about the power 
of moral symbolism, the symbolists offer no additional examples. It turns out that images that 
symbolically represent moral Ideas are few and far between in the corpus, and tend to be 
brought up occasionally as illustrations during lectures. Here is a typical selection:  
That man, moreover, should act in accordance or adequacy with moral laws, can occur 
only insofar as he has repressed and conquered, through the moral law, the inclination he 
harbours to deviate or do the opposite. The struggle of inclination with the moral law, and 
the constant disposition (intentio constans) to carry out his duties, therefore constitutes 
what we call virtue. The very Latin word virtus originally signifies nothing else but 
courage, strength and constancy, and the symbol for it indicates the same: a Hercules, with 
lionskin and club, striking down the hydra, which is the symbol of all vice. (VE 
Vigilantius 27: 491; cf. MS 6: 376) 
Now it is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at this parting of the ways (where the 
beautiful fable places Hercules between virtue and sensual pleasure) the human being 
shows more propensity to listen to his inclinations than to the law (MS 6: 380n). 
The tutelary god of morals does not yield to Jupiter (the god of power); for Jupiter is still 
subject to fate, that is, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series of 
predetermining causes that would allow it to predict confidently the happy or unhappy 
results of human actions in accordance with the mechanism of nature (though it is 
sufficiently enlightened to hope they will be in conformity with its wish). But it throws 
enough light everywhere for us to see what we have to do in order to remain on the path of 
duty (in accordance with rules of wisdom), and thereby do toward the final end (EF 8: 
370). 
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One does not need to be a literary critic to appreciate that, pace Johnson, these lacklustre 
conventional symbols drawn from Greek and Roman mythology fall far short of creative and 
inexhaustibly meaningful metaphors.400 Moreover, not even the example par excellence of 
moral symbolism – the beautiful as the symbol of the morally Good – can give the symbolists 
what they yearn for. As so many readers of the famous § 59 discover to their disappointment, 
Kant’s tantalizing assertion that beauty is the symbol of the Good does not open up a 
boundless new field of interpretation, but is instead constrained by a strict – some might say 
pedantic – analogy between two judgments with respect to four features: immediacy, 
disinterestedness, freedom and universality (KU 5: 353-4).401 Moreover, taste in the beautiful 
in nature does not open a path towards a deeply personal “symbolic disalienation”; rather, it 
accustoms us to value things in a disinterested, impersonal manner (KU 5: 354). In short, 
moral symbolism in Kant is a far cry from poetic.  
In Kant’s aesthetic theory, the privileged vehicle of the poetic is instead the aesthetic 
idea. In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant defines the “aesthetic idea [die 
ästhetische Idee]” as an intuitive representation, produced by the imagination, that evokes an 
unlimited chain of associations around a rational Idea. Just as no individual intuition can be 
adequate to the infinity evoked by the Idea of reason, so no determinate concept can be 
adequate to the infinite manifold of representations evoked by the imagination’s aesthetic idea:  
by an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that occasions 
much thinking without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be 
adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible. – 
One readily sees that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, 
conversely, a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be 
adequate” (KU 5: 314, cf. 342).  
Aesthetic ideas “strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of experience, and thus 
seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (of intellectual ideas)” (KU 5: 314). 
They also have a strong affective force insofar as they “animate the mind by opening up for it 
the prospect of an immeasurable field of representations” (KU 5: 315) where the imagination 
has free rein:  
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In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given 
concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use 
of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for 
it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the 
feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter 
of language (KU 5: 316).  
Finally, as inimitable expressions of the ineffable, aesthetic ideas are quintessential products 
of artistic genius (KU 5: 313-9). 
 While some commentators have identified symbols with aesthetic ideas or ascribed the 
latter a symbolic function, the two kinds of representation must be distinguished.402 The key 
difference is that the meaning of a symbol is constrained by the underlying analogy from 
which it derives, whereas the meaning of an aesthetic idea is inexhaustible, as Kirk Pillow 
explains:  
Now the problem with construing aesthetic ideas as symbols is that the analogical rule-
content of a Kantian symbol is too determinately specifiable. … The meaning of a Kantian 
symbol can be determined by specifying the rule governing the analogy, and this 
determination of meaning is entirely at odds with the inexhaustibility of meaning Kant 
attributes to aesthetic ideas. The meaning of an aesthetic ideas cannot be determined by 
any rule, certainly not by an analogical one, and so aesthetic ideas cannot have a symbolic 
function in Kant’s sense of the term. Aesthetic ideas are not structured as analogies, and 
hence they do not exhibit rational ideas (or anything else) symbolically. They do not 
exhibit concepts or ideas at all, in fact; instead, they express an indeterminate and 
expansive range of meaning that no rule, concept or rational idea can encompass. The 
relationship between aesthetic and rational ideas is one of indeterminate expression, rather 
than symbolic exhibition …403  
Thus Kant’s “symbol” and his “aesthetic idea” function in different ways and should not be 
confused. Correspondingly, the imagination plays a different role in producing each kind of 
representation. In symbolic hypotyposis, the imagination merely produces the image specified 
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by the underlying analogy; this process restricts the imagination – and perhaps even dulls 
aesthetic sensibility itself, as Nietzsche would later argue. 404  By contrast, when the 
imagination produces aesthetic ideas, it strives for an unbounded aesthetic expression.  
And so it is actually surprising that those commentators keen on attributing the typic a 
poetic function should not have had recourse to the aesthetic idea, which, according to Kant, is 
both a product and source of the poetic imagination and finds its greatest expression in poetry:  
The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the 
blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc., as well as to make that of which there 
are examples in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, 
etc., sensible beyond the limits of experience, with a completeness that goes beyond 
anything of which there is an example in nature, by means of an imagination that emulates 
the precedent of reason in attaining to a maximum; and it is really the art of poetry in 
which the faculty of aesthetic ideas can reveal itself in its full measure (KU 5: 314, my 
emphasis). 
In contrast to the stilted symbolism of morality plays and allegories, where each one-
dimensional character personifies a particular vice or virtue, the aesthetic idea provides a 
genuinely poetic expression of moral Ideas and thereby fulfills the desiderata of the aesthetic 
interpretation far better than symbolic hypotyposis. Firstly, the aesthetic idea functions as “the 
spur to an open-ended exploration of meaning or significance” insofar as it is an aesthetic 
representation of the imagination that elicits much thinking without it being possible for any 
determinate concept to be adequate to it.405 Secondly, the aesthetic idea is deeply personal: it 
can only come into existence through the genius of an individual poet; and since it functions 
through association, it could quite conceivably “call up its own peculiar cluster of experiences, 
concepts, feelings, images, etc.,” in each individual person who contemplates it. And thirdly, 
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the aesthetic idea gives meaning to moral Ideas with a uniquely powerful imaginative and 
affective force, “animating the mind” with a flow of emotionally charged images.  
 
This brief excursus through Kant’s aesthetics suggests that even if one wanted to aestheticize 
the typic, identifying it with symbolic hypotyposis would not be the best way to go about it. 
More generally, I submit that it is both more faithful as well as more fruitful simply to 
acknowledge that the typic has a pure function, which later gets supplemented by the second, 
“impure” part of Kant’s ethics, which gives due attention to aesthetics and ‘moral 
anthropology’.406 Aesthetics (in the broad sense) may play a complementary role to the typic, 
but not a constitutive one. This thesis does justice to the distinctive philosophical contribution 
of Kant’s ethics to his own historical period, as Cassirer has emphasized: “Thus it was 
precisely the formalistic nature of Kantian ethics that proved historically to be the peculiarly 
fruitful and effective moment; by the very fact that it conceived the moral law in its maximum 
purity and abstraction, Kantian ethics immediately and tangibly invaded the life of Kant’s 
nation and age, imparting to them a new direction.”407 And the symbolists would do well to 
note that it was the great poets and playwrights of Kant’s time who most clearly recognized 
this achievement: “Not only Schiller, who explicitly lamented in a letter to Kant that he had 
momentarily taken on the ‘aspect of an opponent,’ but Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe and 
Hölderlin also concur in this judgment.”408 
 
4.	  Conclusion	  
 
The upshot of the analysis conducted in this Chapter (summarized in section 2.1. of the 
Conclusion) is that the symbolist interpretation of the Typic chapter is unsatisfactory. From 
the outset, the attempt to read the third Critique back into the second was anachronistic and 
textually unsupported. The concepts that the symbolists purport to assimilate – typification 
and the type on the one hand, symbolic hypotyposis and the symbol on the other – show 
                                                
406 See Louden, Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings.  
407 Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 270. 
408 Letter from Schiller to Kant, 13 June, 1794 (11: 487), cited in ibid. 
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significant and, one is tempted to say, obvious differences. Furthermore, the many variants of 
the symbolist interpretation, when examined in detail, turn out to be arbitrary and mutually 
inconsistent. Finally, the wilful attempt to aestheticize the Typic chapter not only distorts 
Kant’s text, but also fails to achieve its own purpose, due to a false assessment of the 
resources offered by Kant’s aesthetic theory. In the final analysis, the symbolists read the 
Typic chapter backwards – not only historically, but also philosophically: the challenge of 
enabling moral appraisal is not a matter of making the invisible visible, as they assume, but 
rather of judging the already visible against an invisible, abstract standard, namely maxims’ 
formal capacity to be universalized as laws. The next question is how to characterize this 
function in terms of a mode of symbolic representation that is distinct from symbolic 
hypotyposis.   
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Chapter 2. 
The typic and symbolic anthropomorphism 
 
“The human mind comes equipped with an ability to penetrate the cladding of sensory 
appearance and discern the abstract construction underneath – not always on demand, and 
not infallibly, but often enough and insightfully enough to shape the human condition. Our 
powers of analogy allow us to apply ancient neural structures to newfound subject matter, 
to discover hidden laws and systems of nature, and not least, to amplify the expressive 
power of language itself.” – Steven Pinker409 
 
 
To recall, the aim of this second part of the thesis is to situate the typic within Kant’s theory of 
symbolic representation. Kant provided a valuable clue when he indicated that the typic 
functioned not as a schema, but rather “served only as a symbol [nur als Symbol diente]” (KpV 
5: 70). But as I argued in Chapter 1, most commentators spoil any insight to be gained from 
this remark by hastily identifying the typic with the notion of “symbolic hypotyposis” that 
Kant developed two years later in § 59 of the Critique of Judgment (1790). This is a 
misreading that distorts the typic’s nature and function, and threatens to denature Kant’s ethics 
as a whole. Instead of anachronistically reading the third Critique into the second, therefore, it 
would surely be more responsible and promising to investigate whether the typic may have 
been informed by an earlier conception of symbolic representation. In section 2.4. of Chapter 
1, I examined the occurrences of the terms “symbol” (Symbol) and “symbolic” (symbolisch) 
prior to the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, suggesting that the most 
plausible source appears five years earlier: the discussion of “symbolic anthropomorphism” in 
§§ 57-59 of the Prolegomena. Surprisingly – almost inexplicably – this connection has not 
been explored by commentators of the Typic chapter: the most one finds is a passing reference 
to the Prolegomena. In the present Chapter, I remedy this oversight by conducting a full, 
detailed comparison of the two texts, which shows that the typic in fact has significant 
continuities, both historical and conceptual, with symbolic anthropomorphism. Section 1 
analyzes Kant’s conception of symbolic anthropomorphism in terms of six characteristic 
features, presenting it as a (1) non-absolute, (2) analogical, and (3) non-sensible mode of 
                                                
409 The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature (London: Penguin, 2007), 276. 
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representation which is (4) permitted, required and (5) sufficient for reason’s purposes and 
which (6) performs a number of critical, protective functions. Section 2 provides some 
historical background to Kant’s theory of symbolic anthropomorphism by comparing it with 
St. Thomas Aquinas’ influential doctrine of analogical predication. Section 3 compares 
symbolic anthropomorphism with the notion of symbolic hypotyposis as described in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, noting the differences between these two forms of 
symbolic representation. Section 4 systematically compares symbolic anthropomorphism with 
the typic, stressing the significant continuities between the two notions while identifying the 
latter’s specific differences and innovations. 
 
1.	  ‘Symbolic	  anthropomorphism’	  in	  the	  Prolegomena	  
 
The discussion of symbolic anthropomorphism figures in the Conclusion to the Prolegomena, 
entitled “On Determining the Boundary of Pure Reason” (§§ 57-59; P 4:350-365), where Kant 
deals with the delicate problem of reconciling two apparently conflicting epistemological 
demands. On the one hand, the Critique of Pure Reason had already delimited the legitimate 
extension of synthetic a priori principles to the sphere of possible experience, circumscribed 
by the concept of the noumenon in the negative sense. Accordingly, the main negative result 
of the first Critique was the prohibition against transgressing the sphere of possible experience 
in attempts to acquire determinate cognition of noumenal beings. On the other hand, the 
central theme of the first Critique was that reason does not find satisfaction within the sphere 
of empirical knowledge, but is “pushed by its own need” (B21) ever higher towards the 
unconditioned, which necessarily transcends possible experience. Consequently, reason forms 
Ideas of the intelligible objects that would ground every conditional nexus, and demands that 
the latter be pursued until reaching the former, namely “an immaterial being, an intelligible 
world, and a highest of all beings (all noumena)” (P 4: 355).  
Nevertheless, Kant maintains that since these two requirements are equally valid, it 
must be possible to satisfy both of them, and in so doing, determine and cognize “the 
boundary [Grenze] of all permitted use of reason …” (P 4: 356). Kant employs a spatial 
metaphor to illustrate the nature of his proposed solution: unlike limits, “which are merely 
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negative,” he explains, “in all boundaries there is something positive,” i.e., a space wedged 
between two other spaces; accordingly, rather than stopping short of the boundary or 
transgressing beyond the boundary, there is a third possibility, namely remaining directly “on” 
it (P 4: 354). Analogously, the boundary between phenomena and noumena constitutes an 
epistemic space which reason can occupy by positively cognizing the connection between 
noumenal beings and the sensible world (P 4: 355, 361). In the Prolegomena Kant discusses 
this form of cognition in connection God: How should reason conceive the intelligible being 
corresponding to its Idea of a supreme cause of the world? The answer that Kant gives 
corresponds neither to strict deism nor to theism, but instead to think of God by means of a 
“symbolic anthropomorphism”:  
But we hold ourselves to this boundary [of all permitted use of reason] if we limit our 
judgment merely to the relation that the world may have to a being whose concept itself 
lies outside all cognition that we can attain within the world. For we then do not attribute 
to the supreme being any of the properties in themselves by which we think the objects of 
experience, and we thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute those 
properties, nonetheless, to the relation of this being to the world, and allow ourselves a 
symbolic anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns only language and not the object 
itself (P 4: 357). 
In the rest of this section, I will analyze Kant’s conception of “symbolic anthropomorphism” 
in §§ 57-59 of the Prolegomena in terms of six characteristic features. To be sure, this part of 
the Prolegomena is related to Kant’s treatment of the regulative use of the Ideas in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (KrV A642-68/B670-96); nevertheless, for the sake of concision and 
consistency I will focus my analysis on the Prolegomena, and refer to the Critique only to 
supplement certain points. Moreover, the Prolegomena contains elements not elaborated upon 
in the same way in the Critique, notably its relatively detailed treatment of analogy.  
 
1.1. Merely symbolic, as opposed to absolute  
 
On the one hand, in accordance with reason’s demand to ascend to the Ideas, symbolic 
anthropomorphism targets “intelligible beings [Verstandeswesen]” beyond the horizon of 
possible experience, notably God, yet Kant repeats several times that this mode of 
representation does not allow us to cognize intellectual beings or their intrinsic properties 
“absolutely [schlechthin, absolut]” (P 4: 358, 358n) or “in themselves [an sich, selbst, an sich 
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selbst]” (P 4: 355, 357, 358, 359, 360, 360n, 361).  
Kant situates his conception of symbolic anthropomorphism vis-à-vis two traditional 
modes of cognizing God: theism and deism. Kant condemns theism – i.e., taking properties 
from our own natures, limited as they are to the conditions of sensibility, such as a physical 
body, a will, etc. and ascribing them absolutely to the divine being – as “dogmatic 
anthropomorphism” (P 4: 355, 4: 357). On the other hand, reason’s need to employ the Ideas 
must still be satisfied, but deism – i.e., the representation of God through pure, unschematized 
categories alone – remains too empty and indeterminate (P 4: 355-356). Indeed, the only 
conceivable way in which one could attain absolute knowledge of God would be to cognize 
him as he cognizes himself, that is, through intellectual intuition – but of course human beings 
have no such faculty (KrV B307, B159). Consequently, we must forswear all dogmatic 
attempts to determine intelligible beings as they are in themselves and instead admit modestly 
that – to us – they must remain “absolutely unknown [absolut unbekannt]” (P 4: 358n). This 
admission of ignorance is the starting-point of symbolic anthropomorphism – which, contrary 
to what some commentators have maintained, is thoroughly anti-metaphysical.410  
Kant explains that reason’s epistemic need can be met in an appropriate way if, and 
only if, reason restricts itself, “as befits knowledge of a boundary, … solely to the relation 
[bloß auf das Verhältnis] of what lies outside the boundary to what is contained within (P 4: 
361, trans. mod., my emphasis). Kant maintains that if we “restrict our judgment merely to the 
relation [wir unser Urtheil bloß auf das Verhältnis einschränken]” that intelligible entities 
have to the sensible world (P 4: 357, 359, 361, 361-2), we can determine intelligible beings’ 
relation “with respect to the world and hence with respect to us [respektiv auf die Welt und 
mithin auf uns]” (P 4: 358) in a manner consonant with our epistemic finitude.411 And we 
determine the relation between an intelligible being and the sensible world by assimilating it 
with a known relation between two things within the sensible world. In this way we represent 
                                                
410 Michel Guérin, "Kant et l'ontologie analogique: Recherches sur le concept kantien d'analogie," Revue de 
Metaphysique et de Morale 79, no. 4  (1974); Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique; contrast with Annemarie 
Pieper, "Kant und die Methode der Analogie," in Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne, ed. Gerhard  Schönrich 
and Yushi Kato (Frankfurt a.M.: 92-112, 1996), 112. 
411 Kühn doubts this claim, however I do not share his epistemological worry: see "§§ 57-60: Von der 
Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft," in Kants Prolegomena: Ein kooperativer Kommentar, ed. Holger Lyre 
and Oliver Schliemann, Rote Reihe (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2012), 241-242. 
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God’s relation to the sensible world according to a merely symbolic anthropomorphism, which 
Kant explains as follows:  
If I say that we are compelled to look upon the world as if it were the work of a supreme 
understanding and will, I actually say nothing more than: in the same way that a watch, a 
ship and a regiment are related to an artisan, a builder, and a commander, the sensible 
world (or everything that makes up the basis of this sum total of appearances) is related to 
the unknown – which I do not thereby cognize according to what it is in itself, but only 
according to what it is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part (P 4: 
357). 
The first point to note concerning this key passage is that the mode of representation 
described here is anthropomorphic only in an epistemological sense. Intelligible beings are not 
represented as they are in themselves, but only according to their relation to human beings and 
to the human world: for instance, God is represented “not according to what it is in itself, but 
still with respect to me and world of which I’m a part [zwar nicht nach dem, was es an sich 
selbst ist, aber doch nach dem, was es für mich ist, nämlich in Ansehung der Welt, wovon ich 
ein Teil bin]” (P 4: 357). In addition, this mode of representation is executed by means of 
human cognitive capacities, and for the sake of human cognitive needs and goals. As we will 
see, however, symbolic anthropomorphism does not produce a symbol, or image, of 
intelligible entities in the shape of a human being.  
Secondly, symbolic anthropomorphism proceeds, as Kant puts it repeatedly, “merely 
by analogy [nur/bloß nach der Analogie]” (P 4: 359, 361). As we will see in more detail 
below, symbolic anthropomorphism is a form of analogical thinking insofar as it involves 
asserting a similarity between two relations. The point to appreciate here is that symbolic 
cognition is “only [nur]” or “merely [bloß]” analogical insofar as it yields no determinate 
cognition of the “missing” term (i.e., the term of the analogy corresponding to the intelligible 
being), but only of the relation of that being to the sensible world, insofar as that relation is 
construed as analogous to a certain relation within the sensible world. As Kant puts it in the 
first Critique: “And now we are thinking of a Something about which we have no concept at 
all of how it is in itself, but about which we think a relation to the sum total of appearances, 
which is analogous to the relation that appearances have to one another” (KrV A674/B702; cf. 
KrV A698/B726). For example, when one represents God’s relation to his Creation by analogy 
with a human artisan and his artifact, one does not thereby transfer properties onto the Creator 
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itself, but only on his causal relation to the world: 
reason is not thereby transposed as a property onto the first being in itself, but only onto 
the relation of that being to the sensible world, and therefore anthropomorphism is 
completely avoided. For here only the cause of the rational form found everywhere in the 
world is considered, and the supreme being, insofar as it contains the basis of this rational 
form of the world, is indeed ascribed reason, but only by analogy [nur nach der Analogie], 
i.e., insofar as this expression signifies only the relation [nur das Verhältnis] that the 
highest cause (which is unknown to us) has to the world, in order to determine everything 
in it with the highest degree of conformity to reason (P 4: 359; my italics). 
Thirdly, this epistemological restriction on symbolic anthropomorphism entails a 
semantic limitation on the language used to talk about intelligible beings. In the case of 
symbolic anthropomorphism, we are only authorized to speak of God “as if [als ob]” he were 
an artisan, and the world, his artifact. This characteristically Kantian expression signals that 
such a claim about God “in fact concerns only language and not the object itself [in der Tat 
nur die Sprache und nicht das Objekt selbst angeht]” (P 4: 357); it is just a façon de parler 
that should not be interpreted in any strict, literal, or absolute sense (per eminentiam). The 
expression “als ob” also figures prominently in the Critique’s discussion of “the regulative use 
of the Ideas of pure reason” to indicate the same kind of restriction (KrV A672-68/B700-96, 
A699/B727).412 In a word, such anthropomorphic, ‘as-if’ language is only symbolic. Kant’s 
employment of the word “symbolisch” to signal a semantic restriction can therefore be seen as 
an epistemological adaptation of a more common eighteenth-century usage listed in the 
Grimm dictionary: “in ausgesprochener oder unausgesprochener Einschränkung, soviel wie 
‘uneigentlich, übertragen, nicht im wirklichen, wörtlichen Sinne.”413 This is not to say that 
merely symbolic, ‘as-if’ language is hollow or empty, however; as we will see next, the proper 
meaning of an as-if statement can be reconstructed as an analogy. 
In sum, when Kant speaks of symbolic anthropomorphism in §§ 57-59 of the 
Prolegomena, the term is accompanied by definite restrictions. In this short text, Kant uses the 
restricting words “mere [bloß]” and “only [nur]” eighteen and fourteen times, respectively, to 
                                                
412 This is not the place to discuss the epistemological significance of ‘als ob’ thinking to Kant’s philosophy in 
general. For the classic debate on this topic, see Adickes, Kant und die Als-Ob-Philosophie; Vaihinger, 
Philosophie des Als Ob; ———, The Philosophy of ‘as if’: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious 
Fictions of Mankind, trans. C. K. Ogden (Mansfield Centre (CT): Martino Publishing, 2009).  
413 "Symbolisch,"  in Deutsches Wörterbuch, ed. J.  Grimm and W. Grimm (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1984), 1389.  
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emphasize that this mode of representation is not absolute, but merely symbolic insofar as it 
determines intelligible beings not as they are in themselves, but merely in their relation to “the 
world of which I am part,” and this merely by analogy, and with merely symbolic language.  
 
1.2. Analogical 
 
We have just seen that Kant repeatedly characterizes symbolic anthropomorphism as cognition 
“merely by analogy [bloß nach der Analogie].” At first sight, this characterization may strike 
one as doubly disappointing: we do not cognize intelligible beings as they are in themselves; 
worse still, the ersatz is epistemologically second-rate, a ‘mere analogy.’ Indeed, in 
philosophy analogy is commonly looked down upon – even today – as a sketchy resemblance, 
a shaky inference, or an insidious source of semantic ambiguity. However, in the Prolegomena 
Kant explicitly disavows such negative views of analogy, defending instead his own positive 
conception of analogy as a precise and reliable instrument for representing conceptual 
relations.  
Kant begins his discussion of analogy in the Prolegomena by quickly forestalling any 
confusion between the widespread notion of analogy as a rough, superficial similarity and his 
own, properly philosophical, form of analogy that underlies symbolic anthropomorphism: 
“This type of cognition is cognition according to analogy, which surely does not signify, as the 
word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect 
similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things” (P 4: 357). The common 
conception of analogy as an approximate similarity does not do justice to the focus, degree, 
and depth of similarity involved in Kant’s “philosophical analogy” (KrV A179-180/B222-
223). Firstly, the latter does not concern the similarity between individual things, but rather the 
similarity between relations. Accordingly, Kant’s philosophical analogy must be sharply 
distinguished from inductive analogies based on the similarity between two things; indeed, the 
distinction is all the more pressing, since inductive analogies are sometimes employed in 
philosophical contexts. One kind of inductive analogy allows one to make an a posteriori 
inference of the following form: if entity A, with the properties P1, P2, P3, and P4 is known to 
share the properties P1, P2, and P3 with entity B, then one can infer, on the basis of the known 
 201 
similarity between entities A and B, that entity B probably also possesses the property P4. 
Kant discusses this form of analogical inference in his lectures on logic, yet it is distinct from 
his own model of philosophical analogy.414 Another form of inductive analogy licences an a 
posteriori inference from the similarity between two effects to the similarity between their 
respective causes. This form of analogy is obliquely alluded to in the Prolegomena, when 
Kant notes that Hume had rightly criticized it as an inadequate basis for proving the existence 
of a divine Creator from the alleged similarity between the universe and an artifact (P 4: 356). 
Here is how Hume analyzes that analogy: 
“If we see a house, … we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect and 
builder; because this is precisely that species of effect, which we have experienced to 
proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears 
such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, 
or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the 
utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a 
similar cause.”415  
Obviously, this is not the model of analogy that Kant endorses for his own purposes. 
Secondly, the degree of similarity between relations posited by a philosophical analogy is not 
imperfect or approximate, but rather a “perfect similarity [eine vollkommene Ähnlichkeit],” 
“sameness [Gleichheit]” (KrV A179/B222) or even “identity [Identität]” (KU 5: 464n). 
Thirdly, these relations are deep enough that they can correspond to each other “in spite of 
[ungeachtet]” the superficial dissimilarity of the elements between which they respectively 
obtain. In the Prolegomena, Kant illustrates this important point with the following example:  
Such is an analogy between the legal relation of human actions and the mechanical 
relation of moving forces: I can never do anything to another without giving him a right to 
do the same to me under the same conditions; just as a body cannot act on another body 
with its motive force without thereby causing the other body to react just as much on it. 
Right and motive force are here completely dissimilar things, but in their relation is 
nonetheless complete similarity [Hier sind Recht und bewegende Kraft ganz unähnliche 
Dinge, aber in ihrem Verhältnisse ist doch völlige Ähnlichkeit]” (P 4: 357n, my 
emphasis).  
Kant’s definition of analogy in the third Critique also highlights this point: “An analogy (in a 
qualitative sense) is the identity of the relation [die Identität des Verhältnisses] between 
                                                
414 John J. Callanan, "Kant on Analogy," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 4  (2008): 749ff. 
415 Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 178.  
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grounds and consequences (causes and effects), insofar as that identity obtains in spite of the 
specific difference between the things … [sofern sie ungeachtet der spezifischen 
Verschiedenheit der Dinge … stattfindet]” (KU 5: 464n). 
We can further characterize Kant’s conception of analogy by referring to the 
“Analogies of Experience” in the first Critique, where as above, Kant distinguishes his 
technical conception of analogy from another form with which it could easily be confused – 
not the common view, this time, but the technical mathematical sense:  
In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in 
mathematics. In the latter they are formulas that assert the identity of two relations of 
magnitude, and are always constitutive, so that if two members of the proportion are 
given, the third is also thereby given, i.e., can be constructed. In philosophy, however, 
analogy is not the sameness of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations [nicht die 
Gleichheit zweener quantitativen, sondern qualitativen Verhältnisse], where from three 
given members I can cognize and give a priori only the relation to a fourth member but 
not this fourth member itself … [nicht aber dieses vierte Glied selbst]” (KrV A179-
180/B222-223). 
Kant’s description of the form and function of mathematical analogies calls for a brief 
digression, as it has leant itself to confusion. As for the form, readers of the Critique of Pure 
Reason had long been puzzled by the fact that mathematical analogies are described as having 
only three members, rather than four; accordingly, many editors and translators, notably 
Mellin, emended the text to read “... wenn drei Glieder gegeben sind, auch das vierte dadurch 
gegeben wird ...” – whereas others, such as Guyer and Wood, in the passage quoted above, 
revert to the original three-term formulation. It turns out that this debate cannot be settled on 
philological grounds alone, but depends on an understanding of the proper function of the 
mathematical analogy. Most scholars who favour the four-term formulation apparently think 
that the mathematical analogy is an algebraic formula that functions something like the well-
known “Rule of Three” in elementary arithmetic:  
For an equation of the form !! =    !" where the variable to be evaluated is in the right-hand 
denominator,the Rule of Three states that: 𝑥 = !"! . 
This seems to correspond perfectly to the four-term model of mathematical analogy: if three 
members of the proportion are given (a, b, c), the fourth (x) is thereby also given; e.g. If a = 3; 
b = 4; c = 75, then we can calculate that x = 100. In other words, a “mathematical analogy” 
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designates a four-term formula of elementary algebra symbolizing numbers (whole integers) 
and basic arithmetic operations (here, multiplication and division), which allow one to 
determine the missing fourth term by calculating it from the given three terms. Plausible as it 
may seem, Lisa Shabel has shown that this interpretation rests on an anachronistic assumption. 
The mathematical analogy is indeed an algebraic formula, she suggests, but Kant’s notion of 
algebra differed significantly from the modern, arithmetical notion – and we must adjust our 
interpretation of the analogy accordingly: “in a Kantian context ‘algebra’ cannot be taken 
simply to denote the arithmetic of indeterminate or variable numeric quantities, but must be 
recognized as a method applied to the solution of arithmetic and geometrical problems, 
resulting in a geometrical construction of ‘magnitude in general’: a line segment expressing 
either a number, or the determinate size of a magnitude (quantum).”416 In other words, 
mathematical analogy symbolically expresses determinate ratios that can be used to determine 
“which and how great” the missing term is by means of a geometrical construction. This 
account makes mathematical analogy a special case of “symbolic construction,” and it also 
explains why Kant specifies, in the above-quoted passage, not that the missing member is 
given by a process of calculation, but rather by being “constructed” (konstruiert): the 
geometrical procedure for constructing the three-term formula (a : b :: b : c – determining the 
third proportional), is described in Proposition VI.11 of Euclid’s Elements, while the 
procedure for constructing the four-term formula (a : b :: c : d – determining the fourth 
proportional) is described in Proposition VI.12 (in fact, Proposition VI.11 is a special case of 
Proposition VI.12). So it turns out that a mathematical analogy can have four distinct terms 
a : b :: c : x or only three a : b :: b : c. Accordingly, both readings of the passage cited above 
(KrV A179-180/B222-223) are technically possible, depending on whether one counts the 
number of terms in the analogy as such (four) or the number of distinct terms (three or four). 
In short, the mathematical analogy determines the missing term by constructing it according to 
the same mathematical ratio that holds between the “given” terms. 
                                                
416 Shabel, "Kant on the 'Symbolic Construction' of Mathematical Concepts," 617 (my italics). Callanan addresses 
the controversy over the interpretion of the mathematical analogy in "Kant on Analogy," 759-764. For accounts 
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Eudoxean theory of proportions, see Sutherland, "Kant on Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Proportions," 
533-558; ———, "Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics," 161-164; Emily Carson, "Kant on the Method of 
Mathematics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 37, no. 4. 
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In any case, the mathematical analogy operates on quantitative relations, whereas 
Kant’s philosophical analogy deals with qualitative relations (notably causal relations, cf. KU 
5: 464n). Consequently, the philosophical analogy does not construct the missing term; rather, 
the philosophical analogy allows us to perfectly determine the second relation, insofar as it 
posits the second relation’s perfect “sameness” (Gleichheit) to the first, known relation. 
Accordingly, the proper form of a philosophical analogy in Kant’s sense is a : b :: c : x.417 
Returning to symbolic anthropomorphism, conceiving of God as if he were an artisan allows 
us to determine his causal relation to the sensible world by positing that this relation is 
perfectly similar to the causal relation between an artisan and the artifact he produces, 
according to the analogy God : sensible world :: artisan : artifact. Correspondingly, speaking 
about God as the ‘artisan’ of the world should be interpreted as no more and no less than a 
condensed linguistic expression of this very analogy; in general, the legitimate interpretation 
of any symbolic statement must be determined by reconstructing its underlying analogy.418 
In summary, symbolic anthropomorphism employs “philosophical analogy” as a 
cognitive instrument for determinately representing the relation between an intelligible being 
and the sensible world. The analogy functions by construing that unknown relation as perfectly 
similar to a known relation between things in the sensible world – and this, regardless of the 
dissimilarity of the individual terms of the analogy, and without cognizing the fourth term as it 
is in itself. 
 
1.3. Non-sensible 
 
The third feature of symbolic anthropomorphism is, like the first, a restriction: it yields no 
sensible intuition (i.e., no image) of the intelligible object that it “symbolically” represents, 
nor does it ‘sensibilize’ the noumemon’s relation to the world. Indeed, an intelligible being 
(Verstandeswesen) would be denatured if one were to attribute sensible properties to it, as in 
theism: “… if we think [an intelligible being –AW] through properties borrowed from the 
sensible world, it is no longer an intelligible being: it is thought as one of the phenomena and 
                                                
417 Callanan, "Kant on Analogy," 761. 
418 Maly, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 288-289. 
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belongs to the sensible world” (P 4: 355). Accordingly, Kant castigates dogmatic 
anthropomorphism because it “transfers [überträgt] predicates from the sensible world onto a 
being wholly distinct from the [sensible] world” (P 4: 358). Dogmatic anthropomorphism 
denatures the deistic representation of God – a “wholly pure concept of reason” (P 4: 355) – 
by contaminating it with sensible intuitions. In symbolic anthropomorphism, by contrast, the 
analogy functions in a non-sensible, purely conceptual way. For example, in the Prolegomena 
Kant construes God’s love for humanity in terms of “the mere category [die bloße Kategorie]” 
of causality; i.e., the pure concept of the understanding, devoid of any sensible qualities: “But 
here the relational concept is a mere category, namely the concept of cause, which has 
nothing to do with sensibility [Der Verhältnisbegriff aber ist hier eine bloße Kategorie, 
nämlich der Begriff der Ursache, der nichts mit der Sinnlichkeit zu tun hat]” (P 4: 357n; trans. 
mod., my emphasis).419 Relatedly, in his contemporaneous Lectures on the Philosophical 
Doctrine of Religion, Kant recommended “the noble way of analogy” because it enables us “to 
remove from our cognition of God everything sensible inhering in our concepts” (cf. VpR 28: 
1023, 1046-1048).420  
In short, the properly “symbolic” use of analogy enables us to form a determinate 
representation of a purely conceptual relation with which we are not acquainted by 
assimilating it to a second, purely conceptual relation with which we are familiar– yet no 
sensible properties are thereby attributed to either of the relations, nor onto the entities 
between which they obtain. Thus, the use of analogy that Kant condones as properly 
“symbolic” in contrast to “dogmatic” is not figurative; rather, it respects the critical 
interdiction against exhibiting supersensible representations as sensible images.421 Despite the 
name, then, “symbolic anthropomorphism” does not produce a symbol in the image of a 
human being. 
 
                                                
419 See SA vs SH below. 
420 Ludwig Pölitz published the Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre in 1817 (second edition, 
1830); however, Kant delivered the lectures on which this text is based sometime between 1783 and 1786 – 
roughly contemporaneously with the Prolegomena and just prior to the composition of the Critique of Practical 
Reason. 
421 Contra Cathy Caruth, "The Force of Example: Kant's Symbols," Yale French Studies, no. 74  (1988): 29ff. 
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1.4. Permitted and required 
 
Kant makes it quite clear in the Prolegomena that the use of analogy in symbolic 
anthropomorphism is justified and legitimate from the point of view of critical philosophy. As 
we saw in the introduction to this section, Kant motivated the prima facie feasibility of 
symbolic anthropomorphism as a promising way of squaring a “proscription” (Verbot) with an 
equally legitimate “prescription” (Gebot), both announced in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
while we cannot even cognize intelligible beings as they are in themselves, we may 
nonetheless expect to determine “at least their relation to the sensible world and bring it to 
clarity” (P 3: 354). Indeed, reason positively bids us to do so, for, driven by its speculative and 
architectonic interests (KrV A467/B495, A474-5/B502-3), it refuses to stop short of the 
bounds of experience and demands a standpoint from which to view experience as a whole – 
which is just what “knowledge of the boundary” promises to provide. And since Kant 
considers symbolic cognition by means of analogy to be the only possible way to sufficiently 
determine this relation without falling into the errors of dogmatism, we “can allow ourselves” 
(wir erlauben uns) (P 4: 357) to employ it – and indeed “we are compelled [wir sind 
genöthigt]” (P 4: 357) to do so.422 In the Prolegomena, thus, Kant is reiterating the gist of the 
“transcendental deduction” he provided in the related discussion of the analogical, ‘as if’ 
employment of the Ideas in the Critique, where he declared that we are “not only warranted 
but even compelled [nicht allein befugt, sondern auch genötigt]” to posit God’s relation to the 
world by analogy (cf. KrV A677-8/B705-6, cf. A671/B99).  
 
1.5. Sufficient 
 
Kant goes on to assure us that while our permitted use of symbolic anthropomorphism may be 
subject to certain restrictions, it is nevertheless sufficient for us and we have reason to be 
satisfied with it. Thus when I regard the world as if it were an artifact produced by an artisan-
God, for instance, I must accept that I do not gain any absolute knowledge of God as he may 
be constituted in himself, yet I nevertheless grasp this notion “according to what it is for me, 
                                                
422 Compare the “transcendental deduction” of the regulative, ‘as if’, use of Ideas in the Critique (A671/B699 and 
following). 
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that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part” (P 4: 357). In other words, symbolic 
anthropomorphism may be relative to the human perspective, but that makes it all the more 
relevant. Indeed, Kant insists that this analogy yields a concept of God’s relation to the 
sensible world that is sufficiently determinate for our theoretical needs:  
By means of this analogy there still remains a concept of the supreme being sufficiently 
determinate for us, though we have omitted everything that could have determined this 
concept unconditionally and in itself; for we determine the concept only with respect to 
the world and hence with respect to us, and we have no need of more (P 4: 358, emphasis 
added; cf. VpR 28: 1023). 
We do not actually need more than this “cognition by analogy,” Kant insists, because reason’s 
true vocation is not to determine God’s intrinsic properties a priori – an enterprise which the 
first Critique proved to be a futile attempt to transcend the boundaries of possible experience – 
but instead to provide regulative principles for the systematic use of the understanding within 
possible experience. And reason can give the understanding its greatest systematic extension 
by instructing it to investigate nature as if it were an artifact designed and constructed by a 
supreme intelligence; indeed, “such a principle must be thoroughly advantageous to reason 
and can nowhere harm it in its use in nature” (P 4: 359).423 Kant concludes that “this is, 
however, all of the benefit that can reasonably even be wished for here, and there is cause to 
be satisfied with it” (P 4: 361-2, my emphasis). Symbolic anthropomorphism therefore forms 
                                                
423 The history of science has repeatedly confirmed Kant’s insight that a well-chosen analogy can serve as a 
powerful tool for explaining diverse phenomena in a unified theory. A spectacularly successful example is 
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, in which “Nature” is conceived by analogy with a breeder who 
carefully selects and passes on the heritable traits of his fittest animals – whereby no intelligent agency is literally 
attributed to “Nature” itself. Also worth noting in connection with the first feature discussed above are Darwin’s 
remarks to the effect that the anthropomorphic language based on this analogy is merely symbolic: “In the literal 
sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term; but who ever objected to chemists speaking of the 
elective affinities of the various elements? – and yet an acid cannot strictly be said to elect the base with which it 
in preference combines. It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity; but who 
objects to an author speaking of the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets? Every one 
knows what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity. 
So again it is difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by nature, only the aggregate action and 
product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us.” See Chapter 4 of The 
Origin of Species (London: Harper Collins, 2011), 78. For more treatments of the role of analogies in science, see 
Daniela Bailer-Jones, "Models, Metaphors and Analogies," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, 
ed. Peter K. and Michael Silberstein Machamer (Malden (MA) & Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). Max 
Black, "Models and Archetypes," in Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca (NY): 
Cornell University Press, 1962). Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1966); "Models,"  in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London & New York: Routledge, 
1998). "Models and Analogy in Science," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York & London: Macmillan 
& The Free Press / Collier-Macmillan, 1967).  
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part and parcel of Kant’s epistemological bargain in the first Critique, i.e., the demand to 
renounce the excesses of dogmatic metaphysics in exchange for the assurance that heeding the 
strictures of critique is the surest and indeed the only way “to bring human reason to full 
satisfaction” (KrV A856/B884).  
 
1.6. Protective 
 
The final feature of symbolic anthropomorphism is its critical, protective function, which 
flows from the previous two features: as the only possible way to accomplish the difficult feat 
of satisfying reason’s demands while still heeding the strictures of critique, symbolic 
anthropomorphism serves to discredit and ward off rival epistemological approaches: 
dogmatism, scepticism, empiricism, and mysticism. 
Kant frames symbolic anthropomorphism as “the true middle way … determined 
precisely and according to principles” between the opposite dangers of dogmatism and 
scepticism (P 4: 360). As we have seen repeatedly, Kant takes great care to avoid dogmatic 
anthropomorphism: symbolic anthropomorphism is merely analogical, “and we are thereby 
prevented [verhütet]” from making spurious claims to absolute knowledge of God’s inner 
properties or transferring any sensible properties onto the Supreme Being (P 4: 359). If one 
refuses to give up the “fantastical concepts” of dogmatism, Kant warns, one exposes oneself to 
the sceptical attacks that brought theism to its knees (cf. P 4: 356). Indeed, Kant pleaded for 
this shift to merely symbolic anthropomorphism during his contemporaneous Lectures on the 
Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, where he exhorted his audience to renounce the arrogance 
of dogmatism as well as the despair of scepticism and adopt instead the reasonable and modest 
way of analogy:   
“It would be easiest to deal successfully with all the consequences of anthropomorphism if 
only our reason voluntarily relinquished its claim to have cognition of the nature of God 
and his attributes, as to how they themselves are constituted internally, and if, mindful of 
its weakness, it never tried to exceed its bounds but were content to cognize only so much 
of him, who must always remain the object of an eternal quest, as it has need of. This 
interest of humanity is best attained per viam analogicam. … [If] we understand analogy 
to be the perfect similarity of relationships … then we will be satisfied at once; we can 
then form a concept of God and of his predicates which will be so sufficient that we will 
never need anything more” (VpR 28: 1048, 1023, my emphasis). 
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When it comes to cognition of God, less is more.  
While dogmatism and scepticism certainly represent the two main dangers Kant warns 
of in the Prolegomena, a close reading of the text reveals that he alludes to two additional 
dangers that symbolic anthropomorphism wards off. Both appear in the following passage, in 
connection with Kant’s metaphor of the boundary of experience:  
But setting the boundary to the field of experience through something that is otherwise 
unknown to it is indeed a cognition that is still left to reason from this standpoint, whereby 
reason is neither locked inside the sensible world nor raving outside it [nicht innerhalb 
der Sinnenwelt beschlossen, auch nicht außer derselben schwärmend], but, as befits 
knowledge of a boundary, restricts itself solely to the relation of what lies outside the 
boundary to what is contained within (P 4: 361, trans. mod., my italics).  
As I read this passage, Kant is presenting symbolic anthropomorphism, as cognition “on the 
boundary,” as a suitable way of avoiding two opposing dangers that threaten reason with 
respect to the delimitation of its use: on the one hand, empiricism stultifies reason by confining 
it to a merely imminent use; on the other hand, mysticism deludes reason by inciting it to stray 
into the transcendent. 
 Symbolic anthropomorphism wards off empiricism insofar as it offers reason a more 
satisfying and legitimate alternative. Indeed, the strictly imminent use prescribed by 
empiricism does not meet reason’s needs. Reason, by its very nature, demands completeness 
in the regression from conditions to their unconditioned ground, and therefore with respect to 
this drive for metaphysical knowledge, “experience never fully satisfies reason; it directs us 
ever further back in answering questions and leaves us unsatisfied as regards their full 
elucidation …” (P 4: 352, cf. KrV A314/B370-1). Consequently, Kant castigates the facile 
complacency of those “naturalists of pure reason” who smugly declare – without bothering to 
first undertake a critical investigation – that “with all our reason we can never hope to get 
beyond the field of experiences” (P 4: 314). What is more, empiricism cannot even satisfy 
reason within the realm of experience: empiricism limits scientific investigation to a piecemeal 
approach, whereas reason aims to direct natural science, in accordance with an all-
encompassing a priori principle, towards systematicity and maximal expansion (P 4: 359; cf. 
KrV A651/B679, A675/B703). 
 And although he does not discuss it at any length in the Prolegomena, Kant subtly yet 
unmistakably – as evidenced by the tell-tale word “schwärmend” – alludes to the danger of 
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mysticism. Mysticism, or Schwärmerei, tempts reason with the prospect of a direct, inner, and 
immediate cognition of the intelligible realm through supersensible intuitions. Kant’s 
discussion of symbolic anthropomorphism serves as a critical warning against the delusion of 
transcending the boundary of the only world that can possibly make sense to us. The best 
cognition of the intelligible sphere that epistemically finite human beings can reasonably hope 
for is merely symbolic, i.e., according to analogy – and that, Kant assures us, is “all of the 
benefit that can reasonably even be wished for here” (P 4: 361-2, my emphasis).  
 
2.	  Symbolic	  anthropomorphism	  and	  Aquinas’	  doctrine	  of	  analogical	  
predication	  
 
Before proceeding any further, we should inquire into the relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
influential doctrine of analogical predication to Kant’s conception of symbolic cognition, since 
it has been suggested that in the Prolegomena “Kant actually speaks in a manner that could be 
mistaken as coming directly from Aquinas’ own pen.”424 Aquinas invoked analogy to deal 
with the problem of predication with respect to God: How can we legitimately use language to 
make affirmative statements about the Supreme Being? The trouble arises because of the 
ontological incommensurability between the Creator, who is infinite, and his creatures, who 
are finite. Take the statement “God has knowledge.” If we mean to say that he has knowledge 
in the same sense that we ordinarily attribute knowledge to a human being – univocity – then 
we lapse into anthropomorphism insofar as we thereby attribute the limitations of human 
knowledge onto God, whereas his knowledge is supposedly perfect and unlimited. On the 
other hand, if we conclude that our word “knowledge” has an entirely different sense from 
what we mean by God’s “knowledge” – equivocity – then we must consequently give up 
making any fitting affirmation about God using that word (agnosticism). As a way between 
the opposing pitfalls of anthropomorphism and agnosticism, Aquinas suggests predication 
according to analogy. In fact, Aquinas successively entertained several different conceptions 
                                                
424 Jerry H. Gill, "Kant, Analogy, and Natural Theology," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 
(1984): 22. 
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of analogy, of which I will present two and compare them with Kant’s model: the analogy of 
proportionality and the analogy of attribution.425  
 
a) The analogy of proportionality 
 
In Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate, 1256-1259), Aquinas 
proposes the analogy of proportionality for speaking about God’s properties. An analogy of 
proportionality is “a likeness of two proportions to each other, as six with four because six is 
two times three, just as four is two times two.”426 While particular example is arithmetical, 
Aquinas extends the analogy to non-mathematical proportions as well. The analogy of 
proportionality licences a particular form of non-univocal, non-equivocal predication by 
transferring vocabulary between corresponding terms of the two proportions. Assuming the 
analogy seeing : eye :: understanding : intellect, for example, one can say that understanding 
is an intellectual form of “seeing.” In the same way, Aquinas suggested, one could affirm – 
neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically – that what we call “knowledge” plays the 
same role in God’s mental life as knowledge plays in human mental life.427  
The form of Aquinas’ analogy of proportionality – two perfectly similar relations 
holding between two pairs of terms – clearly corresponds to the model of analogy that Kant 
presents in the Prolegomena. It is certainly possible that Kant was influenced by Aquinas on 
this point. Then again, Aquinas puts the analogy of proportionality to a different 
epistemological use than Kant, namely to determine God’s properties, whereas Kant insists 
that the analogy cannot be employed to determine God’s properties in themselves, but only his 
relation to the world. Moreover, Aquinas borrowed this model of analogy from Aristotle, and 
so it is also possible that Kant did the same – without the middleman, so to speak – in which 
                                                
425 This paragraph and the following one are based on the helpful exposition by M.J. Danby-Smith, "The 
Scholastic Doctrine of Analogy" (McMaster University, 1969), 15-17. 
426 St. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 2, a. 11, in G.P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy (Chicago: 
Loyola University Press, 1960), 89-90. 
427 Danby-Smith, "The Scholastic Doctrine of Analogy", 18-21. 
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case the common source would explain the similarity.428 Indeed, as Callanan remarks in his 
article on Kant’s theory of analogy, “much of Kant’s logic was inherited from the Aristotelian 
corpus without modification,” and so we should not be surprised to find Aristotelian models of 
analogy directly reproduced in Kant.429 In my view, Kant’s “philosophical analogy” was most 
likely modelled directly on Aristotle.  
 
b) The analogy of attribution 
 
Aquinas later abandoned the analogy of proportionality, however, realizing that any putative 
proportional analogy such as knowledge : God :: knowledge : human was bound to be “deeply 
flawed … given that the problem of divine names arises precisely because the relationship of 
God to his divine properties is so radically disproportionate to our relation to our human 
properties.”430 Consequently, in later texts, notably the Summa Theologiae (1265-1273), 
Aquinas turned to a model of analogy that later came to be called the analogy of attribution. 
Unlike the Aristotelian analogy of proportion, the analogy of attribution has one primary 
analogue and one or more secondary analogues; each secondary analogue stands in a 
derivative, or ‘epigonic’, relation to the primary analogue.431 Correspondingly, the same word 
can be predicated in its essential significance, or “focal meaning,” when applied to the primary 
analogue and in a secondary, derivative sense when applied to a secondary analogue.432 A 
paradigmatic example is the word “healthy,” which is attributed primarily to the physical state 
of a man and derivatively to medicine or diet (qua causes of the man’s health) and to urine 
(qua indicator of the man’s health). In order to solve the problem of divine names, Aquinas 
                                                
428 Cf. Poetics 21, 1457b7-34; Rhetoric III, 10-11; Nicomachean Ethics V, 3; 6/7, 1131a9; Eudemian Ethics VII, 
9, 1241b33-38; 10, 1242b2-21; in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. (Princeton (NJ): Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
429 Callanan, "Kant on Analogy," 750. 
430 E.J. Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Analogy," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. 
431 “Das Verhältnis „von Einem her – auf Eines hin“ hat ein schlechthin vorgeordnetes, maßgebliches „erstes“ 
Glied und dem gegenüber beliebig viel „zweite“, für die der Bezug auf das „erste“ wesentlich ist, während dies 
wiederum durch den Bezug in keiner Weise betroffen ist. Dieses Verhältnis kann nicht durch die – von 
Aristoteles allein anerkannte – viergliederige Proportion beschrieben werden.” "Analogie,"  in Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1971), 217-218. 
432 "Analogie,"  in Sprachphilosophie: Ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung (Berlin & New 
York: De Gruyter, 1996), 1242f. 
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then conjugated this model of analogical predication with his metaphysics of Creation, 
according to which God had actively transmitted properties resembling his own to his 
creatures, as when he made humanity “in his own image” (Genesis 1:27). On this conception, 
“God is an analogical cause, and this is the reality that underlies our use of analogical 
language.”433 Accordingly, when we say that Adam had “knowledge,” we mean this word in a 
weak sense commensurate with his derivative ontological status qua creature; yet we can also 
attribute the same word in a superlative sense to his Creator, as befits the latter’s absolute 
ontological priority. The analogy of attribution thereby provides a solution to the problem of 
divine predication by giving rise to an analogical employment of language, as Aquinas 
explains in the Summa Theologiae: “In this way some words are used neither univocally nor 
purely equivocally of God and creatures, but analogically, for we cannot speak of God at all 
except in the language we use of creatures and so whatever is said both of God and creatures is 
said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God is to their source and cause in which all 
the perfections of things pre-exist transcendentally.”434 
Clearly, Aquinas’s analogy of attribution differs in significant respects from Kant’s 
Aristotelian-inspired model in the Prolegomena. To begin with, Kant does not adopt all of the 
metaphysical presuppositions underlying Aquinas’s model of analogy. Although Kant leaves 
room for the metaphysical doctrine of creation (KpV 5: 102), he does not endorse the 
Scholastic axiom that every cause produces an effect similar to itself. And while Kant accords 
analogy an important role in his own theory of causation, the model he proposes in the 
Analogies of Experience is based on analogies of proportionality between abstract relations 
(KrV A179-180/B222). 435  Moreover, Kant’s “philosophical analogy” involves two 
symmetrical relations, while the analogy of attribution involves a single, asymmetrical 
relation. And again, the two kinds of analogy serve different epistemological functions: the 
analogy of attribution serves to ascribe properties to God; Kant’s philosophical analogy 
                                                
433 ———, "Medieval Theories of Analogy." 
434  T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. H. McCabe (New York & London: Blackfriars & McGraw-Hill, 1964), 
65-66 (Ia, q. 13, a. 65). 
435 Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 303-304. 
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purports to determine no more than God’s relation to the world.436 Incidentally, this analysis 
also contradicts Gadamer’s assertion that there is a deep affinity between the theological 
analogia entis, based on the analogy of attribution, and Kant’s conception of symbolic 
hypotyposis, for in fact the latter is also based on Kant’s “philosophical analogy,” as will be 
explained in the next section.437 
 
3.	  Symbolic	  anthropomorphism	  and	  symbolic	  hypotyposis	  
 
Before exploring the connections between symbolic anthropomorphism and the typic, it will 
be necessary to compare symbolic anthropomorphism as described in the Prolegomena with 
symbolic hypotyposis as described in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Not only is this 
comparison important for the overall argument of the present thesis, but it is also a pressing 
exegetical task in its own right. Put more critically, one should not simply assume that the 
expression “symbolic”, used (only once) in a text from 1783, means the same as thing as when 
the corresponding word appears in the midst of a technical discussion in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, written seven years later. For instance, Sebastian Maly has criticized Petra 
Bahr and Heiner Bielefeldt for hastily assimilating the two forms of symbolic representation 
without having carefully compared the relevant texts.438 Indeed, I will argue that there are in 
fact noteworthy differences between symbolic anthropomorphism and symbolic hypotyposis.  
                                                
436 Douglas Glover comes to the same conclusion in his study of analogy’s role in Kant’s epistemology and 
metaphysics: “Instead of relations between different terms being the same, there is a direct linking of terms [in 
the analogy of attribution – AW]. Thus, man is healthy and the causes of health in a man are considered healthy 
by analogy. In effect, one property is ascribed to both terms of the analogy. If the use of this concept of analogy 
were ascribed to Kant in this sense, it would result in grave problems for his epistemological thought since it 
involves the actual attribution of properties to entities to which nothing can be properly attributed, that is, of 
which we can have no knowledge. Analogy in the [Aristotelian] sense does not necessarily fall into this difficulty 
since nothing is ascribed to entities. Instead, the analogy is drawn between relations between entities. In fact, 
Kant seems to have used the concept … in the Aristotelian sense.” "Metaphysical Dualism in Kant's Ethics" (PhD 
Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1971).  
437 Cf. Truth and Method, 75; Wahrheit und Methode, 81. 
438  See Maly, Symbolische Erkenntnis, 292; Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren, 286-292; Bielefeldt, 
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 173-174.  
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To recall, Kant first describes symbolic hypotyposis in the famous § 59 of the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, entitled “On beauty as the symbol of morality.” Here again is the 
key passage: 
All hypotyposis (presentation, subjecto ad aspectum), as making something sensible 
[Versinnlichung], is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to a concept grasped by 
the understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or symbolic, where to a 
concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, 
an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in a way merely 
analogous to that which it observes in schematization, i.e., it is merely the rule of this 
procedure, not the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the 
content, which corresponds to the concept. … All intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a 
priori are thus either schemata or symbols, the first of which contain direct, the second 
indirect presentations of the concept. The first do this demonstratively, the second by 
means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions are also employed), in which the 
power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a 
sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition 
to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical 
state is represented by a body with a soul if it is ruled in accordance with laws internal to 
the people, but by a mere machine (like a handmill) if it is ruled by a single absolute will, 
but in both cases it is represented only symbolically. For between a despotic state and a 
handmill there is, of course, no similarity, but there is one between the rule for reflecting 
on both and their causality (KU 5: 351; cf. FM 20: 279-80). 
In symbolic hypotyposis, intuitions are put under concepts, although these intuitions are not 
actually adequate to the concepts but only correspond to them by means of an analogy.439 In 
this sense, symbolic hypotyposis can be understood as an “indirect presentation [indirekte 
Darstellung]” of concepts. Correspondingly, the expressions “symbolic hypotyposis” as well 
as the “indirect presentation of concepts” refer to the process of symbolization, while the 
“symbol” per se, i.e., the intuition that embodies the indirect presentation of a concept, is the 
product of this process.440 This distinction between the process, or procedure (Vorgang) of 
symbolization, and the ‘symbol’, as the former’s product, or outcome (Ergebnis), is 
significant. On the one hand, symbolization is an abstract, analogical process that the power of 
judgment implements by means of a “double task” or “two-step procedure [doppeltes 
Geschäft, abbr. DG].” To recall, here are the two steps, as applied to Kant’s own example of 
the handmill symbolizing the despotic state:  
                                                
439 The account of symbolic hypotyposis given here is largely based on Maly’s excellent study, Symbolische 
Erkenntnis. 
440 Symbolische Erkenntnis, 156. 
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DG1: The imagination produces an image in sensible intuition of a handmill, and the 
power of judgment ascribes to it the specific causality elaborated by reflection from its 
corresponding empirical concept (i.e., mechanical causality). 
DG2: The power of judgment analogically transfers (übertragen) the rule of reflection on 
the specific causality of the handmill given in intuition onto the concept of the despotic 
state; in this way, the handmill becomes a symbol that indirectly presents the concept of 
the despotic state, particularly its specific causality (i.e., the mechanism of the handmill, 
whereby the crank moves the ‘passive’ gears through an external force, symbolizes the  
mechanism of a despotic state, where the despot’s absolute will compels his passive 
subjects through an external force).441 
On the other hand, the symbol is the product of this analogical procedure, namely a “sensible 
image [Sinnbild]” or “analogon from sensibility” (VA Friedländer 25: 356; VA Mrongovius 
25: 1294) – in this case, the image of a handmill. Its main purpose is to provide a lively and 
easily grasped presentation (Darstellung) of a more abstract concept.442 The key point to note 
here is that while every symbol necessarily presupposes an analogy, not every analogy 
necessarily produces a symbol: one can, if one wishes, employ an analogy in order to produce 
a symbol for a given concept, but one does not have to actualize the analogy’s symbolic 
potential, so to speak;443 the analogy can also stand alone or be employed for other purposes 
than symbolic hypotyposis. 
And symbolic anthropomorphism, I submit, should be understood as an abstract 
analogical process that does not produce a symbol in sensible intuition, but which serves only 
to give us a purchase on pure, conceptual relations. The text of the Prolegomena already gives 
a general indication of this. The term “symbolic” appears only once (P 4: 357), and when Kant 
explains what he means by it, he refers only to “cognition according to analogy” (P 4: 357), 
never once mentioning “indirect presentation” at all. As I stressed in section 1.1. of the 
analysis above, the term “symbolic” should be read here in conjunction with the ubiquitous 
                                                
441 Cf. Symbolische Erkenntnis, 146, 198. 
442 Symbolische Erkenntnis, 290. 
443 Symbolische Erkenntnis, 199-200, cf. 167, 290. Significantly, Aristotle makes a similar point about the 
possibility of producing metaphors by means of analogy: “[The metaphor –AW] from analogy is possible 
whenever there are four terms so related that the second is to the first, as the fourth to the third; for one may then 
put the fourth in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth. … Thus a cup is in relation to 
Dionysus what a shield is to Ares. The cup accordingly will be described as the ‘shield of Dionysus’ and the 
shield as the ‘cup of Ares’. Or to take another instance: As old age is to life, so is evening to day. One will 
accordingly describe evening as the ‘old age of the day’ … and old age as the ‘evening’ or ‘sunset of life’.” 
Poetics 1457b15-24, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol 2, 2332-2333. This parallel provides additional 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Kant based his theory of analogy directly on Aristotle’s. 
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restricting modifiers “only [nur]” and “mere [bloß],” which indicate that this mode of 
representation operates “merely by analogy [bloß nach der Analogie].” In addition, Kant 
specifies throughout that the analogies must not be used to attach sensible intuitions to 
supersensible concepts. Indeed, the Prolegomena’s emphasis on abstract analogies, rather than 
on sensible symbols, contrasts markedly with all of Kant’s treatments of symbolic 
hypotyposis, which instead prioritize the problem of symbolic Versinnlichung.444 This is not 
surprising, considering the different contexts into which symbolic anthropomorphism and 
symbolic hypotyposis respectively intervene: the former pertains to the possibility of 
theoretical cognition; the latter addresses aesthetic and subjectively practical concerns.  
In addition, there is a subtle but important difference between the analogical 
procedures used in the two modes of symbolic representation. Symbolic anthropomorphism, 
as we have already seen, produces analogies based on relatively abstract causal relations, 
notably “causality through reason,” i.e., teleological causality (P 4: 358). And as Kant explains 
at length in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, these analogies assist the 
determining power of judgment in subsuming natural phenomena under higher-order 
systematic principles (KrV A642ff./B670ff.). By contrast, symbolic hypotyposis operates with 
analogies based on causal relations which are as specific as possible and which are elaborated 
by the reflecting power of judgment on the basis of sensible intuitions. 
The role of specific causal relations in symbolic hypotyposis emerges when one 
examines the two examples that Kant discusses in KU, § 59 as possible symbols for a 
monarchical state: the handmill and the “body with a soul [beseelter Körper]” (KU 5: 352). 
Why exactly is the former an apt symbol for a monarchical state “ruled by a single absolute 
will,” and the latter an fitting image for a monarchical state “if it is ruled in accordance with 
laws internal to the people,” but not vice versa? Why aren’t the two symbols interchangeable? 
The key difference between the two images, as Maly has explained, is that they respectively 
embody two different, specific kinds of causality:  
In the case of the handmill, there is a mechanical kind of causality; in the case of the body 
with a soul, by contrast, there is an organic-teleological causality. Both kinds of causality 
are specific insofar as they are only recognizable through specification in intuition: 
                                                
444 Symbolische Erkenntnis, 317, cf. 292. 
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whether an object can be attributed one or the other kind of causality can only be decided 
on the basis of the intuition of the object.445  
Accordingly, the handmill is an apt symbol of the despotic state because the mechanical 
causality that it embodies is a suitable analogue for the causality characteristic of a despotic 
state: just as the internal gears of the handmill are passive vis-à-vis the crank, which makes 
them turn through an external force, so are the subjects of a despotic state passive vis-à-vis the 
despot’s will, which acts as a force external to the people’s collective will. Indeed, this 
analogy corresponds exactly to Kant’s definition of despotism in the Doctrine of Right as a 
“mechanism [Machinenwerk] of unifying a nation by coercive laws, that is, when all the 
members of the nation are passive [passiv] and obey one who is over them” (MS 6: 339, my 
emphasis). Incidentally, this analogy shows that the relevant feature of the handmill qua 
symbol is the mechanical action of the crank on the gears, rather than, as most interpreters 
suggest, the crushing, grinding action of the handmill on the grains (supposedly analogous to 
despot’s violent quashing of his hapless subjects).446 In contrast, just as a body is impelled 
‘from the inside’, by its soul, so is a monarchical state governed by a benevolent monarch 
“ruled in accordance with laws internal to the people” (KU 5: 352), and this explains why an 
animated body is a suitable symbol for a benevolent monarchical state but not for a despotic 
one.  
Moreover, as Maly aptly notes, the specification of the suitable rule of causality in 
each case is accomplished by the reflecting power of judgment, which scrutinizes and 
compares the sensible intuitions of these objects in order to extract and elaborate the 
appropriate rule (EEKU 20: 211). For example, one has to have seen a handmill and examined 
its mechanism before one could possibly use it as a symbol for the ‘mechanism’ of a despotic 
state. And the finer-grained this discrimination, the better: a handmill, with its active, external 
crank and passive, internal gears, is a far more apt and vivid symbol of a despotic state, than, 
say, a watch, which, while also mechanical, presents the image of moving itself from the 
inside, as if it were “autonomous” (KpV 5: 96). In short, these examples illustrate that the 
analogical procedure underlying symbolic hypotyposis operates with specific causal relations 
                                                
445 Symbolische Erkenntnis, 123, my emphasis. 
446 On this point I depart from Maly’s exposition; cf. Symbolische Erkenntnis, 146, 158-159, 198. 
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reflectively elaborated on the basis of sensible intuitions, in view of producing symbols that 
are as apt and vivid as possible. But in symbolic anthropomorphism, by contrast, we are not at 
all concerned with the figurative aptness of individual symbols per se. It does not matter 
whether one says that God is an “artisan,” a “builder,” or a “commander,” because analogy the 
underlying these images is based on the Verhältnisbegriff of teleological causality –  which is 
all that theoretical reason cares about for its purposes (P 4: 357-358; KrV A699/B727).  
In summary, this analysis suggests that symbolic hypotyposis and symbolic 
anthropomorphism function in different ways.447 Symbolic hypotyposis employs an analogical 
procedure for the purpose of indirectly presenting an abstract concept in the form of an 
intuitive symbol. By contrast, (merely) symbolic anthropomorphism does not produce a 
symbol, but consists only of a strictly analogical procedure for representing the causal 
connection between the sensible and intelligible worlds in such as way as to render the 
theoretical investigation of nature more systematic. In addition, the analogical procedure 
underlying symbolic hypotyposis is less abstract, more finely grained, and more closely tied to 
intuition than the analogical procedure underlying symbolic anthropomorphism. Also, 
symbolic hypotyposis depends on reflecting judgment, whereas symbolic anthropomorphism 
pertains to determining judgment. Given these differences between symbolic 
anthropomorphism and symbolic hypotyposis, it will be worthwhile to investigate, next, 
whether the typic bears greater affinities to the former than to the latter. 
 
4.	  Symbolic	  anthropomorphism	  and	  the	  typic	  
4.1. Merely symbolic, as opposed to absolute 
 
Just like symbolic anthropomorphism in the Prolegomena, the typic establishes a connection 
to the intelligible sphere (conceived as a ‘supersensible nature’), yet it thereby affords no 
theoretical cognition of the intelligible realm, its entities or their properties: “of all the 
intelligible absolutely nothing [schlechterdings nichts] is cognized” (KpV 5: 70). To be sure, 
in the second Critique Kant does allow that we can cognize the law of freedom, yet this 
                                                
447 Tellingly, Caruth runs these two treatments together due to her interpretation of symbolic anthropomorphism 
as figurative; cf. "Kant's Symbols," 31ff. 
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cognition is afforded to us not by the typic per se, but by a special “warrant” of pure practical 
reason (KpV 5 : 50-57), which in no way extends our theoretical cognition of intelligible 
entities, as he recalls pointedly in the Typic chapter: “all intelligible objects to which reason 
might lead us under the guidance of that law have in turn no reality for us except on behalf of 
that law and of the use of pure practical reason” (KpV 5: 70). So even if the typic allows us to 
conceive of an “ intelligible nature” for the sake of practical judgment (KpV 5: 71), this 
“nature” nonetheless remains an empty space for theoretical reason. A corresponding 
epistemological restriction applies to the intellectual concepts that designate those intelligible 
entities: just as in the Prolegomena Kant censured the dogmatic use of analogy for transferring 
“merely” (bloß) symbolic properties onto intellectual concepts “themselves” (selbst) (e.g. in 
theism), so his remark in the Typic serves to “prevent reckoning among concepts themselves 
that which belongs only to the typic of concepts [… um zu verhüten, daß, was blos zur Typik 
der Begriffe gehört, nicht zu den Begriffen selbst gezählt werde]” (KpV 5: 70, my emphasis). 
As I read it, then, the first sense in which the typic serves “only as a symbol” is that it obeys 
the same epistemological restriction as merely symbolic anthropomorphism: neither of these 
forms of symbolic representation allow us to cognize the intelligible as it is in itself; rather, 
they afford us a merely symbolic – i.e., analogical – grasp of certain relations. 
 
4.2. Analogical 
 
Is the typic an analogical procedure? Although the text of the Typic chapter does not mention 
analogy explicitly, it contains several clues that analogy may lie just beneath the surface: the 
statement that “laws as such are the same [Gesetze als solche sind einelerlei]” (KpV 5:70) in 
spite of their specific differences; the characterization of typification using the verb 
übertragen (to transfer, to transpose) (KpV 5: 71) which Kant elsewhere employs to describe 
how analogies function (e.g. in the second Analogy of Experience, KrV A199-200/B245);448 
and the typic-procedure’s similarity to FLN, which Kant explicitly characterizes as an analogy 
(G 4: 437). Moreover, from a more general, systematic point of view, analogy performs key 
                                                
448 See Claude Piché, "Qu'est-ce qu'une 'analogie' de l'expérience?," in Kant actuel: Hommage à Pierre Laberge, 
ed. G. Lafrance, C. Piché, and F. Duchesneau (Montreal, Paris: Bellarmin, Vrin, 2000); Renaut, Kant 
aujourd'hui, 303-304.  
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functions in Kant’s philosophical methodology – especially for presenting abstract concepts – 
and so we can surmise that it may also intervene in the typic.449  
Many commentators have suggested that analogy plays a role in the Typic chapter. 
Unfortunately, their various proposals, taken together, compose a bewildering hodgepodge of 
inconsistent analogies: between a moral order of interacting wills and the order of nature under 
law;450 between “the world of sensible data” and “the world of freedoms”;451 “between the two 
sets of objects conceived to fall under the two laws, moral wills on the one hand and temporal 
events on the other”;452 between the “invisible realm of God” and the sensible world;453 
between the “compulsive force” of the moral law and that of natural law;454 between the 
understanding and practical reason as “lawgiving authorities”;455 between the relation of 
maxims to the will and the relation of the law of nature to nature as a whole;456 between the 
relation of an event in nature to the law of nature and the relation of an action to the moral 
law;457 between “the moral world’s relation to the will’s free causality” and nature’s relation to 
“phenomenal causality”458 and, last but not least, between the kingdom of ends and the 
kingdom of nature.459 I will not examine all of these individual proposals in detail, as that 
would only sow more confusion. What I will point out here is that this striking lack of 
consensus reflects the regrettable fact that most scholars studying the Typic have apparently 
not read each other, and as a result produce inconsistent intepretations. In the rest of this 
                                                
449 ———, Kant aujourd'hui, 302ff. See also Callanan, "Kant on Analogy; Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique, 
esp. 247-266; Pieper, "Methode der Analogie," esp. 95-96, 108-109.  
450 Beck, Commentary, 159. 
451 Marty, Naissance de la métaphysique, 258. 
452 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 160. 
453 Vaihinger, Philosophie des Als Ob, 655. 
454 Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 113; Pieper, "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," 115. 
455 ———, "Zweites Hauptstück (57-71)," 112. 
456 ———, "Methode der Analogie," 108. 
457 ———, "Methode der Analogie," 109. 
458 Grandjean, "Jugement moral," 48. 
459 Kant's Life and Thought, 259; Kants Leben und Lehre, 250. Beck, Commentary, 158-160; Bielefeldt, Symbolic 
Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, 181-182; Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 259; ———, Kants 
Leben und Lehre, 250; Grondin, "Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen Gesetzes," 394; Rawls, Lectures, 214-
216; Shell, The Rights of Reason, 88; Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 149ff. I have already criticized this 
interpretation in the Commentary; see sections 4.1.2.4. and 4.2.3.2.  
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section, I propose an analysis which I find more compelling and which I will then compare 
with symbolic anthropomorphism.  
It seems to me that the natural place to begin is to ask whether there is an analogy 
between the moral law and its type, the law of nature. In the Commentary, I suggested that 
there is an analogy between the two laws that guides moral appraisal.460 In the typic-
procedure, we employ the universal law of physical causality as “the type of the law of 
freedom” in virtue of an analogy between the two laws qua universal and hence 
‘exceptionless’. That is, just as the law of natural causality governs every “case of experience” 
without exception (KrV A542/B570), so does the moral law apply to every action without 
exception (G 4: 421, 424). Conversely, this analogy provides a “model [Muster]” for moral 
appraisal (KpV 5: 44): just as “in the most ordinary judgments of … experience” one must 
reject – i.e., disbelieve – all exceptions to the law of nature as superstition (KU 5: 294), so “in 
cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised” must one reject – i.e., condemn – all 
purported exceptions to the moral law as morally evil (G 4: 424; KpV 5: 44). 
There is a fascinating characterization of the universal law of nature in the Critique of 
Pure Reason that may prove useful here for formulating the analogy in a more technical way. 
Kant writes that the universal law of nature “contains the condition and as it were the exponent 
for a rule in general [die Bedingung und gleichsam den Exponenten zu einer Regel 
überhaupt], while experience provides the case which stands under the rule” (KrV A159/B198, 
my emphasis). As Reich has suggested in his classic study of the table of judgments, Kant’s 
adoption of the term “exponent” in this context has to do with its meaning in mathematics. In 
the Euclidean theory of proportions (cf. Elements, Books V-VI), popular in the mathematical 
textbooks of the eighteenth century (cf. Kästner, Klügel, Euler), an “exponent” is defined as 
the number by which one must multiply or divide the first member of a pre-defined 
quantitative proportion (logos, ratio) in order to obtain the second member.461 In the Critique, 
                                                
460 See section 5.1.2. 
461 Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, trans. Jane Kneller and Michael Losonsky 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 76; Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel, 2nd ed. (Berlin: 
Schoetz, 1948), 67. Kant was thoroughly acquainted with both the eighteenth-century as well as ancient Greek 
mathematical theories of proportions – see Carson, "Kant on the Method of Mathematics; Daniel Sutherland, 
"Kant on Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Proportions," ibid.44 (2006); ———, "Kant's Philosophy of 
Mathematics."  
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Kant cautiously extends this term (“gleichsam”) beyond quantitative relations, as Reich 
explains: “The concept of an exponent generally, that is, if we do not confine it to 
relationships of quantities … is a general concept of the relation of a term in general of a 
defined relation to another term in general.”462 On the one hand, sensible experience provides 
individual cases as well as general regularities. On the other hand, empirical laws worthy of 
the name must have truly universal application if they are to fit within the formal framework 
of a unified and lawful nature. In this sense, the universal laws of nature supplied a priori by 
the understanding can perhaps be interpreted as universalization exponents that convert 
empirical regularities into empirical laws. Kant provides a helpful example of this conversion 
in the Prolegomena: “in perception a rule of relation [eine Regel des Verhältnisses] [may – 
AW] be found, which says this: … If a body is illuminated by the sun for long enough, then it 
becomes warm. … But I continue on, and say: … The sun through its light is the cause of the 
warmth. The foregoing empirical rule is now regarded as a law [Die obige empirische Regel 
wird nunmehr als Gesetz angesehen] and indeed as valid not merely of appearances, but of 
them on behalf of a possible experience, which requires universally and therefore necessarily 
valid rules [welche durchgängig und also notwendig gültige Regeln bedarf]” (P 4: 312, my 
emphasis; cf. KrV A128, B162-3). Here, the universal law of natural causality functions as an 
exponent that converts an empirical regularity based on particular cases into a truly universal 
law. 
I would like to suggest that the law of nature and the moral law are analogous insofar 
as they both function, in their respective spheres, as universalization ‘exponents’, i.e., as 
functions that convert general regularities into truly universal laws. As we have just seen, in 
the theoretical sphere, Kant distinguishes between empirical regularities, which apply to most 
objects in most situations, and empirical laws, which apply universally to all objects in all 
situations of a certain kind. In the practical sphere, Kant makes a parallel distinction between 
maxims, as rules of conduct that apply only to myself, in most situations of a certain kind, and 
practical laws, which apply universally to all rational beings in all situations of a certain kind 
(KpV 5: 19). Accordingly, just as the law of natural causality functions as an exponent that 
converts empirical regularities into empirical laws of nature by imparting them with the strict 
                                                
462 Reich, Completeness, 76-77 (trans. mod.); ———, Vollständigkeit, 67-68. 
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universality of the supreme law of the understanding (KrV A542/B570), so does the moral law 
function as an exponent that converts maxims into practical laws by imparting them with the 
strict universality of the supreme law of pure practical reason (G 4: 420-1, 401-402, 437; KpV 
5: 29; KpV 5: 30, 33; VE Collins 27: 1428). This analogy is represented schematically in the 
following diagram:  
 
 
a  law of nature qua universalization exponent  b 
Empirical regularity     Empirical law of nature 
 
:: 
 
c   moral law qua universalization exponent   x 
Individual maxim    Practical law 
 
 
For the sake of precision in the following analysis, let me introduce some technical 
terminology: the individual terms of this analogy will be designated as “analogata” (sing. 
analogaton); the shared relations between the terms will be designated as “analoga” (sing. 
analogon).463 Here, the two universal laws, as exponents, are not things, but functions; 
correspondingly, they figure in the analogy not as individual analogata, but rather as analoga. 
Indeed, Kant’s concept of an exponent is perfectly suited to figure as an analogon because it is 
the concept of a determinate relation between two members of a proportion in general.464  
This analogy sheds light on several elements of the Typic chapter. Firstly, we can 
specify that the type of the moral law is its formal analogon; indeed, the analogy guarantees 
that the law of nature is an adequate type for the moral law’s formal universalization function 
in virtue of their “perfect similarity” qua formal relations (cf. KrV A179/B222). Secondly, we 
can interpret the key statement that ‘laws as such are the same despite differences in their 
determining grounds’ (KpV 5: 70) as meaning that the universal law of nature and the law of 
freedom, despite the great metaphysical and representational differences between them, 
                                                
463 Cf. "Analogie," 1240ff. 
464 ———, Completeness, 76-77; ———, Vollständigkeit, 67-68. 
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nonetheless perform analogous functions as formal universalization exponents. Thirdly, this 
analogy elucidates how step 2 of the typic-procedure works: to typify a maxim, we simply 
take a maxim applicable only to myself in certain situations (e.g. ‘I will make a false promise 
if I happen to find myself in financial need’) and plug it into the exponent defined by the 
universal law of nature, which then converts this rule into an ‘as if’ empirical law of a 
counterfactual nature in which it applies to all agents in all situations of the specified kind (e.g. 
‘Everyone will make false promise whenever they find themselves in financial need’).465 To 
be sure, this operation only occurs the within the context of the thought experiment, and the 
typified maxim is evaluated only as to its form. 
The analogy I have just sketched between the law of nature and the moral law as 
universalization exponents does not appear explicitly in the text of the Typic chapter and 
should therefore be taken as a hypothesis. That being said, it seems to be confirmed and also 
extended in three passages where Kant explicitly refers to an analogy between the law of 
nature and natura formaliter spectata on the one hand and the moral law and supersensible 
nature on the other. The first appears in the Critique of Practical Reason, just a few pages 
before the Typic chapter:  
The moral law is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and hence a law of the 
possibility of a supersensible nature, just as [so, wie] the metaphysical law of events in the 
sensible world was a law of the causality of sensible nature … (KpV 5: 47, my 
emphasis).466 
Here, the expression “just as [so wie]” signals an analogy.467 The second passage 
appears in connection with FLN in the Groundwork:  
Since the validity of the will as a universal law for possible actions has an analogy with 
the universal connection of the existence of things in accordance with universal laws, 
which is the formal aspect of nature in general, the categorical imperative can also be 
expressed thus: act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their 
object themselves as universal laws of nature (G 4: 437, my emphasis; cf. G 4: 421).468  
                                                
465 See section 4.2.1.4. of the Commentary. 
466 [Das moralische Gesetz ist in der Tat ein Gesetz der Kausalität durch Freiheit, so wie das metaphysische 
Gesetz der Begebenheiten in der Sinnenwelt ein Gesetz der Kausaliät der sinnlichen Natur war, …] 
467 See Piché, "Qu'est-ce qu'une 'analogie' de l'expérience?," 225. 
468  [Weil die Gültigkeit des Willens, als eines allgemeinen Gesetzes für mögliche Handlungen, mit der 
allgemeinen Verknüpfung des Daseins der Dinge nach allgemeinen Gesetzen, die das Formale der Natur 
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The third mention of an analogy between these notions appears in the Nachlass:  
The principle of the unity of freedom under laws establishes an analogon with that 
principle that we call nature […] The unity of the intelligible world according to moral 
principles, just like the unity of the sensible world under physical laws (Refl 7260, 19: 
296-297, my emphasis).469 
These passages all seem to be pointing towards a fundamental analogy between nature and 
freedom. On one side of the analogy, we have the idea, familiar since the first Critique, that 
the law of physical causality functions, in virtue of its universality, as a constitutive ‘principle 
of unity’ that ‘makes possible’ the formal lawfulness that structures the sensible world, i.e., 
‘the formal aspect of nature in general’, or natura formaliter spectata. Kant defines the “law 
of nature that everything that happens has a cause” as the principle “through which alone 
appearances can first constitute one nature [dieses Gesetz, durch welches Erscheinungen 
allererst eine Natur ausmachen]” (KrV A542/B570). On the other side of the analogy, we 
have the idea that the moral law functions, in virtue of its universality, as a constitutive 
‘principle of unity’ that ‘makes possible’ the formal lawfulness of an intelligible moral order 
or supersensible nature: “Now, nature in the most general sense is the existence of things 
under laws. … [T]he moral law … is therefore the fundamental law of a supersensible nature” 
(KpV 5: 43). In other words, just as the law of physical causality ‘makes possible’ the unified 
lawfulness of nature in its formal aspect, so (mutatis mutandis) does the law of freedom ‘make 
possible’ the unified formal lawfulness of supersensible nature. There are two ways of 
formalizing this analogy.  
First, as a Kantian ‘philosophical analogy’ of the form a : b :: c : x, where (a) the law 
of nature stands in the same relation to (b) nature in the formal sense as does (c) the moral law 
to (x) supersensible nature. The analogy is represented schematically in the diagram below:  
  
                                                                                                                                                    
überhaupt ist, Analogie hat, so kann der kategorische Imperativ auch so ausgedrückt werden: Handle nach 
Maximen, die sich selbst zugleich als allgemeine Naturgesetze zum Gegenstande haben können].  
469 [Das Principium der Einheit der freyheit unter Gesetzen stiftet ein analogon mit dem, was wir Natur nennen. 
… Die Einheit der intelligibeln Welt nach practischen Principien, so wie der Sinnenwelt nach physischen 
Gesetzen] 
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a   functions as the constitutive principle of the universal lawfulness of  b 
law of nature     natura formaliter spectata 
 
:: 
 
c   functions as the constitutive principle of the universal lawfulness of   x 
moral law     supersensible nature 
 
 
From a formal perspective, we can note that the analogaton of the moral law is none other 
than Type1, just as the analogaton of supersensible nature is Type2. This analysis suggests that 
in both cases the choice of Typus is underwritten by an analogical correspondence, and it also 
confirms that Type2 is more general than Type1.470 The philosophical import of this analogy is 
best characterized in Marty’s words: “We are faced with a properly Kantian analogy as 
expounded in the Prolegomena: the connections are identical – the connections, here, that 
constitute a universe.”471 Indeed, the idea that nature and freedom should each constitute a 
universe, world, or kosmos governed by law is a characteristic result of Kant’s philosophical 
method, as Cassirer has observed: “The fact that … the idea of obligation in a general sense 
crystallizes in the shape of a ‘world’, has its profound methodological basis.”472  
However, if we take the view that universal ‘laws as such’ are can be characterized as 
exponents, then they can figure in the analogy as relations (analoga) rather than as individual 
terms (analogata). And it does seem to be possible to reformulate the analogy accordingly 
while remaining faithful to the passages quoted above. On this view, saying that each law 
serves as ‘the principle of unity’ of its respective ‘nature’ is equivalent to saying that just as 
the law of nature transforms the disunited manifold of appearances into a system united under 
physical laws (natura formaliter spectata) by imparting the manifold with the form of 
universal lawfulness (allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit) (KrV A542/B570), so does the moral law 
                                                
470 See section 4.1.2. of the Commentary. 
471 Naissance de la métaphysique, 258.  
472 Kant's Life and Thought, trans. James Haden (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1985), 258-259; 
Kants Leben und Lehre, 249. See also section 3.2. of the Conclusion. 
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transform the disunited ‘manifold’ of actions (or desires) (cf. G 4: 437; KpV 5: 65) into a 
system united under practical laws, which Kant calls a supersensible or archetypal nature, by 
imparting the manifold with the form of universal lawfulness (Gesetzmäßigkeit) (KpV 5: 43). 
Consequently, this second formulation also has the characteristic form of a Kantian 
philosophical analogy: a : b :: c : x, since (a) the disunited manifold of appearances has the 
same relation to (b) natura formaliter spectata as does (c) the disunited manifold of actions to 
(x) natura archetypa. The analogy is represented graphically in the diagram below:  
 
 
a   law of nature qua exponent of universal lawfulness  b 
manifold of appearances     system of physical laws 
(natura materialiter spectata)    (natura formaliter spectata) 
 
:: 
 
c   moral law qua exponent of universal lawfulness   x 
manifold of actions       system of practical laws 
        supersensible nature 
        (natura archetypa) 
 
  
On this model, the law of nature is the analogon of the moral law, as in the first analogy 
proposed above. What is more, we can see that this analogy underwrites the legitimacy of 
typifying Type2 – i.e., taking (b) “the form of lawfulness in general” articulated by “the 
understanding’s pure form of nature” and analogically “transferring” it (übertragen, 
hineintragen) into (x) the intelligible realm (KpV 5: 70-71).473 Conversely, the analogy also 
suggests, in line with step 3 of the typic-procedure, that a disunited, disjointed, or incoherent 
representation of nature is an adequate analogue (as regards its form) for inconsistency, 
capriciousness and conflict in the moral sphere.  
How does the analogical procedure in the Typic chapter, as characterized here, 
compare with symbolic anthropomorphism? On the one hand, the analogical procedure 
                                                
473 See section 4.1.2.3. of the Commentary and Renaut, Kant aujourd'hui, 309-310; Kant, Fondation, 194-195n. 
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underlying the typic shares certain key characteristics with symbolic anthropomorphism – 
tellingly, the very characteristics that distinguish them both from symbolic hypotyposis. Just 
as in symbolic anthropomorphism, the analogous relations (analoga) in the typic are more 
formal, abstract, and independent of sensibility than the specific causal relations that figure in 
symbolic hypotyposis. In addition, the analogies in the typic are employed to get a conceptual 
grasp of these relations for use within the sensible world, but not to positively cognize – or 
symbolize – the fourth term by transferring sensible intuitions onto it: “Hence it is also 
permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an intelligible nature, provided 
that I do not carry over into the latter intuitions and what depends on them but refer to it 
merely the form of lawfulness in general (the concept of which occurs even in the most 
common use of reason, although it cannot be determinately cognized a priori for any purpose 
other than merely the pure practical use of reason)” (KpV 5: 70).474  
On the other hand, there are also some illuminating differences between the two 
concepts. While symbolic anthropomorphism generally employs teleological causality as an 
analogon, the typic goes one step further in abstraction, extracting the category’s 
transcendental-logical function as an ‘exponent for a rule in general’. Put another way, while 
symbolic anthropomorphism focuses on the category of causality, the typic focuses on the 
category of causality. Also, while symbolic anthropomorphism analogically maps a (causal) 
relation within the sensible world onto the (causal) relation between the sensible world and the 
intelligible world, the typic maps a (formal, constitutive) relation within the sensible world 
onto a (formal, constitutive) relation within the intelligible world. Finally, the analogies 
employed in the typic are more abstract, complex and ‘higher-order’ than those used for 
symbolic anthropomorphism, since the individual terms (analogata) are not individual objects, 
but rather rules or systems of rules. (Incidentally, this additional complexity may be another 
explanation for the lack of consensus among commentators on how to spell out the analogies 
in detail.) In sum, there does seem to be an analogical procedure underlying the typic – one 
                                                
474 [Es ist also auch erlaubt, die Natur der Sinnenwelt als Typus einer intelligibelen Natur zu brauchen, so lange 
ich nur nicht die Anschauungen, und was davon abhängig ist, auf diese übertrage, sondern blos die Form der 
Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt (deren Begriff auch im gemeinsten Vernunftgebrauche stattfindet, aber in keiner 
anderen Absicht, als blos zum reinen praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft a priori bestimmt erkannt werden 
kann) darauf beziehe. Denn Gesetze als solche sind so fern einerlei, sie mögen ihre Bestimmungsgründe 
hernehmen, woher sie wollen.] 
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that shares the key characteristics of symbolic anthropomorphism, but that must be 
acknowledged as a more abstract, complex, and sophisticated version. 
 
4.3. Non-sensible  
 
Just as he did in the Prolegomena, Kant stresses in the Typic that these analogies are abstract, 
formal, purely conceptual correspondences, devoid of sensible content. Just as the deistic 
concept of God would be inevitably distorted if one were to attribute sensible properties to it, 
so the “purity and sublimity [Reinheit und Erhabenheit]” (KpV 5: 71) of the supersensible 
Ideas of the moral law and the morally Good would be contaminated if one were to attach 
sensible intuitions to them. And just as only a pure concept of the understanding can subtend 
the analogy to such a being without distorting the latter, so the type of the moral law can only 
be furnished by the understanding, not the imagination (KpV 5: 69). Accordingly, Type1 is law 
of natural causality, a pure concept produced by the understanding’s intellectual synthesis, and 
it functions as a type “only as to its form [nur seiner Form nach]” (KpV 5: 69). 
Correspondingly, Type2 is not identical with the nature of the sensible world qua sensible; 
instead we must first extract “the mere form of lawfulness in general [blos die Form der 
Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt]” (KpV 5: 70) that the understanding thought into nature in the 
first place. So the underlying analogies in both the Prolegomena and the Typic operate with 
entirely pure, non-sensible representations. 
 
4.4. Permitted and required  
 
Another significant correspondence between symbolic anthropomorphism and the typic is that 
Kant legitimates their ‘merely symbolic’ employment in almost exactly the same terms. Just 
as, for theoretical purposes, “we can allow ourselves [wir erlauben uns]” (P 4: 357) and are 
even “required” or “compelled [genöthigt]” (P 4: 357) to employ symbolic 
anthropomorphism, so, for moral purposes, “reason is entitled and even required [berechtigt 
und auch benöthigt] to use nature … as the type of judgment” (KpV 5: 70). The pure practical 
power of judgment needs the typic, because otherwise it could not subsume actions under the 
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concepts of the morally good and evil. Type1 (the law of nature) meets this need by typifying 
the supersensible Idea of the moral and by providing a procedure for testing the 
universalizability of maxims; Type2 (natura formaliter spectata) typifies the moral order of 
the intelligible realm as a whole and harmonizes maxims.  
The typic’s permissibility is tied to three considerations. Firstly, as we just saw, the law 
of nature and the form of nature in general may be employed since they represent formally 
adequate analogues of the moral law and of supersensible nature, respectively. Secondly, the 
typic may be employed for the purposes of moral appraisal because it enables sufficiently 
determinate and reliable moral judgments (to be explained just below). Thirdly, Kant states 
that Type2 is “permitted” insofar as it “serves only as a symbol [nur als Symbol dient]” (KpV 
5: 70-71, my emphasis), which I interpret to mean that it can be employed by the power of 
judgment only as a non-absolute, non-sensible analogue for the moral realm, and only for the 
sake of moral appraisal:  
Hence it is also permitted [erlaubt] to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an 
intelligible nature, provided [so lange] that I do not carry over into the latter intuitions and 
what depends on them but refer to it merely the form of lawfulness in general [sondern 
blos die Form der Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt] (the concept of which occurs even in the 
most common use of reason), although it cannot be determinately cognized a priori for 
any purpose other than merely the pure practical use of reason [blos zum reinen 
praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft]) (KpV 5: 70, trans. mod., emphasis added) 
The proviso is clear: one must extract the formal representation of “nature” that the pure 
understanding thinks into the sensible world a priori – i.e. the “mere [bloß]” conceptual form 
of lawfulness in general, dissociated from all sensible intuition – and analogically transfer 
(übertragen) only that abstract conceptual structure to the intelligible realm. This confirms 
that the legitimate employment of the typic, just like symbolic anthropomorphism in the 
Prolegomena, rests on a purely conceptual analogy.  
 
4.5. Sufficient 
 
Nevertheless, just as Kant held that symbolic anthropomorphism, confined to the boundary of 
experience, was nevertheless sufficient for the purposes of theoretical reason, so, mutatis 
mutandis, does he maintain that the typic is sufficient for “the pure practical use of reason” 
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(KpV 5:70). Indeed, the thought experiments generated by the typic-procedure ensure that the 
outcomes of moral appraisal are so clear, even “obvious” (KpV 5: 44), that everyone, even “the 
commonest understanding,” can employ the law of nature as type for judging a wide range of 
moral cases with accuracy and ease (KpV 5: 69-70, 40; G 4: 403-405).475 In addition, Type2 
systematizes and harmonizes all uses of pure practical judgment within the sensible world and 
thereby provides guidance for our practical vocation as finite rational beings “to furnish the 
sensible world ... with the form of world of the understanding,” i.e., to remodel “ectypal 
nature” after the form of “archetypal nature” (KpV 5: 43). 
 
4.6. Protective  
 
As we saw above, symbolic anthropomorphism serves to prevent a number of dangers in 
theoretical philosophy, including empiricism, mysticism, dogmatism and scepticism. The typic 
also performs such preventative, protective functions; indeed, Kant stresses this point even 
more strongly in the second Critique, maintaining that the typic is so “important and advisable 
[wichtig und anrathungswürdig]” in the moral sphere precisely because it “protects from 
[bewahrt von]” empiricism and mysticism (KpV 5: 70-71). The typic’s protective functions 
have already been described in section 5.2. of the Commentary; here, the important point to 
appreciate is that the typic, just like symbolic anthropomorphism, functions as a “safeguard 
[Verwahrung]” in virtue of its merely symbolic status (KpV 5: 71).  
 
a) Dogmatism and scepticism 
 
Systematically comparing symbolic anthropomorphism with the typic allows us to ascribe two 
protective functions to the latter that were not mentioned in the Commentary. Symbolic 
anthropomorphism wards off dogmatism and scepticism in the theoretical sphere, and we can 
now see that the typic prevents these two epistemological approaches in the moral sphere as 
well. Firstly, by countenancing no more than a merely symbolic, ‘as-if’ correspondence 
between natural and moral lawfulness, Kant’s typic effectively counters those schools of 
                                                
475 See section 5.1. of the Commentary. 
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dogmatic rationalism that, in various forms – from Stoicism to Natural Law ethics to Wolffian 
perfectionism – have sought to establish a literal, ontic identity between the natural and moral 
realms.476 Secondly, if Kant is correct in asserting that the typic-procedure supplies an 
effective means for enabling everyone (even the common understanding) to perform moral 
appraisal, then this would allay the sceptical doubt that moral judgments are intrinsically 
indeterminate and unreliable.477 Moreover, his caveat that the typic provides no absolute 
theoretical knowledge of the intelligible realm (KpV 5: 70) provides no fodder for sceptical 
attacks.  
 
b) Empiricism 
 
As we have seen, moral empiricism commits two deep and unforgiveable philosophical errors 
by taking literally that which should function only symbolically.478 Firstly, it distorts moral 
appraisal by reducing the concepts of good and evil to the “experiential consequences (so-
called happiness)” that would actually come about from implementing a given maxim as a rule 
of human conduct (KpV 5: 70-1, 57ff.). Secondly, it corrupts the moral disposition by reducing 
freedom to the heteronomous, “animal” pursuit of physical pleasure in accordance with natural 
causality. In the Typic, by contrast, Kant re-construes happiness merely symbolically, i.e., as 
the merely formal type of the rational Idea of the morally good (Type3).479 Also, in the typic-
procedure, he invites the agent to consider the law of freedom only as if it were a law of 
nature. Only by remaining cognizant of these restrictions can we avoid “reckoning among 
concepts themselves that which belongs merely to the typic of concepts [was blos zur Typik 
der Begriffe gehört]” (KpV 5: 70, my emphasis). There is, however, an instructive difference 
between the ways in which the Prolegomena and the Typic assess the danger of empiricism. In 
                                                
476 Beck, Commentary, 162; H. D. Klein, "Formale und materielle Prinzipien in Kants Ethik," Kant-Studien 60 
(1969): 186; Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," 100-101; Charles Taylor, "Modern Social 
Imaginaries," in A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2007); Timmermann, 
Kant's Groundwork: A Commentary, 78-79. 
477 See Ware, "Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility", 117ff; Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," 
101. 
478 See section 5.2.1. of the Commentary. 
479 See section 5.2.2. of the Commentary. 
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the theoretical sphere, the empirical approach in and of itself is reliable, even commendable, 
its only limitation being that it does not go far enough to ultimately satisfy reason’s highest 
theoretical needs; it only becomes a danger when it categorically denies that those needs can 
ever be met in principle (P 4: 351, cf. KrV A468-473/B496-501). In the moral sphere, the 
empiricist way of thinking per se proves to be far more pernicious, as it “destroys at its root 
the morality of dispositions” and thereby “degrade[s] humanity” (KpV 5:71). Moreover, while 
the scientific mindset characteristic of theoretical empiricism will never become popular (KrV 
A472-473/B500-501), moral empiricism seduces “everyone’s way of feeling” by leaguing 
itself with our sensible inclinations (KpV 5: 71). In short, the typic’s protection against 
empiricism in the practical sphere is far more urgent. 
 
c) Mysticism 
  
To my eyes, one of the most significant and telling correspondences between symbolic 
anthropomorphism and the typic qua merely symbolic modes of representation is their 
common opposition to mysticism. In both cases, we find Kant proposing symbolic 
anthropomorphism as a way to satisfy the needs of theoretical reason while preventing it from 
“venturing beyond experience into the incomprehensible and inscrutable [zu dem 
Unbegreiflichen und Unerforschlichen]” (KrV A689/B717). In the Typic, Kant extends this 
strategy to the practical sphere, where mystical Schwärmerei threatens to rob the moral Ideas 
of both their supersensible purity as well as their normative force by turning them into 
images. 480  But the typic, precisely because it functions not schematically, but only 
symbolically, effectively counters this pseudo-schematism by providing the power of 
judgment with a rational, strictly analogical alternative that, by contrast, “takes from sensible 
nature nothing more than what pure reason can also think for itself” (KpV 5: 71). Thus the 
similarities between symbolic anthropomorphism and the typic adduced above ultimately 
crystallize, and perhaps reveal their common root, in Kant’s rationalist opposition to 
                                                
480 See Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 260; ———, Kants Leben und Lehre, 250. 
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mysticism’s detrimental tendency to “intuit or feel itself into” the intelligible realm (G 4: 
458).481  
 
5.	  Conclusion	  
 
The comparative analysis carried out in this Chapter (summarized in section 2.2. of the general 
Conclusion) appears to have borne out the hypothesis that symbolic anthropomorphism 
decisively informed the typic. Accordingly, Kant’s statement that the typic “served only as a 
symbol [nur als Symbol diente]” (KpV 5: 70) should be read adverbially, i.e., as signifying 
that, like symbolic anthropomorphism, the typic functions only, or merely, symbolically, i.e., in 
a non-absolute, non-sensible, and strictly analogical manner – unlike symbolic hypotyposis, the 
purpose of which is to provide an aesthetically lively, specific symbol in sensible intuition. 
Indeed, the typic carries the analogical procedure underlying symbolic anthropomorphism to 
an even higher level of abstraction and complexity. Ultimately, the correspondences between 
the Prolegomena and the Typic chapter have a common historical and philosophical root in 
Kant’s long-running campaign against the tendency – exemplified and exacerbated by 
mystical Schwärmerei – to make the invisible visible, i.e., to degrade supersensible Ideas into 
images. If symbolic anthropomorphism and the typic can “guard against” this tendency in their 
respective spheres, it is because these properly critical and rationalist modes of symbolic 
representation provide finite human reason with a necessary, permitted and sufficient way to 
apply the supersensible Ideas of reason without thereby denaturing them – a task that is all the 
more urgent in the practical sphere. In a word, both of these carefully designed forms of 
symbolic representation foster “the rationalism of the power of judgment [der Rationalism der 
Urtheilskraft]” (KpV 5: 71).   
                                                
481 See section 3 of the Conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
1. Summary of Part One: Commentary 
 
In the Commentary, the Typic chapter was analyzed within a framework which enabled us to 
work through the text in a systematic and continuous manner. We were able to characterize the 
task at hand, to identify the “particular difficulties,” impeding its performance, to assess a 
certain number of resources for potentially overcoming this obstacle, to present Kant’s 
solution for resolving the difficulties and accomplishing the task, and finally to assess the 
proposed solution’s particular outcome, effectiveness, and additional functions. 
 
1.1.	  Task	  	  
 
In the chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason immediately preceding the Typic, Kant 
defined two “concepts of an object of pure practical reason,” namely “the morally good [das 
sittlich Gute] and “the morally evil [das sittlich Böse],” by deriving them a priori from the 
moral law, conceived as a universal rule that commands the will to choose actions according 
to “the represesentation of a law in general and its form.” At the beginning of the Typic 
chapter, Kant explains how the application of these concepts presents the power of judgment 
with a specific task. Kant terms this task “moral appraisal [moralische Beurtheilung],” since it 
consists in appraising actions as good or evil in light of the moral law. Put in the technical 
language of Kant’s theory of judgment, the “pure practical power of judgment [die reine 
praktische Urtheilskraft]” is called upon to subsume particular actions, as cases in concreto, 
under a rule in abstracto. Moreover, moral appraisal is a specific, limited exercise of moral 
judgment: it is strictly determining, rather than reflecting; it is pure, rather than applied; and it 
concerns only finite rational agents. 
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1.2.	  Particular	  difficulties	  
	  
However, this task presents the pure practical power of judgment with “particular difficulties” 
(KpV 5: 68). The problem, at the most general level, is that the cases cannot be subsumed 
under the rule because of a mismatch between them. This mismatch turns out to be tricky to 
characterize exactly. While it presupposes a number of fundamental dichotomies in Kant’s 
system (notably natural necessity vs. freedom; ‘is’ vs. ‘ought’), it takes on a more specific and 
precise form in the Typic – a form misconstrued by many commentators. I then proposed my 
own construal of the mismatch, beginning from Kant’s remark that, in one important respect, 
the pure practical power of judgment shares “the very same difficulties” as the theoretical 
power of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason (KpV 5: 68). This remark was interpreted to 
mean that in both cases, subsumption is hindered because of the heterogeneity between two 
species of representations. But unlike the theoretical power of judgment, the pure practical 
power of judgment does not have to mediate between the pure concepts of the understanding 
and appearances in sensible intuition for the sake of experience, nor can it resort to the 
schematism. I then argued that moral appraisal creates particular difficulties for human beings 
because it provokes a conflict rooted in our particular constitution as finite rational beings. On 
the one hand, insofar as we are finite, our intuition is limited to sensibility; on the other hand, 
insofar as we possess reason, we can produce supersensible Ideas that transcend sensibility 
and can never be directly exhibited within it. In moral appraisal, we become acquainted with 
actions in the physical world through our sensible intuition, yet we represent the morally good 
and the moral law as supersensible Ideas of reason. The total mismatch between these two 
species of representation prevents the subsumption of the cases under the rule; as Kant puts it 
in the Typic, it is “absurd” to expect the supersensible Idea of the morally good to be 
presented in concreto (KpV 5: 68). This particular mismatch – between sensible intuitions and 
the supersensible Ideas of morality – constitutes the obstacle that will have to be overcome in 
order to enable moral appraisal. 
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1.3.	  Resources	  
 
The ensuing problem was to determine whether Kant’s conceptual repertoire contained any 
resources suitable for overcoming these particular difficulties and accomplishing the task.  
The first resource to assess was the transcendental schema, introduced in the Critique 
of Pure Reason as a tool for the theoretical power of judgment to use in order to overcome its 
own difficulties by mediating between the pure concepts of the understanding and sensible 
intuition. However, the schema turns out to be unsuitable for solving the particular difficulties 
faced by the practical power of judgment, for two reasons. First, as a product of the sensible 
imagination’s figurative synthesis, the schema would inevitably contaminate the supersensible 
moral Ideas with sensible content. Second, as a tool of the theoretical power of judgment, the 
schematism is unsuitable for moral appraisal: it represents actions as events that are entirely 
necessitated by natural causality, rather than as deeds that are freely caused and morally 
imputable.  
On the other hand, this assessment of the transcendental schema opens up a 
“favourable prospect” (KpV 5: 68): we should look for a representation that performs an 
analogous function to that of the schema – i.e., mediation between heterogeneous 
representations in order to enable the subsumption of cases under a rule – while avoiding the 
particular characteristics of the transcendental schema that do not fit the “particular 
difficulties” of the pure practical power of judgment. What is needed, Kant hints, is a “schema 
of a law itself,” whereby “schema” is meant in a broad, functional sense as a mediating 
representation, and “law” refers to the moral law, in particular its demand that maxims have 
the form of universal law. Accordingly, I interpreted this peculiar expression as a formula 
encapsulating four criteria that describe the right tool for overcoming the particular difficulties 
and accomplishing the task, viz. (1) a sensibly uncontaminated representation (2) of the form 
of universal lawfulness (3) that can mediate the subsumption of particular actions given in 
sensible intuition under the supersensible moral law and (4) provide a procedure for moral 
appraisal. 
Lastly, I offered a characterization of two additional resources in Kant’s system: the 
universal law of natural causality (or, simply ‘the law of nature’) and the representation of 
nature’s form, or natura formaliter spectata. Both of these representations are produced by the 
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understanding. The assessment of these resources is promising, as they are both pure, non-
sensible representations of formal lawfulness generated by intellectual synthesis.  
 
1.4.	  Solution	  
	  
Kant’s original solution for overcoming the particular difficulties and accomplishing the task 
is to employ the law of nature as the “type [Typus],” or formal analogue, of the moral law. 
This resource meets the four criteria adduced in the Resources section. The law of nature 
meets the first two criteria because, as was just shown, it is a non-sensible representation of 
the form of universal lawfulness and can therefore be analogically substituted for the 
supersensible moral law without contaminating it with sensible intuition (see also Chapter 2, 
section 4.2.). And as a law of nature, its application to all actions in the sensible world is 
assured by the schematism. In virtue of these characteristics, the law of nature – or more 
precisely, its pure form – can meet the third criterion by mediating the subsumption of actions 
in sensible intuition under the supersensible moral law despite the heterogeneity between the 
two species of representations – a process I term “typification.” The type also meets the fourth 
criterion insofar as it provides a formal standard against which to test the universalizability 
that the moral law demands of all maxims.  
Prior to elaborating on this last point, I investigated Kant’s remark that “it is also 
permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an intelligible nature” (KpV, 5: 
70). I offered an interpretation of the source, nature, and function of this second, more general 
formulation of the type (‘Type2’). Starting from the etymology of the ancient Greek word 
“túpos,” I proposed that Type2 should be conceived as the abstract form shared by natura 
archetypa and natura ectypa (in Chapter 2 I characterize this connection as a complex 
analogy). On this reading, the understanding’s purely conceptual representation of nature’s 
universal lawfulness (natura formaliter spectata) mediates between, on the one hand, reason’s 
Idea of a supersensible ‘nature’ in which all rational beings obey the law of freedom, and, on 
the other, the sensible nature in which we live and act. This provides a regulative horizon for 
moral appraisal that heeds the restrictions of Kant’s critical rationalism. Conversely, I 
contended against a number of interpretations in the secondary literature that Type2 should not 
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be characterized as a sensible image, as a teleological realm, as the intelligible world per se, or 
as a fiction. 
Moral appraisal is executed by means of what I term “the typic-procedure”: the agent 
performs a thought experiment in which she asks herself if she can both conceive and will 
herself as a part of a counterfactual nature in which the maxim of her action were a universal 
law. This is a decisive “test [Probe]” of the formal universalizability of a maxim and thereby 
of its moral possibility (KpV 5: 69). I offer an interpretation of this thought-experiment based 
on the fundamental principles of Kant’s moral philosophy, proposing that the typic-procedure 
be understood as a new way of operationalizing the “canon of moral appraisal” first introduced 
in the Groundwork (G 4: 124). 
In addition, I bring out the specificity of the typic-procedure within Kant’s moral 
philosophy. First, the typic is not just a new name for the Formula of the Law of Nature in the 
Groundwork, since it contributes new and important functions that are specific to moral 
judgment. Second, the typic-procedure does not, by itself, determine the will, but serves only 
for appraising the moral worth of actions. Third, its employment is not restricted to 
deliberation ex ante on one’s own actions: it can also be applied to one’s past actions as well 
as those of other people. Fourth, the typic-procedure should not be construed as an exercise of 
the reflective power of judgment, as several commentators have suggested, but rather as 
strictly determining.  
Finally, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the consequentialist, teleological, 
logical, and ‘rational agency’ interpretations of the Typic chapter, particularly the typic-
procedure. This assessment is carried out from an exegetical point of view: How faithful are 
these approaches to the letter and the spirit of Kant’s text?  
On the consequentialist interpretation, first proposed by Mill, the thought-experiment 
consists in evaluating one’s universalized maxim with respect to “the interest of mankind 
collectively”: If everyone acted as I propose to do, would it result in a net increase or decrease 
of happiness? However, this consequentialist model is inadequate from an exegetical point of 
view: it conflicts in principle with Kant’s rejection of what he calls the “empiricism of 
practical reason”; it fails to capture the specific kind of contradiction operative in Kant’s 
universalization test; and it involves a process of moral reasoning different from Kant’s 
account of moral appraisal.  
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The teleological interpretation, first advanced by Paton and later defended with some 
modifications by Beck and others, holds that Kant’s references in the Typic to nature and its 
laws should be understood teleologically, i.e., with reference to ends. Thus, one is to ask 
oneself whether, if one’s maxim were universalized as a law, it would harmonize with the 
cosmos conceived as a hierarchical system in which every part has its natural end. Speaking 
strongly against the teleological interpretation, however, is the fact that Kant denies a decisive 
role to ends in moral appraisal; correspondingly, both Type1 (the law of natural causality) and 
Type2 (natura formaliter spectata) are formal representations that contain no matter, i.e., 
neither ends nor teleological hierarchies.  
The proponents of the logical interpretation, most prominently Höffe, hold that a 
morally unjustifiable maxim inevitably ‘destroys itself’ when universalized because it gives 
rise to a logical or conceptual contradiction. On this view, the purpose of the typic-procedure 
consists exclusively in testing for such contradictions. While the logical interpretation offers a 
sophisticated analysis of the ‘contradiction in conception’, it misconstrues the typic-procedure 
to the extent that it equates the criterion of universality with ‘contradictionlessness’ 
(Widerspruchslosigkeit), whereas Kant in fact equates it with ‘exceptionlessness’ 
(Ausnahmslosigkeit). 
According to the rational agency interpretation championed by Rawls, the thought-
experiment tests maxims according to whether or not they could be adopted by ideal rational 
agents. Rawls proposes an elaborate reconstruction of the typic-procedure within the 
framework of his analysis of the application of the categorical imperative, which he calls “the 
four-step CI-procedure.” Although Rawls’ model represents an influential attempt to make 
Kant’s thought experiment philosophically plausible, it conflicts with Kant’s text in several 
ways. Finally, the suggestion that Kant’s thought experiment must take place against the 
backdrop of the actual laws of nature is shown to be exegetically inaccurate, but nonetheless 
illuminating to the extent that it reveals a tension in the typic-procedure between the opposite 
problems of false-negatives and false-positives.   
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1.5.	  Outcome,	  effectiveness,	  and	  additional	  functions	  
 
The final section of the Commentary begins by assessing the typic’s outcome and 
effectiveness. Kant avers that everyone, “even the most common understanding,” employs the 
typic to make accurate, even subtle, moral appraisals with relative ease (KpV 5: 70). This 
claim requires explanation, however, as the typic’s abstract and formal mechanism seems to 
conflict with Kant’s conception of the “common understanding” as uncomfortable with 
abstraction and reliant on concrete examples. First, Kant’s statements attesting the common 
understanding’s adept use of the typic-procedure are situated in the context of his more 
general esteem for the moral discernment of ordinary people – a position for which he had 
both empirical as well as a priori philosophical arguments. Second, Kant’s statement that the 
typic provides the common understanding with “an example in a case of experience” (KpV 5: 
70) was explained as a mechanism designed to trigger the common understanding’s a priori, 
unconscious representation of the law of natural causality, which in turn guides moral 
appraisal by analogy: just as the law of nature necessarily applies to each and every “case of 
experience” without exception, so must the moral law govern each and every action without 
exception. Thirdly, I show how the typic performs two heuristic functions, isolation and 
amplification, that together promote a fair, responsible and attentive frame of mind in the 
moral agent while making maxims more salient to her during moral appraisal. 
The typic also performs two additional, protective functions insofar as it “guards 
against” two dangers to morality: empiricism and mysticism. The greatest danger stems from 
the philosophical position that Kant refers to as moral “empiricism,” which holds that actions 
should be judged as good or evil according to their net positive or negative consequences on 
happiness. This is a grave error, Kant warns, as it turns moral appraisal into a self-interested, 
contentious, and uncertain estimation of probabilities, and it also corrupts people’s moral 
dispositions by subordinating them to the heteronomous ideal of happiness. The typic protects 
moral appraisal by providing an a priori rational standard – the formal universalizability of 
maxims as laws – that is independent of the messy consideration of empirical consequences. 
Furthermore, Kant outlines a strategy for transforming the principle of happiness from an 
empirical and ipso facto heteronomous goal-state into a merely formal type (‘Type3’) of the 
rational Idea of the morally good. 
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The second danger to morality is mysticism, the proponents of which claim to see or 
feel the supersensible Ideas directly with “real but non-sensible intuitions of a kingdom of 
God” (KpV 5: 71). Mysticism threatens morality in several ways: by contaminating the purity 
of the moral Ideas through a pseudo-schematization; by reducing moral appraisal to a “private 
illuminism” that lacks – and even precludes – rational, inter-subjective validity; and by 
corrupting moral motivation through the enthusiasm and fear evoked by other-worldly visions. 
The Typic counters these dangers by proposing instead a strictly analogical representation of 
the moral law by means of the pure, universal form of the law of nature – a representation that 
affords us a conceptual grasp of the supersensible moral Ideas in a way that protects their 
purity while enabling the objective, communicable and deliberate appraisal of maxims.  
In sum, the Commentary paints a picture of the typic as the instrument par excellence 
of “the rationalism of the power of judgment [der Rationalism der Urtheilskraft]” in the moral 
sphere (KpV 5: 71).  
 
2. Summary of Part Two: The typic in Kant’s theory of 
symbolic representation 
2.1.	  Chapter	  1:	  The	  typic	  and	  symbolic	  hypotyposis	  
 
Many, if not most, of the commentators who have studied the typic have assimilated it to the 
notion of “symbolic hypotyposis” presented in § 59 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
In Chapter 1, I present this interpretation in systematic manner, subject it to a critical 
examination, and argue that it is both mistaken and misguided.  
Section 1 presents a unified “symbolist interpretation” woven together from the studies 
of various commentators who have independently identified the Typic with symbolic 
hypotyposis. This exposition adopts the same analytical framework as the Commentary in 
order to facilitate comparisons between the two.  
On the symbolist interpretation, the main task to be achieved by the Typic is to give 
meaning to the abstract and formal law of morality by making it visible within our concrete 
experience and thereby applicable to our daily lives. As “image-dependent [bilderbedürftig]” 
beings (KU 5: 408), we need to find some way to connect the supersensible Idea of the moral 
 244 
law with the intuitive, aesthetic dimension of moral experience, for otherwise it will remain 
devoid of significance and otiose for moral praxis.  
The proponents of the symbolist interpretation tend to frame the ‘particular 
difficulties’ of the power of judgment in objective, ontological terms: no object in the sensible 
world can serve as an adequate counterpart to the Ideas of the moral law and the morally good, 
for these refer to objects in the intelligible world.  
The symbolists then consider what resources in Kant’s conceptual repertoire might be 
suitable for mediating the application of the moral law to sensible experience. Noting that 
Kant rules out a direct sensible presentation of the supersensible Idea by means of the 
schematism, they infer that an indirect sensible presentation is both permitted and required. 
What is needed, then, is a figurative substitute for schematization that can make the law 
visible in sensible intuition in an indirect way. 
The crux of the symbolist interpretation is the thesis that the solution must therefore be 
a process of symbolization, which consists in indirectly presenting the abstract representation 
of the moral law in the form of a concrete symbol that human beings can readily see, 
comprehend and apply. And it is the law of nature that plays this role: it provides an intuitive 
analogue, or symbol, of the moral law in sensible experience. On this reading, the type of the 
moral law is like a Biblical ‘type’ that symbolizes a theological notion, or a dramatis persona 
that symbolizes a virtue in a morality play. More specifically, the symbolists situate the typic 
in Kant’s theory of symbolic representation by claiming that typification, as an indirect, 
analogically mediated presentation of a supersensible Idea in a symbol in sensible intuition, 
corresponds to the process of symbolic hypotyposis presented in § 59 of the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment. Furthermore, the symbolists construe the typic-procedure as an 
imaginative procedure that enables moral appraisal by projecting a scene before the mind’s 
eye.  
Correspondingly, the symbolists contend that the Typic effectively satisfies the 
common understanding’s need for concreteness by providing it with a symbol that renders the 
moral law vivid, comprehensible and applicable to everyday life.  
Section 2 conducts an extensive critique of the symbolist interpretation, presenting it as 
anachronistic, inaccurate, and arbitrary. 
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I argue that the symbolists construe the task set for typic too broadly, as they fail to 
distinguish moral appraisal, an a priori exercise of the pure practical power of judgment, from 
the applied, a posteriori exercises of moral judgment that Kant treats in other contexts. The 
symbolists laid great weight on the notions that we finite human beings have a deep-seated 
need for supersensible representations to be presented in sensible intuition in order for them to 
be comprehensible to us, and more specifically, that we require an aesthetic presentation of 
moral Ideas. However, these premises are shown to be less germane to the Typic chapter than 
the symbolists maintain. 
The ontological construal of the ‘particular difficulties’, already refuted in the 
corresponding section of the Commentary, is further characterized as an attempt to suppress 
elements of the Typic that do not fit the symbolist interpretation. 
As for the resources, by assuming that the only substitute for ‘direct’ presentation 
through the schematism must be ‘indirect’ presentation through symbolic hypotyposis, the 
symbolists overlook the possibility that the typic may provide its own, specific form of 
indirect presentation – typification – that is identical neither with the schematism nor with 
symbolic hypotyposis. 
The identification of the typic with symbolic hypotyposis has major flaws. From a 
philological point of view, firstly, it is anachronistic and unsupported. A historical study of the 
corpus shows that Kant did not invent the concept of symbolic hypotyposis until two years 
after having written the Critique of Practical Reason. And contrary to what the symbolist 
interpretation would lead one to expect, Kant never refers back to the Typic in § 59 of the 
third Critique, nor in any of his subsequent treatments of symbolic hypotyposis. Secondly, I 
demonstrate through a detailed conceptual analysis demonstrates that the type is not a symbol 
in the sense of § 59, nor does typification function in the same way as symbolic hypotyposis. 
A symbol is a sensible intuition produced by the imagination: Kant refers to it as a “sensible 
image [Sinnbild]” or “analogon from sensibility” (VA Friedländer 25: 356; VA Mrongovius 
25: 1294). By contrast, the representations that Kant selects to serve as types could not be 
further removed from “sensible images”: Type1 – “the form of a law of nature in general [die 
Form eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt]” (KpV 5: 70) – and Type2 – “the understanding’s pure 
form of nature [die Natur (der reinen Verstandesform derselben nach)]” – are both pure, 
formal and abstract concepts produced by the understanding’s intellectual synthesis. Symbolic 
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hypotyposis, i.e., the process for producing symbols, which Kant characterizes in § 59 as the 
“double task [doppeltes Geschäft]” of the power of judgment (KU 5: 352-353), differs from 
the process of typification in several key respects. Symbolic hypotyposis provides a lively 
sensible presentation (Versinnlichung) of abstract concepts; it begins by producing an image in 
sensible intuition, followed by establishing an analogy; it highlights the specific causality of 
the symbol; and it is executed by the reflective power of judgment. Typification serves not to 
provide an image per se, but to mediate the application of a formal standard to particular 
instances; it begins by establishing an abstract analogy between the Idea and its type, and only 
afterwards does it schematize the type in lieu of the Idea; it operates with the most abstract and 
generic representation of natural causality, abstracting from its specific determining grounds; 
and it is executed by the determining power of judgment. Moreover, the many variants of the 
symbolist interpretation, when examined in detail, turn out to be mutually inconsistent and 
seemingly arbitrary. 
The suggestion that the typic-procedure functions as a kind of mental theatre conflicts 
with fundamental tenets of Kant’s ethics. Kant firmly opposes entrusting moral appraisal to 
the so-called “moral imagination” and the emotions evoked thereby. On the contrary, moral 
appraisal must be carried out “with moral strictness [nach moralischer Strenge],” i.e., 
according to purely rational principles (KpV 5: 154). 
Lastly, Kant’s own account of how “everyone, in fact, judges actions as good or evil” 
(KpV 5: 69) belies the symbolists’ claim that the ultimate function of the typic is to meet the 
common understanding’s need for concrete images by means of a symbol of the moral law in 
sensible experience. What Kant actually states is that the typic provides the common 
understanding with “an example in a case of experience.” But this “example [Beispiel],” is not 
a symbol; rather it is merely a nondescript concrete instance serving to cue the universal rule 
under which it falls, namely the law of natural causality. Its purpose is to trigger an abstract 
analogy between the law of nature and the moral law qua universal. In the final analysis, the 
challenge of enabling moral appraisal in the Typic chapter is not a matter of making the 
invisible visible, as the symbolists assume, but rather of judging the already visible against an 
invisible – i.e., formal, abstract and rational – standard, namely maxims’ universalizability. 
Correspondingly, the typic assists the common understanding in making the transition from 
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the concrete level at which it perceives actions to the abstract level at which it judges maxims 
in a principled manner. 
In the third and final section of the Chapter, I contend that the tendency to assimilate 
the typic with symbolic hypotyposis is not only mistaken, but misguided. Many attempts in 
this direction are motivated by a desire to aestheticize the Typic and, with it, Kant’s moral 
philosophy as a whole. But this enterprise is ill-advised even on its own terms, I argue, since 
the fixation on symbolism stems from a misappreciation of the resources offered by Kant’s 
aesthetic theory. I show that the sublime and the aesthetic idea respectively provide far more 
powerful and poetic aesthetic expressions of the moral Ideas than symbolic hypotyposis. In a 
word, the symbolists are betting on the wrong horse.  
 
2.2.	  Chapter	  2:	  The	  typic	  and	  symbolic	  anthropomorphism	  
 
Chapter 2 argues that the typic was informed by Kant’s earlier conception of symbolic 
anthropomorphism, which figures in the Conclusion to the Prolegomena (1783), entitled “On 
Determining the Boundary of Pure Reason” (P 4:350-365, (§§ 57-59).  
The first section of the Chapter presents Kant’s conception in terms of six 
characteristic features. 
1. When Kant speaks of symbolic anthropomorphism in the Prolegemena, the 
expression carries with it definite restrictions: this mode of representation is not absolute, but 
“only [nur]” or “merely [bloß]” symbolic insofar as it determines intelligible beings not as 
they are in themselves, but merely in their relation to the sensible world, and this merely by 
analogy, and with merely symbolic, “as if [als ob]” language. In this way, dogmatic 
anthropomorphism is avoided. 
2. Symbolic anthropomorphism employs analogy as a cognitive instrument for 
determining the relation between an intelligible being and the sensible world (typically, a 
causal relation). Kant’s “philosophical analogy” enables one to construe that unknown relation 
as perfectly similar to a known relation between things within the sensible world, and this 
regardless of the dissimilarity of the individual terms of the analogy, and without cognizing 
the fourth term as it is in itself. For example, God’s causal relation to the sensible world can be 
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determined by means of the analogy God : sensible world :: artisan : artifact, whereby God’s 
causality is represented teleologically. Accordingly, the model of “philosophical analogy” 
underlying symbolic anthropomorphism must be distinguished from both inductive analogies, 
based on the approximate similarity between individual things, as well as from mathematical 
analogies, based on constitutive proportions between quantities.  
3. Despite the name, “symbolic anthropomorphism” does not produce a symbol in the 
image of a human being; nor does it transfer sensible intuitions into the intelligible realm. 
4. Symbolic anthropomorphism is both permitted and required in the critical 
philosophy: we “can allow ourselves [wir erlauben uns]” (P 4: 357) to employ this mode of 
representation, and indeed “we are compelled [wir sind genöthigt]” (P 4: 357) to do so.  
5. Although the permitted use of symbolic anthropomorphism may be subject to 
certain restrictions, it is nonetheless sufficient for us and we have reason to be satisfied with it. 
When I regard the world as if it were an artifact crafted by an artisan-God, for instance, I must 
accept the fact that I do not gain any absolute knowledge of God as he may be constituted in 
himself, nor do I see an image of this being, yet I nevertheless grasp this notion “according to 
what it is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part” (P 4: 357). And it is 
only in this epistemological sense that this mode of representation is anthropomorphic. 
6. Finally, symbolic anthropomorphism fulfills several protective functions that flow 
from the previous two features: as the only possible way to accomplish the difficult feat of 
satisfying reason’s demands while still heeding the strictures of critical rationalism, symbolic 
anthropomorphism serves to discredit and ward off rival approaches, including dogmatism, 
skepticism, empiricism, and mysticism. 
Next, Kant’s treatment of symbolic anthropomorphism invited a comparison, in 
Section 2, with St. Thomas Aquinas’ influential doctrine of analogical predication. Kant’s 
“philosophical analogy” turns out to have significant continuities with Aquinas’ analogy of 
proportion, yet I suggest that Kant’s conception harks back to the model of analogy first 
proposed by Aristotle. Aquinas’ analogy of attribution, however, differs in significant respects 
from Kant’s model of analogy in the Prolegomena.  
Section 3 compares symbolic anthropomorphism as described in the Prolegomena with 
symbolic hypotyposis as described in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The two modes 
of symbolic representation are shown to have noteworthy differences. On the one hand, 
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symbolic hypotyposis is an “indirect presentation [indirekte Darstellung]” of abstract concepts, 
including Ideas of reason, by means of the “double task [doppeltes Geschäft]” of the reflecting 
power of judgment (KU 5: 351ff.). Correspondingly, the expression “symbolic hypotyposis” 
refers to the process of symbolization, while the “symbol” per se, i.e., the intuition that 
embodies the indirect presentation of a concept, is the product of this process. A key 
consequence of this distinction between process and product is that while every symbol 
necessarily presupposes an analogy, not every analogy necessarily produces a symbol. I argue 
that symbolic anthropomorphism should be understood as an abstract analogical process that 
does not produce a symbol in sensible intuition, but that instead gives us a grasp of pure, 
conceptual relations. An additional difference is that the analogical procedure underlying 
symbolic hypotyposis is more finely grained and closer to sensible intuition than the 
analogical procedure underlying symbolic anthropomorphism. This reflects the different 
purposes of these two modes of representation : symbolic hypotyposis aims to produce a vivid 
and fitting symbol of an abstract concept or Idea; symbolic anthropomorphism serves 
primarily to establish an analogy between relational concepts. Also, symbolic hypotyposis 
depends on the reflecting power of judgment, whereas symbolic anthropomorphism belongs 
only to the determining power of judgment. 
Section 4 compares symbolic anthropomorphism with the typic according to the six 
characteristic features identified in Section 1.  
1. The first sense in which the typic serves “only as a symbol” (KpV 5: 70), I suggest, 
is that it obeys the same epistemological restriction as merely symbolic anthropomorphism: 
neither of these forms of symbolic representation enable us to cognize the intelligible realm in 
an absolute way; instead, they enable us to grasp only relations pertaining to the intelligible 
world.  
2. While not mentioned explicitly, analogy – specifically, Kant’s “philosophical” 
model of analogy – plays important roles in the Typic chapter. The relevance of analogy to the 
typic has been recognized by commentators; however the secondary literature is plagued by 
considerable disagreement and confusion. I offer my own detailed analysis of the role of 
analogy in the Typic chapter.  
In the Commentary, I suggested that an analogy between the law of nature and the 
moral law qua universal underlies the common understanding’s use of the typic-procedure for 
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moral appraisal: just as the law of nature necessarily governs every event without exception, so 
must the moral law govern every action without exception; consequently, just as purported 
exceptions to the law of nature must be rejected as superstition, so must purported exceptions 
to the moral law be rejected as morally evil. 
I then formulate the analogy between the moral law and its type in a more technical 
way: just as the law of natural causality functions as an ‘exponent’ for converting empirical 
regularities into empirical laws of nature by imparting them with the strict universality of the 
supreme law of the understanding, so does the moral law function as an ‘exponent’ for 
converting maxims into practical laws by imparting them with the strict universality of the 
supreme law of pure practical reason. 
Next, I analyze a number of passages where Kant states that the law of nature’s 
constitutive, unifying relation to the form of nature (natura formaliter spectata) is analogous 
to the moral law’s constitutive, unifying relation to what Kant calls ‘supersensible’ or 
‘archetypal’ nature’ (i.e., the Idea of the intelligible realm governed by the moral law). Using 
the concept of law as an exponent, I formulate a complex analogy that also brings Type2 into 
the equation: just as the law of nature (Type1) transforms the disunited manifold of 
appearances into a system united under physical laws (natura formaliter spectata; Type2) by 
imparting it with the form of universal lawfulness (allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit), so does the 
moral law transform the disunited manifold of actions into a system united under practical 
laws, or supersensible nature, by imparting it with the form of universal lawfulness 
(allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit). This analysis shows that Type1 and Type2 are the formal 
analogues of the moral law and supersensible nature, respectively. 
In short, my analysis suggests that the typic-procedure and typification are indeed 
made possible by an analogical procedure. This analogical procedure shares key 
characteristics with the one presented in the Prolegomena, although it is considerably more 
abstract and sophisticated.  
3. Like the analogies underlying symbolic anthropomorphism, the analogies 
underlying the typic are abstract, formal, purely conceptual correspondences, devoid of 
sensible content, and they do not serve to produce a symbol in sensible intuition. 
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4. As he did for symbolic anthropomorphism, Kant legitimates the merely symbolic 
employment of the typic as both permitted and required so long as the strictures of critical 
rationalism are heeded.  
5. Just as Kant averred that symbolic anthropomorphism was sufficient for the 
purposes of theoretical reason, so, mutatis mutandis, does he maintain that the typic is 
sufficient for “the pure practical use of reason” (KpV 5:70). 
6. The comparison with symbolic anthropomorphism highlights that the typic exercises 
its protective functions against empiricism, mysticism, skepticism and dogmatism in virtue of 
its merely symbolic status.  
In sum, Chapter 2 shows that there are considerable continuities between symbolic 
anthropomorphism and the typic, suggesting that the latter can be understood as a 
sophisticated adaptation of the former, employed by Kant in order to solve a complex 
representational problem that arose at the heart of his moral philosophy. 
 
3. General conclusions on the Typic’s signif icance in 
the evolution of Kant’s thought 
 
The main value in studying the Typic chapter, as Rawls presciently remarked, is “to bring to 
life and make intelligible Kant’s characteristic and deeper ideas.”482 To conclude, I wish to 
highlight the Typic’s distinctive significance to two parallel developments Kant’s thought vis-
à-vis symbolic representation on the one hand and the relationship between the domains of 
nature and morality on the other. 
 
3.1.	  Symbolic	  representation	  
 
The first general conclusion I would like to draw, especially from Part Two, is that the typic 
constitutes a pivotal moment in the evolution of Kant’s theory of symbolic representation: on 
the one hand, it was the culmination of Kant’s reaction against metaphysical and mystical 
                                                
482 Lectures, 163-164. 
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symbolism; on the other hand, it opened the door to incorporating, in the third Critique, a 
positive, aesthetic conception of symbolism into the critical system.  
As Hans-Georg Gadamer has emphasized, the prevailing conception of symbolism 
leading up to the modern period had a “metaphysical background” and a “gnostic function”:  
It is possible to be led beyond the sensible to the divine. For the world of the senses is not 
mere nothingness and darkness but the outflowing and reflection of truth. … [T]he symbol 
… presupposes a metaphysical connection between visible and invisible. The 
inseparability of visible appearance and invisible significance, this “coincidence” of two 
spheres, underlies all forms of religious worship.483  
But contrary to what Gadamer went on to argue in Truth in Method, Kant’s theory of 
symbolism should not be construed as a natural extension of this metaphysical conception to 
the aesthetic sphere,484 but, on the contrary, as a properly rationalist and critical Überwindung 
of it. In his youth, Kant was attracted to the idea of a symbolic affinity between the visible 
heavens and their invisible, spiritual significance. For instance, in the Conclusion to his 
Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), he mused: “the view of the 
starry sky on a clear night gives one a kind of pleasure that only noble souls feel. In the 
universal stillness of nature and the calmness of the senses, the immortal spirit’s hidden 
faculty of cognition speaks an ineffable language and provides undeveloped concepts that can 
certainly be felt but not described” (ANTH 1: 366-368). Indeed, that attraction drove him to 
invest considerable money and time into reading the eight volumes of the Heavenly Mysteries 
by the mystic Emmanuel Swedenborg, who had created, on the basis of his visions, an 
elaborate system of symbolic correspondences between the visible cosmos and spirit-world.485 
But in 1766, Kant would decisively reject Swedenborg’s symbolism as the nonsensical 
products of a pathologically overheated imagination (TG 2: 339-340).486 And significantly, it 
was in his treatise Dreams of a Spirit-Seer that Kant developed his first philosophical theory 
of symbolism as a strategic “recasting [Umbesetzung],” as Petra Bahr puts it, of Swedenborg’s 
mystical symbolism with a view to deflating its hyperbolic claims about the intelligible 
                                                
483 Truth and Method, 73; Wahrheit und Methode, 79. 
484 Truth and Method, 73ff; Wahrheit und Methode, 79ff. 
485 Arcana Cœlestia, quae in Scriptura Sacra seu Verbo Domini sunt, detecta (1749-1756).  
486 See section 2.4. of Chapter 1. 
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realm.487 Similarly, Ernst Müller interprets Kant’s treatment of symbolism in Dreams as the 
first move towards his “disempowerment [Depotenzierung]” of mystical and religious 
symbolism.488 Thus, the original impetus for Kant’s reflections on symbolic representation 
came from his rejection of the mystical Verschmelzung of the visible and the invisible.   
And as the present study has shown, this anti-mystical and anti-metaphysical impetus 
continued into the critical period. In 1783, in the Prolegomena, Kant renewed his struggle 
against the exaggerated metaphysical claims of Schwärmerei with a more philosophically 
sophisticated conception of symbolic representation than in Dreams. Symbolic 
anthropomorphism follows the “noble way of analogy” in order to satisfy the needs of 
theoretical reason by giving it a conceptual purchase on the relations of intelligible beings to 
the sensible world, while preventing reason from venturing beyond experience into 
Schwärmerei. In 1788, we find Kant employing a strikingly similar strategy for combatting 
mystical Schwärmerei, this time in the practical sphere. In the Typic chapter, Kant counters 
mysticism’s deleterious and delusional tendency to “intuit or feel itself into” the intelligible 
realm (G 4: 458) with yet another strictly rationalist, deflationary form of symbolic 
representation, based on analogy. Instead of a pseudo-schematism of “the invisible Kingdom 
of God,” the typic provides the power of judgment with a merely symbolic, strictly analogical 
alternative that, by contrast, “takes from sensible nature nothing more than what pure reason 
can also think for itself, that is, conformity with law, and transfers into the supersensible 
nothing but what can, conversely, be really exhibited by actions in the sensible world in 
accordance with a formal rule of a law of nature in general” (KpV 5: 71). The typic mediates 
between supersensible Ideas and sensible intuition not by producing an image, or symbol, but 
rather by means of an abstract analogy between the form of lawfulness common to both the 
supersensible and sensible spheres. As I stressed throughout the thesis, this mediation is 
asymmetrical: it is not a matter of making the invisible visible, but of measuring the already 
visible against an invisible – i.e., formal, abstract, and rational – standard. The typic therefore 
represents a decisive dépassement of mystical symbolism in the practical sphere by “the 
rationalism of the power of judgment” (KpV 5: 71).  
                                                
487 Darstellung des Undarstellbaren, 275. 
488  "Kants Symbolbegriff," 598; Ästhetische Religiosität und Kunstreligion in den Philosophien von der 
Aufklärung bis zum Ausgang des deutschen Idealismus (Berlin: Akademie, 2004), 129-134. 
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And through this very achievement, the typic paved the way for granting symbolism a 
properly aesthetic function in the third Critique. This assertion may come as a surprise, given 
that, in Chapter 2, I emphasized the differences between typic and symbolic hypotyposis in 
order to counter the ‘symbolist interpretation’. Those differences still stand, but what I want to 
suggest here is that the typic’s relative austerity vis-à-vis symbolic hypotyposis was, 
paradoxically, a necessary precondition for the latter’s emergence in Kant’s thought. At the 
most general level, the Typic chapter prepared the ground for the theory of symbolic 
hypotyposis in the Critique of the Power of Judgment in three ways: (1) it saliently raised the 
problem of mediating between supersensible Ideas and sensible intuition; (2) it extended and 
refined the insight, already present in the Prolegomena’s theory of symbolic 
anthropomorphism, that the two could be connected in an indirect, non-schematic way; and (3) 
it threw a spotlight on the power of judgment as the faculty responsible for mediating between 
supersensible and the sensible representations and, more generally, between the domains of 
theoretical and practical reason. As is well known, all of these themes were taken up and 
investigated more extensively in the third Critique, particularly in § 59. More specifically, the 
analogical procedure deployed in the Prolegomena and in the Typic showed that symbolic 
representation need not be schwärmerisch. “Philosophical analogy” provided a means for 
grounding symbols on concepts rather than on wild inspiration, obscure feelings, or 
esotericism. Analogy could tame the imagination. And as we saw above, Kant went on to 
develop the “double task [doppeltes Geschäft]” of the power of judgment as a way to produce 
lively symbols which speak to the aesthetic dimension of humanity but which, far from being 
ineffable or esoteric, have a precise meaning that can be analyzed, spelled out and 
communicated in terms of the analogies on which they are grounded. Tellingly, Gadamer 
completely obscures this critical transformation: in his desire to frame Kant’s theory of 
symbolic hypotyposis as the link between the earlier metaphysical tradition of symbolism and 
its later revival in the aesthetics of Romanticism, he offers an inapt and misleading 
characterization of the Kantian symbol as a representation “which can be interpreted 
inexhaustibly because it is indeterminate” and which spurs “the full freedom of reflection in 
aesthetic judgment.” 489  But as was demonstrated in section 3.2.2. of Chapter 1, that 
                                                
489 Truth and Method, 74-75; Wahrheit und Methode, 81. 
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description applies not to the symbol, but to the aesthetic idea, in the production of which the 
imagination and reflection have free rein (KU 5: 316).490 What is more, the typic made 
possible the symbol par excellence, namely beauty as the symbol of the morally good. This 
symbolization, as Kant explains in § 59, is underwritten by a complex analogy between moral 
judgments and judgments of taste in terms of four features, the fourth being that both kinds of 
judgment are based on universal principles.491 And as we know, the typic was indispensable 
for showing the feasibility of making moral judgments according to a truly universal principle. 
Indeed, as Müller has argued, it was primarily this analogical correspondence between the 
universal, inter-subjective validity of moral judgments on the one hand and judgments of taste 
one the other that emboldened Kant to overcome his distrust of the imagination and to 
supplement his originally austere theory of symbolic representation with a positive, aesthetic 
function appropriate to critical rationalism.492  
 
3.2.	  The	  relation	  between	  the	  spheres	  of	  nature	  and	  morality	  	  
 
The Typic chapter also represents a decisive moment in the long evolution of Kant’s thought 
regarding the relation between the realms of nature and morality. Here we can observe a 
similar – indeed, characteristic – transition from an original mystical and metaphysical unity 
towards a properly critical and rationalist conception of two distinct realms mediated by 
means of analogy.  
In the early phases of Kant’s thought, the realms of nature and morality were deeply 
connected. Kant relates that, when he was a child, his mother simultaneously “planted and 
nourished the seed of the good” and “opened [his] heart to the impressions of nature,” thereby 
                                                
490 See also Pillow, Sublime Understanding, 83-84. 
491 “4) The subjective principle for judging of the beautiful is represented as universal, i.e., valid for everyone, 
but not as knowable by any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is also declared to be universal, 
i.e., knowable for all subjects, and at the same time also for all actions of one and the same subject, yet by means 
of a universal concept). Hence the moral judgment is also possible only by means of the grounding of its maxims 
on these principles and their universality” (KU 5: 354). 
492 "Kants Symbolbegriff," 598, 600-601. 
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instilling in him a deep affective bond between the two.493 In his first theoretical works as a 
young scholar, the vision of the grandiose scale and harmony of the natural universe provided 
by Newtonian cosmology directly inspired moral and metaphysical reflections. For example, 
he concluded his 1775 Universal Natural History with speculations that the stars and planets 
of other galaxies could eventually provide homes for our immortal souls after the death of the 
body.494 As Cassirer observes, “[t]here is no gulf here between the world of the is and the 
ought, but rather the eye roves directly from one to the other.”495  
In the Conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant once again juxtaposes the 
two realms in those famous words that have come to epitomize Kant’s philosophy and, indeed, 
the man himself: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, 
the more often and more steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the 
moral law within me” (KpV 5: 161). At first sight, this statement seems of a piece with Kant’s 
earlier speculations, a reaffirmation of an ineffable metaphysical unity between the natural and 
moral orders. But in reality, as Cassirer and Beck have both emphasized, this passage 
represents a “decisive advance,” or “marked progress,” in Kant’s philosophical 
development.496 For here, unlike in his pre-critical works, Kant clearly separates the two 
realms and warns against letting them fuse together or even overlap:   
“Admiration and respect can indeed excite to inquiry, but they cannot supply the want of 
it. … The observation of the world began from the noblest spectacle that was ever placed 
before the human sense and that our understanding can bear to follow in its vast expanse, 
and it ended in – astrology. Morals began with the noblest attribute of human nature, the 
development and cultivation of which promised infinite utility, and it ended in – 
fanaticism or superstition” (KpV 5: 162).  
                                                
493 Reported by Kant’s early biographer Jachmann, cited in Beck, Commentary, 282n. See also Kuehn, Kant: A 
Biography, 31ff. 
494 “Should the immortal soul remain forever attached to this point in space, to our Earth for the whole infinity of 
its future duration, which is not interrupted by the grave itself, but only changed? Should it never obtain a closer 
view of the remaining wonders of creation? Who knows whether it is not intended to get to know at close 
quarters those distant spheres of the universe and the excellence of their arrangements that already excite its 
curiosity from a distance? Perhaps some further spheres of the planetary system will form around them in order to 
prepare new places for us to reside in other heavens, after the completed passage of time prescribed for our stay 
here. Who knows, perhaps the satellites orbiting around Jupiter will light our way in the future?” 
495 Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 266; cf. Beck, Commentary, 282. 
496 Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 268; Beck, Commentary, 283. 
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Thus, Kant’s juxtaposition of nature and morality in the Conclusion consecrates the properly 
critical distinction between the legislative “domains” of theoretical and practical reason (cf. 
KU 5: 175-175). The historical precedents of astrology and fanaticism show that confusing the 
two legislations works to the detriment of reason. And so, from now on, critical philosophy 
must serve a protective function by separating them, as Cassirer explains:  
Only the critique of theoretical and practical reason alike can safeguard against both of 
these false paths, can prevent us from explaining the orbits of the heavenly bodies by 
spiritual powers and guiding intelligences instead of mathematically and mechanically, 
and, conversely, keep us from trying to describe in terms of sensuous images the pure 
laws of obligation and the intelligible order it opens to us. To inculcate this distinction, 
this “dualism” between Idea and experience, between the is and the ought, and to assert 
the unity of reason in and through this distinction: this can now be described as the most 
comprehensive task set by the critical system for itself.497  
The philosophical separation of the spheres of theoretical and practical reason was 
accomplished in the first two Critiques. The Critique of Pure Reason established the thorough-
going legislation of the understanding over nature: the sensible world is entirely subjected to 
the universal laws prescribed to it a priori by the understanding, under the overarching 
guidance of theoretical reason. Correspondingly, the first Critique forbade admixing human 
caprice or superstition to the empirical investigation of nature; all “evasions” from the laws of 
mathematical physics – whether through divine intervention, miracles, or even chance – “must 
cease” (KrV A165/B206, Bxiii-xiv). The Critique of Practical Reason proved, through the 
Idea of freedom, that morality belongs to the domain of practical reason, which prescribes the 
moral law unconditionally. In addition, the second Critique ensured practical reason’s 
exclusive purview over morality by condemning as heteronomous both empiricist ethics, 
which subordinates morality to the principle of happiness, as well as mystical Schwärmerei, 
which makes “God and eternity with their awful majesty stand unceasingly before our eyes,” 
thereby turning moral conduct into a “puppet show” of fear and trembling (KpV 5: 146-148). 
Crucially, Kant also took himself to have established that the two legislative domains carved 
out by the Critiques of theoretical and practical reason are independent yet still compatible: 
“For just as little as the concept of nature influences legislation through the concept of 
freedom does the latter disturb the legislation of nature” (KU 5: 175). In sum, the Conclusion 
                                                
497 Kant's Life and Thought, 268. 
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of the second Critique marks the moment when Kant definitively sloughs off his earlier 
sentimental and speculative rapprochements between the nature and morality: “All that is now 
transcended,” as Beck explains, “[t]he stark contrast between the two, not some simple 
harmony hazarded between them, gives force to their bold contexture” – and from now on, 
“all that remains of the older conception of the relation of the moral law to the natural is the 
Typic.”498  
Beck’s mention of the Typic at this precise juncture could not be more apt. Firstly, we 
have seen that, in the Typic, Kant actively guards against the perversions of the relation 
between nature and morality by empiricism and mysticism (KpV 5: 70-71). Secondly, Beck’s 
mention of the Typic complements Cassirer’s analysis by reminding us that the 
“comprehensive task set by critical philosophy for itself” involves more than these negative 
functions; it is not enough simply to make the distinction between the natural and moral 
orders, or even to safeguard in perpetuity. Kant’s “dualism between the is and the ought” can 
only remain philosophically viable if there is also some sort of bridge spanning the gulf 
between the two realms; they cannot remain completely separate, without any point of contact. 
This positive requirement is not merely speculative or architectonic; rather, it confronts us 
plainly in moral appraisal, which raises the clear, pressing need to find some way for ordinary 
people to apply ‘the law of what ought to be’ to the actions that we perform in our world, 
governed by ‘the law of what is’. And although the problem of mediating between the 
domains of theoretical and practical reason would eventually require a third Critique to be 
addressed in its full scope and complexity (KU 5: 174-176), it was in the Typic that, for the 
first time, Kant grappled with the challenge of rejoining the spheres that the Critiques of pure 
and practical reason had cloven asunder, yet without confusing them anew.  
 Mediation is therefore the main positive function of the typic, and this, in a manner 
befitting the principles critical rationalism. Mediation, for Kant, does not – and cannot – issue 
in a mystical Verschmelzung or a dialectical Aufhebung. Nor can it take the form of a 
naturalistic theory that explains morality as a natural phenomenon. Rather, the mediation 
implemented by the typic clinches the separation of nature and morality even as it forges a 
connection between them.  
                                                
498 Commentary, 282. 
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This connection, it turns out, is provided by the concepts of law (Gesetz) and 
lawfulness (Gesetzmäßigkeit), as constitutive of an ordered system, or ‘nature’ in an abstract 
sense. And it is crucial to appreciate that this concept of law is itself a distinctive product – 
indeed, a crowning achievement – of the critique of reason. On the one side, the law of nature 
is no mere generalization drawn from empirical data, rather, it is an a priori, strictly universal 
standard that “reason itself puts into nature” (KrV B xiii-xiv). On the other side, the moral law 
is not a norm handed down from a transcendent source (like the Decalogue);499 rather, it is the 
fundamental, universal, and a priori law produced as a Faktum by pure practical reason itself 
(KpV 5: 30). The critical philosophy thus reveals that both of these laws share key features: 
they are pure, universal, formal, and a priori products of reason. What is more, they are both 
laws of lawfulness; i.e., they are meta-laws, or “exponents,” each of which functions as the 
“principle of unity” that as it were ‘formats’ its respective domain into a unified, law-governed 
system. Consequently, “laws as such are the same, no matter where they derive their 
determining grounds from” (KpV 5: 70), as Kant puts it in the Typic. Correspondingly, the 
critical philosophy conceives “nature” in an abstract, formal sense that is common to the 
physical and moral spheres: “Natural (formaliter) means what follows necessarily according 
to laws of a certain order of whatever sort, hence under the moral order as well as the physical 
order” (ED 8: 333n, trans. mod.).500 And because the Critiques articulated the concepts of 
“law” and “nature” in their maximum purity and abstraction, the law of physical nature can 
then be substituted for the law of supersensible nature, as its type, in virtue of a formal analogy 
between them: just as the law of nature transforms the disunited manifold of appearances into 
a system united under physical laws (natura formaliter spectata) by imparting the manifold 
with the form of universal lawfulness (Gesetzmäßigkeit) (KrV A542/B570), so does the moral 
law transform the disunited ‘manifold’ of actions (cf. G 4: 437; KpV 5: 65) into a system 
united under practical laws, which Kant calls a supersensible or archetypal nature, by 
imparting the manifold with the form of universal lawfulness (Gesetzmäßigkeit) (KpV 5: 43). 
Thus the typic mediates between nature and morality in virtue of the quintessential result of 
                                                
499 Pace Arthur Schopenhauer, Über die Grundlage der Moral, ed. Peter Welsen, Philosophische Bibliothek 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 20. 
500 [Natürlich (formaliter) heißt, was nach Gesetzen einer gewißen Ordnung, welche es auch sei, mithin auch der 
moralischen (also nicht immer bloß der physischen) nothwendig folgt] 
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the critical method, namely that these two spheres, despite their differences, each constitute a 
kosmos, or ‘nature’, governed by rational law. And this, finally, is the touchstone of “the 
rationalism of the power of judgment” instituted and mobilized by the typic, which requires 
“nothing more than what pure reason can also think for itself, that is, conformity with law 
[nichts … als was auch reine Vernunft für sich denken kann, d.i. die Gesetzmäßigkeit]” (KpV 
5: 71). 
And although, on a philosophical level, this mediation is extremely abstract, the typic 
brings the concept of law down to earth and makes it concrete and accessible.501 For the law of 
nature is a representation that possesses “aesthetic universality,” i.e., it can be illustrated by a 
virtually infinite number of examples, any one of which cues the rule under which it falls as 
concrete instance (JL 9: 39). As a result, anyone, “even the most common understanding,” can 
easily recognize the universal principle of the universal law of physical causality in any “case 
of experience,” since, as the first Critique proved, it was the human mind that thought the law 
of nature into experience a priori. Thus, the common understanding “has the law of nature 
always at hand” (KpV 5: 70; cf. P 4: 369-370; KrV B4). And once a concrete “case of 
experience” has triggered the representation of universal physical law, “(the concept of which 
occurs even in the most common use of reason),” this representation can then be employed as 
“the type of the law of freedom” in virtue of an analogy between the two laws qua universal 
and hence ‘exceptionless’.502 Just as the law of natural causality necessarily applies to each 
and every “case of experience” without exception (KrV A542/B570), so must the moral law 
govern each and every action without exception (G 4: 421, 424). This equivalence, in turn, 
provides an analogy for guiding moral appraisal: just as “in the most ordinary judgments of 
… experience” one must reject – i.e., disbelieve – each and every purported exception to the 
law of nature as superstition, so “in cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised” 
must one reject – i.e., condemn – each and every purported exception to the moral law as 
morally unacceptable. 
The Typic chapter thus presents a view of nature and morality as distinct realms that 
can nevertheless be connected in a rational and transparent manner. Disavowed and 
                                                
501 See sections 5.1.2. and 5.1.3. of the Commentary. 
502 See Ch. 2, 4.2.  
 261 
abandoned is the metaphysical and mystical conception of the relation between nature and 
morality as an obscure, spiritual connection expressed in a secret, “ineffable language” 
accessible only to those ostensibly possessed of exceptional insight. Indeed, the Typic 
represents a decisive moment where Kant’s critical philosophy, using its own resources, 
quashes this elitist obscurantism in the practical sphere and surpasses it with a coherent, self-
sufficient model of rationality based on intelligibility and communicability. Accordingly, the 
Typic should be recognized not only as a decisive moment in Kant’s philosophical 
development, but also as an important, and characteristically Kantian, contribution to the 
project of Aufklärung.  
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 xv 
Appendix I  :  German text of the Typic chapter 
 
Von der Typik der reinen praktischen Urtheilskraft503  
(KpV 5 : 69-71)  
 
5: 67 Die Begriffe des Guten und Bösen bestimmen dem Willen zuerst ein Object. Sie stehen 
selbst aber unter einer praktischen Regel der Vernunft, welche, wenn sie reine Vernunft 
ist, den Willen a priori in Ansehung seines Gegenstandes bestimmt. Ob nun eine uns in 
der Sinnlichkeit mögliche Handlung der Fall sei, der unter der Regel stehe, oder nicht, 
dazu gehört praktische Urtheilskraft, wodurch dasjenige, was in der Regel allgemein (in 
abstracto) gesagt wurde, auf eine Handlung in concreto angewandt wird. Weil aber eine 
praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft erstlich, als praktisch, die Existenz eines Objects 
betrifft und zweitens, als praktische Regel der reinen Vernunft, Nothwendigkeit in 
Ansehung des Daseins der Handlung bei sich führt, mithin praktisches Gesetz ist und 
zwar | 
5: 68 nicht Naturgesetz durch empirische Bestimmungsgründe, sondern ein Gesetz der 
Freiheit, nach welchem der Wille unabhängig von allem Empirischen (blos durch die 
Vorstellung eines Gesetzes überhaupt und dessen Form) bestimmbar sein soll, alle 
vorkommende Fälle zu möglichen Handlungen aber nur empirisch, d.i. zur Erfahrung 
und Natur gehörig, sein können: so scheint es widersinnisch, in der Sinnenwelt einen 
Fall antreffen zu wollen, der, da er immer so fern nur unter dem Naturgesetze steht, doch 
die Anwendung eines Gesetzes der Freiheit auf sich verstatte, und auf welchen die 
übersinnliche Idee des sittlich Guten, das darin in concreto dargestellt werden soll, 
angewandt werden könne. Also ist die Urtheilskraft der reinen praktischen Vernunft 
eben denselben Schwierigkeiten unterworfen, als die der reinen theoretischen, welche 
letztere gleichwohl, aus denselben zu kommen, ein Mittel zur Hand hatte: nämlich da es 
in Ansehung des theoretischen Gebrauchs auf Anschauungen ankam, darauf reine 
Verstandesbegriffe angewandt werden könnten, dergleichen Anschauungen (obzwar nur 
von Gegenständen der Sinne) doch a priori, mithin, was die Verknüpfung des 
Mannigfaltigen in denselben betrifft, den reinen Verstandesbegriffen a priori gemäß (als 
Schemate) gegeben werden können. Hingegen ist das sittlich Gute etwas dem Objecte 
nach Übersinnliches, für das also in keiner sinnlichen Anschauung etwas 
Correspondirendes gefunden werden kann, und die Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der 
reinen praktischen Vernunft scheint daher besonderen Schwierigkeiten unterworfen zu 
                                                
503 Text from Kant im Kontext III. Werke, Briefwechsel, Nachlaß und Vorlesungen auf CD-ROM. Karsten Worm 
InfoSoftWare, Berlin, 2007. 
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sein, die darauf beruhen, daß ein Gesetz der Freiheit auf Handlungen  als Begebenheiten, 
die in der Sinnenwelt geschehen und also so fern zur Natur gehören, angewandt werden 
soll. 
Allein hier eröffnet sich doch wieder eine günstige Aussicht für die reine praktische 
Urtheilskraft. Es ist bei der Subsumtion einer mir in der Sinnenwelt möglichen 
Handlung unter einem reinen praktischen Gesetze nicht um die Möglichkeit der 
Handlung als einer Begebenheit in der Sinnenwelt zu thun; denn die gehört für die 
Beurtheilung des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft nach dem Gesetze der 
Causalität, eines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, für den sie ein Schema in der sinnlichen 
Anschauung hat. Die physische Causalität, oder die Bedingung, unter der sie stattfindet, 
gehört unter die Naturbegriffe, deren Schema transscendentale Einbildungskraft 
entwirft. Hier aber ist es nicht um das Schema eines Falles nach Gesetzen, sondern um 
das Schema (wenn dieses Wort hier schicklich ist) eines Gesetzes selbst zu thun, weil 
die Willensbestimmung  
5: 69 (nicht die Handlung in Beziehung auf ihren Erfolg) durchs Gesetz allein, ohne einen 
anderen Bestimmungsgrund, den Begriff der Causalität an ganz andere Bedingungen 
bindet, als diejenige sind, welche die Naturverknüpfung ausmachen. 
Dem Naturgesetze als Gesetze, welchem die Gegenstände sinnlicher Anschauung als 
solche unterworfen sind, muß ein Schema, d.i. ein allgemeines Verfahren der 
Einbildungskraft (den reinen Verstandesbegriff, den das Gesetz bestimmt, den Sinnen a 
priori darzustellen), correspondiren. Aber dem Gesetze der Freiheit (als einer gar nicht 
sinnlich bedingten Causalität) mithin auch dem Begriffe des unbedingt Guten kann keine 
Anschauung, mithin kein Schema zum Behuf seiner Anwendung in concreto untergelegt 
werden. Folglich hat das Sittengesetz kein anderes die Anwendung desselben auf 
Gegenstände der Natur vermittelndes Erkenntnißvermögen, als den Verstand (nicht die 
Einbildungskraft), welcher einer Idee der Vernunft nicht ein Schema der Sinnlichkeit, 
sondern ein Gesetz, aber doch ein solches, das an Gegenständen der Sinne in concreto 
dargestellt werden kann, mithin ein Naturgesetz, aber nur seiner Form nach, als Gesetz 
zum Behuf der Urtheilskraft unterlegen kann, und dieses können wir daher den Typus 
des Sittengesetzes nennen. 
Die Regel der Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist diese: 
Frage dich selbst, ob die Handlung, die du vorhast, wenn sie nach einem Gesetze der 
Natur, von der du selbst ein Theil wärest, geschehen sollte, sie du wohl als durch deinen 
Willen möglich ansehen könntest. Nach dieser Regel beurtheilt in der That jedermann 
Handlungen, ob sie sittlich gut oder böse sind. So sagt man: Wie, wenn ein jeder, | wo er 
seinen Vortheil zu schaffen glaubt, sich erlaubte, zu betrügen, oder befugt hielte, sich 
das Leben abzukürzen, so bald ihn ein völliger Überdruß desselben befällt, oder anderer 
Noth mit völliger Gleichgültigkeit ansähe, und du gehörtest mit zu einer solchen 
Ordnung der Dinge, würdest du darin wohl mit Einstimmung deines Willens sein? Nun 
weiß ein jeder wohl: daß, wenn er sich ingeheim Betrug erlaubt, darum eben nicht 
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jedermann es auch thue, oder, wenn er unbemerkt lieblos ist, nicht sofort jedermann 
auch gegen ihn es sein würde; daher ist diese Vergleichung der Maxime seiner 
Handlungen mit einem allgemeinen Naturgesetze auch nicht der Bestimmungsgrund 
seines Willens. Aber das letztere ist doch ein Typus der Beurtheilung der ersteren nach 
sittlichen Principien. Wenn die Maxime der Handlung nicht so beschaffen ist, daß sie an 
der Form eines | 
5: 70 Naturgesetzes überhaupt die Probe hält, so ist sie sittlich unmöglich. So urtheilt selbst 
der gemeinste Verstand; denn das Naturgesetz liegt allen seinen gewöhnlichsten, selbst 
den Erfahrungsurtheilen immer zum Grunde. Er hat es also jederzeit bei Hand, nur daß 
er in Fällen, wo die Causalität aus Freiheit beurtheilt werden soll, jenes Naturgesetz blos 
zum Typus eines Gesetzes der Freiheit macht, weil er, ohne etwas, was er zum Beispiele 
im Erfahrungsfalle machen könnte, bei Hand zu haben, dem Gesetze einer reinen 
praktischen Vernunft nicht den Gebrauch in der Anwendung verschaffen könnte.  
Es ist also auch erlaubt, die Natur der Sinnenwelt als Typus einer intelligibelen Natur 
zu brauchen, so lange ich nur nicht die Anschauungen, und was davon abhängig ist, auf 
diese übertrage, sondern blos die Form der Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt (deren Begriff 
auch im gemeinsten Vernunftgebrauche stattfindet, aber in keiner anderen Absicht, als 
blos zum reinen praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft a priori bestimmt erkannt werden 
kann) darauf beziehe. Denn Gesetze als solche sind so fern einerlei, sie mögen ihre 
Bestimmungsgründe hernehmen, woher sie wollen. 
Übrigens, da von allem Intelligibelen schlechterdings nichts als (vermittelst des 
moralischen Gesetzes) die Freiheit und auch diese nur, so fern sie eine von jenem 
unzertrennliche Voraussetzung ist, und ferner alle intelligibele Gegenstände, auf welche 
uns die Vernunft nach Anleitung jenes Gesetzes etwa noch führen möchte, wiederum für 
uns keine Realität weiter haben, als zum Behuf desselben Gesetzes und des Gebrauches 
der reinen praktischen Vernunft, diese aber zum Typus der Urtheilskraft die Natur (der 
reinen Verstandesform derselben nach) zu gebrauchen berechtigt und auch benöthigt ist: 
so dient die gegenwärtige Anmerkung dazu, um zu verhüten, daß, was blos zur Typik 
der Begriffe gehört, nicht zu den Begriffen selbst gezählt werde. Diese also als Typik 
der Urtheilskraft bewahrt vor dem Empirism der praktischen Vernunft, der die  
praktischen Begriffe des Guten und Bösen blos in Erfahrungsfolgen (der sogenannten 
Glückseligkeit) setzt, obzwar diese und die unendlichen nützlichen Folgen eines durch 
Selbstliebe bestimmten Willens, wenn dieser sich selbst zugleich zum allgemeinen 
Naturgesetze machte, allerdings zum ganz angemessenen Typus für das sittlich Gute 
dienen kann, aber mit diesem doch nicht einerlei ist. Eben dieselbe Typik bewahrt auch 
vor dem Mysticism der praktischen Vernunft, welcher das, was nur zum Symbol diente, 
zum Schema macht, | 
5: 71 d.i. wirkliche und doch nicht sinnliche Anschauungen (eines unsichtbaren Reichs 
Gottes) der Anwendung der moralischen Begriffe unterlegt und ins Überschwengliche 
hinausschweift. Dem Gebrauche der moralischen Begriffe ist blos der Rationalism der 
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Urtheilskraft angemessen, der von der sinnlichen Natur nichts weiter nimmt, als was 
auch reine Vernunft für sich denken kann, d.i. die Gesetzmäßigkeit, und in die 
übersinnliche nichts hineinträgt, als was umgekehrt sich durch Handlungen in der 
Sinnenwelt nach der formalen Regel eines Naturgesetzes überhaupt wirklich darstellen 
läßt. Indessen ist die Verwahrung vor dem Empirism der praktischen Vernunft viel 
wichtiger und anrathungswürdiger, weil der Mysticism sich doch noch mit der 
Reinigkeit und Erhabenheit des moralischen Gesetzes zusammen verträgt und außerdem 
es nicht eben natürlich und der gemeinen Denkungsart angemessen ist, seine 
Einbildungskraft bis zu übersinnlichen Anschauungen anzuspannen, mithin auf dieser 
Seite die Gefahr nicht so allgemein ist; da hingegen der Empirism die Sittlichkeit in 
Gesinnungen (worin doch, und nicht blos in Handlungen, der hohe Werth besteht, den 
sich die Menschheit durch sie verschaffen kann und soll) mit der Wurzel ausrottet und 
ihr ganz etwas anderes, nämlich ein empirisches Interesse, womit die Neigungen 
überhaupt unter sich Verkehr treiben, statt der Pflicht unterschiebt, überdem auch eben 
darum mit allen Neigungen, die (sie mögen einen Zuschnitt bekommen, welchen sie 
wollen), wenn sie zur Würde eines obersten praktischen Princips erhoben werden, die 
Menschheit degradiren, und da sie gleichwohl der Sinnesart aller so günstig sind, aus der 
Ursache weit gefährlicher ist als alle Schwärmerei, die niemals einen daurenden Zustand 
vieler Menschen ausmachen kann.   
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Appendix I I :  English translation of the Typic chapter 
 
On The Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment504  
(KpV 5 : 69-71) 
 
5: 67 The concepts of good and evil first determine an object for the will. They themselves, 
however, stand under a practical rule of reason which, if it is pure reason, determines 
the will a priori with respect to its object. Now, whether an action possible for us in 
sensibility is or is not a case that stands under the rule concerns the practical power of 
judgment, by which what is said in the rule universally (in abstracto) is applied to an 
action in concreto. But a practical rule of reason first, as practical, concerns the 
existence of an object, and second, as a practical rule of pure reason, brings with it 
necessity with respect to the existence of an action and is thus a practical law, | 
5: 68 not a natural law through empirical grounds of determination but a law of freedom in 
accordance with which the will is to be determinable independently of anything 
empirical (merely through the representation of a law in general and its form); 
however, all cases of possible actions that occur can only be empirical, that is, belong 
to experience and nature; hence, it seems absurd to want to find in the sensible world a 
case which, though as such it stands only under the laws of nature, yet would admit of 
the application to it of a law of freedom and to which there could be applied the 
supersensible Idea of the morally good, which is to be exhibited in it in concreto. Thus 
the power of judgment of pure practical reason is subject to the very same difficulties 
as that of pure theoretical reason, though the latter had means at hand for getting out 
of these difficulties, namely that with respect to its theoretical use it depended upon 
intuitions to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied, and such 
intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be given a priori (as schemata) 
conformably with pure concepts of the understanding. On the other hand, the morally 
good as an object is something supersensible, so that nothing corresponding to it can 
be found in any sensible intuition; and the power of judgment under laws of pure 
practical reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special difficulties having their 
source in this: that a law of freedom is to [be] applied to actions qua events that take 
place in the sensible world and so, to this extent, belong to nature.  
  But here again a favourable prospect opens for the pure practical power of 
judgment. Subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world under a pure 
practical law does not concern the possibility of the action as an event in the sensible 
world; for it belongs to the theoretical use of reason to appraise that possibility in 
                                                
504 This English version of the Typic chapter follows Mary Gregor’s translation in the Cambridge Edition, with 
my modifications indicated in bold.  
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accordance with the law of causality, a pure concept of the understanding for which 
reason has a schema in sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under 
which it takes place, belongs among [the] concepts of nature, whose schema 
transcendental imagination sketches. Here, however, we have to do not with the 
schema of a case in accordance with laws but with the schema of a law itself (if the 
word ‘schema’ is appropriate here), | 
5: 69 since the determination of the will (not the action with reference to its result) through 
the law alone without any other determining ground connects the concept of causality 
to conditions quite other than those which constitute natural connection. 
  To a natural law, as a law to which objects of sensible intuition as such are 
subject, there must correspond a schema, that is, a universal procedure of the 
imagination (by which it presents a priori to the senses the pure concept of the 
understanding which the law determines). But no intuition, and hence no schema, 
can be put under the law of freedom (as that of a causality not at all sensibly 
conditioned), nor consequently under the concept of the unconditioned good, for 
their application in concreto. Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than 
the understanding (not the imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects 
of nature, and what the understanding can put under an idea of reason is not a schema 
of sensibility but a law, such a law, however, as can be presented in concreto in objects 
of the senses and hence a law of nature, though only as to its form; this law is what the 
understanding can put under an idea of reason on behalf of the power of judgment, 
and we can, accordingly, call it the type of the moral law.  
  The rule of the power of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: 
Ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the 
nature of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible 
through your will. Everyone does, in fact, appraise actions as morally good or evil by 
this rule. Thus one says: if everyone permitted himself to deceive when he believed it 
to be to his advantage, or considered himself authorized to shorten his life as soon as 
he was thoroughly weary of it, or looked with complete indifference on the needs of 
others, and if you belonged to such an order of things, would you be in it with the 
assent of your will? Now everyone knows very well that if he permits himself to 
deceive secretly it does not follow that everyone else does so, or that if, unobserved, he 
is hard-hearted everyone would not straightaway be so toward him; accordingly, this 
comparison of the maxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is also not the 
determining ground of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type for the appraisal of 
maxims in accordance with moral principles. If the maxim of the action is not so 
constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a | 
5: 70 law of nature in general, then it is morally impossible. This is how even the most 
common understanding judges; for the law of nature always lies at the basis of its most 
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ordinary judgments,505 even those of experience. Thus it has the law of nature always 
at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised it makes 
that law of nature merely the type of a law of freedom, because without having at hand 
something which it could make an example in a case of experience, it could not 
provide use in application for the law of a pure practical reason.  
  Hence it is also permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of 
an intelligible nature, provided that I do not carry over into the latter intuitions and 
what depends on them but refer to it merely the form of lawfulness in general (the 
concept of which occurs even in the most common use of reason, although it cannot be 
determinately cognized a priori for any purpose other than merely the pure practical 
use of reason). For to this extent laws as such are the same, no matter where they 
derive their determining grounds from.  
  Furthermore, since of all the intelligible absolutely nothing is cognized except 
freedom (by means of the moral law), and even this only insofar as it is a 
presupposition inseparable from that law; and since, moreover, all intelligible objects 
to which reason might lead us under the guidance of that law have in turn no reality for 
us except on behalf of that law and of the use of pure practical reason, although reason 
is entitled and even required to use nature (in the understanding’s pure form of nature) 
as the type of judgment; the present remark will serve to prevent reckoning among 
concepts themselves that which belongs merely to the typic of concepts. This, then, as 
the typic of judgment, guards against empiricism of practical reason, which places the 
practical concepts of good and evil merely in experiential consequences (so-called 
happiness), although happiness and the endless useful consequences of a will 
determined by self-love, if this will at the same time made itself into a universal law of 
nature, can certainly serve as a quite suitable type for the morally good but is still not 
identical with it. The same typic also guards against mysticism of practical reason, 
which makes what served only as a symbol into a schema, | 
5: 71 that is, puts under the application of moral concepts real but not sensible intuitions (of 
an invisible kingdom of God) and strays into the transcendent. Only rationalism of the 
power of judgment is suitable for the use of moral concepts, since it takes from 
sensible nature nothing more than what pure reason can also think for itself, that is, 
conformity with law, and transfers into the supersensible nothing but what can, 
conversely, be really exhibited by actions in the sensible world in accordance with a 
formal rule of a law of nature in general. However, it is much more important and 
advisable to guard against empiricism of practical reason, since mysticism is still 
compatible with the purity and sublimity of the moral law and, besides, it is not natural 
and not in keeping with the common way of thinking to strain one’s imagination to 
supersensible intuitions, so that the danger from this side is not so general; empiricism, 
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on the contrary, destroys at its root the morality of dispositions (in which, and not 
merely in actions, consists the high worth that humanity can and ought to procure for 
itself through morality), and substitutes for it something quite different, namely in 
place of duty an empirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly 
leagued; and empiricism, moreover, being on this account allied with the inclinations, 
which (no matter what fashion they put on) degrade humanity when they are raised to 
the dignity of a supreme practical principle and which are, nevertheless, so favorable to 
everyone’s way of feeling, is for that reason much more dangerous than any 
enthusiasm, which can never constitute a lasting condition of any great number of 
people. 
